In this blog, we analyse the future of the relations between the EU and China in light of the State of the Union Speech (SOTUE), with particular focus on three areas: human rights and global governance, Digital and Environmental Policy.
The first State of the Union speech of President von der Leyen was by no means scarce in terms of ambitious projects for the future, including EU’s “Digital Decade”, a closer Health Union, and a new Schengen Strategy. In terms of external policy, the President has been just as ambitious, building on her plan to lead a ‘geopolitical Commission’, calling for Europe to take clear positions and quick action on global affairs, with China being in the spotlight. In this blog, we analyse the future of the relations between the EU and China in light of the State of the Union Speech (SOTUE)[1], with particular focus on three areas: human rights and global governance, Digital and Environmental Policy.
In her speech, President von der Leyen described the relations between the EU and China as “some of the most important but also most challenging”, calling China a “negotiation partner” but also an “economic competitor and systemic rival”. Providing further details about choosing the later appellative, the President argued that the EU and China promote very different systems of governance and society, letting it be understood that, unlike China, the EU believes in the universal value of democracy and human rights.
From the outset, it is important to note that the idea of adopting a European Magnitsky Act is not new. The European Parliament overwhelmingly backed such a proposal in December 2019. [2]What makes the fact that it was mentioned in the SOTUE so important is that the President has promised such legislation will be put forward in the next 12 months, explaining the necessity for such a move by making direct reference to Hong Kong and the Uyghurs, both of which are, without any doubt, very sensitive topics in the relations between the EU and China, and which the EU has addressed before, through European Parliament resolutions, one from June of this year on the “need for EU to defend Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy”[3] and one from December 2019 on the situation of the Uyghurs in China.[4] The President of the Commission stated that she sees such an act as a necessary tool to “complete the EU’s toolbox”.[5] She also expressed her desire to make certain already existing tools easier to utilise, by enabling decisions to be made through a qualified majority, at least on matters related to human rights and the implementation of sanctions.
A Magnitsky Act is a piece of legislation taking its name from a Russian tax lawyer who died in a Russian prison after having investigated alleged tax-related frauds committed by high-level Russian civil servants. Various organisations and governments claim that he was subjected to torture while in prison, having the treatment necessary for his survival refused. The first such act was adopted by the United States, giving its government the power to sanction human rights offenders, freezing their assets or banning them from entering the country. In 2016, the scope of the act has been extended, from being only Russia-focused to worldwide. Similar legislation also exists in other countries, such as Canada or the Baltic States.
Finally, the President has also addressed the rather thorny issue of internal/external coherence[6], by admitting that the EU is facing its own human rights-related challenges, naming anti-Semitism as an example. However, von der Leyen argued, the problems and criticism are discussed freely in the EU, opposition being not only accepted but legally protected.
As the White Paper on AI[7] makes clear, a human-rights, value-based vision also shapes EU’s digital strategy, not only its foreign policy agenda. During the SOTEU, the President has also addressed the issue of Artificial Intelligence and digitalisation more broadly, announcing the “digital decade” of Europe. To achieve it, she proposed a three-pronged approach: Data; Technology - in particular Artificial Intelligence-; and Infrastructure.
On all these three issues the EU is lagging behind China. In regard to access to data in particular, China has established itself as a global leader, building sophisticated data-collection systems, including Global Tone Communications Technology Co Ltd, subsidiary of a state-owned enterprise supervised directly by the Chinese government’s Central Propaganda Department.[8] China is also thriving in AI development, having a vibrant start-up environment, having also invested heavily on infrastructure. The EU is aware of its position on AI in relation to its competitors, as the Commissioner for A Europe Fit For The Digital Age emphasised at her confirmation hearing, admitting that China has access to vast amounts of data while the US has a generous budget dedicated to AI, this indeed being one of the reasons for which the President of the Commission has focused on this call for reinforced action on these issues.
On the issue of Artificial Intelligence, the President of the Commission promised legislation regulating its risks, referring in particular to the opacity of certain AI-based systems. By doing so, she has reemphasised EU’s regulatory activism in this field and its intention to promote its own brand of AI rules globally. Doing so will, however, most likely, not be welcomed by China who, although in agreement with the EU over certain rather broad goals as shown by the Beijing Principles[9] - AI should serve the humanity as a whole - has different views about practical applications of AI, one example being live facial recognition.
Data is also an issue. China is aware of the advantage is has, while the EU is committed to secure as much data as possible. In the AI White Paper, under the section International Aspects, the Commission stated that it will closely monitor the policies of third countries that limit data flows and will address undue restrictions in bilateral trade negotiations and through action in the context of the World Trade Organization. It would seem reasonable to believe that this statement was also addressed, inter alia, to China, and its data localisation rules[10], adding some further pressure to an already complicated relationship.
Among numerous areas of disagreement, von der Leyen has also identified an area on which the EU and China have common interests - environmental policy and sustainable development. She added that on this matter, China has shown itself willing to engage in high-level dialogue, but also that she expects it to follow up on its commitments undertaken through the Paris agreement and lead by example.
Indeed, the EU and China have been discussing issues related to environmental policy, in a formal and organised manner, as early as 2012, when the EU-China Environmental Sustainability Programme (ESP) was launched.[11] The environment is another area on which the EU has been showing signs of regulator activism, releasing its bold European Green Deal[12] earlier this year. Indeed, this is certainly a priority of the current Commission, as highlighted in the SOTEU and the President’s letter of intent addressed to the President of the European Parliament and the Chancellor of Germany, who currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council. China too has adopted a number of bold measures in order to deal with its high levels of pollution, such as the Great Green Wall - focused on afforestation and reforestation - and the Air Pollution Action Plan, initially released in 2013 and which led to significant improvements in air quality[13], recently announcing its goal to be carbon neutral by 2060.[14]
While it is certainly good news that there are on-going dialogues between the parties in relation to the environment, and that areas on which the two can see eye to eye can be found, the SOTEU shows a seemingly ever-increasing gap between the EU’s vision and China’s. While both can appreciate the need and value of collaboration, ways to do so on important matters seem, even more after this speech, complicated to find.
Looking at these three areas, the terms used by the President to describe China seem fitting. China is indeed a negotiating partner, and has been for a while now, considering that the launch of the EU-China strategic partnership was in 2003, with efforts made by both sides in hopes of a closer cooperation. However, any negotiations remain difficult, China being a systemic rival and a strong economic competitor - even more so in the digital age. As emphasised as President von der Leyen, the relation between the two remains one of the most important and one of the most complicated.
[1] State of the Union 2020 - President von der Leyen's speech, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/state-union-addresses/state-union-2020_en
[2] European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 on a European human rights violations sanctions regime (2019/2580(RSP) available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0215_EN.html
[3] European Parliament resolution on the PRC national security law for Hong Kong and the need for EU to protect Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, 15 June 2020, 2020/2665(RSP).
[4] European Parliament resolution of 19 December 2019 on the situation of the Uyghurs in China (China Cables) (2019/2945(RSP).
[5] State of the Union 2020 - President von der Leyen's speech, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/state-union-addresses/state-union-2020_en
[6] For a more in-depth discussion on this issue see Raube, Kolja; Marangoni, Anne-Claire; 2014. Virtue or Vice? The Coherence of the EU’s External Policies. Revue d'Intégration Européenne / Journal of European Integration; 2014; Vol. 36; iss. 5; pp. 473 - 489 and Raube, Kolja; Burnay, Matthieu; 2018. Coherence, strategy and legitimacy - variations on theme in the case of EU-China relations. Global Affairs; 2018; Vol. 4; iss. 2-3; pp. 291 - 304.
[7] European Commission, “White Paper - On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust”, COM(2020) 65 final, Brussels, 19.2.2020.
[8] Ben Doherty, China has built 'massive global data-collection ecosystem' to boost its interests, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/oct/15/china-has-built-massive-global-data-collection-ecosystem-to-boost-its-interests
[9] European Parliament, Hearing of Margrethe Vestager, 8 October 2019, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20191009RES63801/20191009RES63801.pdf
[10] For more information on this point see Global Data Review, S. Yang, China: Data Localisation, available at: https://globaldatareview.com/insight/handbook/2020/article/china-data-localisation
[11] European Commission, DGENVI, General co-operation with China, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/relations_china_en.htm
[12] Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions, The European Green Deal,
COM/2019/640 final
[13] Felix Leung, “How China Is Winning Its Battle Against Air Pollution”, available at: https://earth.org/how-china-is-winning-its-battle-against-air-pollution/
[14] See, for example, Matt McGrath, “Climate change: China aims for 'carbon neutrality by 2060', BBC, 22 September 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54256826