Three years on from the 2019 Brexit election, debate over the UK's relationship with the European Union may have abated but shows no signs of disappearing. To mark the recent anniversary of the EU's 'first enlargement' (when Denmark, Ireland, and the UK all became members), Dr Daniel Furby revisits the circumstances that enabled post-war Britain to join the European Community and considers the prospects for re-accession.
Accession to the European Community - like Brexit for today's UK - was a process and an event of historic significance and symbolism for post-war Britain. The decision to join the Community reflected profound changes in the UK's international position during the two decades after the Second World War: the end of empire and world power status, and the puncturing of illusions that the Commonwealth might serve as a substitute.
More than a decade elapsed between the UK's first membership application in August 1961 and its entry to the Community on 1 January 1973. During that period, fissures first emerged within UK political parties over the appropriate relationship between Britain and the Community - establishing a pattern of political contestation over Europe that would recur through subsequent decades.
Pro-marketeers claimed that Community membership could lead to a significant improvement in the UK's rate of economic growth, thereby arresting the post-war experience of relative economic decline. Anti-marketeers attacked those claims as optimistic and highlighted the potentially damaging balance of payments effects of entry as well as the impact on households of higher food prices.
Then, as today, proponents and opponents of membership staked out irreconcilable positions on the sovereignty implications of UK accession. Was a limited 'pooling' of sovereignty to be considered a worthwhile price for strengthening British influence and the economy, or in tension with the principles and traditions of British parliamentary democracy?
In retrospect, four factors can be seen to have been crucial in enabling post-war Britain to accede to the European Community on 1 January 1973.
1. The leaders of both main parties were committed to the principle of membership
Following the failure of the UK's first application, vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle in January 1963, the Conservatives retained a commitment to Community membership as an ultimate objective, while accepting that it was not a 'live' issue.1 That objective was given renewed emphasis following the election of Edward Heath as Conservative Party leader in July 1965.
With the decision of Harold Wilson's Labour government to apply for membership in the spring of 1967, the European Community was confronted with an apparent unity of purpose at the level of UK party leaders.2 The fact that both party leaderships supported entry (on the right terms) also meant that, if there were to be a change of government in the UK, the status of the UK's membership application should not be called into question.
And so it proved: when the Labour Party unexpectedly lost the June 1970, the Heath government inherited the Wilson government's membership application as well as its preparatory work for accession negotiations, which began less than a fortnight after the election.3
2. Full acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and all subsequent Community decisions
Closely related to the commitment to membership was full acceptance of the so-called acquis Communautaire - that is, the Community's foundational treaties as well as all subsequent legislation and decisions by Community institutions. Acceptance of the acquis was a pre-requisite to a successful outcome of the accession negotiations between 1970 and 1972. UK negotiating priorities were limited to securing acceptable arrangements for a small number of political sensitive issues - notably New Zealand butter and Caribbean sugar - as well as UK contributions to the Community budget over a transitional period.4
3. Political prioritisation of enlargement at Community level
The French vetoes on enlargement, in January 1963 and November 1967, were the principal (though not necessarily the only) obstacle to the UK joining the Community during the 1960s. However, the 1967 veto exacerbated tensions between Community member states and acted as a barrier to the Community's development in other areas.5
Following de Gaulle's resignation in April 1969, the French position began to shift. At a summit in The Hague in December 1969, the leaders of the six Community member states agreed a communique focused on three themes: 'completion' of the common market, the expansion of Community membership, and 'deepening' (i.e. the extension of Community activity into new areas).
The withdrawal of the French veto was thus a key component within a broader revitalisation of the European integration process after de Gaulle. Both the Community and the UK aimed concluding accession negotiations within 18 months - an ambitious timeframe that had the benefit of limiting the scope for unforeseen political or economic developments that might undermine the shared goal of enlargement.
4. A broad domestic coalition in support of entry
UK accession was also enabled by a broad domestic coalition that included support for entry within both main political parties (plus the Liberals) as well as business (notably the Confederation of British Industry), and significant sections of the press. Pro-market papers (by circulation size) included: the Daily Mirror, the Daily Mail, the Sun, The Times, the Guardian, and the Financial Times.6
Support for Community membership within both main parties proved decisive for the October 1971 House of Commons vote on the principle of entry. Faced with a Labour Party membership increasingly hostile to joining on 'Tory terms' as well as threats to his leadership of the party, Harold Wilson hedged: opposing accession on the terms negotiated by the Heath government and promising to 'renegotiate' when a Labour government returned to power. However, 69 Labour pro-marketeers defied the whips and voted with the Heath government to ensure a majority for membership within the House of Commons.
This broad domestic coalition would again prove important during the 1975 referendum campaign on whether the UK should remain a member of the Community.7
These four factors draw attention to the distinctive circumstances that enabled post-war Britain to join the European Community. It also affords insights into the challenges that might confront any future UK government contemplating re-accession.
The positions of the two main parties at the time of the 1970 election represents the greatest contrast with today. Then, it was clear that - whatever the outcome of the election - the next government would continue to pursue UK membership of the Community.
In 2023, the Conservatives are the party of Brexit. Labour has accepted Brexit as well as the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement as the basis of the UK's economic relationship with the EU. Even if a future Labour government were to reconsider that position, the EU institutions can be expected to remain cautious for as long as the Conservatives are opposed to EU membership.
Full acceptance of the EU acquis would also pose significant political and presentational challenges to any UK government contemplating re-joining the EU. Free movement of people is an automatic consequence of EU membership. While in practice the UK could not be compelled to join the Euro, the government would be expected to commit, as a matter of principle, to eventual membership of the single currency. The UK's former budget rebate would also no longer be available.
Re-accession would likely be a lengthy process, which might not receive the same degree of political prioritisation (at EU level) that enlargement was accorded between 1969 and 1972. A broad domestic coalition in support of entry would also be essential in order to sustain a UK membership application throughout accession negotiations and in any referendum that might follow.
The obstacles to the UK rejoining the EU, at least for the next decade, therefore appear formidable. However, it might be argued that the analysis so far has been too focused on the barriers to re-accession. Are there other insights to be garnered from the road to Community membership that might point in other directions?
One insight from the UK's relationship with European integration before accession, and indeed the history of 'Britain and Europe' more generally, is that dramatic changes in government policy can occur under the pressure of changed circumstances. In the mid-1950s, for example, any possibility that the UK might seek to join the Community appeared a distant one.8
Yet by the summer of 1961, the Macmillan government had reversed the previous direction of UK European policy by applying for membership. In 2016, it was the outcome of the referendum that transformed the Conservatives from a party that was divided over Europe, yet still committed to EU membership, into the party of Brexit.
In the 1960s and 1970s, there were also aspects of the acquis Communautaire that attracted opposition. However, the conclusion progressively reached at that time - first by political and economic elites, and subsequently in the 1975 referendum - was that those disadvantages were an acceptable price to pay for the benefits of a stronger economy and increased British influence in Europe and the world.
In spite of the many obstacles to re-accession, it cannot be excluded that a similar conclusion might (over time) be reached again - particularly if the UK economy were to perform poorly relative to its closest neighbours, and if broader geo-political trends were once again to call into question the practical value of UK relationships beyond Europe.
Daniel Furby is a Lecturer at the European Law and Governance School in Athens. He previously taught at Queen Mary, University of London, where he completed his doctorate on the United Kingdom's entry to the European Community. He has also worked as an adviser on EU affairs, including Brexit and the euro crisis, based in Brussels.