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Enlightenment and Dissent

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Editorial

This year we have the pleasure of welcoming Professor Alan P F Sell on to the Advisory Editorial Board. Professor Sell is now Professor of Christian Doctrine and Director of the Centre for the Study of British Christian Thought at the United Theological College, Aberystwyth, within the Aberystwyth and Lampeter School of Theology of the University of Wales. Previously he held the Chair of Christian Thought in the University of Calgary, and before that he was Theological Secretary of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches based at Geneva. Professor Sell has travelled extensively and among his many vocations has found time to write extensively on theological and historical themes: his recent books include *Defending and declaring the faith, some Scottish examples 1860-1920* (1987); *The philosophy of religion, 1875-1980* (1988); *A Reformed Evangelical, Catholic Theology, the contribution of The World Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1875-1983* (1991); *Dissenting thought and the life of the churches: studies in the English tradition* (1990); and *Commorations, studies in Christian thought and history* (1993). Professor Sell's arrival in Aberystwyth has been a fine accession to the study of eighteenth century thought at Aberystwyth and we look forward to working with him.

The International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (ISECS) is holding an East-West Seminar in Paris in August 1994 and is inviting young scholars to attend. The theme of the seminar will be 'The Public - Audiences, Interpretative Communities, Public Opinion and the Public Sphere'. The aim of the seminar is to promote intellectual exchanges and to establish personal contacts between scholars from East European countries and the West. Further particulars may be had from ISECS, The Voltaire Foundation, Taylor Institution, Oxford 1 3NA.

M.H.F.
D.O.T.

LATE LATITUDINARIANISM: THE CASE OF DAVID HARTLEY

Jack Fruchtman Jr.

Historians have long acknowledged David Hartley's role in the development of modern psychology and literary criticism, theological disquisition and political discourse through the twin doctrines of physico-theology and associationism.[1] The present essay poses a far different question, namely whether in addition to his accepted achievements, we may also consider Hartley (1705-57) a late Latitudinarian, 'late' defined here as the mid-eighteenth century. An affirmative answer to this question would have enormous historical appeal. It would suggest that the historical phenomenon we call Latitudinarian flourished well beyond the 1720s, the point most historians conventionally claim that it began to lose its wholly Anglican roots and thereafter gradually transformed itself into the modern idea of religious toleration. The purpose here is to demonstrate that this was in fact the case.[2]

Indeed, the central premise argued in this essay is that as a lifelong Anglican (with reservations), Hartley served as a bridge between the politically moderate Latitudinarians and the late-eighteenth century political opponents of the Pitt ministry. Those opponents were led in part by Joseph Priestley, a self-acknowledged follower of Hartley's doctrines of association and necessity. As Hartley was this bridge, we must ascribe to his presence and influence at mid-century a political and theological importance far beyond that which has already been previously acknowledged.

Educated at Cambridge, Hartley early on declined to become an Anglican churchman. Rather, he devoted himself to science and medicine. As an Anglican medical scientist with liberal theological views, he displayed many characteristics which allow us to examine his life and thought in the context of a Latitudinarian mode. Like other Latitudinarian thinkers and writers who were fascinated by scientific matters, Hartley was attracted to Newtonian theories and principles. He devoted his major work to proving how these principles were linked to religious, that is Protestant (thought not specifically Anglican), belief. His decision to enter scientific research and medical practice resulted from his discontent with some of the Thirty-Nine Articles.

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[1] See Martin Kallich, *The association of ideas and critical theory in eighteenth century England: a history of psychological method in literary criticism* (The Hague, 1970); Barbara Bowen Oberg, "David Hartley and the association of ideas", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37 (July 1976): 441-53; Basil Willey, *The eighteenth century background: studies on the idea of nature in the thought of the period* (Boston, 1961), 136-42; Jack Fruchtman Jr., *The apocalyptic politics of Richard Price and Joseph Priestley* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, Transactions, Vol.73, No.4, 1983).

[2] See John Gascoigne, 'Anglican Latitudinarianism and political radicalism in the late eighteenth century', *History*, 71 (February, 1986): 22-38, an attempt to show how late-century Anglican, liberal (or as he prefers to call them, radical) clergymen participated in the political reform movement as an expression of their 'Latitudinarian' beliefs. He does not, however, demonstrate the roots of their views in the Latitudinarian movement from the seventeenth century forward.

In his correspondence, for example, although he did not identify Article IX of the liturgy specifically, he did note that he was unable to accept the content of that Article, namely the doctrine of eternal damnation. In 1737, he wrote to his friend John Lister that he was certain that 'the goodness of God seems not to admit of eternal punishment; the goodness of man does not, and God's can only differ from man's in being infinitely more good.'[3] We cannot be certain that this was his only objection to the liturgy, but we may, with good reason, speculate that he may well have also denied the truth of the holy trinity, drawing him close to an Arian or even a Socinian outlook.[4]

He articulated a sentiment that seems suspiciously Unitarian when he stated, for example, his belief in 'the unity of the Godhead' and that 'proof of the unity is of great importance'. Moreover, he asserted that God is 'a spiritual, or immaterial Being', thus distinguishing God from the incarnate Jesus, who, Hartley also remarked, possessed an 'entire devotion to God', thus indicating a separate existence for God and Christ. Indeed, he went on, Jesus (and Moses before him) ' were endued with divine authority, that they had a commission from God to act and teach as

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[3] David Hartley to John Lister, 16 January 1737, in W B Trigg, "Correspondence of Dr David Hartley and Rev John Lister", in *Transactions of the Halifax Antiquarian Society*, (1938): 237. In 1735 he had written to his sister on the same theme. See Hartley to Mrs Booth, 2 March 1735, in Rebecca Warner, ed., *Original letters from Richard Baxter, Matthew Prior, Lord Bolingbroke...Dr Hartley, etc.* (Bath, 1817), 101-102. On this point, see Corinna Delkeskamp, "Medicine, science and moral philosophy: David Hartley's attempt at reconciliation", *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 2 (June, 1977): 164, fn.3, who believes Hartley also objected to Article XVII which has to do with predestination and the torment of the soul in hell. There is a curious twist to his stated view denying eternal punishment. In an advice letter to his son who at twenty-three in 1755 was about to undertake a European tour, Hartley advised him to read scripture and religious books along the way, lest he "perish miserably here and hereafter". Hartley to David Hartley, August 1755, in Warner, *Original Letters*, 119.

[4] Norman Sykes, *From Sheldon to Secker: aspects of English church history, 1660-1768* (Cambridge, 1958), 145-50.

they did.'[5] He thus emphasized over and over again the separate nature of God and his messenger, Jesus Christ.

But what sort of Latitudinarian may we say Hartley was? If we take Simon Patrick, the Bishop of Ely, as an early, 'orthodox' exponent of Latitudinarianism, then Patrick's suggestion in 1662 that subscription to the Thirty Nine Articles and dedication to the Crown seemed to be a foregone conclusion for the Latitude men. According to Donald Greene, 'The term 'latitudinarian' is best taken ... to mean those Anglican divines who, before 1662, tried to mediate between the Puritan and High Church wings of the Church of England and, after 1662, to bring about the reunion of the Protestant Nonconformists with the church by the (unsuccessful) attempts at comprehension in the 1670s and 1689; who supported the concessions made to the Nonconformists in the Toleration Act, 1689, and later resisted attempts such as those in the Occasional Conformity Act, 1711, and the Schism Act, 1714, to withdraw or restrict those concessions and, still later, supported the repeal, in 1719, of those two acts and efforts to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts.'[6]

Frans De Bruyn cites several Latitudinarian divines whose views reflected a broad understanding of Church doctrine. Quoting the Archbishop of Armagh, for example, Edward Fowler wrote in 1670 that 'we do not suffer any man to reject the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England at his pleasure; yet neither do we look upon them as essentials of Saving Faith, or Legacies of Christ and his Apostles; but in a mean, as pious opinions fitted for the preservation of unity: neither do we oblige any man to believe them, but only not contradict them.'[7] De Bruyn argues that the Latitudinarians focused the debate over religious practice in an 'attempt to confront and counteract the alarming erosion of ethical standards that most eighteenth-century observers professed to see in the events and personalities of their age.'[8] These liberal Anglicans were in fact aiding in moving part of the Church's ideology toward a more progressive and open outlook.[9]

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[5] David Hartley, *Observations on man, his frame, his duty, and his expectations* (London, 1749), Part II, 30-31, 170, 71. The edition used for this study is the facsimile edition by Theodore L Huguelet (Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1966), where, in quoting, I have modernized the spelling. One might note the following language when Hartley distinguished between the person of Jesus and the being of God, thus again reinforcing his Unitarian belief: "at least, one may affirm, that the condescension of Christ, in leaving the glory which he had with the Father before the foundation of the world, and in showing himself a perfect pattern of obedience to the will of God, both in doing and suffering, has a most peculiar tendency to rectify the present moral depravity of our natures, and to exalt us thereby to pure spiritual happiness." (167-68)

[6] Donald Greene, "Latitudinarianism and sensibility: the genealogy of the 'man of feeling' reconsidered", *Modern Philology*, 75 (Nov., 1977), 177.

[7] Quoted in Frans De Bruyn, "Latitudinarianism and its importance as a precursor of sensibility", *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, 80 (July, 1981), 360. Fowler's text is *The principles and practices of certain moderate divines of the Church of England (greatly mis-understood) truly represented and defended* (London, 1670).

Later in the century, at the opposite end of the spectrum from Patrick stood the signatories of the 1772 Feathers Tavern Petition when a group of Anglican ministers, among them the Unitarian Theophilus Lindsey, demanded relief from subscription. Suggestions of abandoning the Articles in exchange for a general acceptance in the inspiration of the Scripture and a rejection of the leadership provided by the Church hierarchy were presaged by Hartley's critique of Church and King in the mid-century.[10] At the same time, this critique was the prologue for Joseph Priestley's attach on Church and King after the 1770s. The scientific discoveries of Newton and Kepler contributed to the liberalizing appeal of Latitudinarianism for Hartley, his predecessors, and his successors.[11] Hartley's greatest disciple, Joseph Priestley, preferred to see Hartley as a burgeoning Unitarian, and neither Anglican nor even Latitudinarian at all.[12]

How may we respond then, to the question posed above without performing an injustice to either the Latitudinarians who preceded Hartley or Hartley himself? The answer may be found in an investigation of Hartley's ideas concerning religion as he himself linked them to science and politics. We may then assess whether these ideas are Latitudinarian in

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[8] Ibid., 365.

[9] For the view of how this progressive view may have influenced more traditional churchmen, see Gregory F Sholtz, "Anglicanism in the age of Johnson: the doctrine of conditional salvation", *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 22 (Winter, 1988-89): 182-207.

[10] Hartley, *Observations*, II, 147.

[11] Some account, though not within the scope of this essay, should be offered for his association with his Anglican (for some, theologically unorthodox) friends, Joseph Butler (Bishop of Durham), Edmund Law (Bishop of Carlisle), and William Warburton (Bishop of Gloucester). Bishop Law, "Newcastle's henchman in Cambridge university politics", despite his standing in the Church, was a major proponent of theological politics", despite his standing in the Church, was a major proponent of theological heterodoxy. Clark claims he was a closet Socinian. See J C D Clark, *English society, 1688-1832* (Cambridge, 1985), 311-12. Warburton's *Alliance* (1736) of course placed him precisely in the Erastian mode. See Norman Sykes, *Church and state in England in the xviiith century* (Cambridge, 1934), 316-26.

[12] Hartley's daughter many years later in apparent frustration wrote the following to William Gilpin: "he was by no means a dissenter, as Dr Priestley has had a mind to make the world believe." See Mary Hartley to William Gilpin, 1796, in Warner, *Original letters*, 110 and Fruchtman, *Apocalyptic politics*.

nature. The goal is in any case to indicate, from within, what Hartley intended when he crafted his magnum opus, *Observations on Man*. By inquiring into three central areas - toleration, science and politics - we may begin to understand Hartley's Latitudinarianism.

Hartley and Toleration

One principal tenet of Latitudinarian thought was that the faithful's allegiance to the Church of England was based on a broad interpretation of the liturgy. At a later time, liberal theorists and writers would develop these ideas into a theory of religious toleration. Hartley's notion of toleration was embodied in his understanding of man's *universal* physical and spiritual character. God had created all human beings equally with the same physical, universal power to acquire knowledge through the association of ideas. Man, he said, 'consists of two parts, body and mind. The first is subjected to our senses and inquiries, in the same manner as the other parts of the external material world. The last is that substance, agent, principle, etc. to which we refer the sensations, ideas, pleasures, pains and voluntary motions.'[13]

These common physical characteristics meant that all human beings have the same nerve endings, the same vibrations by which simple ideas moved to and were then embedded in the brain, and then transformed into complex ideas. Vibrations 'are excited, propagated, and kept up, partly by the aether [an obviously Newtonian idea], i.e. by a very subtle and elastic fluid, and partly by the uniformity, continuity, softness and active powers of the medullary substance of the brain, spinal marrow and nerves."[14] Using language drawn from Newtonian scientific principles, Hartley included all the ways in which human beings thought or felt about things, in short, the entire width and breadth of their thinking and sensibilities.

Men thus possessed several ways in which sensations entered their minds, some of which Hartley described as feelings and sensibilities: the lower orders, such as imagination and ambition; the higher, for example, benevolence and theopathy. The key idea is that they were universal characteristics of all men. These included the lower *and* higher orders of knowledge. Although Hartley never went this far, the logic of this argument was that even the non-Christian could find the love of God, given the right set of circumstances. 'For the perpetual exertion of a pleasing affection towards a Being infinite in power, knowledge and goodness, and who is also our friend and father, cannot but enhance all our joys, and alleviate all our sorrows; the sense of his presence and protection will restrain all actions, that are excessive, irregular, or hurtful.'[15] In this way, Hartley manufactured a view of man that by its nature was universal and hence ingrained in toleration.

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[13] Hartley, *Observations*, I, i.

[14] Ibid., 13.

Along the same line, he was convinced that at the moment of salvation every human being would experience happiness, a notion which comports with his denial of eternal damnation. In a 1735 letter he seemed so certain of this that he employed a double superlative. 'The chief result of both reason and scripture as appears to me is universal happiness in the most *absolute* sense *ultimately*.' [16] Thus, all human beings could expect this happiness in their future. If man's make-up and happiness were universal, was the acquisition of knowledge through association also universal? We now turn to a consideration of that question.

Hartley's Associationism

Hartley's associationism was related to his conception of man as a universal creation of God, a kind, benevolent Deity who granted to all human beings the same power of association. Every person possessed the power to accumulate ideas through a mechanical process whereby the mind, a wholly material entity, absorbed ideas, associated them into more complex ideas (in a Lockean epistemological manner), and thus achieved knowledge. No one set of ideas was more perfect, more universal, more eternal, more true than any other, except that of the reality of God. But man's understanding of this was always imperfect. Faith was a matter of individual choice, not one of doctrine or dogma. Faith was ground in a kind of Arminianism where God's grace, to which all men may attain, was universal and all men possessed the ability to achieve salvation through a great instauration, the achievement of knowledge.[17]

The laws of association took effect only when the mind collected empirical data through sense perceptions. The very facts that Hartley observed demonstrated, to him, at least, that empirical reality was the basis of man's associationism. The history of mankind had proved that inevitable, though incremental, progress existed in the world.[18] Hartley thus imagined man collectively developing from a state of infancy to that

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[15] Ibid., II, 309-10.

[16] Hartley to Lister, 15 November 1735, in Trigg, "Correspondence", 234 (emphasis added).

[17] For the background of this, see Nicholas Tyacke, "Puritanism, Arminianism and counter-revolution", in *The origins of the English civil war*, Conrad Russell, ed. (New York, 1973), 119-43. See also, Charles Webster, *The great instauration: science, medicine and reform, 1626-1660* (London, 1975).

[18] See Oberg, "David Hartley and the association of ideas", and Margaret Leslie, "Mysticism misunderstood: David Hartley and the idea of progress", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 33 (April, 1972), 625-32.

of adulthood. For Hartley, this was a natural phenomenon. In 1739, he wrote that 'every other thing has an origin, an ascent, a state, and a declination.' [19]

During his infancy stage, man understood nothing because he knew nothing. Like the Lockean image of early man or just-born man, having no innate ideas and a mind consisting of a *tabula rasa*, man could not have survived those early years without divine communications to teach him what to do. 'He would perish instantly, without a series of miracles to preserve, educate, and instruct him.' In this state of infancy, man's demise would have been immediate, 'with his mind a blank, void of ideas, as children now are born.' [20]

The process of association began concurrently for all men when God divinely inspired the first man, Adam, who discovered the phenomenon of language.[21] 'Adam had some language, with some instinctive knowledge, concerning the use of it, as well as concerning divine and natural things, imparted to him by God at his creation.' [22] The development of language had two practical results. It permitted men to communicate directly with God, but even more importantly in terms of his survival on earth, it initiated him into the epistemological process of association. It began with Adam 'naming the animals' to enable him to become accustomed to 'the practice of inventing, learning, and applying words.' [23] In this way, man's growth, his *universal* growth, in knowledge commenced. His experience planted in his mind those ideas which he gradually linked together through association to increase his knowledge and understanding. 'After the Fall, we may suppose, that Adam and Eve extended their language to new objects ... and this they might do sometimes by inserting new words, sometimes by giving new senses to old ones.' [24]

Once man acquired language, the process of association began in earnest. All sorts of learning, 'evil as well as good', took place. He made his own decisions and choices because even then he possessed a practical free will. As a result, his consciousness grew sharply enough that many of the things he experienced served to 'excite the forbidden curiosity.' Even with God's direct intervention in these years (God had after all warned Adam about the fruit on the Tree of Life), early man was his own final decision-maker. He alone had the ultimate responsibility to improve his lot. Many times he erred, and God looked with disfavour on some of his decisions. Thus, his actions culminated in the Fall and banishment of Cain. At the same time, man became aware of his need for greater intellectual skills. He began to widen his realm of experience and to associate more and more complex ideas and increase his knowledge. 'A man's thoughts, words and actions, are all generated by something previous; there is an established course for these things, an analogy, of which every man is a judge from what he feels in himself, and sees in others.' [25]

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[19] Hartley to Lister, 9 January 1739, in Trigg, "Correspondence", 246.

[20] Hartley, *Observations*, II, 139. See Richard H. Popkin, "Divine causality: Newton, the Newtonians, and Hume", in *Greene centennial studies: essays presented to Donald Greene in the centennial year of the University of Southern California*, Paul J Korshin and Robert R Allen, eds. (Charlottesville, 1984), 40-56, esp. 47-49; Robert Marsh, "The second part of Hartley's system", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20 (April, 1959): 264-73; and the previously cited Delkeskamp, "Medicine, science and moral philosophy", 162-76. An empiricist, like David Hume, might simply be content to rely on instinct.

[21] Hartley is not clear how this was accomplished empirically. See Hartley to Lister, in Trigg, "Correspondence", 247 on this point.

[22] Hartley, *Observations*, II, 297.

[23] Ibid., 141.

[24] Ibid., 298.

As a child learns now, so early man in his infancy acquired knowledge. In the *Observations*, Hartley demonstrated that the most important element of a child's education was the alphabet, the basic foundation for all ideas and future learning. The letters of the alphabet were akin to the 'simple sensible pleasures and pains' that human beings experienced in the daily course of their lives. Self-consciousness could not exist without language, the building blocks of all knowledge. As the child advanced in age, just as early man matured over centuries, he was able to combine the letters of the alphabet into words, phrases and sentences to formulate increasingly complex ideas. This occurred precisely like 'various associations of these ideas, and of pleasures and pains themselves.' [26] The result was the incremental, yet progressive increase in knowledge until we achieved a perfected language and 'an adequate representation of ideas, and a pure channel of conveyance for truth.' [27]

At this point, man entered into the adult stages of life, just as the child too became an adult. Until that moment, both children and early man suffered from similar intellectual disabilities. They 'often misrepresent past and future facts; their memories are fallacious; their discourse incoherent; their affections and actions disproportionate to the value of the things desired and pursued, and the connecting consciousness is in them as yet imperfect.' [28]

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[25] Ibid., 141.

[26] Ibid., I, 319.

[27] Ibid., 320.

[28] Ibid., 391. Hartley here was speaking of children alone, but his remarks apply as well to early man.

With every event that took place in the world, man's universal 'course of moral discipline' expanded and his knowledge increased. These events obviated the need for direct intervention and communication, or as Hartley put it, 'all the great events which happen in the world have the same use as the dispensations recorded in the scriptures.' And what were these events?

> The eruption of the barbarous nations into the *Roman* empire, the *Mahometan* imposture, the corruptions of the Christian religion, the ignorance and darkness which reigned for some centuries during the grossest of these corruptions, the Reformation, restoration of letters, and the invention of printing, three great contemporary events which succeeded the dark times, the rise of the enthusiastical sects since the Reformation, the vast increase and diffusion of learning in the present times, the growing extensiveness of commerce between various nations, the great prevalence of infidelity amongst both *Jews* and *Christians*, the dispersions of *Jews* and *Jesuits* into all known parts of the world, etc. etc. are all events which, however mischievous some of them may seem to human wisdom, are, *caeteris manentibus*, the most proper and effectual way of hastening the Kingdom of Christ, and renovation of all things.[29]

Having passed through these stages of history, man was now sufficiently mature to organize government in a way that crudely reflected God's attributes. This is the meaning behind Hartley's claim that, as he called him, God's 'vicegerent' on earth (the executive political leader, the magistrate) had to be self-abnegating and benevolent. These godly virtues must exist in those who ruled on God's behalf, if they were to be divine agents whose task was to hasten 'the Kingdom of Christ, and renovation of all things': to hasten, in short, the inauguration of the millennium, an event Hartley longed for, and one which was intensely desired by many Latitudinarian churchmen in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[30]

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[29] Ibid., II, 136, emphasis in the original. On the increase in knowledge, see above, note 8.

[30] Margaret C Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English revolution, 1689-1720* (Ithaca, 1976), esp. 100-42.

Hartley's Political Millennium

Hartley, of course, is best known in the history of ideas for his extension of Lockean philosophy to a physiological psychology, his doctrine of associationism.[31] Less well recognized is Hartley's use of association, specifically to attack English political corruption. In showing how (and why) he made this attack, we can perhaps better understand how his ideas were Latitudinarian.

For Hartley, political corruption was anchored in the frailties and failures of English political leadership, whose self-interest had blinded princes and magistrates to their citizenry's need to progress on an intellectual and social plane. Such progress only occurred when the collective wisdom of the populace itself increased. Knowledge, as we have seen, was a prerequisite for all political and social growth and improvement. More important, the ultimate outcome of man's intellectual growth was the inauguration of the millennial period when all corrupt practices would disappear from the earth forever.[32]

In adhering to this belief, Hartley placed himself squarely in the

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[31] David Hartley, "Conjecturae quaedam de sensu, motu, et idearum generatione", appendix to *De lithontriptico a Joanna Stephens, nuper invento dissertatio epistolaris*, second edition (Bath, 1746) and of course the previously cited *Observations*. There is a modern edition of the "Conjecturae": *Various conjectures on the perception, motion and generation of ideas*, Robert E A Palmer, tr., notes by Martin Kallich (Los Angeles: Augustan Reprint Society, nos. 77-78, 1959). For studies of Hartley generally, see Kallich, *The association of ideas and critical theory*, 11-32; Barbara Bowen Oberg, "The progress toward the perfection of man: David Hartley and the association of ideas", PhD Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1973; Willey, *The eighteenth-century background*, 136-42; and Stephen Ferg, "Two early works by David Hartley", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XIX (April, 1981): 173-89.

[32] Jacob argues that progress and Anglican millenarianism did not necessarily go together. She argues that "ideas of progress in Anglican circles during the eighteenth century owe their origin more to smugness than to a rethinking of the meaning of the millennium". Hartley, clearly, distanced himself from this idea and by extension prepared the way for Priestley's later millennialism and progressivism. See Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution*, 139.

political-millennialist tradition, especially in its English context.[33] In line with this tradition, he conceived of time and events moving in a progressive, lineal sense. Central to this process were those political changes that were to precede the millennial end of time. Prior to that moment, according to the scriptures, a series of political and natural cataclysms (the 'woes and tribuLatitons') would awaken the world to its impending doom. From their studies of *Daniel* and *ReveLatiton* chiefly, political millennialists learned of the coming upheavals in the 'world politick' (such as the fall of empires, the dissolution of governments, and the restoration of the Jews to Palestine), in the 'world natural' (such as earthquakes, flood and conflagration), and the destruction of the Antichrist. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestant historical thought, these catastrophes were associated with the destruction of the Papacy and the fall of the Turkish empire: the Pope was universally regarded as the devil incarnate (the Antichrist) and the Turks, as the current overlords of Palestine, had to be overthrown to pave the way for the Jews' return to the Holy Land.

During the mid-seventeenth century English Revolution, the more extreme millennialists formed political organizations to enhance the earthly conditions for the imminent return of Christ. The basic, cohesive principle of these organizations was that the promises God had made through his prophets were now to be fulfilled through their agency alone. Chief among these activist groups was that of the Fifth Monarchy Men, whose members were certain that they were among the Elect, the saved, and only their actions would usher in the millennium.

Hartley's position differed sharply in one important respect from the activities and ideas of these earlier visionaries. While he agreed that the millennium was to be preceded by political and natural upheavals, he argued that the historical process in which these cataclysms were to occur was contingent on man's collective development of a moral sense.[34] This moral sense, he said, 'carries us perpetually to the pure love of God, as our highest and ultimate perfection, our end, centre, and only restingplace, to which yet we can never attain.'[35] The achievement of this moral sense could only be accomplished over a very long period of time, and this was not to occur in the near future.

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[33] In addition to the Jacob work cited above, see Bernard Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men: a study in seventeenth-century millenarianism* (London, 1972), Paul Christianson, *Reformers and Babylon: English apocalyptic visions from the Reformation to the eve of the Civil War* (Toronto, 1978), Christopher Hill, *Antichrist in seventeenth-century England* (London, 1971), *idem., The world turned upside down: radical ideas during the English Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1972), William Lamont, *Godly rule: politics and religion, 1603-1660* (London, 1969), Peter Toon, ed., *Puritans and the millennium and the future of Israel* (Cambridge, 1970); Ernest L Tuveson, *Millennium and Utopia: a study in the background of the idea of progress* (Gloucester Mass., 1972).

[34] It is not clear whether the idea of the moral sense's development is rooted in Latitudinarian thought.

Most seventeenth-century millennialists thought that they themselves were to inaugurate the millennium by their actions and in their time. But not Hartley. His stable England in the mid-eighteenth century under Robert Walpole and Henry Pelham was different from the England in the frenetic years of the Puritan Revolution and its aftermath. This shift to a vision of how the millennium could be achieved through a moderate rather than a radical series of actions had already begun to take place by the second decade of the century when Latitudinarian churchmen sought to replace the saints with the established Church as the key element in the eventual triumph of the new heaven and new earth.[36]

Here Hartley distanced himself from these early-century Latitudinarians and served as that bridge to Priestley and other late-century political opponents of the established order. Hartley denied that the agency of the millennium lay with the Church. Rather, human beings had to be intellectually and spiritually prepared for the end of time. This preparation could not be left to the Church but through the mind's development by means of associations. In short, for the millennium to occur, men must be intellectually prepared for Christ's return. As the mind developed, so did man's moral sense.

The question is how was this progress actually supposed to take place. Did it require divine action or could men freely choose the course that they would take to the millennium? Here Hartley seems to have been contradictory and ambivalent. On the one hand, he argues that events occurred because God so ordained them: when he spoke in this way, he was a necessitarian, a determinist. This he himself admitted when he noted that his adoption of the doctrine of association led him directly to 'the doctrine of necessity'.[37] And yet, on the other hand, he seemed to have allocated a free will, or at least a *practical* free will, to man in decision-making. He suggested that there were certain choices that we 'must' or 'ought to' make if human intellectual progress is to proceed apace. 'We *ought* never to be satisfied with ourselves, till we arrive at perfect self-annihiLatiton, and the pure love of God', as if to suggest that we possess the innate ability to do just that.[38] In a 1739 letter to Lister, he tried to dispel this confusion:

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[35] Hartley, *Observations,* I, 497.

[36] Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution, passim.*

[37] Hartley, *Observations,* I, vi.

[38] Ibid., II, 282, emphasis added.

> All I mean to say is that all our most internal and intellectual perceptions result as much from the structure of our bodies and impressions, as the perceptions of colours do upon the structure of the eye and the operation of light... In like manner every resolution to act, and every consequent action, are as much the result of internal or external sensations as deglutition in a new-born child is of the sweetness of the milk which falls upon its tongue, or the action of vomiting is of the sickness of the stomach occasioned by the emetic. And when every action is the result either immediately or mediately of causes thus existing by the will of God, and in which we have no share, I cannot help referring all to him.[39]

The fact is that God had given man the power of association, but he [man] had no control over how it operated. Once he acquired some ideas and once the mechanical process of association was operative, his free will took over to the extent that he now possessed the power to decide what action to take on the basis of his now accumulated ideas. We may well make bad decisions (and choose to eat the forbidden fruit). But if we do, we will have to face the consequences (banishment from the Garden).

People must think for themselves, always with the view that they were progressing toward the perfection of the moral sense the height of human consciousness. Men could achieve this moral sense because they were free agents who possessed broad and growing intellectual capabilities. 'Let every man be allowed to think, speak and write freely', he wrote, 'and then the errors will combat one another, and leave truth unhurt.'[40] Man would not, however, reach this condition for a very long time 'given our present state of ignorance.'[41] In fact, their knowledge would increase so much by the end of days that 'we can form no notions at all of the great increase in knowledge, which may come in future ages and which seems promised to come in the latter happy times predicted by the prophecies.'[42]

Meantime, the mechanical operation of association helped individual men to acquire knowledge until their collective moral sense was perfected. 'The bulk of mankind are by no means so far advanced in self-annihilation, and in the love of God, and of his creatures in and through him ... to be required for the attainment of pure happiness.' Few people even in Christian countries 'know what the true religion and purity of the heart is.' [43] Man's intellectual and spiritual development was inevitable even if it were in the far off distant future. In the intervening years, men must act to assure the proper *use* of ideas so that they could accumulate and associate them. They must, in short, learn to make the right decisions. 'We ought to labour', he said, 'infinitely more after purity and perfection... We are only upon our journey through the wilderness to the land of Canaan.' [44]

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[39] Hartley to Lister, 13 May 1739, in Trigg, "Correspondence", 254. Note the medical analogy, which was characteristic of his style.

[40] Hartley, *Observations,* II, 355.

[41] Hartley, *Observations,* 497.

[42] Ibid., 316.

A major problem he now focused on was the corrupt politician's egotism and selfishness which stunted man's political and social growth. As a result, all progress toward millennial perfection was in danger of being lost. These leaders fought not merely against the social and intellectual interests of the people, but against God's cause as well. Corrupt practices were not simply wrong morally for Hartley, but evil and sinful in a cosmic sense. If England were to lead the world to salvation, as he and indeed the Latitudinarians before him believed, the only way to combat this evil was for the English citizenry to acquire knowledge. That had to be achieved through association.[45] Association became the intellectual foundation of Hartley's assault on corruption as well as the measure of man's progress toward the millennium. It was also the moral equivalent of the Latitudinarian belief in the rescue of Protestantism 'in England, in Europe, and finally in all the known world'.[46]

Hartley, Progress and the Problem of Corruption

When Hartley complained about governmental corruption, he had executive leaders in mind: kings, princes and their magistrates. He seemed to be unaware of the leaders of parliament and their role in governmental decision making. In line with this, he concluded that the only decisions that brought about good political change were those by executives.[47] In other words, change occurred without citizens participating in the legislative process: he made a distinction between the many passive and the few

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[43] Ibid., 404-5. Christian surely but not necessarily the tenets of the Anglican Church.

[44] Ibid., 418.

[45] Only Margaret Jacob tells us that the millennium for the Latitudinarians was to be a church-dominated paradise. See Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English revolution*, 100-42.

[46] Ibid., 105. Jacob argues that Whiston and other conservative Anglican churchmen were millenarians well into the eighteenth century, although she declined at that time to see a linkage between their ideas of the millennium and progress. See Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English revolution*, 133 and 139.

[47] Hartley does not use the term "executive", so far as I know, but prefers instead to speak of princes and magistrates.

active ones, which mirrored the distinction which he made on the intellectual level between being *exposed* to the associative mechanism and becoming *active* in shaping one's mind. Accordingly, he prescribed a passive role for the vast bulk of the popuLatiton. 'The things created', he said, 'must be merely *passive*, and subject entirely to the will of him who created them'.[48]

In the meantime, most people need do nothing, either politically or socially, except to live virtuously and await the coming perfection. Why did Hartley relegate a special role to executive leaders (an idea that is familiarly like the role of the Church held by those early-century Latitudin-arian millenarians)? The reason is that God had given a special role to these officials who could act in a way that created the right political atmosphere in which men's minds best developed. This development, through association, readied men for Christ's eventual return.

Executive political leaders were, then, the only exceptions to Hartley's belief in a passive citizenry. They were the ones entrusted with the organization and operation of government. Their task was to reflect, as well as they could, those same virtues that God had taught men through Jesus, namely industry, temperance and chastity, meekness and justice, generosity, devotion and resignation.

When Hartley saw that princes and their magistrates had failed to fulfil this task, this holy obligation, he provided a blistering critique of political leadership. He showed how the millennium could be hastened only by the downfall of 'all known governments of the world' because they have 'evident principles of corruption in themselves'. This decline involved more than the traditional millennial vision of final, cosmic collapse.

Corruption, already infecting all governments, would eventually tear down the cohesiveness of governmental authority and break apart all political institutions. This would happen because governments and their leaders had made a terrible mistake in exchanging 'the meek, humble, self-denying spirit of Christianity' for 'the splendor, luxury, self-interest, martial glory, etc., which pass for essentials in Christian governments'. The result was clear: ultimate dissolution of these forms of authority. Once the governments collapsed, no other regeneration in the world politick would occur. The next regeneration would be spiritual in Christ's kingdom.[49]

In the meantime, a self-denying spirit and benevolence were necessary to insulate these leaders against egotistical self-interest, always a danger even in Hartley's happy teleology. With these virtues, executives achieved the good of all and fulfilled their most important civic duty, namely 'to promote the welfare of others to the best of our power'.[50] This was a condition of true political leadership: if leaders were benevolent and self-denying, they promoted in political society the mind's development, a precondition for salvation. People could therefore develop their moral sense 'to prepare them for ultimate, unlimited happiness', for the 'reward in a future state'.[51]

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[48] Hartley, *Observations*, II, 12.

[49] Ibid., 366.

Every human being possessed the ability to associate ideas, including 'the bulk of the sinners': through association, 'it seems very repugnant to analogy to suppose, that any sinners, even the worst that ever lived, should be so ... hardened beyond the reach of all suffering, of all selfishness, hope, fear, good-will, gratitude, etc. For we are all akin in kind, and do not differ greatly in degree here'.[52] With that, Hartley reinforced his view of universal salvation, a notion tied directly to his position on all human beings' ability to associate ideas.

The virtues outlined above were important qualities that governmental authorities must possess and pass to their citizens. He wrote, 'we may at once affirm, that the principal care of a magistrate, of the father of a people is to encourage and enforce benevolence and piety'. To bring about the conditions that would motivate the public to become educated, truly benevolent, and self-denying, leaders must conscientiously fulfil two tasks. First, they must teach the citizenry 'the concerns of another world', which 'are of infinitely greater importance than any reLatiton to this'. This task meant that government must teach Christian values to all citizens. If successful, governmental leaders would assure the 'real happiness of the people', and 'the riches and power of the state' would increase.[53]

Second, these leaders must recognize their political obligations to their subjects, namely the duty to protect them, and especially to carry out their responsibility 'to set about the reformation of all matters'. Political reform was critically important. Princes and magistrates were the agents of all political change, but change required these leaders to promote the general welfare of their people, which in this context meant providing the right conditions for the mind to develop.

Into this happy state of affairs entered a danger: just as the body natural may decay if allowed to fall into neglect or dissipation, so also may the body politick 'by partial, imperfect reformations'. Surely, God is the superintendent of all that happens on earth, and man's progress toward the glorious end of time inevitable. But man may also hamper this coming perfection, just as poor Adam had made the wrong choice in accepting Eve's tantalizing offer. Political leaders must allow their citizens to learn how to abide by all Christian values just as 'temperance, labour and medicines, in some cases, are of great use in preserving and restoring health, and prolonging life'.[54] (Hartley's employment of a medical analogy, as elsewhere, is not unexpected here.)

Industry, justice and the other virtues that make up the moral sense were absolutely necessary. They were useful to political leaders because, as they transformed their corrupt states into those leading to the good and happiness of their subjects, their understanding of these Christian virtues (and that of their subjects as well) inevitably followed. Unfortunately, said Hartley, most leaders were not benevolent and self-denying. Their moral sense was highly imperfect because they were egotistical and only interested in their own welfare. They failed to seek their citizen's welfare.

As he said, self-interest 'prevails so much amongst those, to whom the administration of public affairs is committed. It seems that bodies politic are in this particular, as in many others, analogous to individuals, that they grow more selfish, as they decline'. As states become increasingly corrupted, it is unlikely they would remain on 'upright and generous principles, after so much corruption has already taken place'. Political corruption was infecting the English ministry so much that 'if evil increases much more in this country, there is reason to fear, that an independent populace may get the upper hand and overset the state'.

Hartley was very precise about the nature of this corruption, but he was frank about the possibility of citizen response. He envisioned a time when the evil reached such a peak that the government would give absolutely no regard to the public welfare. 'The wheels of government are already clogged so much' that it was increasingly difficult for virtuous leaders to conduct the ordinary affairs of state in an orderly fashion. It was now 'almost impossible to make a good law'.[55] The consequent decline of citizen respect for public authority was the tragedy of modern government and the result may potentially be revolution.

As much as he disliked corrupt government, Hartley detested civil resistance even more. The duty of 'all good Christians' was to obey the civil and ecclesiastical powers under which they were born.[56] This notion seems quite similar, in kind if not in degree, to the Anglican Latitudinarian churchmen who upheld their vision of the spiritual role of the Church and its natural ties to the State. Resistance and revolution were counterproductive to the proper, ordered development of the human mind. Resistance caused upheaval that would eventually upset the moral order of the universe. Party squabbles in England had already demonstrated that they led to the deterioration of public authority.

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[50] Ibid., I, 473.

[51] Ibid., II, 419; see also 473-74.

[52] Ibid., 425.

[53] Ibid., 305-6.

[54] Ibid., 368-9.

[55] Ibid., 448-9.

[56] Ibid., 372.

When this authority broke down, God's authority might also be challenged. Like Locke, Hartley argued that resistance must be an act of last resort when all other attempts at governmental reformation failed. Such acts were permissible 'when there is no oath of allegiance, or where that oath is plainly conditional'. Even then, the citizens must ask themselves whether they are acting from a sense of public welfare (out of the prompting of their moral sense) or from their own self-interests. 'If therefore a man can lay his hand upon his heart and fairly declare that he is not influenced by ambition, self-interest, envy, resentment, etc. but merely by tenderness and goodwill to the public, I cannot presume to say, that he is to be restrained.'

After all, in resisting the prince and then in substituting their own authority for his, the citizens claimed, in effect, that they were more benevolent than the prince and they alone could create the conditions for the mind's progress. And yet, 'these cases are so rare, that it is needless to give any rules about them'.[57] There was no guarantee the citizens were more benevolent than the prince. Thus, again echoing Locke, revolution and resistance had to be the result of a long train of abuses, and a course of action undertaken only with the greatest reluctance. In general, 'a good Christian' must 'be active in the defence of the establishment, to which he has given an oath to that purpose.[58]

The heart of the problem resided in the failure of political leadership to provide the people with a good moral education.[59] A prince must use his power of association to learn the Christian verities, especially if his moral sense is to develop properly, so that when he rules, he would 'set aside all self-regards and devote himself entirely to the promotion of religion, and the service of mankind.' Here, Hartley assumed that having the 'right' associations meant being 'properly indoctrinated', as if these associations automatically tended to drive the prince toward the public welfare. Surely princes being men themselves were neither more nor less moral than ordinary citizens. Even so, their high office literally demanded that they be different. Their duty was to provide a just, generous and benevolent government so they would in return receive their due from their subjects, namely the 'most profound reverence and entire obedience.'[60]

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[57] Ibid., 299.

[58] Ibid., 300.

[59] Ibid., 454-5.

[60] Ibid.

Such, however, was not the case in England or in any country where corrupt government flourished. Hartley thus bemoaned all contemporary leadership. Still, despite his pessimism, as a necessitarian, he took comfort in an unflagging faith that even with corrupt government the millennial glory was coming because men's minds would develop in any case. Reason, he said,

> approves of the pure and indefinite happiness of the good, and acquiesces in the indefinite punishment of the wicked. For we always seem ready to expect a state of pure holiness and happiness from the infinite perfection of the Deity; and yet the present mixture of happiness with misery, and of virtue with vice, also any future degree of vice and misery, may be reconciled to infinite perfection and benevolence, upon supposition that they be finally overpowered by their opposites: or, if we consult the dictates of the moral sense alone, without entering into the hypothesis of mechanism, the pure misery of the wicked, under certain limitations as to degree and duration, may be reconciled to the mercy of God, and will be required by his justice. But the moral sense was certainly intended to warn us concerning futurity.[61]

Men's minds through association were therefore developing into adulthood, even if their governments remained infantile.

Hartley and the Latitudinarians

Hartley's faith in progress reflected the moderate political atmosphere of England at mid-century or perhaps the legacy of the moderate Latitudinarian churchmen of the early eighteenth century. In either case, he never centred the salvation of England or the rest of the world on the actions of a few self-proclaimed saints, as had the radicals of the previous century. At the same time, he saw that God's vicegerents on earth had miserably failed in their duties toward their citizens. Governing officials could do nothing to rectify this failure. They had become hopelessly corrupted. Now it was the responsibility of the people, the community of the faithful, to prepare for the millennial kingdom to come.

In so arguing, Hartley passed to the next generation of Dissenters the foundations of a political theology which unwittingly linked that generation to the Latitudinarians of an earlier moment but which also contained the seeds of a radicalism England had not witnessed for a hundred years.[62] Like the Latitudinarians, Hartley convinced some, like Joseph Priestley, in the following generation that moral authority resided in the individual's grasp of the world and in his ability to use his reason. Only it was that generation, Priestley's generation, that was to carry these ideas further. For them, human beings had the obligation to act outside the institutional framework of both church and state, to seek reform through extra-parliamentary associations and certainly outside the Church. Those who followed Hartley became the outspoken critics of government and carried on the struggle for the mind's advance. Some, like Priestley, insisted that the mind advanced only through psychological association, and that they could endeavour to make political progress only as the mind itself progressed. In sum, they all understood, along with Hartley and the Latitudinarians of an earlier time, that time was on their side and that a bright and glorious future day would soon arrive.

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[61] Ibid., 397, and see 382-97 generally.

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[62] A point missed by Gascoigne ('Anglican Latitudinarianism and political radicalism in the late eighteenth century'), although he does show in some detail how many late-century, liberal Anglicans left the Church to join the Dissenters as Unitarians and to press for reform under that guise.

KANT AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES

Elizabeth Galbraith

Introduction

In this paper I shall be considering Kant's attitude towards two religious doctrines in particular, those of revelation and grace. I will also consider a third, evil, in so far as it relates to Kant's notion of moral conversion. In each case, my purpose will be to show that Kant has a positive attitude towards the doctrine concerned, given certain prerequisites as to the way in which it is to be understood.

Kant's Attitude Towards Revelation

Kant's attitude towards revelation is in many respects determined by his view of the shortcomings of ecclesiastical faith. Kant saw the church as endorsing the view that divine revelation was something miraculous imposed upon men from without, and as maintaining that certain religious truths were dependent upon particular historical events. In contrast to hard-line Lutheranism of this kind, Kant refused to think of God as an agent who intervenes in states of affairs, or as an object of experience. Like many other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant denied that religious truth could depend on particular historical events, and had no respect for the notion of salvation through this or that particular belief. In particular Kant objected to the view that divine revelation is beyond, and may even stand in contradiction to human reason. Luther had repudiated reason as a way of knowing God, in opposition to faith for which God is both known and unknown. It followed from this that God's revelation must be apprehended by faith, not by reason.[1] In Kant's opinion, true faith must be open to universal validity, whereas a revealed faith 'can never be universally communicated in such a way as to produce conviction.'[2] Only a rational faith can 'justly claim universal validity (*catholicismus rationalis*).'[3]

As distinct from any emphasis upon revelation Kant supports the view that:

> They who seek to become well-pleasing to him (God) not by praising Him...according to revealed concepts which not every man can have, but by a good course of life, regarding which everyone knows His will - these are they who

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[1] This contrasts with the Enlightenment view that claims to revelation are acceptable only when they are rationally justified and their contents subject to reason's judgement.

[2] I. Kant, *Religion With the Limits of Reason Alone*, transl... and intro. by Theodore M.Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. (New York, London, 1960), p.100.

[3] I. Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, transl., Mary J. Gregor (New York, 1979), pp. 87-89.

> offer Him the true veneration which He desires.[4]

This suggests that, on Kant's view, far from revelation being necessary, all that is required is a morally good life. And this is the conclusion which many theologians come to on reading what Kant has to say about revelation. However, such a conclusion is both misleading and one-sided. It will be the aim of this section to show that Kant has a positive, if not orthodox at the time of his writing, conception of revelation.

The word 'alone', sometimes alternatively translated as 'mere', in the title of Kant's main work on religion, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,* has been taken by many to indicate that Kant is writing about religion 'without the assistance' or 'aid' of supernatural revelation. They therefore assume that the *Religion* is an attempt to rule out revelation theology. But, as Allen Wood has shown in his paper "Kant's Deism",[5] the title by itself does not necessarily imply that Kant thinks that religion can exist without revelation. Kant himself , when speaking of the *Religion* says that his purpose in formulating its title was :

> to prevent a misinterpretation to the effect that the treatise dealt with religion from mere reason (without revelation). That would be claiming too much, since reason's teachings could still come from men who are supernaturally inspired. The title indicates that I indended, rather, to set forth as a coherent whole everything in the Bible - the text of the religion believed to be revealed - that can *also* be recognized by *mere* reason.[6]

It is not that the *Religion* is an attempt to rule out revelation. Rather :

> Regarding the title of this work...I note : that since, after all, *revelation* can certainly embrace the pure religion of reason, while, conversely, the second cannot include what is historical in the first, I shall be able (experimentally) to regard the first as the *wider* sphere of faith, which includes within itself the second, as a *narrower* one (not like two circles external to one another, but like

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[4] *Religion*, pp.95-6.

[5] Wood, Allen W. "Kant's Deism"- a paper given at a conference on 'Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered', at Marquette University, 1987; p.3.

[6] *Conflict*, pp.9-11.

> concentric circles).[7]

Some people might still see this claim as a cunning way of ruling out what Kant claims not to be ruling out. But, if that had been the case Kant would not have added the note about concentric circles, nor would he have made claims such as that ecclesiastical faith 'cannot be neglected, because no doctrine based on reason alone seems to the people qualified to serve as an unchangeable norm';[8] It would appear difficult, given such a comment, to maintain that Kant is attempting to rule out revelation. Far from it; Kant endorses the view that revelation may facilitate the task of reason by disclosing to it various propositions which it would eventually have discovered for itself, but only at a later date.[9] Reason may accept these revealed truths as given and devote its energies to establishing them on philosophical foundations.

However, it may still be claimed that Kant is not allowing revelation a respectable role; he is allowing it only because of certain deficiencies in human nature.[10] And there is perhaps some truth in this claim, for Kant does imply that no credit can be given to revelation unless it meets the test of reason, ie. can be rationally interpreted in order to meet the requirements of moral faith:

> If such an empirical faith.....is to be united with the basis of a moral faith..... an exposition of the revelation which has come into our hands is required, that is, a thorough-going interpretation of it in a sense agreeing with the universal practical rules of a religion of pure reason.[11]

What will be conclusive for our appraisal of Kant's attitude towards revelation is whether or not the exposition suggested above is seen to be successful in Kant's eyes. It therefore seems appropriate now to turn to a detailed examination of Kant's exposition of revelation, in order to see whether or not it is successful.

It is at the opening of Book Four, Part One of the *Religion*,[12] that Kant begins to outline various attitudes towards revelation:

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[7] *Religion*, Preface to the Second Edition of 1794, p.11.

[8] *Religion*, p.103, see also p.94.

[9] *Religion*, pp.143-4.

[10] *Conflict*, p.17 : Kant says that 'revelation is useful in making up the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has'.

[11] *Religion*, p.100.

[12] *Religion*, p.143.

A religion in which my knowledge of something as a duty depends on my knowledge of it as a divine command is a *revealed* religion, whereas a religion in which my knowledge of something as a divine command depends on my knowledge of it as a duty is a *natural* religion. Someone who holds that natural religion alone is morally necessary, Kant calls a 'rationalist'. A rationalist may either believe that there is a revealed religion, or deny that there is. A rationalist who denies the reality of all supernatural revelation is a *naturalist*, whereas one who accepts the reality of such revelation (while regarding it as unnecessary) is a *pure rationalist*. Someone who not only believes in revealed religion but also holds it to be morally necessary is a *pure super-naturalist*.

Wood has suggested that Kant's position is a rationalist one,[13] and he gives the following reasons to support this view : Kant is committed to denying pure supernaturalism which affirms that a revealed religion is morally necessary. But it is equally clear that Kant is not a naturalist : he insists that it would transcend the limits of human insight to claim that supernatural revelation has not occurred.[14]

According to Wood, Kant is a rationalist because he is an agnostic about supernatural revelation. For instance, he questions whether one could ever have adequate grounds for claiming the authenticity of any putative revelation :

> If God should actually speak to man, man could still never *know* that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for man to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and *recognize* it as such.[15]

Kant's position, then, is that there may be such a thing as supernatural revelation, but if there is, no human being can ever know that there is, and no particular claim to supernatural revelation can ever be deserving of our rational assent. For that very reason, belief in supernatural revelation cannot be required of us as a duty: for it would be a duty which one could fulfil only by holding a belief which no human being could ever be justified in holding.

Although Wood is on the whole correct about Kant's attitude towards revelation, it is important to note that Kant does not quite fit into any of the positions outlined by Wood. Wood suggests that a rationalist can either believe in, or deny supernatural revelation, and he goes on to say that Kant is a rationalist. But in fact, Kant will not go so far as to say either that he believes in, or that he denies supernatural revelation. So, we need to make room for the rationalist who is an agnostic with regard to supernatural revelation. Given this further possibility, Kant's attitude towards revelation now appears as follows: he will not rule out the possibility of supernatural revelation, but he will not adopt it as an essential aspect of the religion of reason. This marks Kant's divergence from the traditional stance, which requires a belief in revelation as one of the essential tenets of faith. Yet, quite remarkably, in *The Conflict of the Faculties* Kant goes on to say that Christianity, as he understands it, adopts the same position as he does with regard to revelation:

> Only a religion that makes it a principle not to admit supernatural revelation can be called *naturalistic*. So Christianity is not a naturalistic religion - though it is a merely natural one because it does not deny that the Bible may be a supernatural means for introducing religion and that a church may be established to teach and profess it publicly : it simply takes no notice of this source where religious doctrine is concerned.[16]

Admittedly, this is a rather unusual interpretation of Christianity, and Kant's critics would still argue that the position outlined above does not reveal a positive attitude towards revelation, but rather, as has already been stated, an agnostic stance. And, so far as the above is concerned it would be pointless to deny this. But, there are certain statements in the *Religion* which suggest that Kant does have a positive attitude towards revelation. At one point he says that 'though each obeys the (non-statutory) law which he prescribes to himself, he must at the same time regard this law as the will of a World-Ruler, *revealed to him through reason,*'[17] and that 'the pure religion of reason is a continually occurring divine (though not empirical) *revelation for all men.*' [18] These statements, far from suggesting a negative attitude towards revelation, seem to be making explicit appeal to divine revelation. But, we are now faced with the question of whether claims such as these can be reconciled with the interpretation of Kant's agnostic position offered above. Fortunately they can, and it is in the remaining section of Wood's outline of Kant's position that we can see how this is possible.[19]

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[13] Wood, "Kant's Deism". p.13ff.

[14] *Religion*, p.143.

[15] *Conflict*, p.115.

[16] *Conflict*, pp.77-79.

[17] *Religion*, p.112.

[18] *Religion*, p.113.

[19] Wood, "Kant's Deism", p.23ff.

Kant provides a way of securing revealed religion, or at least parts of it. For he holds that supernatural, empirical or external revelation, revelation through scriptures or extraordinary experiences, is not the only kind, or even the most important kind:

> Revelation is either *external* or *inward.* An external revelation can be of two kinds : either (1) through works, or (2) through words. Inward divine revelation is God's revelation to us through our own reason. It must precede all other revelation and serve as a judge of external revelation. It has to be the touchstone by which I know whether an external revelation is really from *God*; and it must give me proper concepts of him.[20]

Kant identifies inward revelation with our pure rational concept of God as a most real being, and with our knowledge of our moral duties, since these can be represented as divine commands, and thus go to make up our concept of God.[21] We are justified in regarding all rational knowledge of God as an instance of revelation because it hardly makes sense to suppose that we might acquire any knowledge of God whatever except through revelation. Any knowledge we might acquire about God would have to depend on the decision of such a being to reveal himself to us. Kant is convinced that 'the concept of God, and the conviction of his *existence* can be met with only in reason; they can come from reason alone, and not from inspiration or from any tidings, however great their authority.' [22] It would appear then, that the touchstone of permissible belief about God is inward revelation.

Inward relevation also serves as the judge concerning alleged external revelation;[23] and given that the concept of God revealed is a moral one, Kant goes so far as to maintain that 'even though something is represented as commanded by God, through a direct manifestation of Him, yet, if it flatly contradicts morality, it cannot, despite all appearances, be of God.[24]

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[20] Kant, I. *Lectures on Philosophical Theology,* transl... Allen W.Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca and London, 1978), p.160.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Kant, I. *What is Orientation in Thinking"* in Lewis W Beck *The Critique of Practical Reason and other Writings in Moral Philosophy.* (New York, 1976), p.301.

[23] *Religion,* p.100.

[24] *Religion,* pp.81-2.

So, it would appear that inward revelation takes precedence over and is properly used to judge external revelation. Yet, although it is epistemically dependent and secondary, external revelation has a certain value, for:

> An external divine revelation can be an occasion for man to come for the first time to pure concepts of God which are pure concepts of the understanding; and it can also give him the opportunity to search for these concepts.[25]

Given the above it is clear that even if Kant was unsympathetic towards, and at most agnostic about empirical revelation, he did have a positive conception of inward revelation, through reason.[26] This distinction is similar to the traditional distinction between general and special revelation. Thus, when Kant spoke of the outer circle, he was not ruling out the possibility of including what amounts to revelation in the inner, or general sense. And to those who may try to argue that Kant's belief in inward revelation pre-dates the *Religion* , and therefore may have been cast off later, I would like to offer the following sub-section which is based on a work which appeared after the *Religion,* as a witness to Kant's belief in inward revelation.

The Bible as revelation in the Conflict of the Faculties

On page 81 of the *Conflict of the Faculties* Kant begins a section in which he treats the Bible as divine revelation. Speaking of the Bible as divine, Kant says that 'the mark of its divinity ...is its harmony with what reason pronounces worthy of God.[27] Bible is divine in so far as its contents are in harmony with the moral concept of God which has been inwardly revealed to us in our reason. But, one might ask, in what way the Bible corresponds to inward divine revelation in human reason. According to Kant, 'we must regard the credentials of the Bible as drawn from the pure spring of universal rational religion dwelling in every ordinary man.[28] That is, the Bible is testimony to the predisposition to the moral religion which lays hidden in the human reason of all men, including those who first put this disposition into words in the writing of the Bible. It is for this reason that the teaching of the Bible contains 'a faith which our reason can develop out of itself'.[29]

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[25] *Lectures on Philosophical Theology,* p. 161.

[26] This interpretation is not to be confused with that of Locke. Although Locke maintained that nothing contrary to reason can be accepted as divine revelation, his view of the kind of reason at work in such matters is quite different from Kant's. In Locke's opinion the kind of reason used to judge divine revelation is intuitive reasoning, or inferential understanding. By contrast, the reason Kant associates with divine revelation is practical, or moral reasoning. According to Locke, if a revelation is contrary to clear intuitive reasoning, or knowledge, then it is unacceptable. For Kant, if a supposed revelation does not meet with our moral concept of God and God's will, then it is unacceptable. In fact Locke would be an example of the kind of theoretical approach not only to revelation, but to theology in general that Kant rejects. Kant certainly would not agree with Locke that we have demonstrative knowledge of God's existence. Another interesting distinction regards Kant's claim that revelation actually takes place through our reason, whereas Locke had only maintained that the validity of a supposed revelation must be tested by reason. Locke's view allows for the possibility that revelation might be received by means other than reason, such as faith's reception of truths 'above reason', or, that a particular revelation might disclose truths which unaided reason could not discover. And there would be no problem with this so long as the truths disclosed did not violate the canons of reason. With Kant the supposed revelation of truths 'above reason' would not be possible. Revelation must be both received through and tested by human practical reason.

It is the fact that the Bible has the power to nourish and nurture pure moral religion, rather than its historical status, which makes it a work of divine revelation:

> No historical account can verify the divine origin of such a writing. The proof can be derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the heart... and we must explain it as such, so that we do not attribute the Bible's existence *sceptically* to mere accident or *superstitiously* to a *miracle*, both of which would cause reason to run aground.[30]

Kant seems to be implying that the Bible tells us what our inner conscience also tells us is required of us in order to be worthy of God. And if this is the case, then it must, as must our inward revelation, be considered as divine. Its divinity is testified to by the fact of the widespread influence it has had upon moral beings:

> The Bible contains within itself a credential of its (moral) divinity that is sufficient for practical purposes - the influence that, as the text of a systematic doctrine of faith, it has always exercised on the hearts of men....This is sufficient reason for preserving it, not only as the organ of universal inner rational religion, but also as the legacy (new testament) of a statutory doctrine of faith which will serve us indefinitely as a guiding line.[31]

But, of course, the objection will be raised at this point that Kant is putting human reason before God, that it is human reason itself that is divine. I could see the force of this claim, if Kant had not himself warned against such an interpretation. For, in a note to page 119 of the *Conflict of the Faculties* Kant quite specifically says that the teaching of the Bible is in the Bible because it is from God, not from God because it is in the Bible.

Admittedly, Kant may be unorthodox in his view that if the teaching were from God because it is in the Bible, then that would be presupposing the divine authority of the book, before the divinity of its doctrine, and this would be a moral outrage. But, his divergence from orthodoxy on this point does not alter the fact that on his view the moral content of the Bible is in the Bible because it is the revelation of the moral author himself, and not vice versa, as many exponents of Kant's moral theory have suggested. It is not that Kant is trying to make reason divine, but rather that in Kant's opinion it is only by reason, not by empirical, contingent fact, that we can recognise the divinity of a teaching:

> for since we cannot understand anyone unless he speaks to us through our own understanding and reason, it is only by concepts of *our* reason, in so far as they are pure moral concepts and hence infallible, that we can recognize the divinity of a teaching promulgated to us.[32]

There is then, evidence to suggest that for Kant, the moral component of the Bible is in a sense a revelation of God:

> If a people has been taught to revere a sacred Scripture, the doctrinal interpretation of that Scripture, which looks to the people's moral interest - its edification, moral improvement, and hence salvation - is also the authentic one with regard to its religion : in other words this is how God wants this people to understand 'His will as revealed in the Bible'.[33]

Given the above, it is easier to understand why for Kant the Bible reveals no other than the truths of reason, when he claims that the testimony of Scripture and the teachings of a sermon should be taken as examples 'in which the truth of reason's practical principles is made more perceptible through their application to facts of sacred history',[34] because reason in itself is a divine revelation. For, if the moral law as revealed to our reason is divine, then the moral content of the Bible, which conforms to our conception of the moral law, as put down by its writers is also divine. Therefore in the same way that Kant accepted internal, or general as distinct from external, or special revelation, so here it may be argued, he accepted the Bible as divine revelation in so far as it corresponds to internal revelation.

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[27] *Conflict*, p.81.

[28] Ibid; p.115. It is in passages such as this that we can identify the strong influence Kant's work exercised upon Hegel's early theological writings.

[29] Ibid; p.107

[30] Ibid., p.117

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid; p.85.

[33] Ibid; p.123. See also, same page : 'The God Who speaks through our own (morally practical) reason is an infallible interpreter of His words in the Scriptures, Whom everyone can understand'.

Nor is this interpretation of Kant pure hypothesis. Kant himself gives us the grounds for this interpretation by printing as an appendix to the section on the Bible as revelation, a letter by one Carol Arnold Wilmans, who enclosed it with his dissertation.[35] In the letter Wilmans claims that in a group of people called separatists, but calling themselves mystics, he found the teachings of Kant put into practice. They lived entirely without public worship, and repudiated all 'divine service' that did not consist in fulfilling one's duties. They considered themselves Christians, though they took as their code, not the Bible, but only the precepts of an inward Christianity dwelling in them from eternity. He found in them a pure moral attitude of will and an almost Stoic consistency in their actions. What is most important however, is Wilmans' claim that:

> I examined their teachings and principles and recognized the essentials of your (Kant's) entire moral and religious doctrine, though with this difference : that they consider the inner law, as they call it, an inward revelation and so regard God as definitely the author.[36]

Kant surely also takes the inner, moral law to be an inward revelation and so, in total agreement with these people, regards God as the author. To interpret it as such is to fit entirely with what he has just said in his own section on the Bible as divine revelation.

Wilmans continues that these people regarded the Bible as a book which in some way or other - they did not discuss it further - was of divine origin; but they inferred the divine origin of the Bible from the consistency of the doctrine it contains with their inner law. If one asked their reason, they replied 'the Bible is validated in my heart, as you will find it in yours if you obey the precepts of your inner law or the teachings

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[34] Ibid., p.127.

[35] *Conflict*, p.127 : "De similitudine inter Mysticismum purum et Kantianam religionis doctrinam" (Bielefalda- Guestphalo, Halis Saxonum 1797).

[36] Ibid.

of the Bible'.[37] For the same reason they did not regard the Bible as their code of laws but only as a historical confirmation in which they recognized what was originally grounded in themselves. This also coheres with Kant's claim that the Bible is consistent with what human reason reveals to us, and is validated by the influence it has on men's hearts.

There can be no other reason for Kant to include this letter, if not to point out that the position of these people with regard to the inner law considered as an inward revelation, is no different from the position of Kant himself.

By way of conclusion concerning Kant's attitude towards revelation, and the fact that it is positive in the sense outlined above, it is also interesting to note Mary J. Gregor's comment in her introduction to the *Conflict of the Faculties*, where she says that Kant simply thinks that he can perform the experiment of beginning with some allegedly divine revelation and examining it, as a historical system, in the light of moral concepts, 'to see whether it does not lead back to the very same pure rational system of religion.' From Kant's point of view the experiment was successful.[38] It was successful in so far as Kant claimed to have established Christianity's credentials 'as divine revelation in the only way this can be established, by demonstrating its consistency with pure moral religion.'[39]

Kant's Attitude Towards Grace

As with revelation, so with grace, Kant's position is very much determined by his divergence from the traditional Lutheran conception. The traditional view held that grace is something which invades the will from outside. God's grace is a gift and is received by man through faith alone, not by human merit. Lutheranism also insisted on man's complete dependence upon God's assistance in order to perform good actions. We can see this in the Lutheran claim that 'man of himself can do no good'. But if we are to take this view to its logical conclusion, it implies that, if a person performs a good action, no matter how objectively good that action may be, he himself does not deserve any moral commendation for it, since he is impelled to do it by the grace of God.[40] Consequently, every human deed that is not morally evil is in fact morally indifferent , since it is caused by something external to the agent.

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[37] Ibid.

[38] *Conflict*, p.xiii.

[39] Ibid.

[40] It is important to note Kant's distinction between actions done in conformity with morality and actions of moral worth. An action might be done in conformity with morality, but for the wrong reason, such as from a motive of self-interest. If this is the case, then however right or amiable the action may be, it has no moral worth. In Kant's opinion, only actions performed purely for the sake of duty have moral value. Therefore, there is nothing morally commendable in performing moral acts if the acts are not done for the sake of morality. Cf. Immanuel Kant,*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, transl... H.J.Paton (Harper and Row, 1964), p.65-6.

It is important to recognize the threat that this conception of grace posed to Kant's moral theory. If the will is not independent of external forces, then on Kant's view it cannot be free. And, since freedom is the necessary presupposition of moral responsibility, it follows that those who claim that all the good they do is the work of God are in fact denying the reality of human freedom, and with it the possibility of moral responsibility, and their nature as moral beings. It is no surprise then, to hear Kant saying that 'to await a work of grace means, ...that the good (the morally good) is not our deed but the deed of another being, and that we therefore can achieve it only by doing nothing.' [41] Kant simply could not accept the idea that man can do no good of his own accord. For this would seem to relieve him of all responsibility in the moral realm. Kant wanted to give meaning not only to a more active, but also to a more responsible role for man in the moral realm, both of which were threatened, or at least undermined by the classical conception of grace. It is for this reason that Kant speaks against those who ' intend to wait upon this moral goodness quite passively, with their hands in their laps, as though it were a heavenly gift which descends from on high;'[42] Kant's view is that 'action must be represented as issuing from man's own use of his powers, not as the effect (resulting) from the influence of an external, higher cause by whose activity man is passively healed.' [43]

Given the above, many theologians conclude that Kant has no sympathy whatsoever for the notion of grace. And on reading some of Kant's statements it is not difficult to understand why they come to this conclusion. For example, he says that :

> The calling to our assistance of works of grace is one of those aberrations and cannot be adopted into the maxims of reason, if she is to remain within her limits; as indeed can nothing of the supernatural, simply because in this realm all use of reason ceases.[44]

According to Kant, it is not possible to recognize the working of grace in any human experience, nor to produce grace by activities such as prayer. He rejects totally actions normally associated with ecclesiastical faith, such as prayer, communion and church-going as means of attaining grace. He claims that all men are doing in these actions is trying to apply

themselves to God's grace 'as though thereby God were directly served'. But to think that this is possible is an illusion.[45]

Other theologians maintain that Kant is trying to break off from the Christian tradition's belief in divine grace as the only means to morally good actions, by offering his own 'moral religion' which advocates an individualistic ethic of salvation through good works. Thus he says, 'there exists absolutely no salvation for man apart from the sincerest adoption of genuinely moral principles into his disposition.' [46]

Some theologians do admit that Kant has a use for the notion of grace, but claim that it is an entirely negative use. Keith Ward for instance, claims that Kant's use of the notion of grace is 'a completely empty notion which merely attempts to 'explain' our moral incapacity and remove difficulties in the way of accepting the moral law.' [47] And, in favour of this interpretation, there is Kant's claim that:

> If man's own deeds are not sufficient to justify him before his conscience (as it judges him strictly), reason is entitled to adopt on faith a supernatural supplement to fill what is lacking to his justification (though not to specify in what that consists).[48]

However, it must be pointed out that, even when Kant appears to be entirely unsympathetic towards the notion of grace, when he says that, for instance, 'reason, in its incapacity to satisfy its moral requirements, extends itself to extravagant ideas, which could supply this need,' [49] he goes on to qualify this comment quite markedly, by adding that 'reason does not dispute the possibility or reality of the objects of these ideas, but it cannot include them in its maxims for thought and action'.[50] It is precisely because the understanding of grace is beyond us and the limits of our reason, that we cannot make use of the notion in our practical and theoretical endeavours.[51] We can however, admit the possibility of a work of grace as something incomprehensible. This suggests that, when speaking of the 'parerga of religion within the limits of reason',[52] Kant is not denying what is beyond the limits, he is simply acknowledg-

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[41] *Religion*, pp.48-49.

[42] Ibid., p.149.

[43] *Conflict*, p.73.

[44] *Religion*, p.48.

[45] Ibid., pp.182,187.

[46] Ibid., p.78.

[47] Ward, K. *The Development of Kant's View of Ethics* (Oxford, 1972), p.150.

[48] *Conflict*, p.75.

[49] *Religion*, p.47.

[50] Ibid., p.48.

[51] Ibid., p.49.

[52] Ibid., p.47.

ing the limits of the human capacity for comprehension.

It will be the aim of this section to show that Kant has a positive attitude to grace in the same way that he has a positive attitude to revelation. It is the traditional conception of grace as a one-way process, that Kant is unsympathetic to, and he offers in its place more modest, and less presumptuous claims about divine grace.

What then does Kant's positive attitude towards grace amount to? There are, admittedly, some theologians, Cupitt for instance, who claim that Kant uses the notion of grace in a positive sense, though they maintain that he does so by employing grace in a non-objective fashion. They would argue that Kant does not really believe that there is a God, who exists objectively outside of us, and who has the power to manipulate our wills. Rather, Kant uses the language of grace metaphorically.

The idea is that Kant regards the mystery of grace as a kind of inspiration. It is thought to prevent both the sin of pride which might follow the attribution of good works to ourselves, and moral despair at the thought that our moral efforts are often of no avail. It is not really that there is a judge of man's actions, or a divine power which can aid him, but it is useful for man to adopt such ideas in order to test himself, and continue to persevere in his moral efforts. This interpretation of Kant's use of the notion of grace raises the important question of a necessary fiction. That is, do we act 'as if' a power from without will provide what is not in our power, even though we know that there is no such power, or do we act 'as if' a power from without will provide what is not in our power in the true belief that there is such a power ? The non-objective interpretation would favour the former view.

However, the idea of grace as used by Kant, strongly implies a power that is beyond our own, something which is out of our control. It is for this reason that I shall argue against the non-objective interpretation, that Kant endorses the notion of grace as a belief in the existence of a mysterious divine power which may grant aid to those who exert themselves to the uttermost in their moral endeavours. The kind of moral achievement which Kant endorses is something which is possible, but not by man's own power or choice alone; there does seem to be an explicit reference to the dependence upon a power from without. I will argue that in the *Religion*, and elsewhere, Kant is not using the language of grace simply metaphorically, or non-objectively. We must interpret his use of the language of grace in realist terms.

But, how are we to offer a realist and positive interpretation of Kant's notion of grace without making the notion of moral responsibility incoherent, and without presuming to know too much ? The answer lies in the idea of co-operation. Kant objects to the asymmetry of the Lutheran conception of grace, according to which grace is a one-way effect. He prefers instead a more symmetrical interpretation, according to which man also has a part to play.

Such an interpretation has in fact become popular amongst theologians this century who have placed increasing emphasis upon the ethical implications of the Christian faith. We must work towards the reception of divine grace in the moral improvement of mankind. Not only this, but it is also up to us to make ourselves receptive to the grace of God, by becoming worthy of divine grace, which we nevertheless accept as a gift that is ultimately beyond our comprehension. We shall now turn to an examination of the way that this idea works in Kant's theology.

Kant wanted to give meaning not only to a more active, but also to a more responsible role for man in the moral realm. Bearing this in mind, it is important to note that he felt this emphasis upon man's responsibility to be entirely consistent with the true conception of the Christian faith as he saw it . Thus he says that:

> Each must do as much as lies in his power to become a better man, and that only when he has not buried his inborn talent (Luke XIX, 12-16) but has made use of his original disposition to good in order to become a better man, can he hope that what is not within his power will be supplied through cooperation from above.[53]

This gives us a hint as to Kant's position regarding the idea of grace, by implying that when we have done all that is in our power, God's grace will provide what is lacking in us. However, the most explicit outline of Kant's attitude appears in the section of the *Religion* beginning on page 106, in which he deals with the question of salvation. According to Kant there are two elements in saving faith, both of which are essential. But we must be clear as to which takes precedence:

> Saving faith involves two elements, upon which hope for salvation is conditioned, the one having reference to what man himself cannot accomplish, namely undoing lawfully (before a divine judge) actions which he has performed, the other to what he himself can and ought to do, that is, leading to a new life conformable to his duty. The first is the faith in an atonement (reparation

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[53] Ibid., p.47.

> for his debt, redemption, reconciliation with God); the second, the faith that we can become well-pleasing to God through a good course of life in the future. Both conditions constitute but one faith and necessarily belong together. Yet we can comprehend the necessity of their union only by assuming that one can be derived from the other.[54]

Atonement is that which man cannot bring about, whereas moral improvement is what he can bring about. Kant continues :

> The reasonable man must believe that he must first improve his way of life, so far as improve-ment lies in his power, if he is to have even the slightest ground for hope of such a higher gain.[55] Wherefore, since historical knowledge of the atonement belongs to ecclesiastical faith, while the improved way of life, as a condition, belongs to pure moral faith, the latter must take precedence over the former.[56]

From the above it is clear that on Kant's view, it is inconceivable that atonement should precede moral improvement. He cannot understand how human beings can think that divine grace will be granted without the presupposition of human moral effort in order to merit such grace. Yet, at the same time, he can conceive of divine aid once man has achieved as much morally, as is possible for him.

What is important is that we must make ourselves worthy of God's grace, through actions well pleasing to God. In fact, of the two aspects mentioned, (a) that of hoping that God will supply the surplus necessary, and (b) making oneself worthy of this act of forgiveness, aspect (b) must have precedence. Though we must not see this as implying that (b) is more important (since both (a) and (b) are essential to salvation), it is rather that (b) must come first in order that man may be worthy of receiving divine grace. Kant recognizes however, that his view is unorthodox, since ecclesiastical religion would put (a) before (b).[57] But, as far as he is concerned 'the right course is not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace.[58] This suggests that God's grace will be available to us in order that we may attain

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[54] Ibid., p. 106.

[55] This again implies that when man has achieved as much as is possible for him morally, he may hope that God's grace will supply that which is lacking.

[56] Ibid., pp. 107-8.

[57] Ibid., p. 109.

[58] Ibid., p.190.

salvation, but only after we have made ourselves worthy of such 'pardoning grace'.

In the above I have attempted a reappraisal of Kant's attitude towards grace. I have tried to show that Kant wants to emphasize man's role in the process, and the need to become worthy of God's grace. However, some theologians would argue that the above does not in fact amount to a positive attitude towards grace, but rather a diminishing of the role of grace in a person's life; since it simply pushes the notion of grace into the background as something not even worthy of consideration until one has improved oneself morally. Whereas on the Christian understanding, without the aid of divine grace people cannot even begin to make themselves better. So, if grace is not necessary for this, why allow it to enter in at all ? This is a valid question, and we can only begin to answer it by considering Kant's position with regard to moral conversion from evil to good, to which we shall now turn.

Kant's Attitude Towards Evil and Moral Conversion

Far from denying the biblical notion of original sin, Kant affirms it against those who imagine that man is naturally innocent. However, the ideas of the historical fall, and of inherited sin give place to the conception of a fundamental propensity to act out of mere self-love and without regard to universal moral laws. This propensity is simply an empirical fact, concerning which we can give no ultimate explanation, though the Bible does so in picture language.

Kant entertains the Biblical idea that all men are sinners, since :

> If there is no virtue for which some temptation cannot be found capable of overthrowing it,... then it certainly holds true of men universally, as the apostle said - "they are all in sin, there is none righteous (in the spirit of the law), no, not one.[59]

Kant also seems to reject any notions of moral progress, in favour of the view that evil is innate.[60] It is innate in the sense that it lies at the 'root' of man's character as a free being, and is woven into human nature. Man's propensity to evil, because it is the propensity of a free will, has no explanation in anything other than the spontaneous exercise by the will of its freedom. Evil issues from no other than the freely chosen actions of human beings. We must not therefore look for external causes to explain evil action. The fact of evil, or sin is closely tied to the fact of human freedom.[61] This emphasis upon absolute freedom becomes very significant when we begin to look at Kant's analysis of how one can overcome evil in the moral sphere. Kant claims that :

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[59] Ibid., p.34, see also Romans III, 9-10; cf. *Religion*, p.37, Romans V,12.

[60] See *Religion*, p.17.

[61] Ibid.

> This evil is radical, because it corrupts the grounds of all maxims; it is moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers....yet at the same time it must be possible to overcome it, since it is found in man, a being whose actions are free.[62]

In referring to the overcoming of evil, Kant does not speak primarily of a moral conversion, but claims that man can become good 'only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation and a change of heart.'[63] However, in spite of the explicit appeal to religious terminology here, Kant rejects all claims that the moral conversion must be dependent upon some external divine action. The change from bad to good is only possible through a free act of the agent, whereby the person transforms his or her cast of mind, and adopts a new supreme maxim as the basis of all practical behaviour. This change of heart 'must be possible because duty requires it.' [64]

There is a distinct problem here. From the above it is clear that it is a duty to overcome the evil propensity. In order to do so, man must, not only adopt good maxims, he must also undergo an absolute 'change of heart'. Kant describes this change of heart as a kind of 'rebirth, as it were a new creation'. But, Kant has also said that even the best man cannot extirpate the propensity to evil. In fact, even the man whose disposition is good cannot achieve a holy will, which for Kant is necessary for moral perfection.

The problem centres on how it is possible to overcome the propensity to evil, given that it happens to be the case that all human beings have adopted a morally evil supreme maxim that makes their moral characters evil. This is moral rigorism. Given Kant's view then, it would seem impossible to bring about the moral conversion which Kant claims must be possible.

According to Philip Quinn,[65] this inconsistency in Kant's doctrine of evil reflects the tension which the Christian interpretation of the human situation presents. According to this perspective, all human characters are ineradicably stained, the moral evaluation of each is negative, but sin is self-incurred. Yet, only morally perfect characters, with a positive moral evaluation can be justified by a morally perfect God. Therefore all humanity can hope for is some miraculous dissolution of its moral inadequacies before God. Normally of course, this tension is resolved by an appeal to the divine grace of God's mercy.

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[62] Ibid., p.32.

[63] Ibid., p.43, see also John III, 5; Genesis I, 2.

[64] Ibid., p.60.

[65] Quinn, P. " Original Sin, Radical Evil and Moral Identity," *Faith and Philosophy*, 1, 1984; pp.197-201.

Kant's problem lies in his attempt to resolve the tension in order to make room for hope without stepping beyond the limits enforced by reason. But this means that for him the conversion must precede grace. This precludes the possibility of grace to dispel the evil propensity. Quinn concludes therefore, that Kant simply does not have the resources necessary to the construction of an acceptable solution to the tension in his doctrine of radical evil.

However, in my opinion, Quinn has failed to see the significance of freedom in Kant's notion of moral conversion, which both creates the tension in his theory, and at the same time explains why the moral conversion cannot simply be attributed to divine grace in the traditional understanding of that concept. Once again, the thought is that if we were to rely upon grace from God, then we would be passive instruments in the divine network of things. And this would once again preclude the possibility of moral responsibility. Man must primarily take responsibility for his own moral change of heart, which cannot be produced *in toto* from without. And, contrary to Quinn's thought, there is evidence in the *Religion* to suggest that Kant's understanding of evil as inextirpable is not inconsistent with the view that we can overcome the evil tendencies in our nature. For, even though Kant says that evil is inextirpable, he means by this only that man will always be open to a disposition to evil, not that he cannot overcome this disposition. First, Kant says that 'so long as we do not eradicate the radical evil in human nature, it prevents the seed of goodness from developing as it otherwise would.' [66] Secondly, he implies that it is only if we are not capable of overcoming our disposition to evil that all men can be said to be under sin. He does not say 'they are all under sin' but 'if there is no virtue for which some temptation cannot be found capable of overthrowing it' then 'they are all under sin.' [67] Unfortunately however, we are given no clue in the *Religion* as to how one overcomes the evil in human nature. We need, instead, to refer to the *Conflict of the Faculties* for guidance concerning Kant's thoughts on moral conversion.

The *Conflict of the Faculties* on Moral Conversion

In a section which begins on page 97, and which deals specifically with the question of moral conversion, Kant offers his own answer as follows: the call to moral conversion comes to man 'through his own reason, in so far as it contains the *supersensible principle* of moral life'.[68] Now exactly what this supersensible principle amounts to, Kant does not make clear. But, he does distinguish it from alleged supersensible experiences, saying that 'a direct revelation from God embodied in the comforting statement "your sins are forgiven" would be a supersensible experience, and this is impossible.[69]

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[66] Ibid., p.34.

[67] Ibid.

However, Kant does go on to say that the Bible contains the supersensible principle necessary for the rebirth in that its teaching 'works with divine power on all men's hearts toward their fundamental improvement'.[70] What then is this supersensible principle? The closest Kant comes to telling us is in the following:

> Even the Bible...seems to refer, not to supernatural experiences and fantastic feelings which should take reason's place in bringing about this revolution, but to the spirit of Christ, which he manifested in teachings and examples so that we might make it our own - or rather, since it is already present in us by our moral disposition, so that we might simply make room for it.[71]

It would seem from the above that the supersensible is something akin to the power or spirit of Christ. Saving faith involves two elements, upon which hope for salvation is conditioned, the one having reference to what man himself can not accomplish, namely undoing lawfully (before a divine judge) actions which he has performed, the other to what he himself can and ought to do, that is, leading to a new life conformable to his duty. The first is the faith in an atonement (reparation for his debt, redemption, reconciliation with God); the second, the faith that we can become well-pleasing to God through a good course of life in the future. Both conditions constitute but one faith and necessarily belong together. Yet we can comprehend the necessity of their union only by assuming that one can be derived from the other.[72]

Given that moral conversion is not to be understood in terms of an external influence, Kant seems to be implying here that it has something to do with the 'supersensible principle' in man. This supersensible principle is given through man's reason. What are we to conclude from this notion of the supersensible in man ? It may remind one of Aquinas, and

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[68] *Conflict*, p.83.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., p.107.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., p. 106.

the idea that 'grace perfects nature'. The best explanation I can give of it is as something which is of man, and yet not of him; It is both a part of him, and beyond his natural powers. There is a similarity here with some kinds of modern theology which insist that we must understand God's grace as something which works through the natural world, and yet is not of it. The same is the case with the supersensible principle Kant attributes to man. Kant wants to lodge it safely in the natural world of human reason,[73] and yet it is ultimately supersensible, ie.beyond human nature. And in answer to those who might say that this line of argument is not consistent with the *Religion*, or Kant's attitude to grace displayed there, the following passages from the *Religion* can be offered to show that it is:

> But we cannot know anything at all about supersensible aid - whether a certain moral power, perceptible to us, really comes from above or, indeed, on what occasions and under what conditions it may be expected.[74]

This shows that Kant does already have a notion of the supersensible, and that he believes that it is beyond human comprehension.

Having given an outline of Kant's position with regard to moral conversion, we are now able to answer those theologians who thought that Kant was attempting to diminish the role of grace in the life of the religious man, by ruling it out totally in the process of man's efforts to make himself better.

On Kant's view, there is something supersensible which works in us through our moral conversion, though he will not go so far as to assign to it the traditional Lutheran title of heavenly grace, because this would be something external. Yet, at the same time, it does seem to be a way for Kant to rescue something of the sense of supersensible grace working through human nature - not as an external, but rather as an inward principle. In this way, by adopting a notion of the 'inward' as distinct from the 'external', Kant rescues something of the sense of grace in the same way that he rescued something of the sense of revelation. If grace is present in the moral conversion, then it is plausible to suggest that grace aids human progress in the moral realm.

And, it can also be argued, against Kant's critics, that there is in this much that is positive. Kant's emphasis upon the 'inward' brings us to the very heart of his religion, namely a religion which we must seek within. Kant admits as much when he says that he is afraid that we might 'render ourselves unfit for all use of reason or allow ourselves to fall into the indolence of waiting from above, in passive leisure, what we should seek from within.[75] All of the dangers which traditional religion raises cannot in Kant's mind be avoided 'so long as we seek religion without, and not within us'.[76]

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[73] See for instance, *Conflict*, p. 81.

[74] *Religion*, p.179.

In summary, it may be suggested that, as with revelation, Kant seems to be ruling out grace in one sense, that is the external sense, and allowing it in an inward sense. Instead of conceiving of grace as some kind of special intervention, we are to view it in more general terms as a supersensible principle within human nature. It is at this point that I think we can see the coming together of Kant's notions of revelation and grace. For, if the supersensible principle is given in reason, and if we bear in mind that reason is in a sense a divine revelation, then there is also a sense in which the supersensible principle is divine. Yet at the same time, Kant emphasizes that the supersensible principle is a principle within human nature, in order to rule out any appeals to external supernatural interruption.

Conclusion

We mentioned earlier the fact that in examining Kant's attitude towards religious doctrines it is important to bear in mind his anti-ecclesiasticism. Kant was speaking out against those for whom the Christian faith had deteriorated into a matter of correct ceremonial and Orthodox belief. In this respect Kant's view is made quite clear when he says that 'orthodoxy is the view that belief in dogma is sufficient for religion.' [77]

It is the unconditional value which Orthodoxy gives to religious doctrines such as revelation, that Kant objects to, not revelation itself. On Kant's view it is a superstition to hold that historical belief is a duty and essential to salvation. Kant is also afraid of the possibility of someone professing to believe in such things while being 'the most evil and worthless man'. Add this to the fact that Orthodoxy, according to Kant, regards the natural principles of morality as of secondary importance, and it is not surprising that he tried to offer an alternative exposition of religious doctrines.

From our examination of revelation and grace, two things have become clear. First, in each case Kant wants to rule out external divine intervention in the world. Second, he allows for an internal sense of both revelation and grace. With regard to revelation and the Bible I would argue that Kant believed the Bible to be a work of general as distinct from special revelation, and that it is plausible that he was attempting to assimilate what had traditionally been thought of as special revelation

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[75] Ibid., p.180.

[76] Ibid., p.155.

[77] *Conflict*, p.109.

into general revelation. Something similar applies to the concept of grace, concerning which Kant seeks to replace the notion of external divine intervention with a supersensible principle within human nature. We have also emphasized the guiding theme of freedom, which is essential to the whole of Kant's thought. Kant wants to preserve human nature's absolute autonomy. In order to do this he thinks he must cut humanity off from all external influences, divine, human, and physical alike. But, I have argued that he does leave open the possibility of inward influence, even though we must not seek to explain away the means by which this occurs. In this respect Kant is similar to the libertarian who has to confess that man's freedom , as he conceives of it, is ultimately a mystery, not to be fathomed by the human mind. This is made quite clear in the following :

> It is as though we wished to *explain* and *render comprehensible* to ourselves in terms of a man's freedom what happens to him; on this question God has indeed revealed His will through the moral law in us, but the *causes* due to which a free action on earth occurs or does not occur He has left in that obscurity in which human investigation must leave whatever (as an historical occurrence, though yet springing from freedom) ought to be conceived of according to the laws of cause and effect.[78]

The above statement suggests that freedom is a mystery which is linked to the moral law as revealed to us by God. It also suggests that the cause of our free actions is a mystery. But, given that true freedom amounts to obedience to the moral law, the mystery of free actions must also therefore be the mystery of how we can become good men. And this leads to the mystery of the supersensible principle in man. From this we may conclude that freedom itself amounts to a supersensible principle. To acknowledge this fact is to recognize the link between revelation, grace and freedom in Kant's theology. It is through supersensible freedom that man is able to recognize the moral law as revealed to him, and it is through the supersensible principle of grace within him that he is able to act upon it.

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[78] *Religion*, p.135.

MASTER, SLAVE AND MISTRESS IN WOLLSTONECRAFT'S *VINDICATION*

D L Macdonald

Readers of Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) have often remarked that it lacks a linear discursive organization. Gary Kelly refers to its 'lack of 'masculine' logic and order', if only to suggest that concern for such matters is 'merely academic'.[1] Elissa S Guralnick refers to 'the technique of free association that permits topic to succeed topic haphazardly throughout the text', a technique that gives the text an 'incoherent organization',[2] a 'rambling, uneven nature', even a 'wild disorder'.[3] Such readers have tended not to notice that the work relies instead on an intricate organization of figures of speech; Guralnick even says that 'Wollstonecraft was not a dedicated or inventive user of metaphor or simile.'[4]

If not 'dedicated or inventive', Wollstonecraft is both critical and consistent in her use of metaphors and similes. She disapproves, for example, of that aspect of 'the language of men' which compares women to 'the smiling flowers that only adorn the land';[5] so she always uses flower imagery ironically.[6] She compares ill-educated women to 'the flowers which are planted in too rich a soil, strength and usefulness are sacrificed to beauty; and the flaunting leaves, after having pleased a fastidious eye, fade, disregarded on the stalk, long before the season when they ought to have arrived at maturity.'[7] Because they are brought up to be beautiful rather than strong, they 'languish like exotics'.[8] Wollstonecraft warns them not to 'expect to be valued when their beauty fades, for it is the fate of the fairest flowers to be admired and pulled to pieces by the careless hand that plucked them'.[9] She wishes to 'rouse [her] sex from the flowery bed, on which they supinely sleep life away!'[10] She concedes that once roused, 'they could not then with equal propriety be termed the sweet flowers that smile in the walk of man'.[11] Instead,

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[1] Gary Kelly, 'Mary Wollstonecraft: Texts and Contexts', *Eighteenth-Century Life* 2 (1975-6): 38.

[2] Elissa S Guralnick, 'Radical Politics in Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*', *Studies in Burke and his Time*, 18 (1977): 157.

[3] Elissa S Guralnick, 'Rhetorical Strategy in Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*', *Humanities Association Review*, 30 (1979): 174.

[4] Guralnick, 'Radical Politics', 157.

[5] Mary Wollstonecraft, *The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft*, ed. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler, asst. Emma Rees-Mogg, 7 vols. (London, 1989), 5: 122.

[6] Cf. Guralnick, 'Rhetorical Strategy', 175-6.

[7] Wollstonecraft, 5: 73.

[8] Ibid., 5: 105.

[9] Ibid., 5: 220.

[10] Ibid., 5: 191.

[11] Ibid., 5: 131.

they could with more propriety be compared to stronger and more useful plants: 'Our trees are now allowed to spread with wild luxuriance, nor do we expect by force to combine the majestic marks of time with youthful graces; but wait patiently till they have struck deep their root, and braved many a storm. Is the mind then, which, in proportion to its dignity, advances more slowly towards perfection, to be treated with less respect?'[12]

The *Vindication* is similarly critical and consistent in its use of figures of heat and light, of clothing, of poison, pollution and disease. But its most complex and important figure is that of slavery.[13]

Not all of Wollstonecraft's references to slavery are figurative, of course. As a friend of radicals like Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and Joseph Johnson, Wollstonecraft was sympathetic to the movement for the abolition of the slave trade. As a writer for Johnson's *Analytical Review*, she had a number of opportunities to make her sympathies clear. In Rodolphe-Louis D'Erlach's *Code du bonheur*, which she reviewed in 1789, 'The letters relative to the slave trade, some of which are addressed to Mr Pitt, are long, but interesting; the author could scarcely urge what has not been urged before, yet he seems to have had a comprehensive view of the subject.'[14] By 1789 she was clearly familiar with the debate. But she was evidently not bored by it. In the memoirs of Gustavus Vassa, a former slave, which she reviewed in the same year, 'Many anecdotes are simply told, relative to the treatment of male and female slaves, on the voyage, and in the West Indies, which make the blood turn its course.'[15] In Joseph Lavallée's novel *The Negro Equalled by Few Europeans*, which she reviewed in 1790, she praised the accurate portrayal of 'the misery those poor wretches endure who languish in slavery, and the cruelty and injustice practised to entrap men.'[16]

Two years later, in the *Vindication*, she drew a satirical sketch of a hypocritical 'statesman' who, 'when a question of humanity is agitated ... may dip a sop in the milk of human kindness, to silence Cerberus, and talk of the interest which his heart takes in an attempt to make the earth no longer cry for vengeance as it sucks in its children's blood, though his cold hand may at the very moment rivet their chains, by sanctioning the abominable traffic.'[17] This was not only blunt, it was prescient: in April

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[12] Ibid., 5: 177; cf. 183.

[13] Nelson Hilton, 'An Original Story', in *Unnam'd Forms: Blake and Textuality*, ed. Nelson Hilton and Thomas A. Vogler (Berkeley, 1986), 78-9.

[14] Wollstonecraft, 7: 89-90.

[15] Ibid., 7: 100.

[16] Ibid., 7: 282.

[17] Ibid., 5: 214.

1792, the House of Commons would pass a resolution calling for the 'gradual abolition' of the slave trade, thus presenting itself as a 'temple of benevolence' without actually committing itself to doing anything.[18]

Wollstonecraft went on to ask rhetorically, 'Is sugar always to be produced by vital blood?' [19] The sugar boycott was an aspect of the abolition campaign in which women, as consumers, could play an active part; by 1792, it had the support of three to four hundred thousand consumers. The abolitionist William Fox described West-Indian sugar in even more lurid terms than Wollstonecraft did: 'They may hold it to our lips, ... steeped in the blood of our fellow creatures, but they cannot compel us to accept the loathsome potion.' [20]

Wollstonecraft's application of the concept of slavery to the condition of women was not entirely metaphorical either. For most of the century, social and economic changes had been making it more and more difficult for a respectable woman to consider any career but marriage;[21] and by marriage, as William Blackstone pointed out in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 'the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.' [22] The only instances in which the law considered the wife as a person separate from her husband were those in which it considered her 'as inferior to him, and acting by his compulsion'.[23] On the whole, Blackstone thought this arrangement was equitable, observing 'that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit', and adding gallantly, 'So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.' [24]

Blackstone noted that a husband had the right to 'give his wife moderate correction.' [25] He was allowed, for example, to imprison her in his house, or to beat her: Sir Francis Buller laid down the famous 'rule of thumb', according to which the husband had to use a stick no thicker than his thumb, in 1782, only ten years before Wollstonecraft published the

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[18] David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca, 1975), 430-2.

[19] Wollstonecraft, 5: 215.

[20] Davis, *Age of Revolution*, 435.

[21] Miriam Kramnick, Introduction, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, by Mary Wollstonecraft (Harmondsworth, 1985), 32-4.

[22] William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 4 vols. (1765-69; rpt. Chicago, 1979), 1: 430.

[23] Ibid., 1: 432.

[24] Ibid., 1: 433.

[25] Ibid., 1: 432.

Vindication.[26] Brutality to wives was not socially acceptable; but then brutality to plantation slaves was not acceptable either.

Accordingly, some of Wollstonecraft's references to the slavery of women - to 'domestic drudge[s]',[27] 'slaves of power',[28] and 'slaves of casual lust' [29] - are shockingly literal. Other such references are clearly metaphorical: women are the slaves of opinion,[30] of sensibility,[31] of ignorance,[32] of prejudice.[33] Towards the end of the book, Wollstonecraft connects the two usages, arguing that literal and metaphorical slavery reinforce each other. On the one hand, 'becoming the slave of her own feelings, [a woman] is easily subjugated by those of others';[34] on the other, women 'become in the same proportion the slaves of pleasure as they are the slaves of man'.[35]

Women are slaves, of course, because men are masters. If marriage turns wives into 'abject wooers, and fond slaves', it turns their husbands into 'surly suspicious tyrant[s]'.[36] The male educational theorists with whom Wollstonecraft is particularly concerned provide particularly clear examples. She examines John Gregory's theories to 'shew how absurd and tyrannic it is thus to lay down a system of slavery'.[37] About Rousseau, she is even blunter: 'The master wished to have a meretricious slave to fondle, entirely dependent on his reason and bounty.' [38]

In attempting to develop the theme of slavery as consistently as she did her floral theme, Wollstonecraft had to confront a problem. The institution of slavery was itself internally inconsistent: it treated slaves both as human beings and as less-than-human chattels - both as agents and as instruments, in Aristotelian terms.[39] Shortly before she wrote the

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[26] Alice Browne, *The Eighteenth-Century Feminist Mind* (Detroit, 1987), 48.

[27] Wollstonecraft, 5: 165.

[28] Ibid., 5: 236.

[29] Ibid., 5: 208.

[30] Ibid., 5: 120.

[31] Ibid., 5: 195.

[32] Ibid., 5: 215.

[33] Ibid., 5: 222.

[34] Ibid., 5: 171.

[35] Ibid., 5: 245.

[36] Ibid., 5: 189-90.

[37] Ibid., 5: 101.

[38] Ibid., 5: 173.

[39] David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, 1966), 58-60, 70, 248-9.

Vindication, the American revolutionaries had given a particularly elegant example of this inconsistency: in 1787, the Constitutional Convention had agreed that when calculating population for the purpose of apportioning Congressional seats to states, the federal government should count a slave as equal to three-fifths of a person - but not, of course, that the slave should then get three-fifths of a vote.[40]

Wollstonecraft sometimes addresses this inconsistency explicitly. At present, she remarks, 'women appear to be suspended by destiny, according to the vulgar tale of Mahomet's coffin; they have neither the unerring instinct of brutes, nor are allowed to fix the eye of reason on a perfect model'.[41] In the future, she predicts, 'woman will be either the friend or slave of man. We shall not, as at present, doubt whether she is a moral agent, or the link which unites man with brutes'.[42] Meanwhile, she asks her readers: 'Why do men halt between two opinions, and expect impossibilities? Why do they expect virtue from a slave ...?' [43]

Wollstonecraft addresses the inconsistency of slavery more directly, if less explicitly, by incorporating it into her own account of the enslavement of women. The real focus of her protest, in fact, is not that women are slaves, but that they are (in a pun she is fond of) mistresses.[44] They become mistresses only in a particular context, but it is one that they are taught to consider central to their lives.

Women become mistresses, of course, because men become slaves: 'the very men' who 'tyrannize over their sisters, wives and daughters' are also 'the slaves of their mistresses'.[45] Even a wife, if she behaves like a mistress, will find her husband her slave, since he is 'the slave of his appetites'.[46] The idea that men are the slaves of women is a commonplace of the period, though most authors do not treat it as analytically as Wollstonecraft does. Boswell, in an idiotic but representative poem entitled *No Abolition of Slavery; or, The Universal Empire of Love*, addressed to his own mistress and published in 1791, argues that the abolition campaign is not only unjust but futile:

> should our Wrongheads have their will,
> Should Parliament approve their bill,
> Pernicious as th' effect would be,
> T'abolish negro slavery,
> Such partial freedom would be vain,
> Since Love's strong empire must remain.[47]

The poem concludes by assuring Boswell's 'charming friend' that 'Slavery there must ever be, / While we have Mistresses like thee!' [48]

Men are prepared for this slavery, as women are prepared for theirs, by their education: by the system of fagging which prevails at the public schools, and by the unthinking submission to an ill-understood religion which is inculcated there: 'what can be more prejudicial to the moral character than the system of tyranny and abject slavery which is established amongst the boys, to say nothing of the slavery to forms, which makes religion worse than a farce?' [49]

But if the slavery of men is prejudicial to their character, the mistress-ship of women is even more prejudicial to theirs.[50] 'A king is always a king - and a woman always a woman: his authority and her sex ever stand between them and rational converse.' [51] In her previous book, *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790), Wollstonecraft was even more explicit about what being put on a pedestal does to kings and women: 'such homage vitiates them, prevents their endeavouring to obtain solid personal merit; and, in short, makes those beings vain inconsiderate dolls, who ought to be prudent mothers and useful members of society'.[52] Later in the first *Vindication*, Wollstonecraft described the sort of mistresses those vain, inconsiderate dolls made when transplanted to the West Indian colonies: 'fair ladies, whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent'.[53] She could be just as shockingly literal about the domination of women as about their enslavement.

To surprise her readers into agreeing that the degradation of women and kings may have the same causes, Wollstonecraft quotes from Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* - but without at first identifying his subject: 'To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which they seek.' As soon as her 'male readers' have had a chance to notice how well the remark applies to women, she reveals that it is actually Smith's analysis of the 'general character of people of rank and fortune'.[54]

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[40] Davis, *Age of Revolution*, 104-5.

[41] Wollstonecraft, 5: 103.

[42] Ibid., 5: 104.

[43] Ibid., 5: 115-116.

[44] Cf. Guralnick, 'Radical Politics', 159-61.

[45] Wollstonecraft, 5: 93.

[46] Ibid., 5: 116.

[47] James Boswell, *No Abolition of Slavery; or, The Universal Empire of Love* (London, 1791), 255-60.

[48] Ibid., 293, 297-8.

[49] Wollstonecraft, 5: 231; cf. 232.

[50] Cf. ibid., 5: 68.

[51] Ibid., 5: 125. Cf. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D D Raphael and A L MacFie, The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 1 (Oxford, 1976), 53.

[52] Wollstonecraft, 5: 25.

[53] Ibid., 5: 45.

Smith's real concern is with 'the advantages which we can propose to derive from' rank and fortune: the subject of his chapter is 'the origin of Ambition'.[55] Wollstonecraft is aware that men can seek a variety of advantages from rank. Women, however - at least in the middle class, the only class with which she concerns herself - are not allowed to seek any other advantages than being observed, attended to, and taken notice of: 'Women, commonly called Ladies, are not to be contradicted in company, are not allowed to exert any manual strength; and from them the negative virtues only are expected, when any virtues are expected, patience, docility, good-humour, and flexibility; virtues incompatible with any vigorous exertion of intellect.' [56] The men of this class, 'in their youth, are prepared for professions, and marriage is not considered as the grand feature in their lives', even though a major reason for their professions is the need to support wives and families; 'women, on the contrary, have no other scheme [than marriage] to sharpen their faculties. It is not business, extensive plans, or any of the excursive flights of ambition, that engross their attention; no, their thoughts are no[t] employed in rearing such noble structures.' [57]

Fifteen years before the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Wollstonecraft has outlined a crucial phase of the 'Hegelian' dialectic of master and slave. She has done so in considerably more lucid prose than Hegel's and in terms of social and economic reality rather than in Hegel's idealist terms.

In Hegel's primal myth, two men confront each other; each sees the other as completely alien; each tries to exact from the other a recognition of his own humanity. Both must stake their lives on the struggle; but unless both remain alive, the results are not philosophically interesting, since two corpses cannot recognize each other, and a corpse cannot recognize a living man. One must overpower and yet spare the other; or, as Hegel puts it, must supersede him 'in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded': victory is *Aufhebung*.[58] The defeated is forced to recognize the humanity of the victor; the victor need not recognize that of the defeated.

The victor becomes the master and the defeated becomes his slave: this is Hegel's version of the old idea (common to Grotius, Hobbes and even Locke) that slavery is a natural consequence of war.[59] Wollstonecraft may be recalling this old idea when she refers to 'the state of warfare which subsists between the sexes'.[60] Largely, however, she does not bother to anticipate this phase of Hegel's dialectic, having little interest in primal myths.

In the next phase, the master's position is undermined in two ironic ways. This double process, in which an apparently simple opposition between two concepts like mastery and slavery gives rise to a new, more complex situation - in which antitheses form a synthesis - is what Hegel means by the dialectic.

First, the master discovers that the recognition for which he has risked his life is valueless, since it is the recognition of one whom he does not recognize as human:[61] this is Hegel's version of the internal inconsistency of slavery. Wollstonecraft anticipates it when she argues that conventional women, deprived by their sex of all opportunities for rational converse, strike even the most appreciative husbands as less than fully human, so that their company is as valueless as that of beasts of burden: 'Their husbands acknowledge that they are good managers, and chaste wives; but leave home to seek for more agreeable ... society; and the patient drudge, who fulfils her task, like a blind horse in a mill, is defrauded of her just reward; for the wages due to her are the caresses of her husband.' [62]

Unlike Hegel, Wollstonecraft is aware that the lack of recognition is at least as much a misfortune for the slave as for the master. In her unfinished last novel, *The Wrongs of Woman* (1797), she makes one of the characters - Jemima, a former prostitute - explain how the lack of recognition degrades the slave (an obvious point which Hegel ignores) by denying her rational converse as surely as if she were a king: 'I was, in fact, born a slave, and chained by infamy to slavery during the whole of existence, without having any companions to alleviate it by sympathy, or teach me how to rise above it by their example." [63] In saying that she was born a slave, of course, Jemima means only that as the illegitimate child of a servant, she was born into a social position that made slavery and degradation inevitable, and not (as Aristotle might have interpreted her case) that she was innately inferior and so 'marked out for subjection'.[64] The idea of a natural slavery was one of the 'aristotelean prejudices' that Wollstonecraft had made it her mission to explode.[65]

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[54] Ibid., 5: 127.

[55] Smith, 50.

[56] Wollstonecraft, 5: 127; cf. Smith, 55-6.

[57] Wollstonecraft, 5: 129.

[58] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A V Miller, foreword and notes by J N Findlay (Oxford, 1977), 114-15; cf. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the* Phenomenology of Spirit, assembled by Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H Nichols (New York, 1969), 15.

[59] Davis, *Western Culture*, 115-20; cf. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1967), 302; II.24.

[60] Wollstonecraft, 5: 239.

[61] Hegel, 116-17; Kojève, 19-20.

[62] Wollstonecraft, 5: 135-6.

The second way that mastery is undermined, according to Hegel, is that the master, as a pure consumer, is (like a woman) denied the opportunity to realize his humanity and autonomy through productive work. It is the slave who is (like a man) forced to work; consequently, 'in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware ... that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right'.[66]

This is Hegel's secularized version of the old religious idea that slavery is ultimately redemptive. Earlier, explicitly religious versions of the idea included the notion that the Jews had to endure slavery in Egypt and bondage to the law of Moses in order to be redeemed from their sins, and that the sufferings of the innocent Africans might win them the palm of martyrdom.[67] A displaced form of the first notion was still current in England in 1833, to judge from a remark recorded in Coleridge's *Table Talk*: that the West Indian slaves 'ought to be forcibly reminded of the state in which their brethren in Africa still are, and taught to be thankful for the Providence which has placed them within means of grace'.[68] The second was still current in the United States in 1852, to judge from *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

Wollstonecraft is as ironic as Hegel but less optimistic. In her version, both men and women suffer the ironic degradation of the master (or mistress). They also both suffer the straightforward degradation of the slave. As Wollstonecraft argued in the first *Vindication*, 'inequality of rank must ever impede the growth of virtue, by vitiating the mind that submits or

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[63] Ibid., 1: 110.

[64] Cf. Davis, *Western Culture*, 69-70.

[65] Wollstonecraft, 6: 116.

[66] Hegel, 118; Kojève, 22-7.

[67] Davis, *Western Culture*, 78, 194.

[68] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Table Talk*, ed. Carl Woodring, *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, gen. ed. Kathleen Coburn, Bollingen Series 75, Vol.14.1 (Princeton, 1990), 386; 8 June 1833.

domineers.' [69] Women, however, are degraded further than men, since they are denied the opportunity to perform redemptive, productive work. They are so degraded as to be unfit even for reproductive work - for the duties of motherhood: 'have women, who have early imbibed notions of passive obedience, sufficient character to manage a family or educate children? So far from it, that, after surveying the history of woman, I cannot help, agreeing with the severest satirist, considering the sex as the weakest as well as the most oppressed half of the species.' [70]

Master (or mistress) and slave are both so degraded by their relationship that neither can transcend it; they can, however, change places, both in sexual relations and in larger political contexts. In discussing the French Revolution, Wollstonecraft warns that 'one power should not be thrown down to exalt another'.[71] Despite her revolutionary sympathies, however, she is aware that this is already happening in 1792, and she refuses to be surprised: 'Slaves and mobs have always indulged themselves in the same excesses, when once they broke loose from authority. The bent bow recoils with violence, when the hand is suddenly relaxed that forcibly held it.' [72] She is as aware as Blake or Byron that a revolt against tyranny may turn into a new tyranny: 'History brings forward a fearful catalogue of the crimes which their cunning has produced, when the weak slaves have had sufficient address to over-reach their masters.'[73]

Hegel, by contrast, despite the benefit of an additional fifteen years of historical perspective, is strikingly (and characteristically) idealist - or, as Kojève puts it, 'metaphysical' - in his account of the excesses of the revolution.[74] To Hegel, these are not the result of the material degradation of the sans-culottes, but the inevitable expression of the consciousness of universal freedom and its ethical counterpart, the general will: 'The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore *death*, a death too which has no inner significance ... the coldest and meanest of all deaths.' [75] Wollstonecraft would have seen such an analysis as an example of the reactionary distortions she dismissed in her *Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution* (1794 - a book she actually wrote in France, during the Terror: 'malevolence has been gratified by the errours they have committed, attributing that imperfection to the theory they adopted, which was applicable only to the folly of their practice'.[76]

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[69] Wollstonecraft, 5: 46.

[70] Ibid., 5: 103.

[71] Ibid., 5: 85.

[72] Ibid., 5: 152.

[73] Ibid., 5: 238.

[74] Kojève, 69.

[75] Hegel, 360.

Nevertheless, there was no denying the folly of their practice. Wollstonecraft was left with the grim vision of a world of mutual slavery, presided over by a god as tyrannical as the Jupiter of *Prometheus Unbound*: 'I know that many devout people boast of submitting to the Will of God blindly, as to an arbitrary sceptre or rod, on the same principle as the Indians worship the devil. In other words, like people in the common concerns of life, they do homage to power, and cringe under the foot that can crush them.' [77] In the first *Vindication*, she explicitly presented this tyrannical god as the projection of a tyrannical society: 'Why is our fancy to be appalled by terrific perspectives of a hell beyond the grave? - Hell stalks abroad; - the lash resounds on the slave's naked sides ....' [78] We imagine a hell in the other world only because we have made a hell of this one.

Wollstonecraft refuses to do homage to the god of tyranny:[79] 'it is not his power that I fear', she declared in the first *Vindication* - 'it is not to an arbitrary will, but to an unerring *reason* I submit'.[80] She is not, however, much more explicit than her son-in-law about how to rid this world of him. Like Locke, she grounds her defence of natural rights on the concept of a just and reasonable God, but there is a significant difference between their arguments. According to Locke, human beings have rights because they have duties: they are 'the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business', and no-one may rightfully interfere with that business.[81] Locke's argument is religious without being otherwordly. According to Wollstonecraft, however, human beings (and in particular women) have rights because they have immortal souls. Women are not 'a swarm of ephemeron triflers',[82] so they should not 'always be degraded by being made subservient'.[83] Far from redeeming them, such a degrading subservience prevents them from redeeming themselves as God intended: 'women were destined by Providence to acquire human virtues, and by the exercise of their understandings, that stability of character which is the firmest ground to rest our future hopes upon'.[84] Depriving them of these future hopes - that is, hopes for the next world - is doubly unjust because

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[76] Wollstonecraft, 6: 219.

[77] Ibid., 5: 255; cf. 115.

[78] Ibid., 5: 58.

[79] Guralnick, 'Radical Politics', 163.

[80] Wollstonecraft, 5: 34.

[81] Locke, 289; II.6.

[82] Wollstonecraft, 5: 88.

[83] Ibid., 5: 96.

[84] Ibid., 5: 89.

these are the only real hopes. Wollstonecraft is blunt about this: 'life yields not the felicity which can satisfy an immortal soul'.[85] Her argument is both religious and otherworldly. Hegel would have recognized it as the expression of a form of religious faith - the form faith takes in response to Enlightenment scepticism: 'a *sheer yearning*, its truth an empty beyond, for which a fitting content can no longer be found, for everything is bestowed elsewhere'.[86]

It has often been noticed how modest Wollstonecraft's hopes are.[87] Mary Poovey has suggested that the problem is not with her religion but with her ambivalence about sexuality, which has prevented her from attaining a more optimistic, activist position.[88] The problem, however, may not be within Wollstonecraft but around her; it may be neither religious nor sexual but social. She hopes that society may be changed by education, but 'till society be differently constituted, much cannot be expected from education'.[89]

Since Hegel's myth describes the origins of society, it needs only two players. Wollstonecraft's analysis must begin with a third force already in place - society itself, with all its problematic bearings on the relations between men and women. Hegel offers us a dialectic, in which slavery inevitably entails liberation; Wollstonecraft presents us with a dilemma, in which the liberation of the individual and of the society depend on each other. It is a dilemma that we have not yet entirely solved.

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[85] Ibid., 5: 95.

[86] Hegel, 349.

[87] Cf. Guralnick, 'Radical Politics', 165.

[88] Mary Poovey, *The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley and Jane Austen*, Women in Culture and Society, gen. ed. Catharine R Stimpson (Chicago, 1984), 79.

[89] Wollstonecraft, 5: 90.

LIBERTY OR LUXURY: CATHERINE MACAULAY GRAHAM AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF THE STATE

Barbara Brandon Schnorrenberg

Historians must always make choices in their emphases if they want to do more than simply record all the events of a particular time. Recent histories of the eighteenth century have emphasized taxes and the spending of public money to the exclusion of politics and ideas,[1] or Tory ideas to the exclusion of politics and economics.[2] Eighteenth-century historians were no different, but as they were often more leisurely in their approach and cast a broader net than their modern brothers and sisters, they can sometimes provide insights into subjects about which they were not directly writing.

Thus the works of Catherine Macaulay Graham, usually read for their radical critique of the politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, suggest not only political reforms but also ideas about how the economic base of the state could be reorganized to better protect individual liberty. As one of the last of the Old Whigs or Commonwealthmen, Macaulay Graham always held the protection of individual liberties to be the main function of the state and its government. But whether she was recounting the failure of the partizans of liberty in seventeenth century Britain or defending the French and American revolutions, she was aware that the social and economic bases of the state must be consonant with its political institutions.

Though the eighteenth century did not have modern economic theory and its vocabulary, property was a word they knew well. It meant more than land or chattels; property also included interests, investments, reversionary rights, dowries, wives, dogs and children. Most people assumed liberty meant that a man could manage his property as he chose, with only minimal regulation from the state.[3] Although property took many forms, land was always the most desirable and valuable kind. The produce of the land was necessary for life; thus its possession led to power.

When possession of land was limited to a small number of people, the result was an aristocracy. Macaulay Graham accepted the idea of a pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxon society of happy and equal free men, though she nowhere elaborated this theory. 'William the Norman tyrant' imposed a new order in which 'all but the great landholders, who held their estates from father to son, by feodal entail, were in a state of abject and impassable vassalage, excluded from any voice in the legislature, or property in the soil.' The creation of Parliament gave the landlords a share in the government. When Henry VII allowed his barons to sell or mortgage their lands, they lost the original rationale for their position. But despite the 'extravagance, dissipation, and idleness, which ever attends hereditary fortune', the nobility continued to possess political power. Elizabeth, using 'all the policy of an artful woman', was able to keep the balance between the Lords who had power and the Commons who now had land. James I also avoided trouble, but Charles I could not. His defeat opened the prospect of achieving liberty, meaning access to property and political power, for all Englishmen.[4]

Clearly one problem for the state was to reconcile political and economic power. Should individuals be able to amass great estates? Should political power automatically go hand in hand with economic power? Some seventeenth century writers such as James Harrington had suggested solutions to these questions; Macaulay Graham knew their work from her early education and from her research in the British Museum and in the pamphlets supplied her by Thomas Hollis.[5] Although there was little place for these theories in her *History*, her pamphlets reflect her acquaintance with Old Whig adaptations of seventeenth century ideas.

In *Loose Remarks on Certain Position to be found in Mr Hobbes' Philosophical Rudiments of Government and Society. With a Short Sketch of a Democratical Form of Government, in a Letter to Signior Paoli* (1767), the results of the historian's reading are obvious. The first part is an indignant rebuttal of Hobbes. Macaulay Graham attacked his view that monarchy is the only effectual government and that to be effective it must be absolute. She argued that neither God nor ancient societies instituted monarchy as the preferred government. Hobbes's statement that 'the state of equality is the state of war', and thus absolute monarchy the only route to a peaceful society was ridiculous. As a good

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[1] John Brewer, *The sinews of power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (Cambridge, 1990).

[2] J C D Clark, *English society 1688-1832* (Cambridge, 1985).

[3] Macaulay Graham defended the property right of authors in their works in *A Modest Plea for the Property of Copy Right* (Bath, 1774). Paul Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798* (Oxford, 1991) presents a full account of changing views of property and their relation to political power. He mentions Macaulay Graham only in relation to copyright (pp.25-27). For other accounts of eighteenth century ideas about property, see: H T Dickinson, *Liberty and property: political ideology in eighteenth-century Britain* (London, 1977); J G A Pocock, *Politics, language and time: essays on political thought and history* (New York, 1971), and *Virtue, commerce and history: essays on political thought and history, chiefly in the eighteenth century* (Cambridge, 1985); J A W Gunn, *Beyond liberty and property: the process of self-recognition in eighteenth-century political thought* (Kingston and Montreal, 1983).

[4] This summary can be found in Catherine Macaulay Graham, *History of England, from the accession of James I to that of the House of Hanover*, (London, 1771) 5: 380-384.

[5] Caroline Robbins, *The eighteenth century commonwealthman* (Cambridge, 1959), remains the best single work on the spread of these ideas.

Commonwealthman, Macaulay Graham believed 'that political equality, and the laws of good government, are so far from incompatible, that one never can exist to perfection without the other'. Monarchy without popular control will encourage an aristocracy, a court and a royal family, all of whom will seek 'to gratify' their own 'lusts and private advantages' which are 'incompatible with the good of the public.' (12-21)

The second part of the pamphlet proposes a constitution for Pasquale Paoli's new Corsican republic. This proposal is pure Commonwealth theory: a representative government protected from corruption by rotation in office and land reform. All positions in the government were to be held in rotation, with a prescribed wait between terms. This would obviously hinder anyone's acquiring a property interest in an office. To prevent the creation of great estates, all land would be inherited equally by the owner's sons, or failing those, male kin of the first or second degree. No female would 'be capable of inheriting or bringing any dower in marriage'. A woman who did not marry must be supported by her male kin. (29-39)

Such a radical revision of property laws could be suggested for a new foreign state but was hardly practicable for England.[6] The radical historian was well aware of the importance her countrymen placed on property. As she continued to address the question of the relations of liberty, property and government, Macaulay Graham faced a familiar dilemma: how far can a government interfere with an individual's property for the common good?

The historian clearly believed that society's interest could override that of the individual property owner. In her account of the Great Fire of London and the subsequent rebuilding of the City, she sided with those who questioned the reluctance of the London authorities to destroy or enter private property to attempt to contain the fire. She also thought that after the fire the King should have 'summoned the Parliament to an immediate attendance, when the sovereign authority of the nation might have adopted and coerced a plan [for rebuilding], which comprehended convenience, beauty and public utility'. She had only scorn for 'what is often erroneously called the security of property', which 'in the opinion of an Englishman, is the very essence of freedom; and the independent use of it, however that liberty may be abused, the *summum bonum* of political happiness.' The view that hoarders, monopolists, cheats and defrauders, as well as honest men, must be protected in their property whatever the consequences to others, found little sympathy with Macaulay Graham. She observed that:

> ... in England, from these false notions of freedom and political good, the basest affections of the human heart are nourished and encouraged; public good avowedly sacrificed to every private interest; ... contrary to every rational principle of freedom, which does not consist in the uncontrouled use of any privilege, natural or political, but in that equality, wisdom and justice of law, which takes from every individual the power of abusing any to the disadvantage of the community.[7]

Macaulay Graham was not opposed to all private property but to the accumulation of large estates and the privileges which the aristocracy, the historic owners of such property, claimed for themselves. She was well aware of the temptations faced by holders of wealth and power. One protection against aristocratic government was to make it impossible for a relatively few people to control most of the property in the state. Edmund Burke, defending aristocratic privilege and property, said great estates were a protection for smaller landowners. Not so, the female historian replied, for:

> ... every citizen who possesses ever so *small* a share of property, is *equally* as tenacious of it as the most opulent member of society; and this leads him to *respect* and to *support* all the laws by which property is protected. It is this sense of personal interest, which, running through every rank in society, and attaching itself to every one of its members who are not in the condition of a pauper, ...

which protects the property of all classes. She cheered the renunciation of privileges by the French nobility in the National Assembly and was hopeful that when the new French constitution was settled all property owners would be treated alike.[8]

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[6] Abolishing primogeniture seemed to many positively unEnglish. David Hume in his *History of Great Britain* described similar Irish customs as 'calculated to keep that people forever in a state of barbarism and disorder', thus part of the justification for James I's real occupation of the neighbouring island. [David Hume, *The History of Great Britain, The Reigns of James I and Charles I*, ed. Duncan Forbes (Harmondsworth, 1970), 117-123.] I owe this reference to the kindness of Susan Staves. Macaulay Graham's *History* is firmly Anglocentric and deals very little with Ireland.

[7] *History from James I* (London, 1781) 6, 207-212.

[8] *Observations on the Reflections of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, on the Revolution in France* (London, 1790), 38-41.

It was not only the accumulation of vast properties in a few hands that Macaulay Graham opposed, but also the equation made by many that property, or economic power, was the same as political power. Political equality of citizens, as she had pointed out in *Loose Remarks*, not a landed aristocracy, is necessary for good government. She knew that some people would acquire more property than others, but that should not automatically give them more political power or higher social position. This view is illustrated in her account of an encounter with Samuel Johnson. James Boswell's version is that while dining with the Macaulays in 1763, Dr Johnson pretended to be converted to his hostess's ideas and proposed that her footman be commanded to sit down to eat with them. She of course refused; 'I thus, Sir, shewed her the absurdity of the levelling doctrine.'[9] In her version, the matter of 'political distinctions' had been discussed at dinner. During coffee afterwards, Johnson suggested that according to her views the footman ought to sit with them instead of waiting on them. She countered, 'I was not arguing against that inequality of property which must more or less take place in all societies, ... I was speaking only of political distinctions.'[10]

A footman, a free man who worked for wages, could be regarded as his master's political equal by a radical Whig. But how did the institution of slavery, humans as property, square with this ideology? Macaulay Graham nowhere confronted the moral issue of slavery; her focus on modern England in most of her work allowed her generally to ignore the question. In her last major work, *Letters on Education*, there are a few hints of disapproval at least of contemporary West Indian slavery (251) as well as an acknowledgement that African and Asian civilizations could be as good as that of Europe (257-258). She also counted the increasing number of slaves and their cruel treatment as one of the factors in the decline of Roman virtue (260). She appears to have regarded slavery as an institution that happened, but certainly not as a necessity for any civilized people.

Too much property and privilege in the hands of a few not only led to oligarchic or despotic government, but, worse, to the pursuit of luxury and the decline of virtue. Most writers on moral and political subjects in the eighteenth century lamented what they saw as the increasing love of luxury, the desire for new possessions and styles whether they were needed or not and whatever their quality might be.[11] Luxury had to be paid for; those who pursued it needed to acquire more property to support their ever more costly desires. Luxury led to corruption in government and morals as those who indulged in it used their political influence to acquire goods or positions. Bribes, buying and selling offices, increasing ranks of placemen, were all inevitable results of the pursuit of luxury. The rich got richer and more corrupt; the poor got poorer and more downtrodden. These disastrous results could happen to any state and any form of government.

Rome usually served as the terrible example of what happened when a state allowed the desire for luxurious living to dominate. Macaulay Graham, while she certainly agreed that 'the *pride*, the *avarice* and *corruption* of the Roman Senate' was the reason for the republic's fall, did not linger long in the classical world in her history or political pamphlets.[12] Her examples of the dangers of corruption came from much closer home, from the history of Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

She described the reign of James I in terms of a balance of interests between the crown and the Commons and between the various religious factions. Furthermore,

> ... their manners were not at this time so effeminate as to endanger an attachment to an inglorious inactivity; idleness, servility and their concomitant vices, were, in these happy days, only to be found among the servants and followers of the court. Candour, valour, integrity, a spirit of independence and every other masculine virtue, were possessed in a high degree by the Commons of England, viz. of the male sex; whilst chastity, modesty, and industry were the general characteristics of the females.[13]

But this happy state did not last. Charles, driven by his 'Passion for power' and supported by corrupt and luxury-loving nobility and bishops, drove his subjects to revolt.[14] Following the execution of the King and the abolition of the monarchy, Parliament acted to restore order and virtue. 'Excellent laws' were passed 'to correct the morals and the manners of the people, without infringement of their political rights, to guard the poor from the miseries of undeserved poverty, to protect society in general from the impositions, fraud and rapacity of individuals.' [15] This settlement however, was overturned by 'the base and wicked selfishness of one trusted citizen', Oliver Cromwell, who was little better than the Stuarts. [16] Once again taxes went to support the luxury and corruption of a court. Religion was no freer, morals no better than they had been before 1649. [17] The Restoration was of course even more guilty of corruption of morals and love of luxury. [18]

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[9] James Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, revis. L F Powell, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1934), 1, 447-448. Another version: 3, 77-78.

[10] *Letters on education, with observations on religious and metaphysical subjects* (London, 1790), 167.

[11] Several of the works on property cited in note 3 also discuss the critique of luxury. In addition, see: John Sekora, *Luxury: the concept in western thought, Eden to Smollett* (Baltimore, 1977); Malcolm Jack, *Corruption and progress: the eighteenth century debate* (New York, 1989); Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and bourgeois radicalism: political ideology in late eighteenth-century England and America* (Ithaca, 1990).

[12] *Observations on the Reflections*, 81. In *Letters on Education*, (239-264) she detailed at more length the decline of Athens and Rome through love of luxury.

[13] *History from James I* (London, 1763) 1, 276-277.

[14] Macaulay Graham's summary of Charles can be found in *History from James I* (London, 1768) 4, 391-397.

The Revolution of 1688 did not improve matters at all. The person of the monarch was changed, but the liberties of the people were no more protected under William than under his Stuart predecessors. Courtiers, politicians and favourites, bishops and placemen, used the institutions of the British state to line their pockets and increase their own power and privileges. The South Sea Bubble was only the most obvious example of the corruption of society, as 'the increase of luxury and vice kept more than equal pace with the imaginary increase of riches: individuals of the lowest class, lifted up in idea to the possession of large property, pampered themselves with rich dainties, with expensive wines, purchased sumptuous furniture, appeared in sumptuous equipages and apparel'; conspicuous luxurious consumption indeed. Even worse,

> It was now generally asserted, that every man had his price: the few instances which the times exhibited of self-denial, ... were regarded as the effects of an enthusiastic lunacy; the electors paid no regard to their privileges, but as it enabled them to make a lucrative gain of their votes; the elected made the best market of their purchased seats; and opposition was now carried on without other motive than the bringing obscure men into notice, and enhancing the price of corruption: ... [19]

Macaulay Graham was not very sanguine about the prospects of immediate improvement of politics and morals in Britain. She and her friends

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[15] *History from James I*, 5, 79.

[16] *Ibid*., 5, 95.

[17] *Ibid*., 5, 388-390.

[18] *Ibid*., 6, 51-53, 287-289.

[19] *History of England from the Revolution to the Present Time* (Bath, R Crutwell, 1778), 308-310. See also Barbara Brandon Schnorrenberg, 'An Opportunity Missed: Catherine Macaulay on the Revolution of 1688', *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture*, 20 (1990), 231-240.

proposed frequent elections, universal manhood suffrage, elimination of placemen from Parliament, reduction of the national debt, and abolition of the standing army. [20] These goals, however, did not seem immediately attainable. Better opportunities for creating states which could eliminate luxury and preserve liberty for all citizens seemed to be offered by revolutionary France and the new United States.

The historian believed that the French National Assembly was making a proper start in the creation of a free and moral state. It took on 'preserving the state from the ruin of an impending bankruptcy, *brought on* by the *prodigality* of courts, and the *regeneration* of the constitution'. It reformed the church and the legal system, drastically reduced the number of pensioners, reformed local government, extended the suffrage, limited the power of the king. All of these were steps toward a better government for France. [21] Macaulay Graham wrote approvingly:

> The French have justified the nobleness of their original character, and from the immersions of luxury and frivolity, have set an example that is unique in all the histories of human society. A populous nation effecting by the firmness of their actions the Universality of their sentiments, and the energy of their actions, the entire overthrow of a Despotism that had stood the test of ages. We are full of wonder in this part of the world, and cannot conceive how such things should be. [22]

The French might be able to achieve a free and uncorrupt state, but Macaulay Graham thought the better opportunity lay with the Americans. In a state which had no nobility, which had thrown off the monarchy, and where land was available for all, there was no dead hand of the past to constrain making a perfect constitution. Could the inhabitants of the United States create a government free from the abuses of privilege and corruption? This was the main theme of letters exchanged between the English historian and two Americans, Mercy Otis Warren and George

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[20] See *Observations on a Pamphlet, Entitled, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (London, 1770); *An Address to the People of England, Ireland and Scotland on the Present Important Crisis of Affairs* (London, 1775), in addition to her works already cited.

[21] *Observations on the Reflections*, 57-89. See also, Barbara Brandon Schnorrenberg, '*Observations on the Reflections*, Macaulay vs. Burke Round Three', *Consortium on revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850. Proceedings, 1987* (Athens, GA, 1987), 215-225.

[22] Catherine Macaulay Graham to George Washington, October 1789. George Washington Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, Library of Congress, Series 4, Reel 98.

Washington, in the later seventeen-eighties. Macaulay Graham and her second husband William Graham, visited the United States in 1784-85. She had corresponded with Warren before the Revolution; after several months together in the Boston area, the friendship between the two women was firmly established. The English couple visited Mount Vernon in the spring of 1785 before they returned to Europe. Macaulay Graham's views about America were, therefore, based on some personal knowledge.

In September 1786 Warren wrote, reassuring her English friend that despite recent disturbances the principles of the Revolution, 'simplicity, virtue and freedom', would be preserved in America. 'Though her nativ`e propensities to folly are strengthened and the seeds of every foreign vice have takn root, ... her local situation and the incapacity for splendid indulgence, from the general equality of fortune' would, Warren believed, keep virtue and liberty strong.[23] However, as the Constitutional Convention pursued its work in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, Warren became more and more doubtful about the future of the United States. She shared anti-Federalist alarm about the Society of Cincinnati, the creation of a standing army, and a turn toward luxury. 'A fondness for honorary distinctions has arisen among us, which calls for an hereditary monarchy for its support and a taste for expensive pleasures reigns while the public treasures are empty and private finances low.'[24]

Macaulay Graham was not so pessimistic as her American friend. She thought the Constitution was 'grounded on simple Democracy' and not tending so much toward 'Monarchy and Aristocracy' as earlier reports had suggested. Pursuit of luxury was the greatest danger faced by the United States, but ...

> ... were your people less fond of Commerce and European luxuries[,] would they attend to the cultivation of their Lands and employ their industry in those manufactures which are necessary to the comforts of life[,] and were strict prohibitions made against the consumption of any forreign manufactures[,] you would in a short time be the happiest and greatest people in the World.'[25]

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[23] M O Warren to C M Graham, Milton, 7 Sept. 1786. Massachusetts Historical Society, Mercy Otis Warren Papers, Letterbook.

[24] MOW to CMG, Milton, 18 Dec. 1787. *Ibid.* Also MOW to CMG, Milton, Aug. 1787; same to same, Milton, 28 Sept. 1787; same to same, Plymouth, July, 1789. *Ibid.*

[25] CMG to MOW, Knightsbridge, Nov. 1787. Massachusetts Historical Society, *Warren-Adams Letters*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1917,1925) [Collections of Massachusetts Historical Society, vols. 72,73], 2, 298-300.

In the Englishwoman's correspondence with Washington, the roles were reversed. The American wrote defending the Constitution and the historian criticized it and made suggestions about how the new state might be further improved. Washington stressed the compromises and conciliation that had been necessary to create the Constitution.[26] Macaulay Graham congratulated the first President on his election and expressed her pleasure that the 'elegant simplicity' of the General and his wife would offer an example to those who equated political importance with luxury.[27] Washington replied with a longer discourse on the new government and its prospects for success.[28]

The historian agreed that the new American government contained nearly all the proposals to protect liberty that she had suggested in her constitution for Corsica. But by the late eighties, she had come to believe that the legislature should not have any control over any part of the executive, and that no member of the legislature should hold any other office, for 'there is no depending on their virtue, except where all corrupting motives are put out of their way.' She had also decided that the new French model of a one house legislature was better; she feared the American Senate might 'in length of time acquire some distinctions which may lay the grounds for political inequality.' Finally, though she was pleased with the apparent increasing prosperity of the United States, she worried that as its commerce and wealth grew,

> ... it is more than possible that the novelty of such seductive enjoyments will overturn all the virtue which at present exists in the country. That an inattention to public interests will prevail, and nothing be pursued but the private gratification and emoluments. These do not appear as groundless fears; for the Americans have shown a greater inclination to the fripperies of Europe, than to classic simplicity.[29]

In her last years, as she contemplated the basic issue of how citizens could be trained to create a good society instead of specific prescriptions for existing governments, Macaulay Graham began to define more clearly what she meant by the luxuries and fripperies of civilization. She realized that the luxuries of one age were sometimes the basic necessities of a later society. Using the example of straw to sleep on ... first a luxury, then a comfort for most as a good firm straw bed, finally degenerating into down beds which caused physical decline ... she criticized not the idea of comfort for sleeping but the inability of most people to know when to stop improvements before they cause harm.[30] It is proper education which will teach men and women when and where to stop. Both Greeks and Romans failed in this. Athenians allowed indulgence of their love of beauty and the arts to corrupt their civilization. Greek ideas and luxuries influenced the Romans; in addition Roman 'public counsels were corrupted by the lust of conquest; and their private manners, by the possession of riches and power.' [31]

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[26] George Washington to CMG, Mt. Vernon, 16 Nov. 1787. John C Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington*, 39 vols. (Washington, 1931-1944), 29, 316-317.

[27] CMG to GW, Oct. 1789. Washington Papers Microfilm, Ser.4, Reel 98.

[28] GW to CMG, New York, 9 Jan. 1790. *Writings of Washington*, 30, 495-498.

[29] CMG to GW, Bracknal, June 1790. Washington Papers Microfilm, Ser.4, reel 99.

But the question of what is luxury still remained. Macaulay Graham acknowledged that the term is used differently, though usually censoriously, by all writers. If luxury includes everything 'which is not necessary to the mere support of existence', then 'every age of the world and ... every state of society' has been guilty of pursuing it. Bathing and the practice of all forms of cleanliness are by some considered luxuries though they are advantageous to everyone. Some enhancement of personal beauty is good; it is extravagance of dress and other adornments that needs correcting. Good food well cooked is not a luxury; it is excessive and wasteful presentation that should be stopped. Likewise, gardening and improvement of the landscape, well designed and well made buildings, are not necessary, but do improve, to use a modern term, the quality of life. How can people be taught the right choices? Education will enable citizens to differentiate between 'those luxuries which are incompatible with the good of society; and what are those indulgences which on motives of sound policy may be allowed and encouraged by government'.[32] It is the 'most important' duty of the state to provide that education which 'must comprehend good laws, good examples, good customs, a proper use of the arts, and wise instruction conveyed to the mind.' Only in this way can the tendency of all people to excess or extremes, whether in government, dress or riches, be corrected.[33]

In her analyses of how a state can protect the liberties of its subjects and how that state can encourage a virtuous and moral citizenry, Catherine Macaulay Graham dealt with some of the most basic questions of politics. How can property or wealth be distributed so as to enable the largest number of citizens to have a fair share? What should be the relation between the owners of property and the government? How much can the government interfere with private property? How can political corruption be avoided? What is the relation between political power and corruption?

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[30] *Letters on education*, 24-26.

[31] *Ibid.*, 241-247, 252-264.

[32] *Ibid.*, 295-307.

[33] *Ibid.*, 272-274.

How can a state attempt to prevent the pursuit of luxury? She believed that the preservation and protection of liberty was the primary function of the state, but liberty meant far more than property, however distributed. Liberty meant popular control of government, free press and free speech, disestablished religion; all these were barriers to the rule of the corrupt privileged few. The validity of her questions and solutions are not limited to the eighteenth century.

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ENLIGHTENMENT PSYCHOLOGY AND INDIVIDUALITY: THE ROOTS OF J S MILL'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF

G W Smith

1. Character, Personality and Individuality

Mill's conception of the self may be explained in terms of his understanding of the relation of the self to its desires. Mill operates with two senses in which my desires may be said to be 'mine'. The primary sense of possession for Mill is a *moral* sense, the sense of 'mine' connected with a capacity for moral agency and with the notion of moral 'character'. The great threat here is the doctrine of determinism, especially social determinism in the form popularized by the early socialist Robert Owen. Owen argues that our characters are not made by us but are made for us, by our social circumstances, and hence that we cannot be held responsible for the desires (and actions) that flow from them. Mill's response is to admit that desires necessarily flow from character, and that if my character were entirely determined for me by society and not, at least in part, by me, my desires would flow from a character not mine and hence they could not be, in a morally relevant sense, my desires. I could not identify with them, could not 'own' them, and consequently could not be held responsible, either for them or for the actions arising from them: moral agency and individual freedom would be impossible. Mill concedes that the human condition is necessarily such that I will have society and socialization to thank for most of my character but, *pace* Owen, not for all of it; or at least, not necessarily for all of it. I can make my desires 'my own' if I can at least take a hand in the making of my character by amending it in the light of a reflective commitment to moral principles and ideals. And this Mill argues we can in fact do in the modified Compatibilist proof of the possibility of human freedom presented in Chapter 2 of Book 6 of the *System of Logic*.[1] We are, or can be, free and morally responsible agents because, generally, we can at least modify our own character 'if we wish'. The wish to modify our character in the light of an ideal of living will admittedly itself have sufficient causal antecedents but, crucially for Mill, it can also figure as a causal ingredient in the complex of conditions determining character.[2]

For Mill, the development and exercise of moral agency represent the most vital interest we have as human beings, and his proof of its possibility (understood as the proof of the possibility of character self-amendment) is at the same time his proof of the possibility of human freedom in a determined world. However, as well as being a reconstructed Compatibilist, Mill is a Utilitarian, and he enters a significant qualification in respect of freedom at this point. Certainly, I must be permitted the space necessary for becoming the kind of person I wish to

become. But, equally, society has a legitimate interest in what use I make of my freedom and in what kind of moral character I develop, i.e. what my dominant dispositions are, whether they are, in particular, felicific or not - whether my character is such that I am disposed to contribute to the general happiness.[3] Thus character formation is in fact a matter of a divided responsibility between the individual agent and society: it is private and self-regarding in the sense that my own personal engagement in the process of character development represents a vital interest I have as a moral agent, but it is other-regarding and public in that the outcome is of proper and profound concern to society at large, which consequently has a legitimate interest in the circumstances in which the process unfolds. Mill's view is, of course, that coercion will generally be inappropriate for obvious reasons - genuinely moral motivation cannot be coerced. Society must therefore discharge its duty by way of education, understood in its broadest sense as arranging social and political institutions and practices in such a way as to encourage and elicit the development of morally desirable characters.[4]

As far as the basic constitution of moral character is concerned, then, the issue of personal originality, or individual eccentricity, simply does not arise. Indeed, even self-agency has a peculiarly restricted scope. First, its goal is already set: moral character, as we have seen, has for its end the production of both individual and general utility. Secondly, to the degree that I actually succeed in making my character what I morally wish it to be, that is to say, in so far as I succeed in establishing steady dispositions of the morally appropriate kind, I necessarily constrict further opportunities for self-formation. The process is essentially one in which the self is, so to speak 'encharactered' - a precipitate increasingly structured by and embedded in the effects of its own activities.[5] Moreover, this process is conceived of as occurring not only in me but in all the moral agents comprising a society grounded in utilitarian principles. Hence, Mill's conception of character self-development implies that not only is my own self increasingly self-integrated, but that it is also thereby integrated into a society of self-integrated moral agents. That is to say, a 'well-ordered' utilitarian society will consist of a system of practices and institutions exemplifying secondary rules of felicific conduct, rules which are internalized by its members as *axiomata media* (in part by social training, in part by self-agency) as motives and dispositions of a well-ordered

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[1] J S Mill, *Collected works,* ed. J Robson (Toronto, 1963-89), 8. [Henceforth '*CW*']

[2] Mill's proof is discussed in more detail in G W Smith, 'The Logic of J S Mill on Liberty' *Political Studies* (1980), 238-52.

[3] See esp. 'Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy', *CW*, 10, 5-17.

[4] Mill is not entirely consistent in excluding coercion as an educative instrument, see *CW*, 9, esp. 458.

[5] See also G W Smith 'Markets and Morals: Self, Character and Markets', in G Hunt (ed) *Philosophy and Politics* (Cambridge, 1990), 15-32.

'virtuous' character.[6] The significance for Mill of his notion of character is thus two-fold: his conception of a combined process of self and social integration is both central to his understanding of individual freedom and moral responsibility on the one hand, and to his account of the grounds of social order on the other. But the effect is precisely to marginalize the values typically associated with Millian individuality, *viz.* originality and eccentricity.

This brings us, of course, to the other, more familiar, sense for Mill in which my desires may be 'mine'. This is the sense in which they express my temperament, display my tastes, reveal my particular (perhaps even peculiar) concerns and attachments, and exhibit my talents, proclivities, and distinctive needs, *etc.* They are what make me especially *me* and *different* from other persons. We might term this the 'expressivist' sense of 'mine'.[7] Mill uses the term 'individuality'; today we tend to talk about 'personality' in this context.[8] Mills' discussion in chapter 3 of *On Liberty* is, of course, the *locus classicus* here, and it is this idea which is generally taken to epitomize his distinctive understanding both of the nature of the self and of human freedom. In explicating the idea, scholars have either sought its roots in Mill's rather casual organic analogies (human nature as being more like a tree than a machine, *etc.*), or have more or less arbitrarily imputed to Mill 'the Romantic belief that each has a quiddity or essence which awaits his discovery and which, if he is lucky, he may express in any one of a small number of styles of life'.[9] The danger with taking Humboldt's conception of individuality as a key to Mill's thinking, however, is that, whereas Humboldt grounds his idea of individuality in an exotic mixture of Kantian idealism and Aristotelian teleology, Mill remains a committed champion of empiricism in philosophy and Associationism in psychology. To put the point in Mill's own terms, Humboldt is on the side of *a priori* Intuition whilst he is a defender of science and Experience. They are thus separated by a philosophical chasm which Mill himself spent most of his intellectual career attempting to widen and deepen. The common difficulty with all these interpretative strategies is at bottom the same: they all fail to connect the notion in any convincing way with the roots of Mill's social philosophy, *viz.* with his empiricism.

Nonetheless, Mill's references to Humboldt do serve to illuminate one significant facet of his conception of individuality. Mill says of Humboldt, 'Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt ... made the text of a treatise - that 'the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole'; that, therefore, the object 'towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts ... is the individuality of power and development.'[10] What is of significance here is the absence of any reference to singularity or eccentricity; individuality is rather a matter of harmony, development and completeness. This is not to deny, of course, that Mill undoubtedly believes that fully developed individuals will in some sense be unique, but his emphasis is at least as much upon the intrinsic value of the integration of individual capacities and powers into a unity. And, in the light of our analysis of his understanding of character, this in turn implies the desirability of the integration of the moral and expressivist sides of our nature into a complete and coherent whole; and further, given the socially integrative function of character as described above, the harmonization of these elements in such a way that the individual is successfully incorporated as a 'complete individual' into a well-ordered society.

Mill's considered conception of individuality, then, accords no intrinsic value to eccentricity *per se*, or to merely happening to be different. On the contrary, it is of value because it represents the highest kind of achievement: the production of a self- and socially-integrated expressive and moral unity; the creation of an agent capable of 'owning' his or her desires (and actions), both *qua* character and *qua* personality.

The remainder of this paper is devoted to investigating the relations between these two elements of Mill's conception of the self; in particular, to considering the conditions under which Mill believes 'character' and

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[6] See F Berger *Happiness, justice and freedom: the moral and political philosophy of J S Mill* (Berkeley, 1984) ch.1; and G W Smith 'Freedom and Virtue in Politics: some aspects of Character, Circumstances and Utility from Helvetius to J S Mill' *Utilitas* (1989), 112-134.

[7] I intend a thinner notion of 'expressivism' here than the post-Romantic doctrine identified by Charles Taylor, see *Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity* (Cambridge, 1989), ch.21.

[8] Mill was probably inhibited here by the older sense of the term, *viz.* legal personality, the capacity for legal agency. Also, for reasons which I hope will become apparent, Mill's theory of the self ultimately resists a sharp or unambiguous distinction between what we might now differentiate as 'character' and 'personality'. On the importance of the idea of character more generally in the 19th century, see S Collini 'The Idea of 'Character' in Victorian Political Thought' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (1985), 29-50.

[9] John Gray in, J Gray and G W Smith (eds.) *J S Mill on Liberty in Focus* (London, 1991), 193. Gray's investigation of individuality is exemplary in its penetration, but he frankly admits to its speculativeness. See also: R F Ladenson 'Mill's Conception of Individuality' *Social Theory and Practice* (1977), 167-82, and A Thorlby ' Liberty and Self-development: Goethe and J S Mill *Neohelicon* (1973), 91-110.

[10] *CW*, 18, 261.

'personality' may be integrated and harmonized in the achievement of 'individuality'. The discussion will lead us into some of the perhaps less familiar aspects of Mill's empiricism. A beginning will be made by considering an Enlightenment debate as to the nature of individuality, a debate which anticipates some of Mill's major preoccupations on the same topic, and in terms of which his own position may be usefully located.

2. An Enlightenment Dilemma

On the question of empiricist psychological doctrine as to the nature of the self, Mill was heir to a severely divided tradition. By the end of the 18th century empiricist psychology had fallen into two distinct and contending schools. The Associationist psychology, of which Mill was a committed proponent, represents the culmination of a distinctive way of thinking about the mind which originated with Locke. Lockean psychology is primarily epistemological in its concerns. That is to say, its aim is to produce a scientific account of the growth of knowledge in terms of the mental elements (impressions and ideas) constituting human experience. It proceeds on the assumption that the influence of the physical organism remains constant, and differences in knowledge, and consequently in the behaviour of individuals, are explained in terms of differences in the environmental circumstances to which they are exposed. The political implications of Lockean 'sensationalism' were drawn out in France as a part of the Enlightenment project of the 'perfectibility of man' *via* (most influentially) Helvétius and Condillac.[11] The result of the refusal to assign any differentiating role to the particular organs of perception or sensation, or to the physical organism in general, was 'Condillacian man' - a conception of the individual as a depersonalised 'species-being', a 'statue with a *tabula rasa* for a mind'. Opposed to sensationalism and the philosophy of *l'experience* was the method of *l'homme machine*, exemplified most famously in La Mettrie's book of the same name.[12] Here the concern is with the facts of individual physiology. The instincts, emotions, individual temperament and intelligence, rather than abstract ideas, are the major focus of interest, and the aim is to trace their causes in the physical organism.

The difference of method reflects a divergence of interest. Whereas the sensationalists wish to explain the general conditions of the formation of knowledge, the exponents of *l'homme machine* are more concerned with the instinctual and emotional responses, and with the innate temperament of the individual. From the point of view of the likes of La Mettrie and Diderot, elegant and economical though the Helvétian sensationalist method might be, it exacts too high a price, tending as it does systematically to discount individual differences arising from the physiological peculiarities of the individual. Hence it has difficulty in accommodating instinctual, emotional or affective states, automatic reactions, hereditary dispositions, temperamental traits, sympathetic relations, or the stages of maturation. Or so it was charged by its critics.[13] In consequence, equality and individuality are theorized within the broad empiricist tradition in severely antithetical ways. The sensationalist method is grounded in an axiom of human equality and holds out the prospect of endless species perfectibility through social improvement, but fails to accommodate individuality and difference; the method of *l'homme machine* is strong on individuality, but at the expense of human equality.

On the face of it, the problem seems to be specifically designed for resolution by the application of Mill's celebrated eclecticism. We might expect Mill to try to combine elements of each, giving appropriate weight to physiology on the one hand and to experience on the other, with what is expressively distinctive about the individual *per se* being explained in terms of the unique constellation of emotional and affective dispositions, temperamental traits, insight and personal intelligence, associated with the distinctive physiology of the individual. No such theory is, however, to be found in Mill. Why Mill declines to take the opportunity to develop an expressivist theory of individuality in these terms, or to attempt a judicious reconciliation of elements of each, is an interesting question in the history of liberal ideas, involving the murky and neglected question of the reception of physiological psychology into the British tradition of utilitarianism.[14] Here an attempt will simply be made to illuminate Mill's understanding of the self by reconstructing a dilemma arising from this division within Enlightenment psychology; a dilemma which must confront anyone who, like Mill, is committed to evolving a conception of the agent as a socially self-integrated self from principles grounded in empiricist psychology.

The nature of the dilemma may be revealed by briefly considering an exchange between two major representatives of the contending schools, Helvétius and Diderot. Helvétius takes the most uncompromising sensationalist line on individuality. He maintains that even genius, not to speak of mere originality or individuality, must be explained solely in environmental terms. Thus the likes of Milton and Molière owe their genius primarily to accidents of social circumstances, one to the consequences of the death of a dictator, the other to the impact of the glimpse of a beautiful

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[11] Karl Marx has an interesting account of the reception of the Lockean doctrine into France, see G W Smith 'Sinful Science: Marx's Theory of Freedom from Thesis to Theses' *History of Political Thought* (1981), 141-59, and cp. W M Spellman *Locke and the problem of depravity* (Oxford, 1988).

[12] *L'Homme Machine: a study in the origins of an idea*, ed. A Vartanian (Princeton, 1960).

[13] See Vartanian, *op. cit.* 68.

[14] Alexander Bain, a Victorian psychologist of note, biographer of James Mill and friend, collaborator and biographer of J S Mill, alludes to the puzzle, without solving it, in his *James Mill: a Biography* (London, 1882), 248-50.

woman.[15] Originality must be a matter of accident because our natures are all basically the same: our characters are the effect of our passions, these in turn are the effect of our situation; and, as things are in unreformed, irrational societies, our situation is more often than not a matter of chance. But what about original differences of talent? Helvétius concedes that there are marginal differences in individual endowments, but what makes the real difference between the likes of Milton and Molière and the rest of us is not natural talent but effort and application. That is to say, differential performance is due overwhelmingly to differential motivation, especially to concentration and persistence; and these are open to external, environmental, manipulation and stimulation. Hence the need to radical social reform, to replace a regime of chance with a system of rational education, understood in the broadest sense as all those circumstances that can be altered to affect the formation of character - domestic, pedagogical, social and political.[16]

In his *Réfutation d'Helvétius* Diderot objects that the sensationalist account of originality is simply incredible. True, social circumstances have some effect on character, but surely by no means to the degree Helvétius claims.[17] Of far greater significance are what Diderot, in a quaint metaphor, calls the two 'mainsprings of the human machine' - the brain, which determines our mental powers, and the diaphragm, the seat of the emotions. In addition, heredity ('the paternal molecule') has its effect too. Though the basic construction is the same in at least all 'normal' people, in its minute organization every individual human machine is unique. According to Helvétius, the provision of a sufficiently powerful motive is enough to make anyone pretty well capable of anything - 'l'éducation peut tout, elle fait dancer l'ours'.[18] But the facts refute him. Bears may indeed be taught to dance, but the dancing bear is an unhappy creature. Indeed, Diderot is himself a case in point: with all his desire to be successful with women he could never learn to dance properly. And as for literary genius, if he were placed in the Bastille and given ten years to write a scene worthy of Racine or be executed, they might as well strangle

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[15] C A Helvétius *Oeuvres complètes* (Hildesheim, 1969), *De l'Homme*, 7, 51-5. (We also apparently owe *Hamlet* to an unfortunate episode of deer-stealing on the outskirts of Stratford-upon-Avon.)

[16] See Smith 'Character and Virtue' *op. cit.* sects. 1 and 2.

[17] D Diderot, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1875), ed. J Assezat, *Refutation d'Helvétius*, 2, 275-456. (The Refutation was unpublished at the time of Diderot's death in 1784.) The MSS went to the Hermitage and was not published in its entirety until this edition, though parts were cited in the late 18th century in Naigeon's *Memoires* and other bits appeared in 1857 in the *Revue de Paris*. So it is unclear how much of it (if any) was directly known to either James or J S Mill.)

[18] Diderot, *op. cit.* 384; Helvétius, *op. cit.*, 228.

him right away.[19]

Diderot's opinion, then, is that we cannot avoid invoking inequalities of natural endowment in any credible explanation of genuine individuality. If anything, the truth of the matter is the reverse of that asserted by Helvétius: pre-existing talents and aptitudes explain persistence and enthusiasm, and hence individual achievement, rather than the other way about. Prospects for individual improvement are thus necessarily limited by an unequal distribution of natural capacities and powers, and hence of motivation. Moreover, 'Just as there are different species of dogs with different characteristics, so it is with men. If some dogs are good at hunting, others at guarding, why should there not be the same variety within the human race?' [20] Diderot thus raises the ominous possibility, not merely that natural talents and capacities may be distributed unequally, but that they may be distributed in a systematically unequal way.

And he goes further, raising questions about the effects of heredity which must grate upon anyone with Mill's moral commitments. Thus in *Rameau's Nephew* Diderot asks the rascally Rameau: 'How is it that with a discrimination as delicate as yours and your remarkable sensitivities for the beauties of musical art, you are so blind to the finer things of morality, so insensitive to the charms of virtue?' Rameau blames it on the paternal molecule; 'this wretched first molecule must be hard and obtuse and has affected everything else'. But what about his children? Rameau loves his son, won't he then attempt to check the effect of the unfortunate paternal molecule on him? Rameau: 'I should work to very little purpose, I think. If he is destined to become a good man I shan't do him any harm. But if the molecule meant him to become a ne'er-do-well like his father, then the trouble I should have gone to in order to make him an honest man would have been most harmful: training being continually at cross purposes with the natural bent of the molecule, he would be torn between two opposing forces and walk all crooked down life's road like a lot of them who are equally inept at good or evil and whom we call 'types', the most frightening of all epithets because it indicates mediocrity and the last stages of the contemptible.' [21] If an education to virtue can go against the grain of an individual's nature and produce a weak and vacillating character without the courage of his or her convictions, good or bad; that is to say, if the imperative of character development can contend with that of personality realization, then Diderot has manifestly raised a most ominous and possibly intractable problem for Mill's programme of constructing the integrated self.

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[19] Diderot, *op. cit.* 333 (Diderot remarks that he would be more impressed with Helvétius's theory 'if great discoveries were made by others than the likes of Newton, d'Alembert and Euler', 369.)

[20] Diderot, *op. cit.* 406.

[21] Diderot, *op. cit.* 468-9. *Rameau's nephew* was first published in 1823. (Translation from *Rameau's nephew and D'Alembert's dream*, (Harmondsworth, 1966), 107.)

The upshot of Diderot's critique of Helvétian sensationalism is thus uniformly hostile to Mill's two basic values, namely equality and individuality. As for individuality, the doctrines of physiological psychology support a much more convincing account of individual difference than do those of sensationalism, but at the same time they imply the possibility of genetically grounded limitations sharply restricting prospects for individual improvement. And as far as equality is concerned, they serve to raise the spectre of biologically or physiologically based systematic intra-species inequalities, possibilities which Mill's ethics must on principle exclude. This latter perhaps requires a further word of explanation. Mill in fact advances two conceptions of equality, one empirical and one normative. The first is that of (Helvétian) 'natural equality': all humans are basically the same so far as their original capacities and potentialities are concerned, and hence all are equally capable of 'improvement'. The second is a normative principle to the effect that 'each is to count for one and only one' when aggregating utilities. The two are connected in that the practical effect of the normative principle depends upon the truth of the empirical claim - significant empirical inequalities between individuals or groups will license very unequal (and unjust?) treatment. Hence Mill's emphatic rejection of all forms of natural intra-species inequality - between races, the sexes, and social classes.[22] In short then, a physiologically based expressivist theory of individuality of the kind Diderot advances against Helvétian sensationalism, superficially attractive though it might be to anyone who values and wants to theorize individual differences, in fact exacts a price Mill must find unacceptable: it simply renders impossible the realization of his major values, equality and freedom.

4. Mill's Modified Associationism

The kind of position represented by Diderot may be unwelcome and inconvenient to Mill, but as it is drawn within the broad field of empiricist psychology, to which he is himself commited, he clearly cannot afford simply to ignore it. Neither can be simply leave a void where the proponents of physiology attack the sensationalist account of individual difference. Mill's general orientation on the question is signalled unambiguously in his essay *Nature*. As we have seen, Diderot's theory of the self is a theory of 'natural' individuality, in the sense that it is grounded in the natural biological and physiological 'givens' of the individual 'machine'. Mill reacts sharply to such a view of human nature, observing that some people hold that we should 'follow our nature', understood in the sense of simply obeying the unreflective and primitive impulses or instincts of our natures, and that this is often held along with the view that almost every feeling or impulse is an instinct, with the result that 'almost every variety of unreflective and uncalculating impulse receives a kind of consecration'.[23] Mill refuses to enter into the 'difficult question' of what are and what are not instincts, but 'allowing everything to be an instinct which anybody has ever asserted to be one, it remains true that nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct; and that there is hardly anything valuable in the natural man except capacities - a whole world of possibilities, all of them dependent upon eminently artificial discipline for being realized.'[24] What then, does this 'artificial discipline' involve? How do we refine our instincts and realize our capacities? What are the psychological processes Mill believes to be at work here? And can they furnish an alternative, plausible, account of the expressive side of the self?

We may begin by noting that Mill's alternative to the doctrines of *l'homme machine* involves what he considers to be a crucial reformulation of the principles of Helvétian sensationalism. Helvétius, in addition to his commitment to species equality, is a psychological egoist. For him, selfishness is a pre-social and unalterable fact. Not only do we necessarily seek our own pleasure, if necessary at the expense of others, we also invariably adopt the same means - by seeking power over other people. All other motives and dispositions are merely socially determined variations upon this fundamentally Hobbesian theme of striving for power over others: tactical modes, so to speak, of a permanent and pervasive grand strategy. Hence the severe limits upon possibliities of reform: as our primary dispositions to seek pleasure and power are unalterable, the best we can hope to do is to restructure our political institutions and social practices so as to establish a rational system of externally-imposed incentives and deterrents aimed at modifying our secondary dispositions in the direction of general utility.[25]

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[22] Mill's position on human nature is thus a two-fold one: we are fundamentally the same *qua* members of the human species but profoundly different, even unique, *qua* individuals within the species. He thus rejects *e limine* any 'mediation' of individuality *via* natural intra-species group membership. Under pressure from his ideological commitments Mill's 'argumentative strategy' in dealing with opponents who cite 'evidence' of the natural inequality of subordinate groups (women, *etc.*) varies. Sometimes he claims the methodological higher ground and charges them with faulty induction from limited evidence (how can we know what *e.g.* women could do or be in quite different circumstances from what we know of them now in circumstances of social inequality?); sometimes he proceeds as if he already has a completed science of the social production of the self (Ethology) at his elbow and can thus demonstrate the artificiality of all actual inequalities. Collini charges Mill with being 'high-handed' here, see 'Introduction' to *CW*, 21, esp. xxxiii; and cp. Bain's comments on Mill's 'two major errors as a scientist', *J S Mill* (London, 1882), 146-8. Leslie Stephen maintains that Mill's unwillingness to recognize natural inequalities leads to an 'abstract' understanding of individuality, see 'An Attempted Philosophy of History', *Fortnightly Review* (1880), 672-95.

[23] *CW*, 10, 393.

[24] *Ibid.*

Mill's response essentially is that the Helvétian psychology has been falsified by developments in the science of the mind. The Lockean principle of association, *viz.* that the more complex phenomena of the human mind arise out of the more simple and elementary (impressions and ideas) according to causal principles of repetition, contiguity and resemblance, has been significantly strengthened and its implications deepened by the discoveries of Hartley and James Mill.[26] The advance revolves upon the discovery of two basic and pervasive mechanisms of the human mind: coalescence and displacement.[27]

Coalescence: *e.g.* the idea of an orange is a compound of simple ideas of colour, visible and tangible shape, taste, smell, *etc.*, yet it is to us a single thing not a plurality of things. It is a typical example of the way in which a number of sensations which have been often experienced simultaneously or in very rapid succession not only raise up one another, but do this so certainly and instantaneously as to run together, and 'seem melted into one'. In the case of the orange it is still fairly easy to resolve the complex idea into its constituent parts by analysis. But mental phenomena can be even more intimately united in a kind of 'chemical union', in which the separate elements are no more distinguishable as such than hydrogen and oxygen in water, the compound 'having all the appearance of a phenomenon *sui generis*', as simple and elementary as its ingredients.[28] And in a similar way complex feelings, although resolvable into more primitive constituents, undergo a qualitative change.

Displacement: this mechanism applies particularly to motivation. It determines how what is first desired as means becomes, as a result of the 'adhesive force of association', desired for itself.[29] We do not thereby cease to desire pleasure; everything desired is necessarily desired *qua* pleasant, but the range of things it is possible to come to desire *qua* pleasant is indefinitely wide. So, although it is true that I begin by pleasing others so they will please me, I end by finding pleasure in pleasing others. In both cases my motive for action is the same, my pleasure, but in the latter case what was originally desired merely as a means to pleasure becomes pleasurable in itself. I come to find pleasure in the idea of

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[25] Smith 'Freedom and Virtue in Politics', *op. cit.* sections 1 and 2.

[26] James Mill, *Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind* (2nd ed. J S Mill and A Bain) 2 vols. (London, 1869), Introd. xii; *CW*, 31, 98-9.

[27] These are my terms for what Mill tends to call the 'plastic process'.

[28] *Analysis*, ch.3.

[29] *op. cit.* ch.23, 295-6; *CW*, 31, 229-30.

the cause of the pleasure without reference to its effect, and it is this pleasure which I act to satisfy, in Mill's view thus detaching my action from its connection as a means.[30]

The principle of displacement carries immense ramifications in Mill's thought. It furnishes Mill with an account of how external incentives and deterrents determining behaviour may be internalized and pursued or avoided for their own sake. And, not least, it goes to the heart of one of the central doctrines of *On Liberty* in furnishing the empirical psychological basis for his ideal of 'experiments of living, as the 'adhesive process' is causal and contingent, a good part of our learning experience consists of coming to discover what it is that we like. Mill credits his father with pioneering the way by showing how 'Wealth, Power and Dignity', originally pursued as means to pleasure come to be desired for themselves. His father, however, failed to follow up the implications. Thus, these grand strategies themselves spawn further means upon which desire tends to be displaced, *e.g.* knowledge sought originally as a means to power or wealth (themselves possibly having become a 'part of happiness'), comes to be valued for itself, and so on.[31] Self-discovery, then, is not a matter of intuiting some mysterious pre-existing essence or quasi-teleological 'quiddity' of our natures, but rather one of discovering the effects of the potentially endless process of displacement of affect from ends to means. And the more various the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the more complex the causal network, and hence the more differentiated the final results. Mill acknowledges that associations will vary between individuals, not only because of our differing situations and experiences, but also, to some degree, because of differences in aptitudes and proclivities. But, like Helvétius, he is very much concerned to minimize the effects of natural differences. His emphasis is upon the flexibility of the processes, upon the malleability of our motives, and hence upon the opportunities we (and society) have to influence and 'improve' our characters.[32]

In addition, displacement furnishes the psychological key to the troubled transition from desiring my own happiness to desiring that of others.[33] As we have seen, Helvétian selfishness, far from representing the truth about human nature, simply represents an incomplete and stunted psychological development - 'untutored' nature. In the course of the appropriate 'artificial discipline' (*i.e.* a good education), though I begin by pleasing others so they will please me in return, I shall end simply finding pleasure in pleasing them. Of course, even in terms of Mill's modified theory of motivation, the position is not without difficulties. For, if others cease to reciprocate and please me because I please them, I may find a diminishment in the pleasure I get from pleasing them, a fact which suggests that my pleasing them is both a means and an end, rarely simply an end in itself. Indeed, Mill at times seems to hold that an unconditional devotion to others' pleasures would require a revolution in human nature, and at other times that it would be positively undesirable if it were possible - *vide* his comments on Comte's doctrine of altruism.[34]

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[30] *op. cit.* ch.23, 308; *CW*, 31, 231-2. See also F Wilson, *Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of J S Mill*, (Toronto, 1990), esp. ch.7.

[31] *Analysis*, ch.21, 233-4; *CW*, 31, 220-22.

[32] See J Riley, *Liberal utilitarianism* (Cambridge, 1988), ch.9, sect.5; and *CW*, 10, 409-11.

[33] See J Skorupski, *J S Mill* (London, 1989), ch.9.

Bain, Mill's collaborator as editor of the *Analysis*, was struck by the narrowness of the Associationist basis of Mill's psychology, and by the inadequacy of his treatment of egoism. He argues that Mill's derivation of Benevolence from Prudence cannot account for 'the intensity and diffusion of disinterested impulses as actually found among mankind' and that we must therefore assume a 'sympathetic instinct' as 'an ultimate fact of our nature'. [35] Mill's response is both characteristic and significant for an understanding of the root idea informing his notion of the fundamental features of the self. For Mill, what is important about sympathy is not its genesis, or even its strength, but rather its susceptibility to control and direction. Sympathy is important primarily because it contributes the basis of a 'Moral Sentiment': to constitute a moral feeling 'not only must the good of others have become in itself a pleasure to us, and their suffering a pain, but this pleasure or pain must be associated with our own acts as producing it, and must in this manner have become a motive, prompting us to one sort of act, and restraining us from the other sort.' [36] Mill's interest in the emotion is thus basically a practical one - sympathy is significant as a feeling which can be developed and directed by exposing the agent to the appropriate kind of education, and it can be made a moral motive for action in the same way. His response to Bain's criticisms well reveals his overriding concern, which is to develop an empirical theory of the subject according to which self and social integration is achieved by way of the application of the mechanisms of association, which are conceived of essentially as handles by which selves may be produced, both directly by self-formation, and by way of socialization.

Mill's position thus remains essentially one of Helvétian sensationalism, in the sense that it is fundamentally an elaborated theory of motivation grounded in the Helvétian axiom of human equality. By extending

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[34] *CW*, 10, 339-40. In this respect Mill's psychology supports the basically 'contractual' reading of Mill's ethics offered by Alan Ryan in *John Stuart Mill* (New York, 1970).

[35] *Analysis*, ch.23, 302-7.

[36] *op. cit.* ch.23, 308-9; *CW*, 31, 231-3.

the malleability of human motivation from secondary to primary motives Mill believes both that he has solved the problem of egoism connected with the more elementary form of social determination of the self associated with Helvétius, and that he has avoided the problems associated with taking human nature as a mere 'given' *à la* Diderot. Bain's complaints as to the narrowness of Mill's approach, and of the absence of any serious attempt to explain the nature and genesis of the emotions, identify precisely the point at which biological or physiological considerations are likely to be paramount, and where deeply intractable, and possibly systematic, intra-species inequalities are likely to lie (Bain prefers an explanatory mix of evolutionism and physiology).[37] Moreover, on the closely allied topic of aesthetic sensibility, Mill himself confesses that he has little or nothing to say.[38]

5. Mill's 'restricted self'

These then, are the primary psychological elements out of which Mill fashions his distinctive notion of the self; and the nature of these principles is such that they are clearly much more amenable to being deployed in an account of the social self-construction of the steady motives and dispositions that constitute the good 'character' than in explaining the genesis or nature of the 'expressivist' idiosyncrasies of 'personality'. The driving assumptions of Mill's psychology surface unambiguously in his comments on 'self-culture' in his 'Rectorial Address' to the students of St. Andrew's University. 'There is', he says '... a natural affinity between goodness and the cultivation of the Beautiful, when it is a real cultivation, and not a mere unguided instinct. He who has learnt what beauty is, if he be of virtuous character, will desire to realize it in his own life - will keep before himself a type of perfect beauty in human character, to light his attempts at self-culture'.[39] Stefan Collini comments that although as a step-child of English Romanticism, Mill insists that the cultivation of the feelings is at the core of the aesthetic experience, it seems to be only a certain, rather narrow, selection of the feelings that is involved.[40] Natural beauty is taken primarily to have value because it ennobles the soul and unites us in the experience of the higher pleasures. Mill's aesthetics thus remains very much a moralizing aesthetics *à la* Wordsworth.[41] Moreover, there appears to be little room for the tragic. As Collini puts it, where values clash 'there is the presumption that selfishness is at work somewhere'.[42] Mill apparently finds no place for art as a rival realm of value. Moreover, Collini argues, there is the slide from 'beauty in general' to 'beauty in human character': again evidence that for Mill aesthetic sensitivity is tied to moral cultivation, and beauty necessarily supplements and supports goodness and virtue. To put the point in the terms of this paper: personality is essentially similar to character in two significant respects - it represents an achievement, rather than a given, and it is an achievement of a distinctive kind of 'éducation sentimentale', in which morality invests beauty with an authentic value. In effect, then, as Collini puts it, Mill advances a significantly 'restricted' notion of the self; that is to say, a conception of self (and social) formation, the pursuit and fulfilment of which not only does not impede, but positively fosters, the moral interests of others.[43] Mill's system of actual priorities thus appears accurately to reflect the tendencies of his psychological analysis: it is the making of character (according to the principles of Association) that constitutes, ideally, the primary activity of self-culture; and the achievement of individuality is a process in which the expressive aspects of personality are ideally integrated with character by embellishing the latter in a manner which produces an aesthetically pleasing, unified, self, one distinguished both by virtue and by grace.

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[37] *op. cit.*, ch.23, 305.

[38] *Analysis*, ch.21, 254; *CW*, 31, 224.

[39] *CW*, 21, 255.

[40] *CW*, 21, lvi.

[41] *Ibid.* Cp. Mill's account of the effects on his own character of reading Wordsworth during his youthful 'mental crisis'. *CW*, 1, and his approving references to Ruskin's highly moralized understanding of beauty, *Analysis* 21, 254; *CW*, 31, 224.

6. Conclusion

Two final observations may be made as to the broader implications of the reading offered here. In the first place, it brings Mill significantly closer in practical terms to an idealist position on the question of the relation between the individual and society than is usually acknowledged. For, as the self is for Mill 'constituted' rather than 'given', a major preoccupation of politics must be one of *bildung*, that is to say, the arrangement of political and social institutions and practices in such a way as to further the moral/aesthetic social self-formation of the individual, rather than (as Mill is often interpreted) one of regulating the mutual jostling of self-asserting individuals preoccupied with simply 'expressing themselves' or intent upon searching out and displaying the mysterious 'quiddity' which makes them unique as individuals. In this respect *Considerations on Representative Government* perhaps serves a a more accurate guide to Mill's understanding of the self than does *On Liberty*. But this in turn raises in an acute form the question of how such an understanding of Mill's conception of the self can be squared with his celebrated presentation of individuality in the Essay. On this, admittedly tricky, issue the following brief points must suffice.

First, we must as a preliminary surely put Mill's casual organic analogies and approving references to Humboldt aside. The deep assumptions concerning the nature of the self which underlie his discussion of individuality in *On Liberty* are more reasonably to be sought in the theory of modified sensationalism designed to accommodate the individuality which both Diderot and Mill find, though in very different ways, to be so signally lacking in the naïve sensationalism of Helvétius. Mill, after all, prides himself in being a systematic thinker and it is simply perverse to proceed on the assumption that, when he comes to write *On Liberty*, the desire for system suddenly deserts him. Secondly, the internal complexity of the Millian conception of the self described above permits, even encourages, ambiguities, which Mill at times exploits, and at other times to which he himself perhaps falls victim.

More specifically, free agency, as Mill theorizes it, is susceptible of emphasis in two very different directions. On the one hand, with the aspect of 'character' uppermost, it can be pointed towards Mill's preoccupations with the conditions for democratic stability, towards the social self-creation of a virtuous citizenry, equipped with the steady moral dispositions necessary for integration into the practices of a successful democracy.[44] On the other, with 'personality' in the ascendant, it can be turned in the direction of the ostensible concerns of *On Liberty*, where the emphasis is instead upon singularity and variety - not simply making one's desires one's own, but making them different from those of others. Indeed, his submerged assumptions as to the nature of the psychological mechanisms involved in human action enable him to take a fairly relaxed view, at least in the long term, of what is typically regarded as the central 'liberal' problem addressed in the Essay, *viz.* the problem of regulating, in a manner compatible with justice, the conflicts and collisions which inevitably arise between agents dedicated to individual self-development and personal self-expression. For, if the above account is correct, Mill is theoretically well placed to regard the kind of primitive Helvétian egoism that requires strong and extensive external constraint under the Principle of Liberty as its primary mode of control (law, public opinion, etc.) as merely a contingent and temporary mode of human motivation - the result of faulty social education. That is to say, as the *axiomata media* informing the institutions and practices of a good society are ideally progressively internalized as aspects of the virtuous character, the Principle of Liberty may itself be expected increasingly to figure as a moral motive internally shaping and constraining the direction of the individual's engagement in 'experiments of living' and self-culture. Indeed, the internalization of the Principle of Liberty in this way may be seen as an exemplary instance of how character and virtue operate to shape the development of the expressive aspects of personality to produce an integrated individuality displaying both harmony and uniqueness.

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[42] *CW*, 21, lvi.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] See Smith, 'Freedom and Virtue', *op. cit.*, sect.6, and 'Markets and Morals', *op. cit.* for Mill's understanding of the integrative functions of market practices.

Even so, Mill's vision of the fully developed exponent of self-culture is admittedly not much in evidence in *On Liberty* itself, and this raises the further question of the place of the Essay in Mill's broader social philosophy. In this regard all that can be said here is that the question of the status of *On Liberty* as a paradigmatically liberal document is perhaps due anyway for reconsideration. Thus, Stefan Collini argues that Mill is in fact much more committed to an essentially late Victorian ideal of altruism as the proper and possible form of motivation for social action than is usually thought to be the case.[45] In a similar vein, Joseph Hamburger maintains that the *On Liberty* is best read, not as a direct defence of individual liberty, but rather as a polemically conceived attack on the mentally debilitating Victorian atmosphere of Christian religiosity, and as a strategically indirect defence of an alternative society of the kind Mill intimates in the 'Utility of Religion', where he is clearly willing to envisage a much more 'organic' relationship between the individual and society, and where he shows himself to be prepared to admit an extensive educative role both for rationally reconstructed social institutions and practices and for a public opinion purged of Intuitionist metaphysics and dogmatic religion.[46] Both readings support, and are supported by, the analysis of Mill's theory of the self presented here.

The central conviction informing the entirety of Mill's thought is thus that the possibility of both individual self culture and social progress arises from the vital truth that we can work creatively upon our natures, both individually and in social co-operation with others; and that we can do so in such a way as to produce an individuality which in fact transcends the limitations of the conventional liberal understanding of the self - namely a unified totality comprising the integration of the aspects of both character and personality, whereby the apparently contending moral and expressivist senses in which my desires are 'mine' are reconciled and harmonized, both internally and with respect to society at large. And all this without need either to sacrifice the Helvétian principle of natural equality, to which Mill remains thoroughly committed, or to accept the kind of morally repugnant physiologically grounded account of individuality offered by Diderot, and which he is so manifestly concerned to reject.

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[45] *Public Moralists* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. chs.2 and 4.

[46] 'Religion and *On Liberty*', in M Laine (ed.) *A Cultivated Mind: Essays on J S Mill Presented to John M Robson* (Toronto, 1991), 139-81; see also *CW*, 10, 403-28.

LITERALLY ORTHODOX: SAMUEL JOHNSON'S ANGLICANISM

Jane Steen

Scholarship of Johnson's religious thought has attended both to its biographical importance and to its place in the context of his writing.[1] Its significance has been reinforced by recent studies of the *Dictionary* which have emphasized the theological and politico-theological aspects of that work.[2] No published study, however, has considered Johnson's doctrinal position in the light of the Anglican theology expressed in the Book of Common Prayer and other writings of early Anglican theologians which the *Dictionary* indicates that he read. This article considers the relationship between Johnson's and this earlier thought with specific reference to the doctrine of the sacraments. Two of Johnson's surviving sermons are communion sermons, his diary accounts of his preparations for communion suggest a strict and elevated understanding of the importance of the eucharistic sacrament,[3] and he includes in the *Dictionary* quotations concerning sacramental doctrine that point to the body of theological thought upon which he drew. This evidence makes it possible to argue for Johnson's sacramental doctrine as rooted in Reformation thought and to view it as at times in opposition to that of some of his more immediate predecessors and near contemporaries. In order to substantiate these connections, however, it is necessary to look first at that Reformation thought, secondly at its use and expression by Johnson and finally at his own in relation to other eighteenth century sacramental doctrine.

(i) Eucharistic theology and the Reformation

When the English church ceded from the Roman, Archbishop Cranmer was chiefly responsible for its vernacular services, including the 1549 and 1552 Prayer Books and an early communion service. Abandoning the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation, by 1538 Cranmer appears to have accepted a doctrine of the Real Presence; from this, he moved to the doctrine professed in the Book of Common Prayer, which he expressed in his *Defence of the True and Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrament* of 1550.[4]

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[1] Book-length studies include those by: Robert Voitle; Paul Kent Alkon; Maurice Quinlan; Chester Chapin; James Gray; Charles Pierce; Nicholas Hudson.

[2] See Robert DeMaria, Jr., *Johnson's Dictionary and the Language of Learning* (Oxford, 1986) and Allen Reddick, *The Making of Johnson's Dictionary 1746-1773* (Cambridge, 1990).

[3] See *Diaries, Prayers and Annals*, ed. by E L McAdam, Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, general eds., A T Hazen and J H Middenhorf (New Haven and London, 1958, 1963-), I, 91, 136, 224-5, 77, 106, 296.

[4] On Cranmer's sacramental doctrine, see C W Dugmore. *The Mass and the English Reformers* (London, 1958); Peter Brooks, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of the Eucharist: An Essay in Historical Development* (London, 1965); Darwell Stone, *The History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, 2 vols. (London, 1909), II, 125-8.

The *Defence* opposed the doctrine of transubstantiation with one which maintained the distinction between sacrament, or sign, and what is represented. Cranmer quoted Augustine to support his argument:

> now this saiyng of Christ, (Excepte you eate the fleshe of the sonne of manne and drynke his bloude, you shall haue no lyfe in you) seemeth to commaunde an haynous and a wycked thynge, therefore it is a figure, commaundyne us to be partakers of Christes passion, keepyng in our minds to our great comfort and profit, that his flesh was crucified and wounded for us.[5]

The concept of figurative language was important for Cranmer's sacramental doctrine and he argued that it was in keeping with a wider understanding of Christ's speaking and of the language of the Bible:

> meruaile not good reder, that Christ at ye time spake in figures, whan he did institute that sacrament, seing that it is the nature of al sacramentes to be figures. And although ye scripture be ful of Schemes, tropes, & figures, yet specially it useth them whan it speketh of sacramentes. (p.71v)

Figurative understanding of the sacrament which upholds the distinction of which Cranmer and Augustine write insists on the acceptance of perceived actuality and of the larger meaning beyond it; of the papists' view, Cranmer commented:

> O good lord, howe wold they haue bragged if Christ had sayd: This is no bread? but Christ spake not that negatiue, This is no breade, but said affirmyngly, This is my body. not deniyng the bread, but affirmyng that his body was eaten, (meanyng spiritually) as the breade was eaten corporally. (p.18r-v)

The presence of the spiritual does not lead to denial of the physical:

> let all the Papistes laye their heades togither, and thei shal neuer be able to shew one article of our faith, so directly contrarye to our senses, that all our senses by daiely experience shall affirme a thynge to bee, and yet oure faythe shall teache us the contrary therunto. (pp.22v-23r)

Rather, the physical is the believer's path to the spiritual, and Cranmer, citing Cyprian, wondered what words he could 'haue spoken more playnly, to shewe that the wyne doothe remayne, than to say thus: If there bee no wyne, there is no bloud of Christe?' (p.24r)

For Cranmer, the sacrament presented that which was seen and that which was believed. Much of the emphasis of his sacramental understanding falls on a combination of faith, use, and resultant significance. In 1548, during a debate in the House of Lords concerning the sacrament, Cranmer explained:

> it was naturall breade, but nowe no common breade for it is separated to another use. Because of the use it may be called brede of lief.
> That which you see is breade and wyne. But that which you beleve is the bodye of Christ.
> We muste beleve that there is breade and the bodye.[6]

Concern for reception and use remained a central feature of Anglican sacramental theology. The Order for Holy Communion in the 1549 Prayer Book prayed:

> heare vs (o mercifull father) we besech thee: and with thy holye spirite and worde vouchsafe to bl+esse and sanc+tifie these thy gyftes, and creatures of bread and wyne, that they maye be vnto vs the bodye and bloud of thy moste derely beloued sonne Iesus Christe.[7]

Cranmer explained the doctrine underlying this carefully in the *Answer*:

> in the boke of the holy communion we do not praie absolutely, that the bread and wine may be made the body and bloude of Christ, but that unto us in that holy mystery they may be so, that is to say, that we may so woorthely receaue the same, that we may be partakers of Christes body and bloude, and that

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[5] Thomas [Cranmer], *A Defence of the True and Catholike Doctrine of the Sacrament* ([London, 1550]), pp.61v-62r; Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 86 vols. (Vienna, 1866-1981), Sancti Aureli Augustini Opera, VI-vi, ed. by G M Green (1963), 93-94.

[6] *The First Prayer Book of Edward VI: The Great Parliamentary Debate in 1548, on the Lord's Supper*, introduced by J T Tomlinson (London, 1895), 55.

[7] F E Brightman, *The English Rite*, 2 vols. (London, 1915) II, 692.

> therwith in spirite and in truth we may be spiritually nourished. (p.89)

The 1662 Book of Common Prayer reflects more clearly Cranmer's explanation than his original wording:

> hear us, O merciful Father, we most humbly beseech thee, and grant that we receiving these thy creatures of Bread and Wine, according to thy Son our Saviour Jesus Christs holy institution, in remembrance of his Death and Passion, may be partakers of his most blessed Body and Blood.[8]

But the understanding is the same: by the operation of God, the sacramental elements of bread and wine become for the believer, and without any physical change and without any statement of Real Presence, the means of reception of the body and the blood of Christ. Cranmer's eucharistic thought affirmed the importance of the spiritual state of the believer and the necessity of receiving the sacrament while denying its material change or self-generated worth. He asserted the reality of the presence of Christ through the eucharist in a way which denied neither the supremacy of God's grace nor the real signifying power of his sacrament.[9]

These two factors found non-liturgical expression in Richard Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*. Hooker so described the manner of the sacrament's use as to achieve an Anglican sacramental theology of 'meanes effectuall'.[10] In his understanding, the sacrament is inseparable from the grace imparted through it; the imparting of that grace coalesces with the act of reception:

> grace is a consequent of Sacramentes, a thinge which accompanieth them as theire ende, a benefit which he that hath receyveth from God him selfe the author of sacramentes and not from anie other naturall or supernaturall qualitie in them [...] because they conteine *in them selves* no vitall force or efficacie, they are not physicall but *morall instrumentes* of salvation, duties of service and worship, which unlesse wee performe as the author of grace requireth, they are unprofitable. (II, 246-47)

'Moral' for Hooker carries overtones not only of pre-extant ethical integrity - although to receive as required implies moral probity - but of spirituality as it is contrasted to physicality. The sacraments' force lies

> in that they are heavenlie ceremonies, which God hath sanctified and ordeined to be administred in his Church, first as markes wherebie to knowe when God doth imparte the vitall or savinge grace of Christ unto all that are capable thereof, and secondlie as meanes conditionall which God requireth in them unto whome he imparteth grace. (II, 245-46)

The sacraments must be taken, the communion effected, if the grace available to man is to be conveyed.

Sacraments are therefore a medium of communication between God and man, requiring both and variously required by each:

> that savinge grace which Christ originallie is or hath for the generall good of his whole Church, by sacramentes he severallie deriveth into everie member thereof; sacramentes serve as the instrumentes of God to that ende and purpose, morall instrumentes the use whereof is in our handes the effect in his; for the use wee have his expresse commandement, for the effect his conditionall promisse; so that without our obedience to the one there is of the other no apparent assurance, as contrariwise where the signes and sacramentes of his grace are not either through contempt unreceyved, or receyved with contempt, wee are not to doubt but that they reallie give what they promise, and are what they signifie. For wee take not baptisme nor the Eucharist for bare *resemblances* or memorialls of thinges absent, neither for *naked signes* and testimonies assuringe us of grace received before, but (as they are in deed and in veritie) for meanes effectuall whereby God when we take the sacramentes delivereth into our handes that grace available unto eternall life, which grace the sacramentes represent or signifie. (II, 247)

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[8] *The Book of Common Prayer* (Oxford, 1743). References to the Prayer Book throughout cite a microfilm copy of Johnson's copy of this (unpaginated) edition, now in the Beinecke Library, Yale University, by services, sections and prayers as appropriate.

[9] See, for example, Stone, II, 128, Brooks, 107.

[10] Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, general ed., W Speed Hill, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA and London, 1977-90), II, 247.

Hooker stressed the availability of both that which was seen and that which was not seen and saw the sacraments as instrumental means for the communication of grace. When used in faith, 'the elements and words have powers of infallible signification for which they are called seales of God's trueth' (III, 85). He cast aside neither the physical nor the spiritual, and expressed neither by way of the other; rather, at the point at which meaning is released in use he insisted that the believer moves into the realm where the sign is not to be explained or apprehended by anything other than itself.[11]

(ii) Doctrine in Johnson's *Dictionary* and other writings

The presence of Hooker in Johnson's *Dictionary* is considerable. I have counted 5,573 quotations under the letter 'A', of which 154, or 2.8% are from Hooker. This proportion remains fairly constant throughout 'A' - 'E' where I have counted 669 quotations from Hooker. Assuming these five letters to be representative, as is suggested by reading subsequent pages, Hooker accounts for some 3,400 of the *Dictionary*'s quotations, making him one of Johnson's most frequently cited sources.[12] This liking for Hooker is interesting given both Johnson's Anglicanism and his desire concerning the *Dictionary* 'that every quotation should be useful to some other end than the illustration of a word', for it suggests his desire to instruct the *Dictionary*'s reader in the doctrine which Hooker developed.[13]

Johnson's definition of *eucharist* [n.s] captures Hooker's (and Cranmer's) emphasis on use and performance: 'the act of giving thanks; the sacramental act in which the death of our Redeemer is commemorated with a thankful remembrance; the sacrament of the Lord's supper'.[14] Johnson also drew upon Hooker's descriptions of the sacrament for

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[11] On Hooker's sacramental thought, see C W Dugmore, *Eucharistic Doctrine from Hooker to Waterland* (London, 1942), especially 19-22, Stone, II, 239-49 and Oliver Loyer, *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1979), I, 495-52.

[12] For numeric details, see DeMaria, p.17, W K Wimsatt, Jr., *Philosophic Words: A Study of Style and Meaning in the Rambler and Dictionary of Samuel Johnson* (New Haven and London, 1948), 34 and 71, James L Clifford, *Dictionary Johnson: Samuel Johnson's Middle Years* (London, 1979), 147, and Reddick, 121-22.

[13] Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th edn., 2 vols. (London, 1773), Preface (unpaginated), paragraph 57.

[14] The first number in square brackets after a word's grammatical information refers to the sense under which it appears in the *Dictionary*; where there is no number, Johnson gives no plurality of meaning. The second figure, following a period, indicates that the quotation is the 1st (.1) etc. for that sense; no such figure indicates no plurality of quotation and one after two periods indicates the quotation's place where only one definition is given.

Dictionary illustrations. Under *hand* [n.s.32], he cited 'sacraments serve as the moral instruments of God to that purpose; the use whereof is in our *hands*, the effect in his' (II, 247). Under *unreceived* [adj], he quoted 'where the signs and sacraments of his grace are not, through contempt, *unreceived*, or received with contempt, they really give what they promise, and are what they signify' (II, 247). And under *conditional* [adj.1.1], he wrote that 'for the use we have his express commandment, for the effect his *conditional* promise; so that, without obedience to the one, there is of the other no assurance' (II, 247). Each quotation suggests that Johnson endorsed Hooker's sense of the sacraments as effectual, although not causal, means of grace. In the first the moral effect of the sacraments is a result of the working of God through them; while their employment depends upon man, their effectuation relies on God. In the second, Johnson allows Hooker to put aside explanation of the sacrament and to aver that it is what it declares itself to be, and in the third he has intensified, by omitting Hooker's 'apparent' qualifying 'assurance', not only the dependent relationship of the effect of the sacraments upon their use but also the importance of their use if without it the grace they impart is not assured.

Johnson also quoted from Hooker's discussion of the definition of sacraments, using him to suggest that

> many times there are three things said to make up the substance of a sacrament; namely, the grace which is thereby offered, the element which *shadoweth* [v.a.9.1] or signifieth grace, and the word which expresseth what is done by the element. (II, 249)

Under *sacrament* [n.s.2], he cited:

> as often as we mention a *sacrament*, it is improperly understood; for in the writings of the ancient fathers all articles which are peculiar to Christian faith, all duties of religion containing that which sense or natural reason cannot of itself discern, are most commonly named *sacraments*; our restraint of the word to some few principal divine ceremonies, importeth in every such ceremony two things, the substance of the ceremony itself, which is visible; and besides that, somewhat else more secret, in reference whereunto we conceive that ceremony to be a *sacrament*. (II, 207)

The definition which the quotation illustrates is 'an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace', lifted unacknowledged but verbatim from the church catechism; placing Hooker and the Prayer Book together, Johnson presents a brief but coherent and complementary sacramental theology in which the received sacraments are seen as effectual means for the imparting of grace.[15]

Johnson's use in the *Dictionary* not only of Hooker but also of the language of the Prayer Book recurs in his sermons and devotional writing. When, in his Easter prayer, composed on the eve of communion, of 1781, he pleads, 'enable me so to commemorate the death of my Saviour Jesus Christ, that I may be made partaker of his merits' (I, 306), his wording reflects the Collect for the eleventh Sunday after Trinity, which asks that we may 'be made partakers of thy heavenly treasure'. His prayer of 1758 asks that his affections may be fixed on 'things eternal' (I, 64), which words appear in the collect for the fourth Sunday after Trinity, and asks too for a 'quiet mind' (I, 64), in words used in the Collect for the twenty-first Sunday after Trinity. At Easter, 1777, he adapted the collect for the fourth Sunday after Easter, which asks that 'our hearts may surely there be fixed, where true joys are to be found', writing, 'so help me by thy Holy Spirit, that my heart may surely there be fixed where true joys are to be found' (I, 265). And he uses phrases from the Order for Holy Communion itself. In his journal for Easter Saturday, 1761, he wrote, 'Come unto me all ye that travail' (I, 73) which appears as the beginning of the first of the comfortable words from the Order for Holy Communion; Johnson's wording partly follows the Biblical version of Matthew 11.28, 'come unto me all *ye* that labour', and aurally approaches the Communion Service, 'come unto me all that travel[*sic*]'. And in his prayer for Easter Day, 1771, he wrote of the 'redemption of the world by our Lord and Saviour, thy Son Jesus Christ' (I, 140), echoing the third Exhortation at Holy Communion which speaks of 'the redemption of the world by the Death and Passion of our Saviour Christ'.

In Sermon 22, a communion sermon, Johnson encourages those in whose minds God is rarely present to meditate upon 'our creation, our redemption, the means of grace, and the hope of glory'.[16] His phrasing is taken from the General Thanksgiving: 'we bless thee for our creation, preservation, and all the blessings of this life [...]; for the means of grace, and for the hope of glory'. In the same sermon, he applies the same phrase when speaking of the veniality of occasional unworthy communion (see XIV, 233), and in his communion Sermon 9, he uses language from the Order for Holy Communion to express a potent sense of the sacraments as effectual means of grace. He urges his hearers to enforce the habit of communion upon themselves by considering:

> that to refuse the means of grace, is to place our confidence in our own strength, and to neglect the assistance of that Comforter, who came down from heaven according to the most true promise of our blessed Saviour, to lead the apostles out of darkness and errour, and to guide them and us into the clear light and certain knowledge of God, and of his Son Jesus Christ. (XIV, 103)

So saying, he quotes and adapts the Proper Preface for Whitsunday which speaks of the descent of the fiery tongues on the apostles 'to lead them to all truth' and of the Gospel 'whereby we have been brought out of darkness and error, into the clear light and true knowledge of thee, and of thy Son Jesus Christ'. Johnson's use of his quotation, however, equates refusal of communion with rejection of the Paraclete, and hence assigns weighty significance to the sacrament.

The continuity of sacramental doctrine indicated by Johnson's employment of the terminology of the Prayer Book - in particular by his use of the term 'means' - shows that he interpreted the Prayer Book Service in the tradition set by Richard Hooker. Sermon 9 makes plain Johnson's awareness of the supernatural nature of the sacrament's instrumentality:

> this sacrament is a representation of the death of our Saviour, appointed by himself, to be celebrated by all his followers, in all ages; to the end that by commemorating his sufferings in a solemn and publick manner, they might declare their confidence in his merits, their belief of his mission, and their adherence to his religion.
>
> It has likewise a tendency to increase this confidence, confirm this belief and establish this adherence, not only by the new strength which every idea acquires by a new impression; and which every persuasion attains by new recollection, approbation and meditation, but likewise by the supernatural and extraordinary influences of grace, and those blessings which God has annexed to the due use of means appointed by himself. (XIV, 99)

Johnson here so combines the natural and the supernatural effects of the sacrament as to express, with Hookerian orthodoxy, their synthesis. This concise and considered doctrinal statement, stressed by the deliberate tone and accumulative structure of the passage quoted, not only shows how near Johnson was to the doctrine of the Reformers, but also distinguishes his thought from that of the eighteenth century Latitudinarians. For sacramental controversy did not cease with the Reformation and many of the arguments of later theologians were, like those of the Reformers, concerned with the nature and manner of sacramental efficacy.

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[15] Catechism, fifteenth question and response.

[16] Samuel Johnson, *Sermons*, ed. by Jean Hagstrum and James Gray, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, XIV (1978), 235.

(iii) The variety of orthodoxy

In a way reminiscent of, although not identical to, sixteenth century sacramental controversy, subsequent discussion involved understanding the sacraments' figurative nature. Although there is a seeming, and certainly a possible, derivation of some later views from earlier Anglican theology, the tendency of some, as for example Samuel Clarke's, is away from Hooker's. Clarke saw literal comprehension both of baptism and of the eucharist as foolish:

> no man ever was so absurd, as to understand the *one* literally; and there is no more *reason* to understand the *other* so. But by *Both*, men are intitled, if they be worthy Receivers, to the *Benefits purchased by Christ's Death.* And This participation of those Benefits, is, by a very proper *Figure* of Speech, in *One Sacrament* styled a being *buried with Christ* and *rising with him again*; and in the *Other*, the *receiving of his Body and Blood.* Which kind of Expressions ought the less to seem strange, because even *before* the Institution of the Sacrament, our Lord styled himself the *Bread of Life*; and when he was discoursing about men's *imbibing*, *digesting*, and *practising* his Doctrine, he even *then* called it *eating his Flesh and drinking his Blood.*[17]

Clarke did not deny that there were real benefits to be obtained by receiving the sacrament, but he believed them to be of a '*moral* and *religious* nature'; by taking communion, the believer confirmed his commitment to virtuous and pious conduct:

> by *doing This* constantly and devoutly in *Remembrance of Christ*, and *showing* forth *the Lord's Death till he come*; we renew and confirm continually *our own* part in the Christian Covenant. (p.314)

Clarke's primary emphasis is on the ethical effect of communion on the communicant. It is rather man than God who uses the sacraments which serve as foci for the endeavours of faith.

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[17] Samuel Clarke, *An Exposition of the Church-Catechism* (London, 1729).

Although Clarke is not at odds with Cranmer, with the Prayer Book, or with Hooker in asserting the necessity of a righteous life and a pure heart at the time of reception, it is for him rather this moral qualification than the operation of God that determines their effect. In this sense, the sacraments are for Clarke means but not means effectual:

> the outward Signs, are *Means whereby* we receive the inward and spiritual Benefit; not in the way of *physical Efficiency*, (as I just now observed,) but in the way of *moral Qualification.* (p.288)

Whereas for Hooker, the sacrament as received has worth which is affected by the reprobation or integrity of the communicant, for Clarke it has worth as caused by these factors. Both would agree that there is no physical efficacy in the material elements, but their understanding of sacramental efficacy is very different.

In one of four sermons concerning *The Nature, End and Design of the Holy Communion*, Clarke separated, as Hooker had not, baptism and the eucharist, greatly reducing the influence of the latter.

> the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is not *itself*, like Baptism, a Rite appointed for the Remission of Sins; but 'tis a *commemoration* only of that All-sufficient Sacrifice, which was *once* offered for an eternal Expiation.[18]

As appointed by God, the sacraments are '*external* Means, to promote and improve in us (that which is the great End to all outward Performances) the *real* Virtue and *inward* Religion of the Mind' (I, 364). Clarke's transference of the operative force of the sacraments from the working of God through them to the virtue of the recipient tends to a view of their function as spiritual *aide-mémoires* rather than as necessary channels of grace.

Clarke's position was reiterated after his death by Arthur Ashley Sykes who, in a defence of Clarke's *Exposition* repeated '*That the Sacraments have the Nature of Means to an End, and therefore they are never to be compared with Moral Virtue*'.[19] Sykes insisted that

> this Sacrament is a *Means* to Virtue among the Disciples of Christ, and not an "Improvement upon Virtue"; it is a wise Means to make Men grow habi-

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[18] Samuel Clarke, *The Works of Samuel Clarke*, 4 vols (London, 1738) I, 351.

[19] [Arthur Ashley Sykes], *An Answer to the Remarks upon Dr Clarke's Exposition of the Church-Catechism* (London, 1730), 68.

> tual in Morality; but not of "nearer and more immediate Efficacy than Virtue to unite us to God." (p.74)[20]

So far removed was Sykes' understanding from one implying any coherence of the physical sign and the spiritual meaning that, again repeating Clarke, he could quite consistently comment on the Words of Institution:

> I cannot but think that the *Exposition* has given us its true meaning, when it says that by "*eating his flesh and drinking his blood*, our Lord meant *imbibing*, *digesting* and *practising his Doctrine*." (p.67)

Sykes' observation mars a total separation of the physical act of reception from the infusion of divine grace. It fully shifts the force of sacramental efficacy from the workings of God through the sacraments to the practice and mentality of the recipient. Subsequently, Sykes wholeheartedly adopted belief in the sacrament's force as mnemonic aids to morality; God, he wrote, 'has instituted proper *means* to virtue, has given us memento's of our duties.'[21]

With different emphasis, the value of the sacrament's reminding function appeared also in the thought of the Latitudinarian Hoadly who, in *A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Lord's Supper* (1735) placed his emphasis on the value of the memory of Christ's death:

> the End for which our Lord instituted this Duty, was the *Remembrance* of Himself; that the *Bread*, to be taken and eaten, was appointed to be the *Memorial* of his *Body* broken; and the *Wine* to be drunk, was ordained to be the *Memorial* of his *Blood* shed.[22]

Consequently, he wrote,

> we do not *eat* and *drink Bread* and *Wine*, as at an ordinary Meal; but as *Memorials* of the *Body* and *Blood* of *Christ*; in Honour to *Him*, as the *Head* of that *Body* of which We are all *Members*. And the very same Sense seems the only Sense in which the *Communion* or *Joint-partaking* of his *Body* and *Blood* can reasonably be *here* understood. (III, 857)

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[20] Sykes quotes Waterland's response to the *Remarks*, discussed below.

[21] [Arthur Ashley Sykes], *A Defence of the Answer to the Remarks [...]* (London, 1730), 81.

[22] [Benjamin Hoadly], *A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, in *The Works of Benjamin Hoadly*, 3 vols. (London, 1773), III, 843-924 (III, 852).

Hoadly removes from the main focus of his attention all talk of supernatural means and concentrates instead on the effect of the natural aspects of communion. It is with this outlook that he considers their figurative aspect. It is, he notes, 'particularly to be observed, That the whole Tenor and Form of this *Institution* is in the *Figurative* Way of Speaking' (III, 850). As to partake of the cup means to drink not the cup but its contents, so 'it follows, by all the Rules of Interpretation, agreeably to the Way of speaking throughout the Whole, that the *Bread* and *Wine* are not the Natural *Body* and *Blood*, of Christ, but the *Memorials* of his *Body* and *Blood*' (III, 850). By this interpretation, Hoadly arrived at a position not only in which, with reference to the sacraments, human works were of greater power than divine appointment in the remission of sin, but also in which such an effect is specifically denied to the sacrament:

> the effectual *Re-establishment* of the *Christian Covenant* on *our* part, if it has been shaken by Our Sins, can be only compassed by that *Actual Amendment* which is part of the *Covenant*. And [...] the *partaking* of the *Lord's Supper* is *not* the *Actual Amendment* of our *Christianity*, by which we do in effect acknowledge our Obligation to it; and by which, as by a *Mean*, We are naturally, and by the Appointment of *Christ*, led to it. (III, 895)

For Hoadly, as well as for Sykes and Clarke, the sacrament is a memorial act producing associations in the mind which lead to moral reformation, and what was one element in the thought of earlier divines has become the dominant part of some, but not all, later doctrine.[23]

In some respects interestingly distinct from the Latitudinarianism examined above is the thought of Tillotson, who, while vehemently opposing any notion of transubstantiation or corporeal presence, and using the same words as Clarke and Hoadly to speak of 'the Blessing annexed to the Institution', nevertheless accords greater weight to the supernatural efficacy of the received sacrament.[24] He does not deny the necessity for moral reformation, but he insists that 'the way *to grow in Grace*' is

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[23] On Clarke, Hoadly and the controversy surrounding their eucharistic publications, see Dugmore, *Eucharistic Doctrine*, 158-67.

[24] Tillotson, *The Works of the Most Reverend Dr John Tillotson*, 3 vols., vol.I, 9th edn., vols. II and III, 4th edn. (London, 1728) I, 240.

> with Care and Conscience to use those means which God hath appointed for this end: And if we will neglect the use of these means, it is to no purpose for us to pray to God for his Grace and Assistance. [...] If we expect God's Grace and Assistance, we must work out our own Salvation in the careful use of all those Means which God hath appointed to that End. That excellent degree of Goodness which Men would have to fit them for the Sacrament, is not to be had but by the use of it. (I, 232).

Tillotson's imputation of efficacy to the sacrament is clear; he asserts that it is the operation of God, and neither the morality of the communicant nor the material of the sacrament, that is efficacious.

> the spiritual Efficacy of the Sacrament doth not depend upon the nature of the thing received, supposing we receive what our Lord appointed, and receive it with a right Preparation and Disposition of Mind, but upon the supernatural Blessing that goes along with it, and makes it effectual to those spiritual Ends for which it was appointed. (I, 240)

Morality, communication, and divine interaction combine for Tillotson to impart grace to the believer. Like Augustine, he considers literal eating and drinking of the flesh and blood to be 'a great *Impiety*' (I, 242), but, unlike Clarke, Sykes, and Hoadly, he sees the sacraments as means effectual and uses the term 'means' with the implications of Hooker's use.

Such implications were of considerable importance in the eucharistic thought of Daniel Waterland, author of the responses to Clarke's *Exposition* to which Sykes replied. One of Waterland's major criticisms of Clarke was his inattention to this aspect of the sacraments and his over-accentuation of the believer's response:

> the Author of the *Exposition* [...] seems to have been too sparing in setting forth the spiritual Advantages and Blessings coming down from above through this Channel of Grace and Pardon, upon the *worthy* Receiver. He says [...] that thereby we renew our Part in the Christian Covenant, *we* strengthen our Faith, *we* increase our Hope, *we* inlarge the Bond of universal Love: And all this he seems to account for in a *natural* Way, [...]: As if virtuous Practice were all, and the Sacraments were to be consider'd only as a *Means* to that *End.*[25]

Waterland considered that 'something should have been inserted to signify that when the *Recipient* is fitly qualified, and duly disposed, there is a salutary *life-giving* Virtue annex'd to the Sacrament' (p.83). He himself produced an eloquent statement of sacramental efficacy, reminiscent of Hooker:

> the Body and Blood of Christ are taken and receiv'd by the Faithful, not *substantially*, not *corporally*, but *verily* and *indeed*, that is *effectually*. The sacred Symbols are no bare Signs, no untrue Figures of a Thing absent: But the Force, the Grace, the Virtue, and Benefit of Christ's Body broken, and Blood shed, that is of his Passion, are really and effectually present with all them that receive worthily. (p.79)

As a result, Waterland's understanding of the sacraments as means is much closer to Hooker's means effectual; for him, morality alone cannot bring grace:

> I know not how to approve what the Exposition says [...] of the two *Sacraments*, in common with other positive Institutions, that *they have the Nature only of* Means to an End, *and that therefore they are never to be compared with Moral Virtues.* I cannot understand why positive Institutions, such as the two Sacraments especially, should be so slightly spoken of. *Moral Virtues* are rather to be consider'd as a *Means* to an End, because they are *previous* Qualifications for the Sacraments, and have no proper Efficacy towards procuring Salvation till they are improv'd and render'd acceptable by these *Christian* Performances. (p.85)

In a treatise on *The Nature, Obligation* and *Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments*, written in remonstrance against Sykes's *Answer* to his *Remarks* on Clarke, Waterland further expounded the way in which the sacraments functioned as means and expressed a similar sense of symmetry to that evinced by Cranmer's balanced period describing the sacrament in the catechism and the *Dictionary* as 'an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace':

> *Obedience* to God, in the Use of the *Sacraments*, is as plainly an Exercise of Virtue, as any Act of moral

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[25] [Daniel Waterland], *Remarks upon Doctor Clarke's Exposition of the Church-Catechism* (London, 1730), 84.

> Duty can be, and therefore they are not *Means* only. None could ever have suggested such a Thought of their being *Means* only, had they not first abstracted in their Minds the *outward* Act from the *inward* Piety, which always goes along with the *worthy* Reception of them. And were we so to abstract the outward Acts from the inward Piety, in any *moral* Performances, there would then be no more direct Virtue in them, than some suppose in these *positive* Observances.[26]

Waterland extends to the believer the complementarity of the outward and visible to the inward and spiritual which he perceived in the sacrament. The true worth of the sacrament requires a consequent complementarity between sacrament and recipient: in both, there must be present the inward and the outward form. He does not dispute that the sacraments are 'means', but that they are 'means only'; his quarrel is not with those who assert that the sacraments have effective power but with those who deny that they are 'the ordinary standing Means by which the salutary Influences of *Christ's* Passion are conveyed'. (p.58)

Clarke, Sykes, Hoadly and Waterland would therefore agree that the sacraments are in some sense 'means', but they disagree radically as to the actual use to which they put the word. 'Means' to describe the sacrament for Clarke implies extraneity to the end desired; for Waterland it implies complete intrinsicality: Clarke argues that the ideas of religion should be fixed in the mind and 'the *Means* to preserve these Impressions constantly fresh upon our Minds, and in their full force; is to partake frequently of those elements, which our Lord himself has appointed to be received, as the most proper remembrances of himself' (I, 350); Waterland writes that 'the right and worthy Use of the Sacraments has not barely the Nature of Means to an End (*viz.* to moral Virtue) but is Virtue direct, is *Part* of our moral and Christian Holiness, Piety and Perfection' (p.52).[27]

Like Clarke, like Tillotson, and like Waterland, Johnson speaks of the sacraments as means and the blessings conveyed as annexed in some way to them. The general trend of Johnson's thought, however, is away from Clarke's and towards an interesting coincidence between Tillotson's and Waterland's. Whereas Clarke had deliberately contrasted baptism with the eucharist, Johnson as deliberately compares them. There are no surviving sermons by Johnson on the sacrament of baptism, but Sermon 9 describes the eucharist as 'a kind of repetition of baptism, the means

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[26] [Daniel Waterland], *The Nature, Obligation and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments* [...] (London, 1730), 54.

[27] On Waterland, the eucharist, and Latitudinarianism, see Dugmore, *Eucharistic Doctrine*, pp.169-83 and Holtby, *Waterland*, 152-95.

whereby we are readmitted into the communion of the church of Christ, when we have by sin been separated from it' (XIV, 100). The *Dictionary* definition of *baptism*, adapted from the *Parergon* of John Ayliffe is potent: 'an external ablution of the body, with a certain form of words, which operates and denotes an internal ablution or washing of the soul from original sin'.[28] The vital phrase is 'operates and denotes'. It is not only that baptism represents the release of the soul from the taint of the sin of Adam but that it actually effects this purification. In Sermon 9, Johnson both aligns baptism and communion in the understanding of sin committed after baptism so that communion becomes a necessary renewal of baptism, and declares that communion is, like baptism, appointed for the remission of sins; the communion is 'a renovation of that covenant by which we are adopted the followers of Jesus, and made partakers of his merits, and the benefits of his death' (XIV, 102) and as such, necessary for salvation.[29]

Furthermore, Johnson not only associates baptism with communion in its sacramental nature, but also asserts that so vitally important is the communion that without it and its effects, Christ's death is worthless:

> vain had been the sufferings of our Saviour, had there not been left means of reconciliation to him; [...] for this purpose this sacrament was instituted; which is therefore a renewal of our broken vows, a re-entrance into the society of the church, and the act, by which we are restored to the benefits of our Saviour's death, upon performance of the terms prescribed by him. (XIV, 100)

This affirmation of the operative power of the sacrament is meticulously iterated. The very deliberativeness of Johnson's expression reinforces and prolongs a particular and considered explication of the eucharist, giving homiletic expression to his doctrinal position and by its repetition throughout the sermon indicating his care for its teaching.

Both Johnson and Waterland, in describing the sacraments as means, signified by the term instrumental cause, see them as naturally and supernaturally effective. Like Johnson, Waterland considered communion to be a renewal of baptism; he asserted that '*Baptism* is the new Birth, the entring upon the Christian Life; and the *Eucharist* is the constant Renewal of it' (p.51), in a way which is clearly consonant with Johnson's view. Although Waterland supported Clarke in attributing the natural effects to the commemoration of Christ's death within the Christian community and by meditation upon and expectation of its benefits, he insisted also that 'besides this *natural* Effect, there is also a *supernatural* Virtue and Efficacy derived from above upon the worthy Receiver'. (p.47) Johnson, having declared that 'by a neglect of God's worship and sacraments, a man may lose almost all distinction whatsoever of good and evil' (XIV, 101-2), explains, with thought comparable to Waterland's, that the use of the sacrament prevents this as it is 'a commemoration of the death of our Lord; consequently, a declaration of our faith; and both naturally, and by the cooperation of God, the means of increasing that faith'. (XIV, 102)

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[28] John Ayliffe, *Parergon Juris Canonici Anglicani [...]* (London, 1726), 102.

[29] Concerning Johnson's distinction from Clarke on the eucharist, see also Maurice J Quinlan, *Samuel Johnson: A Layman's Religion* (Ann Arbor, 1964), 93-96, and James Gray, *Johnson's Sermons: A Study* (Oxford, 1972), 142.

There is a point of comparison with Tillotson here too, for although Waterland considered that Tillotson could have put more stress on the supernatural instrumentality of the sacraments and less on moral virtue, their positions on the supernatural function of the sacraments overlap in a way that Waterland's do not with Clarke's and Hoadly's.[30] Tillotson too wrote of that 'Covenant which we entred into by Baptism, and are going solemnly to renew and confirm by our receiving of this Sacrament' (I, 231). He also saw the sacraments as means in the effectual sense, describing them in a sermon encouraging frequent communion as 'one of the best Means and Advantages of confirming and conveying these Blessings to us' (I, 227). In addition, the sacraments are for Tillotson figures, but they are so for him not as they were for Hoadly and Clarke but much more so as they were for Cranmer. In a sermon against transubstantiation, he averred that 'it is of the very nature of a Sacrament to represent and exhibit some invisible Grace and Benefit by an outward Sign and Figure' (I, 230). Such a figure is not an empty sign; rather, Tillotson's insistence on both the absence of physical or material change in the consecrated elements and the communication of real spiritual and divine benefit ensures that it is properly significant:

> as *Water* in *Baptism*,without any substantial Change made in that Element, may, by the Divine Blessing accompanying the Institution, be effectual to the washing away of Sin, and spiritual Regeneration; so there can no Reason in the World be given why the Elements of *Bread* and *Wine* in the *Lord's Supper* may not, by the same Divine Blessing accompanying this Institution, make the worthy Receivers Partakers of all the spiritual Comfort and Benefit designed to us thereby, without any substantial Change made in those Elements. (I, 240)

For Waterland, the sacraments have a comparable figurative aspect according to which they are significative:

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[30] See *Nature, Obligation and Efficacy*, 37-41, for Waterland on Tillotson.

> so long as *Symbolical* Language was well remember'd and rightly understood, and Men knew how to distinguish between Figure and Verity, between Signs and Things: While due Care and Judgment was made use of, to interpret the *literal* Expressions of Scripture and Fathers *literally*, and *figurative* Expressions according to the *Figure*: I say, while these Things were so, there could be no room for imagining any *Change* in the Elements, either as to *Substance* or *internal* Qualities.[31]

This figurative understanding Waterland certainly considered to be in keeping with earlier Anglican orthodoxy. Discussing differences in Protestant sacramental doctrine he noted that 'our Divines, as *Cranmer, Jewel, Hooker,* &c. (to do them Justice) understood this Matter perfectly well' (p.41).[32] Although Johnson did not in his sacramental sermons elucidate this figurative understanding, he apparently endorsed it, after recalling Tillotson's argument against transubstantiation, in conversation with Boswell: 'if, (he added), GOD had never spoken figuratively we might hold that he speaks literally, when he says, "This is my body".'

It is left to Boswell to remind the reader that 'the Catechism and solemn office for Communion, in the Church of England, maintain a mysterious belief in more than a mere commemoration of the death of Christ, by partaking of the elements of bread and wine'.[33] Yet it is to this Reformation expression that Johnson's pronouncements on sacramental doctrine point. His description of the sacraments as 'the highest act of devotion and the most solemn part of positive religion' (XIV, 229) includes Clarke's assumption but is finally closer to Waterland's position. When he exhorts his hearers to

> consider this sacrament as a renewal of the vow of baptism, and the means of reconciling us to God, and restoring us to a participation of the merits of our Saviour, which we had forfeited by sin (XIV, 103),

he places an active and particular significance upon the sacraments themselves and asserts their vital sufficiency as proper imparters of peculiar grace.

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[31] D[aniel] Waterland, *The Sacramental Part of the Eucharist explain'd [...]* (London, 1739), 12.

[32] For Jewel on figurative understanding of the sacraments, see John Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England*, ed. by J E Booty (New York, 1963), 30-32.

[33] James Boswell, *Life of Johnson*, ed. by George Birbeck Hill, rev by L F Powell, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1934-50) V, 71-72.

The emphatic exhortation which concludes Sermon 22 is designed to alert the recipient to the danger of precluding the workings of grace from the performance of the sacrament by reliance on his own merits:

> let him beware of vain confidence in his own firmness, and implore, by fervent and sincere prayer, the co-operation of God's grace with his endeavours; for by grace alone can we hope to resist the numberless temptations, that perpetually surround us; by grace alone can we reject the sollicitations of pleasure, repress the motions of anger, and turn away from the allurements of ambition. [...] As the sacrament was instituted for one of the means of grace, let no one who sincerely desires the salvation of his own soul, neglect to receive it. (XIV, 236)

The effect of such language is to free the believer from the impossible task of conquering his own temptable, fallible nature and to release to him assurance that he has only to ask and sufficient grace will be given. Johnson's tone is firm and unyielding, imitating the nature of the solid, unfailing hope he holds out. The power of grace in the life of the believer is transforming, rendering that which was 'hopelessly corrupt' and 'abandoned' (*Dictionary, graceless*) able 'to approach the table of the Lord' (XIV, 236); as that grace is there received, so the sacrament is for Johnson, not simply a sign of faith nor a metaphorical expression for the pursuit of the Christian religion nor a mere memorial but one way in which divine grace, verily and indeed, is imparted to man.

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SOCIETY RESTORED AND ITS AUTHORS

J Dybikowski

In *Beyond liberty and property* J A W Gunn comments on an unfinished work printed, but not published in 1793 by James Ridgway and entitled *An Essay on Civil Government, or Society Restored* (henceforth *'Society Restored'*).[1] All the known surviving copies are proof copies.

The author of the title essay was given as A.D.R.S. The book's preface indicated that it was translated from an Italian manuscript and the author had chosen to wait until a second edition before revealing his identity. This preface consists largely of a letter sent earlier to another possible publisher identified as Mr J----. The writer of the preface hinted at complications which prevented an earlier appearance of an important work.

The title essay is followed by a brief set of critical notes as well as another essay, much the longest part of the printed book and written on several occasions during 1792 and 1793. This essay, entitled 'Some farther Observations on Liberty, Property, Man, Legislation, &c.', serves not only as a critical commentary on the title work, but on the political events of the day. Both the notes and the essay are by a hand other than A.D.R.S., but the two may well be by different authors.

Gunn surmises that the claim of the title essay to be a translation from the Italian is a fabrication. The author, he believes, wrote in English and was likely influenced by David Williams. On both scores, he was mistaken, although the author of 'Some farther Observations' wrote in English and was influenced by Williams.

Mr J---- is identifiable. The addressed original survives.[2] It was sent to the publisher, Joseph Johnson, by Major Alexander Jardine, an artillery officer, diplomat, writer, and in 1792 and 1793 a figure active in London radical political circles, who was actively working to secure the book's publication and who wrote the unsigned preface. He was a friend of David Williams, but, more significantly, he was at the time very close to William Godwin.

During 1792 and the first two-thirds of 1793, there was scarcely anyone Godwin saw more frequently than Jardine.[3] Godwin gave him the proofs of *Political Justice* to read; he read his journal; and he rewrote a piece Jardine had prepared for the *European Magazine*.[4] Jardine apparently had mixed opinions of *Political Justice*. Godwin recorded the view Jardine had expressed directly to him in a supplement to his journal: 'Jardine had previously informed me...Holcroft & I had our heads full of plays & novels, & then thought ourselves philosophers.' [5] On the whole, however, Jardine's opinion of Godwin and his book was very high and he praised both lavishly in his correspondence.[6]

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[1] J A W Gunn, *Beyond liberty and property: the process of self-recognition in eighteenth-century political thought* (Kingston and Montreal, 1983, 309. The full title is: *An Essay on Civil Government, or Society Restored, by means of I. A Preface of Peace, II. A Reform in Metaphysics [sic] and III. A Political Code and Constitution, adapted to the True Nature of Man.*

[2] Edinburgh University Library, La II 432/158, Jardine to Johnson, June 6, 1792.

[3] Bodleian Library, Abinger Deposit, e.273/2. Entry of March 24, 1793.

The two discussed philosophy and people, sometimes by themselves, sometimes in the company of others. Godwin and Jardine had tea or supped or simply met with Thomas Holcroft, Joel Barlow, David Williams, Horne Tooke, Adriani, Tom Wedgwood, Walking Stuart, Mary Wolstonecraft, the Reveleys, and many others. Godwin entered some of the subjects they covered in his diary. These included the foundations of morals, reason and passion, property, the division of labour and co-operation, ideas and revolution, self-love, marriage, punishment and free will, automatic motions and sleep, immortality, truth, science, the war with France, the execution of Louis XVI, the establishment of a society for philosophical discussion without any rules apart from a commitment to truth, knowledge and mind as its chief objects, Burke and Fox, Burney and Blair.[7]

Jardine had written to Joseph Johnson from Bristol on June 6, 1792. He was expecting to sail to Spain imminently to serve as consul, but he was anxious to find a good publisher for the essay before leaving. As matters turned out, he did not set sail until late in 1793 when he was captured by the French en route, but, fortuitously, recaptured and taken to his diplomatic posting as consul for Galicia in Corunna where he remained until he died in Portugal in 1799.[8] The letter published in the preface of *Society Restored* was adapted from the original, omitting some personal remarks intended for Johnson alone and elaborating at greater length on the substance. It is clear in the original letter, although not as published, that a version of the letter was all along intended to serve as a preface to the title essay.

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[4] All that is known of Jardine's journal and article is Godwin's mention in his diary.

[5] Bodleian Library, Abinger Deposit, e.273/2. Entry of March 24, 1793.

[6] *Archivo del General Miranda*, Caracas: Leon Hermanos, 1925-, VI, 256, Jardine to General Miranda, January 7, 1793.

[7] For the select philosophical society, see Bodleian Library, Abinger Deposit, c.532/4. Those proposed for membership by Jardine included most of the individuals Godwin indicated that he and Jardine had been seeing. Through the society Jardine also wished to establish contact between English intellectual figures and their counterparts elsewhere.

[8] David Rivers, *Literary memoirs of living authors* (London, 1798), I, 308.

At the time Jardine was corresponding with General Miranda, then serving with the French army. In one of his letters he recommended several new books about to appear in England. They included works by Godwin, Joel Barlow, Thomas Holcroft, David Williams, 'and one from Italian M.S. Called Society Restored'.[9] He urged Miranda to do what he could to see that these works were translated into French once they were published. He was showing his high opinion of *Society Restored* by identifying the company in which it properly belongs. In the original letter to Johnson he also compared it to a work by Filangieri about to be published by Robinson.[10] The two works explored the same subject matter, but Jardine believed *Society Restored* was of a quantity far superior to its rival. He invited Johnson to solicit the judgement of Joseph Priestley and Thomas Christie on the quality of the manuscript.

Jardine's connection with David Williams went back at least to 1782 when he wrote a fulsome review of *Letters on Political Liberty* for the *Monthly Review*.[11] They were fellow members of a literary club from which the literary fund was founded.[12] Jardine served on the fund's general committee for a time and in 1793 he was successful in securing a grant for the author of *Society Restored*, who he had described to Johnson as an impoverished writer.[13] Jardine's application identified the author of the essay as Antonio D R Borghesi, a French composer and musical theorist born in Rome.[14] He wrote his essay in Italian, as he had an earlier work on musical theory.

The application on Borghesi behalf also makes clear the conditions on which Johnson originally must have agreed to publish the work. The one document in Borghesi file is a publishing proposal under Johnson's name soliciting subscriptions. Johnson's agreement to publish, one can only assume, must have been contingent on securing sufficient subscribers.[15] Presumably it collapsed because potential subscribers did not respond in sufficient numbers. According to the publishing proposal, the essay was intended for publication in September [1792].

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[9] *Archivo del General Miranda*, VI, 217, Jardine to Miranda, November 19, 1792. In an earlier letter, ibid., VI, 199-200, Jardine to Miranda, September 7, 1792, Jardine indicated that he was almost alone in Britain in approving Miranda's decision to serve 'the cause of Liberty & justice' by joining the French army.

[10] Gaetano Filangieri (1752-88), *An analysis of the science of legislation* (London), 1791.

[11] *Monthly Review* LXVI (1782), 551-5. The review is known to be by Jardine from the notation in Ralph Griffiths's marked copy in the Bodleian Library.

[12] This is clear from his attendance at the meeting of the Friends of the Literary Fund Club on May 17, 1790, at which the decision was taken to convene a meeting on May the literary fund. British Library Archives of the Royal Literary Fund, Minutes of the General Committee, May 10, 1790.

[13] British Library, Archives of the Royal Literary Fund, Minutes of the General Committee, January 4, 1793. The General Committee awarded him 5 guineas.

[14] See the entry on Borghese[i] in *The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians*, ed. S Sadi (London, 1980) III, 49.

The copy of *Society Restored* in the Goldsmith Collection at the University of London has a manuscript note: 'an extremely remarkable collectivist writing apparently not published. The most thoroughgoing & philosophical attack on individualism, based on the natural rights theory, that I have come across.' This description is very apt. On a foundation of natural rights, Borghesi elaborated an idealized vision of society based on a social contract. The whole foundation of society, he argued, must be radically changed, although it would be wrong to attempt to change it by force. The new social order would abandon the outworn idols of liberty, property and security. These, he claimed, would not have been chosen by the parties to a social contract as the foundations of a social order whose object was public happiness.

The desire for liberty, Borghesi claimed, was based on a tissue of intellectual confusions. Borghesi's argument for his position betrays some vacillation. On the one hand, he, relating his claim to the traditional philosophical controversy concerning free will, argued there could not be such a thing as liberty because to act freely is to act without a motive, but action always is from a motive. On the other hand, when he considered the notion of liberty in a social or political context, he appeared to argue that there was no value to liberty, not that it was impossible to act freely. Liberty only existed, he claimed, where it was practicable for individuals to act unjustly, but to act unjustly, on his view, is always to act by mistake. Only by acting justly and virtuously, however, can happiness be achieved. But to act as one must or, by extension, as one ought, whether because everyone is forced to act justly or because, in ideal conditions, there is no impediment to so acting is, in his view, not to act freely.[16]

The myth of liberty led to that of property and divided property was, in Borghesi's judgment, the fundamental root of evil. The wealth produced by society ought to be collectively retained and equally enjoyed on the ground that all contributed to its creation. As matters stood, property was the near exclusive preserve of a few who used their control over it to maintain the rest of the population in a state of bondage to them. Security, unlike liberty and property, was worth having, but it was incompatible with the ideals to which it had been joined.

For liberty and property, Borghesi substituted justice and equality. He sketched in some detail his picture of a social order based on these ends. There would be no urban centers, which encouraged the spread of moral evil, with the largest towns having no more than 20,000 inhabitants. The education of all in accordance with a strict regime he minutely detailed would be a basic social obligation, which would lead to a division in society between those educated for agriculture, medicine, the sciences, painting architecture, music and poetry and those educated for other arts and trades. The layout of towns, the pattern of education, the provisions for marriage, the regulations governing immigration and emigration, the nature of festivals and entertainments and the permitted productions of the press were all subject to minute and highly restrictive regulation. Borghesi's vision was of a closed society.

If Borghesi wrote the title essay, who was the author of the critical commentary? Jardine sent one of the proof copies of *Society Restored* to General Miranda. It reached him in July 1793 by the hand of an unidentified English lady while he was held prisoner in France.[17] His copy contained a manuscript note: 'The book of peace - (for Mr Fox to read). Not yet publish'd, nor finish'd, nor correct, (a national shame!) not daring to appear in these times of tirany, war & madness, so pray show it only to particular friends'.[18] Jardine was anxious during the summer of 1793 to do what he could to prevent hostilities between Britain and France and wrote to Fox proposing Godwin's appointment as a mediator between the two countries, a suggestion Godwin did not appreciate.[19]

In his catalogue of books Miranda inscribed: 'Major Jardine's Tract'. He may only have meant Jardine was the source of his copy, but, more than likely, he meant he was responsible for writing it or, at any rate, most of it. Whatever Miranda may have meant, the latter is a correct surmise.

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[15] British Library, Archives of the Royal Literary Fund, Minutes of the General Committee, Case File 22.

[16] Borghesi, ibid., 20-2. It is difficult to be confident that one has properly interpreted Borghesi's philosophically confused account of liberty, but there can be no doubt of the conclusion he wished to reach.

[17] *Archivo del General Miranda*, XIV, 449-50, where Miranda's manuscript note on his copy is transcribed.

[18] The copy in the Goldsmiths Library has a similar inscription. It reads: 'The book of Peace. Not yet publish'd, nor finish'd nor correct. So pray show it only to few & confidential friends. Aug. 1793'.

[19] Bodleian Library, Abinger Deposit, b.227/2/c. In a draft letter to Jardine, Godwin let him know precisely what he thought of him: 'You have certainly some good qualities & as certainly some that by no means produce approbation or pleasure. The shortest way to adjust the contention is to love you for the one, & hate you for the other...disguise it as you will, there are few people whose general notions of politics differ more than yours to mine.'

More is known of Jardine's political and social views than can be inferred from his friendship with Godwin, the matters they discussed or the character of the preface he wrote on Borghesi's behalf. He indicated much about his views in his letters to Miranda. He wrote in September 1792 how sympathy for France was waning in England among those who had initially been sympathetic to the revolution. He added: 'some of us still wish success to *rational freedom*, or rather, justice wch. includes all virtues; & equality & justice (& not *liberty* wch. is only intoxicating nonsense, worse than brandy.' [20] These views, which are of a piece with those expressed in the essay, and a number of other indicators establish Jardine's claim to be its author.

Jardine extensively referred to the views of Godwin and Barlow, among others, in the course of his essay and many of the topics which he discussed with Godwin, including science, free will, self-love, property, punishment, Fox, Burke and Louis XVI were topics for discussion in it. He referred to Spain and Barbary, places about which he had elsewhere written, and, in keeping with his friendship with Miranda, he looked forward to the extension of the scope of revolution to Spain and its colonies, and the consequential liberation of South America.[21] Most decisively of all and setting the matter beyond any doubt is the similarity of expression between Jardine's surviving correspondence with Miranda and a statement in the essay. To Miranda he wrote: 'You see Franklin, Paine, Barlow have scattered more truths of importance among us than all Europe could do for themselves -'. [22] The author of the essay wrote: 'A Franklin, a Paine, a Barlow, -- have already scattered among us more important practical truths, than all the Europeans together have been able to do for themselves.' [23] The writer of the one must have been the writer of the other.

Jardine was sympathetic to Borghesi's basic principles, but he defended a far more liberal and open version of them. He was as impatient with false conceptions of liberty as an ideal as Borghesi had been, but he believed that a coherent conception of political and personal liberty was well worth articulating. Because Borghesi had focused so much of his attention on the pernicious effects of liberty under existing social conditions, he had wrongly constructed a picture of society in ideal circumstances managed on the principles of 'a convent or an army'.[24] Jardine claimed that the source of Borghesi's social ideal was the paternalistically authoritarian Jesuit communities of Paraguay and the villages of the Moravians.[25]

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[20] *Archivo del General Miranda*, VI, 199-200, Jardine to Miranda, September 7, 1792.

[21] Jardine's only known published work was *Letters from Barbary, France, Spain Portugal, &c. by an English Officer*, initially published in 1788 with a second edition in 1790. On Spain and Barbary, see Borghesi, ibid., 119 and, on Spain by itself, see ibid., 165. On the liberation of South America, see ibid., 101 and *Archivo del General Miranda*, VI, 217, November 19, 1792.

[22] Ibid., VI, 218.

[23] Borghesi, ibid., 112.

Jardine, by contrast, was convinced of the value of personal liberty which, while he readily conceded its subordinate status to justice and equality (including sexual equality), he believed to be fully compatible with them.[26] The minutely detailed and authoritarian regulations governing ordinary life which Borghesi had sketched were rejected by Jardine as totally unnecessary and burdensome. On the contrary, human life under a regime of political justice would approximate the ideals of philosophical anarchism. 'Some social restraints are doubtless necessary to begin reform', Jardine wrote, 'but can only be adopted in the view of removing them again gradually, when they cease to be wanted; - when man becomes fit to walk alone.' [27]

Similarly Jardine rejected Borghesi's Platonic restrictions on the liberty of the press. He defended the importance of the unrestricted freedom of discussion as the ultimate source for the discovery of human knowledge and unanimity.[28] The restrictions Borghesi was prepared to accept on this liberty had 'a direct tendency to the annihilation of human understanding' rather than the realization of an era in human affairs governed by mind and reason.[29] Jardine was likewise sceptical of Borghesi's placing of responsibility for education under centralized control. He was acutely sensitive to the dangers of concentrating power and believed that with a community of property such concentrations would become largely unnecessary.

Jardine committed himself to three fundamental propositions.[30] The first, in common with Borghesi, was the basic evil of divided property which was to be overcome by a social order characterized by political justice, equality, a community of property and interpersonal relations governed by the Godwinian ideals of frankness and sincerity rather than self-love.[31] The second, also held in common with Borghesi, was the view that this condition was only achievable through the renunciation of war and violence. Finally, and differently from Borghesi, he defended the necessity of eliminating superstition by which he meant, more particularly, religious superstition and the bondage in which it had held the human mind.[32] Those he cited as having most signally contributed to a proper understanding of religion and superstition in England and France were deists, infidels and atheists: Helvetius, Voltaire, Mirabeau, Collins, Chubb and Hume.[33]

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[24] Ibid., 77.

[25] Ibid., 80,88.

[26] Ibid., 175: 'nothing shows more clearly the infancy of the human race, than the yet domineering spirit of the male over the female sex'.

[27] Loc. cit.

[28] Ibid., 169; and 183 where he used David Williams's phrase 'intellectual liberty'. See ibid., 112-3, where he remarked in a manner befitting a former artillery officer: 'L'imprimerie battra l'artillerie.'

[29] Ibid., 81.

[30] Ibid., 80.

Like Borghesi, Jardine saw these ideals as achievable in a political context constituted by a federation of small manageable communities, but he was more expansive in his account of the political workings and arrangement of such federations. His views and his language closely resembled those of David Williams, although he nowhere referred to him by name. He envisioned the creation of a general will expressive of the sovereignty of the people and produced through their 'organization' into parishes and clubs of 10 or 20 in which both men and women participated electing electors who in turn would elect electors in a thorough going scheme of indirect representation of the people, not property.[34] Jardine, like Williams, pointed to Hume's proposals for such a scheme of indirect representation.[35] Jardine, like Williams, identified the basic organizational groupings as very small. Jardine, like Williams, emphasized how the 'organization' of the people issued in a public will, wisdom, or - at term which almost uniquely belonged to Williams as an expression used to describe the principles of social organization - 'sensorium'.[36]

What Jardine developed in his essay was an amalgam of Godwinian personal and social ideals structured by a Williams-like political organization. The essay explains the basis of his connection with Godwin. Jardine was writing his own version of a radical political philosophy through much of the time they were meeting each other intensively.

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[31] Ibid., 153.

[32] Differently because Borghesi defended the physical separation of the religiously diverse. See ibid., 52.

[33] Ibid., 111. 'Mirabeau' is the pseudonym used by Baron d'Holbach when he published *Le Système de la nature*.

[34] Ibid., 112.

[35] Ibid., 178. See Hume's essay 'The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', *Essays, moral, political and literary* (London, 1963) 499-515.

[36] Ibid., 168.

S N Dworetz, *The unvarnished doctrine. Locke, liberalism and the American Revolution*, (Durham, N.C., U.S.A., Duke University Press, 1990), pp.x, 247, £36.65.

This is a controversial book, in all the best senses. Dworetz challenges the revisionists' civic republican interpretation in which Locke is irrelevant, or virtually irrelevant, to the philosophical and political foundations of the American Revolution. In opposition he argues that these foundations are basically Lockean, denying both extremes, that they are only Lockean or not Lockean at all. In contrast he offers an interpretation of Locke, one aspect of which I shall call the Multiple-Locke Theory. He agrees that it is possible to find a bourgeois Locke in the Lockean corpus, but points out that there is also a liberal Locke; there is an empiricist Locke and a rationalist Locke, a theistic and a deistic Locke, a voluntaristic and a hedonistic Locke, as well as others. Armed with this interpretation which, from a different but related point of view, might also be called the principle of tolerance, he argues that, because of inadequate scholarship, the revisionists have failed to recognize that Lockean theistic liberalism was interpreted by and transmitted to the revolutionists through the New England clergy. This, he maintains, constitutes a substantive Lockean connection with the foundations of American Revolutionary thought and provides a moral and theoretical justification for the revolution, something he says is impossible on the revisionist interpretation. The book represents, therefore, a swing of the pendulum back to an interpretation of Locke, with important qualifications, that was widely held before the interpretations of Strauss, Pocock, Bailyn, Dunn, Shalhope, Macpherson, Hatch, Wills and others, all of whom receive more or less extensive critical discussion.

The book opens with a review of the revisions of the position of Locke in recent scholarship on the foundation of American Revolutionary thought, preliminary criticism of the revisionists, and a preview of his own alternative interpretation. This is followed by an outline and exemplification of his methodology, then its application to the connection of Lockean thought to American Revolutionary thought. After tracing the formal connection he presents the heart of the book, his interpretation of the substantive connection, by examining the literature of the New England clergy. In conclusion Dworetz calls for co-operation between historical research and political theory and between republicanism and liberalism in an attempt to provide a secular justification of liberalism in America.

In his methodology Dworetz specifies two criteria for interpretation: first, it must be textually sound; second, historically appropriate, that is, sensitive to interpretation in its own historical context. Revisionists, he says, are faulty on both. These interpretations may show formal connections between Lockean thought and American Revolutionary thought, or substantive connections. The first are provided by explicit quotation, close paraphrase with attribution, explicit use of Locke's ideas and language or, generally, similarities on the surface that call for little or no interpretation. The second require deeper analysis showing "affinities between Locke and the author who cited or otherwise used Locke's work in terms of the general philosophical framework within which the appropriate idea is integrally embedded." (36) As aids in the identification and evaluation of evidence he distinguishes four kinds: empirical, circumstantial, external and internal. He agrees that in the latter case it may be necessary or advisable to show not only that Locke is the source of a given doctrine but that it did not come from some other source. He maintains that although such argument is theoretically incompletable it can be carried out to the point of practical certainty, which is the best we can expect.

He concludes explicit discussion of methodology with an example showing that Locke was the source of the clerical doctrine of natural law, and proceeds to trace the formal connections by examining Locke's writings that were available to the New England clergy and the writers of the Revolutionary period. His conclusion, which he considers unnecessarily modest, is that "in terms of language, theory and prescription, American Revolutionary thought differs in no essential way from Lockean-liberal theory." (96)

After extensive criticism of Bailyn, Pocock and Strauss, and other revisionists, he finds that in terms of textual and historical criteria the theistic Locke, understood as he would be in the eighteenth century, overrides the bourgeois Locke: a theistic Locke, with his polity based essentially on God, resistance to the exercise of arbitrary power based, in a theistic context, on the duty we have to preserve ourselves and the workmanship and property of our Creator; on the exercise of sound, individual judgment as a requirement for salvation and for political responsibility.

His strongest arguments come from an examination of the religious preoccupations and theological commitments of Locke and the New England clergy: first, he shows that both Locke and the clergy found reason and revelation compatible, and necessary, in proper balance, for knowledge and action. Locke's view basically was that anyone who takes away reason to make room for revelation puts out the light of both. Second, he points out the similarities in their conception of the nature of God. God's sovereignty is limited by its mercy; and, although absolute, is not arbitrary. The political implication for both Locke and the revolutionists is that any arbitrary unlimited power claiming the right to bind the colonies in every way whatever, is morally repugnant. Third, in an interpretation that is crucial to his argument, he finds that both Locke and the clergy drew a scriptual justification for political resistance from the classical source in apparent support of passive obedience, namely Chapter 13 in St Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Among others, the most frequent citation by the clergy from Locke is the *Second Treatise*, Section 202, "Wherever law ends, tyranny begins". Dworetz adds the circumstantial evidence that Locke was highly regarded by New England clergymen, such as Ezra Stiles, as a commentor on scripture who had a high reputation as such with the public; and underscores the strength and importance of these substantive connections by indicating that they conform to all the methodological categories. Fourth, Dworetz traces the parallels between Locke and the clergy in their view that individual, personal, political judgment is a requisite of salvation. This was fundamental, according to Dworetz, in the process by which the clergy, over periods of time, persuaded the people that they had the right, duty and competence to judge and act on important political matters and thus prepared them to fight in the cause they judged just. Thus, according to Dworetz, Locke's theistic liberalism, theistic epistemology, and theistic individualism lie at the foundation of his theory of revolution in the *Second Treatise*, and this, in turn, provides another strand in the substantive Lockean connection with American Revolutionary thought.

Dworetz's most general summary conclusion appears in the closing paragraph of Chapter Five: "Locke, then, was the political line of the American Revolution, as it was laid down from the New England pulpit; and from the clerical perspective, this was the theistic Locke. This substantive connection has eluded the republican reinterpretation of the founding doctrine because of the revisionists' failure to deal adequately with Locke's thought. The strategic importance of the New England clergy in the Revolutionary movement makes this a serious omission from the Revolution's ideological history. The ministers persuaded the people to take radical, courageous political action, or at least justified such action to the satisfaction of the faithful. Yet the clergy's indispensable contribution to the Revolution - not to mention the equally indispensable contribution of those who heeded the ministers' call to arms - cannot be fully understood without reference to Locke and, indeed to the Locke of theistic liberalism."(183)

Dworetz does not make original contributions to methodology; that is not his purpose. He does, however, set forth his own methodology in an economical, clear and useful way. Furthermore, it includes minimal assumptions and is about as free from theory as a methodology can be. His application leads him to conclusions that seem to be quite weak. They are. This is a case, however, in which the cliché is appropriate. The very modesty of his conclusions make them difficult to deny.

His criticisms of the revisionists at the very least make it clear that nobody can proceed with a study of the political-ideological-philosophical foundations of American Revolutionary thought and its constitutional outcome without paying careful attention to Dworetz. No more "anybody-but-Locke" any more then "nobody-but-Locke".

In the nature of the case much of the book is devoted to the question whether the civic republican or theistic liberal interpretation of Locke is more appropriate. Its larger aim, however, concerns justification and is apparent in Dworetz's claim that the civic republican interpretation robs the American Revolution of its theoretical and moral foundation. When the lines are drawn this way the principle of tolerance no longer applies. So I shall conclude with a discussion of justification although it must be brief, lacking development, explanation and supporting argument, and therefore apparently dogmatic.

Justification may take three basic forms: (1) from principle, (2) by consequence, (3) by coherence, or various combinations of these. It might appear that Locke offers a form of justification by consequence in which rebellion is justified because it results in a liberal society. Locke was not a utilitarian in moral philosophy, however, and neither were the revolutionists. Consider the significance of some of the basic arguments Dworetz finds in Locke and the Revolutionists: God spoke through St Paul: obey good governors, resist bad. Therefore we ought to resist tyrants. Or again, God's government is limited by wisdom, justice, mercy and fairness. Therefore, human governments ought to be limited by wisdom, justice, mercy and fairness. These are examples of justification from principle. The basic principle (the foundation, the "independent bottom", in seventeenth and eighteenth century language) is a theistic one that takes the form, when made explicit: From propositions of the form 'God is...', 'God does...', 'God orders...', it is legitimate to infer, conclude, or move to, propositions of the form, 'We ought to...'

There is then, a clearly identifiable theory of justification from principle at work in Locke and, according to Dworetz, through the New England clergy and into American Revolutionary thought. Furthermore, according to Dworetz, it is a theory that "essentially" justifies liberalism, by which I understand him to mean, interpreted in terms of my formulation, that the elision dots in the fundamental principle will be filled with some identifiably liberal doctrine, including, of course, resistance to tyrants.

He does not spell out his denial that civic republicanism can provide such justification. Along lines suggested in my interpretation of Locke's theory, a version of the civic republican basic principle would be: From propositions of the form '...fulfils one's life as a citizen of the republic,' '...is an act of obedience to the laws of the republic' it is legitimate to infer, conclude, or move to, propositions of the form 'we ought to...' That is, there is also a clearly identifiable theory of justification (by consequence) in civic republicanism. It is not clear that Dworetz recognizes this as an alternative theory of justification, although he does say in so far as the revisionists attribute it, or something like it, to Locke, they find him irrelevant, or virtually irrelevant, to the American Revolution.

Dworetz could have pointed out that it is much worse. Suppose we fill in the elision dots in the civic republican formula with some relevant specifications. In one case we get the following proposition: "An act of rebellion fulfils one's life as a citizen of the republic." So, far from providing the basis for justification of an act of rebellion, this should elicit the Hobbesian comment, in another connection, to the effect that such a proposition is like what the logicians call an absurdity. This would be more obvious of course if the formulation made explicit that the act of rebellion is against the republic in which one fulfils one's life, or is supposed to. It could be even worse, however, particularly if the republic is definitely described: "An act of rebellion against the laws of this republic is an act of obedience to the laws of this republic." This should elicit an even stronger judgment. In the words of Bishop Berkeley in another connection, "it is manifest repugnancy", that is, an explicitly self-contradictory proposition. In short, in a pretty precise sense of 'logical' it is logically impossible to formulate coherent premises, in terms of civic republicanism, from which either a moral or a theoretical justification of the American Revolution follows. It is clear that Dworetz's criticism on this point is correct. I have simply made it more obvious.

He is immediately faced with more problems, such as the question of the cogency of Locke's theory of justification, the complexities of deriving conclusions about obligations from descriptive or factual information and the like. He does not pursue these issues, since they are not immediately relevant to his main purposes, but notes that Locke's theistic liberalism is "not an ideology for our times".(187) In terms of language provided by Grotius, modified and used by Francis Hutcheson, the justifying reasons of theistic liberalism are no longer exciting reasons for American citizens, as they were for American revolutionists. They need a secular justification of liberalism to replace the theistic Locke who "has been honorably retired". (188) He agrees that the question lies beyond the scope of this book but ventures some tentative suggestions, among them cooperation between republicanism and liberalism based upon a recognition that the apparent opposition between them is "neither historically nor theoretically sound", (191), and in any case is not between virtue and commerce, but if there is an opposition, between civic virtue and individual freedom.

That there is opposition, or at least tension, between them hardly seems deniable. After all, Locke himself said it is a truth as certain as any in mathematics that no government allows absolute liberty. Dworetz, and other liberals, clearly face a difficult task but it has not yet been proved impossible; and in their attempts to find a solution they should not neglect the possibility that in a pluralistic society such as America the justification of liberalism lies in the coherence of the diversities.

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D O Thomas (ed.), *The correspondence of Richard Price: Vol.II, March 1778 - February 1786* (Cardiff and Durham, N.C., University of Wales Press and Duke University Press, 1991), xxiv + 348, £29.95.

This is the long-awaited second volume of what will eventually be three volumes of Price's correspondence. Its centrepieces are some fifty letters between Price and Shelburne (nearly all from Price), roughly thirty between Price and Franklin (whose friendship Price regarded as one of the 'blessings of my life'), and ten long, metaphysically dense letters between Price and the eccentric Scots metaphysician, Lord Monboddo.

Monboddo preferred to remain faithful to Aristotle's physics rather than accept the paradoxes of modern physical science. Price energetically defended the proposition that a body will continue in its state, whether in rectilinear motion or at rest, unless subject to an outside force, but failed to move Monboddo. In ancient philosophy Price's allegiances were to Plato, not Aristotle. Monboddo had initially thought of Price as nothing more than a 'Political Arithmetician' until he encountered his controversy with Priestly on materialism and necessity. Price wrote to him: 'But the truth is, that the study of politics has been a late deviation into which I have been drawn by the circumstances of the times and the critical situation of our public affairs. Of this study I am now almost sick; and I am continually resolving to confine my attention for the future to moral, metaphysical, mathematical and theological subjects. With these I begun, and they have always been my favourite and most delightful studies.'

Price never felt happier than when he could reflect on his favourite subjects in tranquility in his study surrounded by his books. The letters, however, show him continually breaking and renewing the resolution he expressed to Monboddo. He was too well connected (most notably with Shelburne from whom he regularly received presents of pineapples and game); his expertise on public finance, insurance and population studies was too considerable and recognized (the collection includes the invitation from the American Congress to become minister of finance for the rebelling colonies); and his conscience too sensitive to resist appeals for advice or help for very long. Price repeated his resolution to abandon politics to Shelburne (after his political eclipse) and Jefferson, but the volume fittingly ends with an exchange with Pitt, then Prime Minister, which shows Price being ineluctably drawn back as an adviser concerning a sinking fund to reduce and eventually eliminate public debt.

Price could not understand the temptations to seek public office. His interventions in public affairs were made from his highly developed sense of duty. He did not share Franklin's evident pleasure in being at the centre of affairs. He was disappointed by the vilification and threats he endured for his unwavering support of the American cause, but his conscience was easy, and he regarded his publication of *Observations on the nature of civil liberty*, where he initially made his case on behalf of the Americans, as one of his best actions. This experience redoubled his determination to conduct debate in a manner respectful of those with whom he disagreed. His debate with Priestley on necessity and materialism was intended to be a showcase of the manners of rational debate and a reflection of his commitment to intellectual liberty.

In his first letter to Shelburne after his elevation as Prime Minister in 1782, Price recommended a political programme to him: a general peace, with the recognition of American independence as its inevitable corollary, and improved parliamentary representation, although the improvements which would have satisfied him were modest. This programme followed from Price's views on civil liberty and his prescriptions for responsible financial management, which, in turn, reflected his somewhat austere conception of virtue as candid, simple, without ostentation or extravagance. The programme, and its motivating principles, run through the correspondence.

Price invested high hope in the American revolution which he saw as an opportunity for liberty and virtue of an order not yet known in the world. In the light of these hopes, scarcely anything disturbed him in the published letters - apart from his wife's health - so much as news from his friend Henry Laurens about the negative reactions of leading figures in the South Carolina legislature to his *Observations on the importance of the American Revolution*, and its recommendations for the gradual abolition of the slave trade and slavery in particular. The language he used to Jay and Jefferson to describe his disappointment was strong and passionate. If the views of the South Carolina legislators were widespread, the friends of American liberty, like himself, would be mortified by the prospect of an America transformed into an arena of 'aristocratical tyranny and human debasement'.

A personal theme which also runs through the correspondence is Price's anxious concern over his wife's seriously deteriorating medical condition. This concern is perhaps most fully and poignantly expressed in a letter Price sent to William Adams shortly before her death. He wrote: 'This illness of Mrs Price has been my greatest affliction. I ... find myself advancing into the evening of my life. May God make it a serene evening; and, after that night of death which is coming upon us all, raise us up to a better life.' The passage sets in sharp relief some of the few incidents of physical pleasure Price described earlier in the correspondence of sea bathing off the coast of Brighton and tramping over the South Downs on horseback.

It is a pleasure to have this meticulously edited volume by the leading authority on Price. (Readers of the volume will find it invaluable to read it altogether with the critical discussions of Thomas' *The honest mind*, chapters XII-XIV and parts of chapter XI in particular.) The scholarly notes are written in Thomas's characteristically trenchant style and display wide ranging, but lightly worn scholarship. I noted very few lapses from this standard. One is an error in the biographical sketch of Granville Sharp which represents him as the founder in 1787 of a society for the abolition of slavery, when it is significant that the society deliberately restricted itself to advocating the abolition of the slave trade. I also noted there were mistakes in the transcription of Lord Monboddo's Greek.

These, however, are small criticisms of an excellent book. The Richard Price it reveals is of a piece with the public persona, but the letters amplify and humanize him. They testify to the breadth of his intellectual interests and to the aptness of Thomas's title for his book on Price: the honest mind.

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Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and bourgeois radicalism: political ideology in late eighteenth-century England and America* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990), x + 304 pp. $42.50 (hardback), ISBN 0 8014 2337 6; $14.95 (paperback) ISBN 0 8014 9589 X.

In this collection of essays, most of which are revised versions of work previously published, Isaac Kramnick sets out to challenge the established view that a classical republican discourse (sometimes referred to as Country ideology or civic humanism) was the dominant political language of late eighteenth-century England and America. This notion, propagated by J G A Pocock, Bernard Bailyn and a host of other scholars in recent years, depicts British radicals and American revolutionaries as being preoccupied with an ideology which desired to see independent men of leisure devoting themselves to an active civic life. These men are shown to be promoting the same political values and remedies that were propagated by such writers as Bolingbroke, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon earlier in the eighteenth century. Like these earlier writers, they looked backwards, sought to restore the constitution to its original purity and endeavoured to recover the historic rights of Englishmen. In opposition to this thesis, Kramnick argues that a brand of middle class or bourgeois liberalism dominated the political discourse of late eighteenth-century reformers. In his view, the leading radicals in England and America re-discovered the natural rights theory of John Locke and wished to establish a new social order in which men of talent and industry would replace the old aristocratic elite and exercise paternalistic authority over the idle poor. Far from endeavouring to restore a political order in which the landed elite governed because of their inherited wealth and status, the bourgeois radicals of the late eighteenth century developed a class view of politics and hoped to establish a new middle class elite on the basis of natural rights and equality of opportunity.

To sustain this interesting and challenging thesis, Kramnick looks primarily at the writings of a handful of Dissenting radicals, most notably Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, James Burgh and Thomas Paine, though he does write a little about American ideologues of similar persuasions. He writes incidentally about the Dissenting campaign for religious equality, about the role of Dissenting academies and about the societies and more informal ties which linked these Dissenting intellectuals with middle class entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers and businessmen, but he mainly writes about the ideas propagated by a handful of Dissenting radicals. He successfully reveals how antagonistic these writers were to the parasitic aristocracy and the idle, licentious poor, and how committed they were to creating a social order in which the industrious and talented middle class could prosper. He is most interested in the writing of Joseph Priestley, but he is most original in his detailed discussion of the writings of James Burgh, who he regards as a transitional figure moving from the Country ideology of the earlier eighteenth century to the radical liberalism of the later eighteenth century.

While Kramnick is certainly justified in arguing that there was more than one political language employed in the English-speaking world of the eighteenth century and he is right in detecting a significant shift in the political language adopted by Opposition writers between the earlier and later eighteenth century, he does tend both to overstate his central thesis and to repeat it at unnecessary length in every essay. He is on secure ground in maintaining that some writers re-discovered Locke in the later eighteenth century and that some middle class values were propagated, but he exaggerates the extent to which such views were held by reformers in general. The historic rights of Englishmen and civic humanism still had an appeal for many radicals, and not all Dissenters, radicals or middle class businessmen shared the view of his favourite authors. Kramnick's concept of bourgeois radicalism is also open to question. While his favourite authors did praise the virtues and talents of the middle classes, not all radicals were advocates of unrestrained capitalism, promoters of 'possessive individualism', or primarily concerned to see the middle class inherit the earth. Moreover, although Kramnick is well versed in the writings of his chosen authors, his reading in the secondary literature is surprisingly shallow. He betrays only limited knowledge of the work of the many historians who have established the context and nature of the radical movements of the late eighteenth century and he appears to have read very little of the work by modern interpreters of his favourite authors. There is no indication that he has read Richard Ashcraft on Locke or D O Thomas on Price, and he has apparently never consulted any of the many relevant articles printed in *Enlightenment and Dissent* or its predecessor, *The Price-Priestley Newsletter*. His views on Locke are decidedly old-fashioned and his reading of Paine is inferior to that of Mark Philp or Gregory Claeys. Repetitive, padded out with details which do not always advance the overall argument, and rather loosely constructed, these essays do not quite add up to a coherent and compelling thesis, but they do show that the political discourse of the late eighteenth century was not as dominated by classical republicanism as has so often been claimed. This, and the detailed examination of the writings of Burgh and Priestley, certainly make them worthy of serious study.

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David MacGregor, *Hegel, Marx and the English State* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), pp.345, £35.50.

The relationship between Hegel and Marx has been the source of tremendous confusion in the history of philosophy. Distinctions between Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism, together with that puzzling reference to Marx 'standing Hegel on his head', have manifestly added to the perplexity. David MacGregor's book is a welcome step in the direction of clarity. He argues effectively and convincingly that Hegel developed a radical critique of 19th century English capitalism, addressing many of the deepest problems of an advanced industrial society, and that Marx was not only aware of this critique, he also employed many of Hegel's insights in *Capital*. Whilst stressing the similarities between Hegel and Marx, MacGregor also questions the thesis that Hegel wrote against the background of a feudal Germany whilst Marx wrote in a period of high capitalism. As MacGregor points out, whatever the politico-economic conditions were in Germany, Hegel was very familiar with the experiment with *laissez faire* capitalism in England, and that an important thread in his political writings can be seen as a warning of its likely developments. Hegel was a philosopher of the Industrial Revolution and his knowledge of early capitalism was much greater than recent commentators have acknowledged. When Hegel wrote his essay on the English Reform Bill the Industrial Revolution in England had been under way for at least fifty years. What Hegel did not see, which Marx saw more clearly, was the emergence of a modern interventionist state.

In his discussion of Hegel's 1831 essay on the English Reform Bill MacGregor demonstrates how Hegel put to sound use such concepts as personhood, property, social class, democracy, elite rule, and the nature of the state. It was the use of these concepts, says MacGregor, that enabled Marx to see the significance of the English experiment with free market capitalism in his own work. Yet in certain respects, argues MacGregor, Marx failed to follow through Hegel's thought. He wrongly replaced Hegel's notion of private property - which includes the right of the worker to the product of labour - with the notion of surplus value and the abolition of private ownership under communism. The practical outcome was highly significant. Marxist communism has consequently forfeited many of the institutions of civil society required to protect personal freedom from arbitrary rule by an elite. Nevertheless, many of Hegel's theories were taken up by Marx: his theory of the family, says MacGregor, influenced Marx's egalitarian vision of family life expressed in his comments on factory legislation. Hegelian ideas about personality, education, the role of the interventionist state, and the universal class, are all developed by Marx. But MacGregor gives particular prominence - and this is one of the great merits of the book - to the significance of the factory inspectors in Marx's mature work. Here we find the embodiment of the Hegelian caring state, the underpinning ethic of the Welfare State.

It is timely that a book dealing with Hegel and Marx should also address problems which have arisen after the demise of Marxist reality. MacGregor therefore offers an examination of the Hegelian ideal. Hegel's critique of the English free market experiment, found in the essay on the Reform Bill, is relevant today. Like the Eastern European admirers of USA capitalism, there were several continental thinkers among Hegel's contemporaries who admired English free market liberalism. Hegel's critique of its false egalitarianism, its class-dominated political structure, and his accusations that England did not have a state - national affairs were, he wrote, 'in the hands of a privileged class'- reveal him to be a radical in marked contrast to the reactionary authoritarian apologist depicted by Sir Karl Popper.

MacGregor's radical Hegel is also seen to have a feminist vision, stressing an equal role for women and a need to restrain men's capacity to harm children. Hegel knew how English fathers sold or rented their children to employers. These issues were later expounded on Marx's support for the English Factory Acts and role of the Factory Inspectors. MacGregor's discussion of Hegel's theory of the family comes down clearly in favour of a feminist reading of Hegel. Despite some of Hegel's disparaging comparisons of women to plants and doubts of their fitness to govern, several writers have seen the potential for a feminist interpretation of Hegel.[1] Given the centrality of personhood and property in the *Philosophy of Right*, MacGregor points out how Hegelian theory treats both women and men as equal property holders. Whether they marry or not, women, for Hegel, never lose the status of persons, property holders, and citizens. Both men and women, held Hegel, are socially constructed beings, not determined by biological facts.

One of MacGregor's bold claims - although well-substantiated - is that Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* concentrates more heavily on the English system of government than on the German one. MacGregor shows this by drawing comparisons between the *Philosophy of Right* and the Essay on the Reform Bill. He shows how Hegel operated with a sophisticated notion of classes which in various ways was employed to criticize English free market liberalism. For example, many references to ancient Rome in the *Philosophy of Right*, argues MacGregor, are to be read as a disguised critique of the English political system, where 'individuals are degraded to the level of private persons'. And when the people of England needed fundamental economic and social reforms the Whigs, like the Roman Emperors, offered deceptive political solutions.

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[1] See Susan Easton, 'Hegel and Feminism', D Lamb (ed.), *Hegel and Modern Philosophy* (London, 1987), 30-55.

Hegel's theory of property receives a radical interpretation from MacGregor: it entails the right of the worker to ownership of the product of labour, and reveals how the capitalist employment contract excludes the worker from the ownership of property. A just contract, for Hegel, should extend the worker's power, not only over the product but over the determination of the length of the working day. This, of course, is the case for Marx's emphasis on the role of the Factory Inspectors, set up by the 1833 legislation and representing the interventionist powers of the Hegelian state. For MacGregor, Marx's Factory Inspectors, whose origin and development are portrayed in great detail, are the active bureaucrats of Hegel's rational state. But these bureaucrats are not the cold impassive types which Marx Weber depicts, but a political pressure group in their own right, defending the welfare programmes they administer, the principal allies of those who should benefit from their programmes, not the 'one of us' servants of whichever political party holds office. In the example of the Factory Inspectors the beneficiaries were to be the exploited and physically abused, the children and women who constituted a significant proportion of the labour force. MacGregor's timely discussion of 19th century administrators thus provides fresh insights into the nature of public service in Hegel's rational state; the bureaucracy was not an end in itself, still less the servant of the authoritarian state, but a primary source of protection from self-interested elites.

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Howard Williams, *Hegel, Heraclitus and Marx's dialectic* (Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), xvi + 256, £35.

This book represents a rare achievement. Going against the trend, it offers a lucid and positive assessment of dialectic method in Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx. Williams strongly connects Heraclitus's vision of change with Hegel and Marx, and shows that concrete social explanation, such as Marx's concept of money, may be traced to the ancient Greek philosopher. For Williams, Hegel is by far the most daring of the three thinkers. While Heraclitus accepted that there is an inner logic in nature, he did not, like Hegel, create an entire science of logic; and though Marx was glad to employ dialectic in the investigation of social laws, he rejected Hegel's belief that logic invests the very being of nature and society.

Williams successfully confronts some of the foremost detractors of Hegelian logic, including Karl Popper and Michael Rosen, and rescues Hegel from misrepresentation as an anti-Kantian. Hegel, as Williams shows, was a dedicated, if ultimately disillusioned, follower of Kant. Much of his work was a courageous extension of Kant's preliminary insights. Although Williams chastises Hegel for taking dialectic too seriously, he allows that Hegel's assertion that thought makes up the universe comes very close to the position of modern linguistic philosophers who see language "as in some way constitutive of our world" (p.51).

Hegel, Heraclitus and Marx's Dialectic offers a brilliant account of the connection between formal logic and Hegel's revolutionary dialectic. For once, Hegelian logic is vastly favoured over formal logic, which the author exposes as limited and lifeless compared to Hegel's system. Still, Williams does not allow himself to be totally seduced by Hegelian melodies; criticisms of formal logic can legitimately go only so far. By arguing the identity of thought and being, "Hegel's *Logic* confuses changes in what objects are for us (both as observers and participants) with changes in those objects themselves" (p.76). I will return to this topic later, since it marks a divergence between Williams's assessment of Hegel and my own.

Experienced scholars and rank beginners alike will be grateful for Williams's refreshing survey of the syllogism in Hegel. In a masterpiece of concise prose, Williams walks the reader through the forms of the syllogism in the *Science of Logic*, and demonstrates that elucidation of the syllogistic form is one of Hegel's most fascinating and significant accomplishments. Equally valuable is a chapter on two exceptionally important Hegelian terms, *Aufhebung* and *Vorstellung*. Variously translated in English as transcendence or sublation, *Aufhebung* stands for the way progress in thought and reality at once overturns and re-establishes preceding forms of consciousness and life. *Vorstellung*, or the Understanding, is the mode of thought common in modern society; a mode Hegel believed must be superseded by a higher form of consciousness which he called reason. Williams admits the considerable difficulty involved with these concepts, but declines to follow the lead of commentators who would subject them to ridicule. "At times our inability to comprehend may well disguise a failure to come to terms with the more profound and intricate parts of his system" (p.133).

The heart of this volume is a luminous and instructive account of the role of dialectic in Marx's *Capital*. Williams's book is reminiscent of John Plamenatz's *Man and Society* in its remarkable clarity and fairness. The author shows how the law of value and the circulation of commodities are analysed dialectically by Marx so that contradictions in experience are exposed as "issues to be resolved by political action" (p.185). According to Williams, Marx owed more to Hegel than is generally acknowledged. Still, his criticism of Hegel's metaphysics remains valid, and *Capital*'s borrowings from Hegelian logic were suitably modest.

Let me turn now to a disagreement with Williams's conception of Hegel that may be especially relevant in this period of upheaval around the Marxian legacy. Williams suggests that Hegel gave too large a role to ideas, and forgot that reality is independent of thoughts about it. Ideas, he says, concerning "the properties of objects leaves the independence of those objects totally unaffected." Now at a fairly superficial level this is true, as Hegel was the first to admit. Your thoughts about a stone will not affect the stone in the slightest, unless they lead you to take certain actions, such as crushing it with a hammer. However, on the level of social action the case is more complex.

Thoughts about freedom and rosy conceptions of life in a free market system had fatal consequences for the Soviet Union. In this case, death came almost entirely as a result of ideas. The collapse of the communist system occurred peacefully in most of Eastern Europe, and seems almost a deliberate illustration of a striking passage in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* [London, 1974, v. ii, p.98]. When the time for change is ripe, Hegel wrote, nothing can stand in the way of the Idea. "Revolutions take place in a state without the slightest violence when the insight becomes universal; institutions, somehow or other, crumble and disappear, each man agrees to give up his right." Far from being autonomous of ideas, nations depend radically upon them. Thus, as in the Soviet Union, as in Yugoslavia, as perhaps soon in Czechoslovakia, "the breaking up of its government breaks up the nation itself."

This small disagreement aside, *Hegel, Heraclitus and Marx's Dialectic* is a superb discussion of the role of Hegelian logic in Marx's work. The

book is a major contribution to our understanding of the relation between Marx and Hegel; it deserves a wide audience.

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John Hedley Brooke, *Science and religion: Some historical perspectives.* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), x + 422pp., £10.95.

The theme of this excellent book is that there is no simple relationship of conflict, or of harmony, between science and religion: the history of their interaction is complex and varied. Stated thus badly, Dr Brooke's thesis is no surprise to those who know something of the history of science, but the virtue of his account lies in the details. For example, we are all aware of Newton's deep involvement in theology, but I at least did not know that he related it to his study of optics by asking whether chance could have fitted the eye to the refraction of light.

Dr Brooke's expertise is in the history of science and especially, I think, of evolution theory. But he is also well informed on the history of theology in relation to science and he knows which works of philosophy are particularly relevant to his subject. He is alive to the influence of politics on the religious positions of some outstanding scientists but is sceptical of making it the major determinant. He gives his readers a further small bonus in a number of illustrations from books, pictures and cartoons.

A preliminary chapter sketches the variety of attitudes that have affected the relations between science and religion. Science has been used by religious men (including scientists of the greatest distinction) as an ally against infidels. It has, of course, also been used by iconoclasts as a mighty weapon against the irrationalism and superstition of religion. But conflict has not always been between science and religion as such; often it has been a conflict between new science and old science which has been 'sanctified' by tradition. While cautioning against an exaggerated notion of conflict, Brooke warns us equally against religious apologists who speak of an underlying harmony, sometimes in terms of inter-religious polemics, as with the claim that Protestantism is more favourable than Catholicism to science. A later chapter shows how difficult it is to confirm that claim.

In his treatment of the Scientific Revolution, Brooke questions the common view that it saw a separation of science from religion. There was rather, he says, 'differentiation from, and reintegration with, religious belief', and he illustrates this with the examples of Boyle, Galileo and Halley. He is particularly helpful on the implications for theology of the mechanistic model of the new natural philosophy. Enlightenment critics of traditional religion welcomed a 'clockwork universe' as one that could run by itself, but leading scientists of the seventeenth century had thought that their use of mechanical metaphors enriched our idea of divine activity. Atomic theory in the ancient world had seen nature as having no need for gods, but Mersenne, Descartes, Boyle and Newton all found it essential to bring an omnipotent Creator into their mechanical explanation of the universe. The eventual effect of Newton's natural philosophy was a reduced conception of divine activity, though Newton's own understanding of it was quite the contrary.

Many readers of this journal will be especially interested in Brooke's references to Priestley, who is indeed a remarkable example of the varied ways in which science and religion can be related. Priestley's religion, says Brooke, was intended to 'purify' Christianity so as to stand up to rational criticism. He welded religion to materialism in order to get rid of superstition, including the dualism of mind and matter, a doctrine inherited from Greek philosophy, not from the Bible. For Priestley, as for some others, natural theology could be a spur to scientific investigation: his 'determination to find the mechanism for the restoration of common air coincided with his conviction that, if nature were a rational and viable system, there had to be such a mechanism'.

Brooke rightly regards Hume as the most serious threat to the kind of enlightened natural theology that Priestley represents. His discussion of Hume, concentrating on the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* but with some reference to the *Treatise* and the *Natural History of Religion*, brings out the crucial role of Hume's thought in the history of the relation between science and religion. Not that it was wholly on the side of science: 'In one respect his empiricism was arguably as subversive of science as of religion' because, 'taken to extremes, his philosophy would preclude the introduction of theoretical entities into science that were not directly perceivable.' I think this goes too far. It ignores important features of Hume's philosophy, but even if that were not so, it exaggerates in suggesting that the subversive tendency was as great for science as for religion. However, this is just a trifling criticism. In general Brooke's account of Hume is helpful and sound. So is his account of Kant, whose philosophy did not bring science and religion into opposition but separated them so as to give breathing space to each.

Hume and Kant both observed that the argument from design has always afforded theism its strongest support in real terms. One consequence is that religious belief has suffered more from the success of evolutionary theory than from the scientific revolution in physics and cosmology. Professor Brooke treats this topic in great detail and with specialized knowledge. His account is therefore complicated and sometimes less easy to follow than his earlier chapters. At the same time it is more satisfying because his expertise enables him to challenge some traditional views, for instance on the history of Darwin's thought and motivation. Brooke rejects the common idea that Darwin delayed publication of the *Origin of Species* until 1859 simply from anxiety about religious reaction; this view neglects the fact that he still had in the 1850s various problems of detail in his theory to work out. Not that Darwin's theory was alone or decisive in sapping religious belief. Brooke notes that the anti-religious effect of Darwinism was part of a wider movement of thought, and also that, as in earlier periods, scientific and religious beliefs were 'enmeshed in broader social and political debates'.

The final section of the book, on the twentieth century, (called a 'postscript' rather than a chapter) lacks the sure touch shown earlier, but that does not detract from the value of the work as a whole. A brief review, picking out a few highlights, cannot do justice to its merits. Anyone interested in the subject would gain much from reading it.

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Bridget Hill, *The republican virago: The life and times of Catharine Macaulay Graham, historian.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp.263, £30.

Bridget Hill's *The republican virago* is the first book length study of Catharine Macaulay Graham, the eighteenth century female historian. It has, therefore, the pluses and minuses that can be expected from such a work.

On the plus side, Hill's biographical study will introduce many to this interesting and long-forgotten historian. Macaulay was well known in her own day but fell into obscurity shortly after her death in 1791. She surfaced occasionally in the nineteenth century as an example of how bad eighteenth century radicals could be: a woman who lived a scandalous life and had the audacity to be active in politics as a supporter of Wilkes and an opponent of Burke. That she was commended by Mary Wollstonecraft guaranteed her dubious reputation. The revival of interest in women writers at the turn of the twentieth century largely passed Macaulay by; not until Doris Stenton's *The English woman in history* (1957) did she receive any significant attention. There have been a number of scholarly articles, at least one doctoral dissertation, and now Hill's book to retrieve Macaulay from the shadows where so many women have lingered.

Hill's factual account of Macaulay is generally accurate, although there is confusion about the family which only reference to the genealogical table can clear up. No major collection of letters or other family papers for Macaulay, her brother John Sawbridge, or either of her husbands have been found. Therefore, one must often depend on newspapers and other secondhand sources to track her movements. Hill sometimes seems to trust these sources more than she should. There are large gaps in Macaulay's life for which there is little or no documentation. Hill's speculations on these periods are brief but generally reasonable.

The minus side of *The republican virago* can also be found partly in these speculations. When there is little or no directly relevant material, surely it is the duty of the historian to try to fill in the gaps from related sources which can provide information for possible generalizations. Hill shows little acquaintance, beyond the most obvious secondary works, of the lives of Macaulay's female contemporaries. The conclusions, therefore, about the historian's 'feminism' and about her career in contrast to society's expectations of women are not always very soundly based.

Contemporaries of Macaulay generally ascribed her fall from acceptance to the events of her stay in Bath (1774-1778) and her elopement with William Graham, a man 26 years her junior. Hill, like all modern writers who have looked seriously at Macaulay, demonstrates that while these events certainly made a splash in the public press and among the gossip mongers, it was really Macaulay's political views which lost her public favour. Nevertheless, Hill's account of the Bath period and the Graham marriage are not satisfactory. She seems to want to redeem Macaulay's reputation from the gossips, but the price is lack of clarity about the events and some of the people involved. The main explanation offered for Macaulay is that she was in ill health. This is always a useful excuse, true or not, which is acceptable for females; Hill does little to question or explain it.

If indeed it was the divergence of her political views from those generally accepted by the Whigs which caused Macaulay's reputation to decline, then these differences ought to be made clear. Some of them might be elucidated by a more thorough look at Macaulay's political pamphlets. Hill, however, concentrates on her as an historian of seventeenth century England. Little attempt is made to integrate all her work, to present a description of the historian's development which relates the events of her life to her publications. Macaulay's *History* was published over the course of 20 years. Is there a unifying theme to all eight volumes as well as her other works? How did the *History* change, or did it? Did events of the sixties and seventies both in the great world and in Macaulay's own life have any apparent effect on her ideas? Answers to these questions are only hinted at.

Macaulay's interest in and support of the American cause both before and after independence for the United States has often been noted. Many of her contemporaries looked at American affairs only as they would affect those in Britain; the female historian was genuinely interested in what was happening across the Atlantic. She corresponded with many American leaders and visited the United States in 1784-85. Hill's chapter on Macaulay and America seems, at least to this American reader, most unsatisfactory. She concentrates mostly on the background for American political ideas and says little about Macaulay. Perhaps this can be justified as a British writer writing for a British audience, but surely any scholar of the period does not need such basic information.

The republican virago should encourage interest in Catharine Macaulay and acknowledgement of her place in British political history of the eighteenth century. But her extensive writing, her interesting life and the exciting times in which she lived have not yet been adequately covered.

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Giannes Plangeses, *Hyle kai Pneuma. Ste Philosophike Skepse tou Joseph Priestley. (Matter and Spirit. The Philosophical Thought of Joseph Priestley).* Published by P Pournaras. Thessalonica, 1991. 131 pp., 1 illustration, paperback.

This study concentrates on Priestley's *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit* (1782). It sets Priestley against the background of the history of materialism, while insisting on the importance of the non-materialistic element provided by his theology. It place him in his historical context, and sees his roots in the history of thought from Cartesianism, through Locke, Toland and Hartley, not omitting Boscovich's theory of matter; it is as seen against the background of the last-named that he identifies Priestley's materialism as dynamic rather than mechanistic. There are copious references to the Marxist tradition of interpretation of the history of science and philosophy, and of materialism in particular - the English summary printed at the end speaks of Priestley as trying 'to meet the task which was initially set in the Seventeenth Century by the rising bourgeoisie, i.e. the task of reconciling science with religion'. The author does not claim to cover more than one aspect of Priestley's thought, and omits discussion of the relevance of his controversy with Price over the free-will issue. The book closes with a summary in English, a chronological table of the main dates on Priestley's life, and bibliographies of Priestley himself, of his predecessors and contemporaries, and of recent relevant publications.

Among the author's previous publications are works on politics and religion in Locke, and on Toland.

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Manfred Buschmeier, *Die Gesellschaft und das Geld, Untersuchungen zum Geld in englischen Romanen und Komödien der 'sentimental era', Horizonte: Studien zu Texten und Ideen der europäischen Moderne*, vol.4, Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1990, 249 pp., 42.00 DM.

Buschmeier's book wants to show the presence of the 'cash nexus' in the literature of the age of sensibility. The author describes his approach to a select number of novels and comedies as a 'textual analysis informed by social history'. He discusses Goldsmith's *The Vicar of Wakefield*, Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling*, Smollett's *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*, Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey* and, somewhat summarily, a number of Georgian comedies including Goldsmith's *The Good Natur'd Man* and Sheridan's *The School for Scandal*. The first and longest chapter is on the *Vicar* as a text claimed to be of paradigmatic importance. The book also contains a short chapter on the 'socio-historical background'.

An inquiry into the importance of the 'money-theme' in the sentimental literature of the 60s and 70s promises to be rewarding. Buschmeier points out that scholars interested in the reflection of the economic dimension in literary texts have hitherto devoted their time primarily to studies in the literature of the earlier decades of the century, to writers like Defoe, Addison, Steele, Gay, Richardson and others. Though he cannot claim to be wholly without predecessors, Buschmeier may thus take at least part of the credit for having redirected our attention to a later and entirely different group of writers. This, however, is not to say that he overemphasizes the group's homogeneity.

Sterne's ironic sentimentalism, for instance, makes him a special case. Yet Buschmeier appears to be rather critical of this great subjectivist. He wants to make us believe that Sterne had to pay a high price for his refusal to let the social context come into view. Yorick is seen by him as a sentimentalist to whom feelings have become a commodity. The parson is shrewdly balancing his accounts. Whenever he indulges in alms-giving he expects a return in the currency of emotions. Yorick's belief in the convertibility of money and feelings, however, hardly warrants Buschmeier's conclusion that Sterne himself has succumbed to the 'economy of benevolence'.

The dramatists are conspicuous for their (mitigated) optimism. Perhaps owing to the genre of comedy, they are more ready than the novelists to offer solutions that strike a balance between money, reason and sentiment. They denounce rapaciousness, but, on the whole, rather seem to endorse possessive individualism. Their young prodigals are 'converted' in the 'medium of money'.

But not only the comedies reveal a critical attitude towards the 'man of feeling'. Buschmeier generously defends Mackenzie as a realist who should not be dismissed as a writer of lachrymose fiction. Indiscriminate benevolence that can but lead to financial ruin is generally disapproved of. The young hero who has to learn the lessons of prudence - like Sir William Thornhill alias Burchill in the *Vicar* or Charles Surface in the *School for Scandal* - is almost a stock character. The machinations of the 'sentimental knave', who merely affects benevolence, are also a favourite topic. There is no denying the all-pervasiveness of the 'cash nexus', which has transformed the entire social cosmos. 'Fictitious bonds' have replaced 'nature's ties', runs Goldsmith's conservative complaint in *The Traveller*. According to Buschmeier, it is the 'mechanism of money' that propels the action of the Georgian drama, affects its peripeteias, and makes sure that the good characters are rewarded at the end. And it is an awareness of the preponderance of commercial relations that explains the bleak economic realism of the novels, a realism which is only suppressed by their unlikely happy endings.

Buschmeier's - occasionally somewhat pedestrian - analysis carries conviction. But his discussion of the *Vicar* is open to criticism. Buschmeier nowhere observes Goldsmith's play on the genre of the sentimental novel. He does not mention - either in the text or the bibliography - A Lytton-Sells's biography of Goldsmith, in which the *Vicar* is described as a parody - the work of a prolific writer who, true to his neoclassicist bias, did not think highly of the novel as a genre but envied Sterne his literary fame and wished to eclipse it through a performance of his own. One need not subscribe to this view. But it must be obvious to most readers, as it clearly is to Buschmeier, that Charles Primrose has his intellectual moorings in both worlds - the spiritual and the material. He endorses virtue and declaims against fortune-hunting, but hardly interferes with the stratagems of his wife and nubile daughters. He slights Burchill as a man of 'broke fortune'. It is only in the prison scene that he comes close to an embodiment of Christian *contemptus mundi*. Buschmeier calls the vicar a 'split' figure, being itself a part of the 'historical process' of the commercialization of society. Yet, Goldsmith was probably too much of a satirist to have any use for the category of a 'historical process'. Goldsmith can be derisive. His female characters furnish clear evidence of misogyny. He, in fact, spares no one. His own Tory leanings notwithstanding, he certainly meant Primrose's harangue against the doctrines of Wilkinson, the butler and follower of John Wilkes, to be funny. Buschmeier, however, does not locate this little set piece of Tory ideology in the contemporary political debate, but, inexplicably, calls it a 'perspicacious socio-political analysis', contrasting favourably with the vicar's unworldliness in practical matters.

In the final analysis, sentimentalism may perhaps be best understood as compensative. In ethics, its career began with the downgrading of reason in philosophy. In modern society that has moved from status to contract, it reconciles us to the cold and artificial mechanism of commerce by providing a kind of antidote. Buschmeier refers to the ethical theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume in his introductory chapter. His book shows us the function as well as the limitations of sentimentalism in the latter respect and as seen by the writers of the sentimental era themselves.

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Thomas Reid, *Practical ethics: being lectures and papers on natural religion, self-government, natural jurisprudence and the law of nations* edited from the manuscripts with an introduction and a commentary by Knud Haakonssen (Princeton University Press, 1990), xiv, 556, £40.

In the Birkwood Collection housed in the Library at the University of Aberdeen there are over five hundred manuscripts by Thomas Reid. From these, together with two papers read by Reid to the Glasgow Literary Society, Knud Haakonssen has assembled an edition of his writings on practical ethics. The greater part of this material was used by Reid in his lectures at Glasgow University where he held the chair of Moral Philosophy from 1764 until his retirement in 1780, and most of them were written, most probably, in the first four or five years of the time he spent there. One of the two papers given to the Glasgow Literary Society was read on 1 April 1768 (see section XV), the other was read on 28 November 1794 and could be regarded as his final testament on political philosophy (see section XVIII).

In the history of philosophy Reid is remembered by many as a proponent of the philosophy of common sense that was developed to refute the scepticism of David Hume. This picture of him was established and perpetuated, as Haakonssen points out, by his devoted pupil and disciple, Dugald Stewart. (That he is so remembered may be thought to be an unfortunate consequence of the epistemological blight, the obsession with the refutation of scepticism and subjectivism, that has so adversely affected moral philosophers for long periods of time.) Haakonssen has shown that this image of Reid needs to be corrected and he has done so by showing the detailed attention that he gave to the principles of moral judgment, and particularly by showing how close Reid was to the traditions of natural law.

In addition to a lengthy introduction in which Haakonssen distils the best of recent scholarship on Reid, including his own, he adds to the text a weighty commentary. This is needed because although many passages in Reid's notes are completely intelligible in themselves and some are very eloquent (for example, his discussion of the moral force of magnanimity), there are many notes that are little more than chapter headings or reminders of what topics to deal with next. Although Reid frequently felt the need to write out with great care what he wanted to say, it is obvious that he was often sufficiently confident that he could remember what he wanted to say with only the briefest of notes to prompt him. The text therefore needs expansion and explanation and this Haakonssen has done handsomely. But the value of the commentary does not just lie in providing what is needed to make Reid's notes intelligible; it does an invaluable service by consistently tying Reid into the tradition of natural law and showing his debts to his precursors. More than that, the commentary is a valuable working tool for all those who quite independently of their interest in Reid are students of the development of natural law.

In setting forth a full system of practical ethics Reid was inspired by the conviction that the moral philosopher has an important contribution to make to the education of the citizen, principally by the inculcation of the virtues. The branches of philosophy that are concerned with the practical are superior to the purely speculative for the same reason that the relief of misery is more worthwhile than the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Thus for Reid moral philosophy is not concerned simply with the elucidation of the meaning of the terms used in moral discourse, nor just with the analysis of moral concepts: it is also concerned to show how conduct can be improved and to contribute to bringing about that improvement.

Reid's system of practical ethics divides into three main branches: our duties to God, our duties to ourselves (or the duties of self-government), and the duties to others (or the duties of justice). The first two of these are given, without prejudicing their importance, relatively short treatment; a much longer and more detailed discussion is reserved for the duties of justice. Although Reid's system is placed in a theocentric context, he is a rationalist in the sense that he holds that our duties are ascertainable by the exercise of reason quite independently of any appeal to revelation.

Reid's discussion of self-government in the moral sense is largely concerned with the virtues of prudence, temperance and fortitude. As many others have tried to do, he attempts to synthesize Christian ethics with the treatment of the cardinal virtues to be found in the ancient philosophers, and like many others, fails to overcome the virtually insuperable difficulty of finding a home for sacrificial altruism among the virtues of the ancients. Of the two principles of practical reason - what is good for us on the whole, and what appears to be our duty - it is the latter and only the latter that can be, according to Reid, the foundation of a moral system: if the cardinal virtues are then to find a place they must give rise to duties. Reid's attitude to prudence thus becomes ambivalent. Prudence has a moral value only in so far as we have a duty to be prudent. Pursuing our own self-interest as such has no moral value: it has moral value only in so far as the conduct which produces benefits for us also enables us to discharge the duties we have to others. On the other hand, Reid is prepared to concede that the practical consequences of following the principle of cool rational self-interest are virtually the same as following the principle of duty. One is tempted to ask, 'If indeed enlightened self-interest does have the same beneficial consequences as doing one's duty, why deny that it may be the foundation of a moral system?' and 'Can a Christian really concede that the behaviour that morality requires is always the same as that indicated by enlightened self-interest?'

The duties of justice divide into three main branches of jurisprudence: the private, the economical and the political. The first of these is concerned with the duties that we owe to each other as individuals, the second with the duties we have as members of families and the third with the duties we have as members of civil society.

One of the most striking features of Reid's treatment of justice is his claim that every right has as its correlate a duty in another (or in others), that is, that every claim that may justifiably be made on the basis of a right lays upon someone (or some others) a duty to respect the holder's right and preserve him in the enjoyment of its. There is no place, it would seem, in his system for the concept of a right that has as its correlate in another what Hohfeld was later to call a no-right.[1] Consequently, there seems to be no room for the notion that what the agent may legitimately have a right to do may bring him into conflict with others likewise engaged in the legitimate pursuit of their rights.

Also important in this connection is Reid's treatment of the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. As Haakonssen points out, whereas some philosophers distinguish as perfect those rights that are essential to the maintenance of perfect (and therefore legally enforceable) from those that are not essential, Reid distinguishes perfect rights as those that give rise to negatively defined duties in others (such as a duty not to injure) from those that give rise to positive duties in others (such as the duty to relieve distress). What needs emphasizing here is that for Reid both perfect and imperfect rights are enforceable.

Now the idea that others always have enforceable duties to allow us to do what we have a right to do, might seem very attractive to the liberal minded seeking to establish strong defences for the enjoyment of rights, but on closer inspection it may be seen to carry with it severe threats to the enjoyment of liberal values, especially where it leads to policies which severely limit the right to compete. According to the interpretation of rights that Reid favours the more rights we have the more duties we have. The point at which we could enjoy the maximum of rights would be the point at which our lives would be saturated with duties. At this point there would be little freedom to do what is not morally prescribed. Paradoxically, the attempt to defend freedom would succeed in severely restricting it. In and by itself, however, the failure to allow for the use of a right which has as its correlate a no-right might not constitute a serious threat to freedom of action, nor the claim that all rights (and their correlative duties) are enforceable. What is crucial is the extent to which, given these definitions of rights, action is or ought to be determined by moral considerations.

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[1] Haakonssen has explicitly rebutted M Dalgano's claim that Reid employs a notion of right that does not have as its correlate a duty in another. *See* 'Reid's politics: a natural law theory' in *Reid Studies*, No.1 (1986-97), 10-17.

It would seem as though for Reid the ideal would be a community in which life would be saturated with moral duties. There are many pointers which lead to this conclusion. In the first place, Reid holds that our rights are grounded in the common good. If we have a right it is because our possessing and enjoying it makes a contribution to the common good. There are no free standing rights. Secondly, it follows from this that no one can have a right to do something that would be injurious to the community at large. Thirdly, and even more decisively, it follows that no one can have a right to do something which does not make a contribution to the common good. Fourthly, it would seem that Reid holds that the common good integrates all individual goods so that the pursuit of the individual's real interest harmonizes with the maintenance of the public interest. Lastly, everyone has a duty to maximize his own interest and the good of the community. (Even if no one has a duty to pursue his own self-interest for its own sake, since doing what rational self interest requires is virtually identical in its consequences with doing one's duty, and since everyone has a duty to maximize the common good, everyone has a duty to do those actions that self-interest requires.)

Reid's Utopia would be a closely knit interdependent community in which everyone's rights and duties would be defined, and everyone's freedom of action would be defended and restricted by what is needed to promote the prosperity of the community. The powers that Reid would grant to government in order to maintain this harmony confirm the suspicion that the application of his conceptual scheme would give it very extensive powers of control: private property would be reduced to a minimum, there would be state control of religious establishments, and state provision of education including a thorough promotion of those virtues thought essential to maintaining harmony within society.

Another intriguing feature of Reid's system is his use of the notion of quasi-contract derived by jurisprudents such as Grotious and Pufendorf from Roman Law and applied as Haakonssen notes by Hutcheson to the interpretation of political obligation. Reid uses the notion to avoid the difficulties experienced in postulating actual or tacit consent in the foundation of political authority. A similar suggestion is advanced by Josiah Tucker in his *A treatise concerning civil government*.[2] Reid uses the notion to explain the relations between the ruler and the ruled - thus it applies to the notion of the contract of government, not to the social

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[2] Op. cit., (1781), 141-42.

contract proper which traditionally sets out how individuals are presumed to constitute themselves members of a political society. To every office in the community there are attached rights and duties *as though* these had been agreed upon by all the interested parties. The striking feature of Reid's treatment is that the ruler's entitlement to the obedience of his subjects is in no way dependent upon the way he came into office - by hereditary, succession, a coup d'etat, a popular revolt, or conquest - what is crucial is whether or not he discharges faithfully the duties of his office. One wonders why Reid wanted to dress this claim up in a legal costume. Shorn of the element of fiction, the theory amounts to saying that 'in the nature of things' rulers and ruled alike have the duties that attend their position in society and provided that he discharges the duties of his office the ruler is entitled to the obedience of his subjects. Although some of the difficulties of holding that authority originates in a historical contract or in tacit consent are avoided in this way, we are left with the problem of determining how disputes are to be resolved where there is disagreement as to what those duties are, and particularly when there is need for change. The difficulty with Reid's conception as, more generally, with the foundation of rights and duties in natural law, is that it assumes that the relations between rulers and ruled are universal, static and unchanging.

Haakonssen has placed historians of eighteenth century thought heavily in debt to him not just for editing fresh material on Reid and thus expanding our knowledge of him but also for the contribution he makes to understanding the importance of the tradition of natural law in the eighteenth century by disclosing Reid's affinities to it and by tracing his debts to his sources. In a short review it is impossible to do justice to the wealth of information this book contains or to the subtlety and penetration of Haakonssen's introduction and commentary.

Princeton University is to be congratulated for presenting this splendid work in a production of the highest quality.

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James E Bradley, *Religion, revolution and English radicalism: nonconformity in eighteenth-century politics and society*. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), xxii, 473, £40.

In 1986, Professor Bradley published *Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown and Public Opinion*, a study of petitions favouring conciliation and coercion in relation to America. These petitions, he argues, clearly demonstrate the extent of political activism among the Dissenters and their commitment to the American cause, indicating their proper place in the emergence of later radical movements. The present work is much more ambitious, though, again, the sweeping title must be qualified by the subtitle, and even the subtitle might be thought to claim more than is actually offered: the book deals only with that portion of the eighteenth century between the 1750s and the 1780s from a rather narrowly defined perspective on both politics and society.

Within those limits, however, Professor Bradley has attempted much and has given us much to be grateful for. Of course, a book so densely packed as this one will provoke objections: there are a number of petty errors and inconsistencies, and every reader will find occasion for disagreement with emphases, proportion and interpretation. But gratitude must outweigh carping. To begin with, Professor Bradley seems to have read *everything* touching on the subject as he defines it; in consequence, the notes are a remarkable guide to scholarly work, stretching beyond books and articles to an array of postgraduate theses, often of considerable age and somewhat disheartening obscurity. Astonishing diligence and considerable ingenuity have gone into Bradley's reconstruction of the Dissenting role in the politics of Bristol and a handful of other boroughs. And, throughout, the extensive marshalling of evidence leads to many striking insights, sometimes in the author's own formulations, sometimes arising from a differing perspective that a reader will bring to bear on material Bradley provides.

Professor Bradley divides his book into three parts (not counting the preliminary historiographical reflections). The first - I follow his formulations in the preface - begins with the legal structures within which Nonconformity moved and had its being and goes on to examine how that being manifested a notable degree of independent, and even radical, thought across a wide spectrum. The second part turns to what he calls established modes of political expression and examines Dissenting political behaviour, primarily in case studies of voting patterns as revealed in poll books, with correlation where possible with evidence from nonparochial registers. The third expands on what he nicely calls "unsanctioned forms of political expression", those popular petitions that formed the subject of Bradley's first book and on which he expands helpfully. But for a decade, he says, his overarching concern has been the possibility of demonstrating the influence of religious ideas on political behaviour. The crux of his book thus becomes the first part, and to that I shall largely confine my attention.

A prefatory word is needed, however, about the constituency analyses in the second part of the book. Bradley recognizes that he is dealing with a narrow evidential base, making the point explicitly with respect to Bristol, the best furnished of his examples, on pages 65 and 207, but he draws enough assurance from consistencies in voting behaviour he finds there and elsewhere to project them onto the whole. I suspect that most historians would feel less confident, particularly in view of the apparent over-representation in his tables of Presbyterian (or Presbyterian-Unitarian) chapels and the scant recognition given to social variation as between generations, despite the suggestive comments on pages 309-311 about differences from one town to another. To some extent, this difficulty is inescapable - there are only so many surviving poll books from which to reconstruct voting patterns, only so many surviving or usable registers to deploy in correlating voting behaviour, occupational status, and Dissenting commitment - and we are left to ask how venturesome one has a right to be in generalizing. But the same problem exists in the discussion of ideology, and without the same mitigating plea from the survival of evidence.

Bradley's ideological explorations rely largely on three orthodox and two anti-Trinitarian ministers: James Murray of Newcastle, Job David of Norwich, Caleb Evans of Bristol, Joshua Toulmin of Taunton and George Walker of Nottingham. While Bradley explains why he chose the six boroughs he analyses (page 43), he nowhere explains why he chose these five ministers, other than to say that he wanted to get away from those he refers to (page 124) as the "most well known radical Dissenters of London and Birmingham" (read chiefly Price and Priestley) to the "most well known ministers" of his five towns. There is not much correlation with his electoral analyses - only Bristol and Newcastle overlap in any significant way.

Bradley draws a very large amount of political argument from his five ministers - it is certainly there to be drawn - but the sources are, even for them, surprisingly few. The most frequently cited of the ministers and the one with the largest number of titles to his name is James Murray, but Murray's most quoted and most radical sermons appear to have been in fact pamphlets; he was an active contributor to the press in other ways as well. At the other extreme is Toulmin, who preached only one surviving sermon on America and so figures very little in the citations. Evans preached three 5th of November sermons, engaged in newspaper controversy about John Wesley's views on America, and published pamphlets to dispute John Fletcher, Wesley's defender, and Josiah Tucker. But Gunpowder Day sermons and fast sermons, both valuable and revealing *genres*, with Walker well represented in the latter, were delivered on very special public occasions that virtually demanded the drawing of political morals, while other public controversy is doubtfully ascribable to "the pulpit". It seems to me a questionable extrapolation from Toulmin's American sermon to say that, given the stance on civil and religious liberty shown in his more general works, "we may safely assume that he espoused radical politics from the pulpit on more than one occasion" (page 132).

Bradley's use of Murray to make the case for radicalism seems highly distinctive. He points out that Murray was a Scottish Presbyterian (a denomination that dominated Newcastle Nonconformity), but he does not go so far as he might have done in speculating about the possible influence of Murray's Scots background on his levelling politics. David, a disciple of Murray's, must have been similarly idiosyncratic, but little is known about him. Leaving those two aside, then, only Evans stands for orthodox English Dissent and as a source of Bristol libertarian and conciliarist argument. It would have been far more useful to have had more ministers strategically placed both denominationally and on the political spectrum, even to have paid more attention to the more famous names, and certainly to have had a greater correlation of case studies and ministers, or, if that is simply impossible, to have ventured less boldness in generalizing.

An instructive instance. Bradley is rather severe about "the politically moderate, indeed pusillanimous" Robert Lewin of Benn's Garden, Liverpool, who took a cautious position in a sermon on the American situation, on the occasion in 1784 of a day of thanksgiving for the peace, a sermon Lewin was reluctant to publish because Dissenting society in the town was, in his own words "divided in political sentiments" (pages 392-393).[1] Bradley follows Anne Holt in pointing out that there were slave traders in the congregation, but he does not consider the larger dependence of Liverpool on the American trade, which may have lain behind the political division. There is, however, a more important consideration.

Bradley assumes that ministers spoke, or should have spoken, radical, or pro-American, politics as a direct consequence of invocations of religious liberty and admiration for the settlement of 1689 which appeared on appropriate, secularly ordained occasions like fast days, and that congregations responded directly to such charismatic preaching and were short-changed if they did not get it. It is my impression that frankly

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[1] Bradley notes that Lewin had signed a conciliatory petition in 1772.

political sermons were rare in the regular course of things, in the nineteenth as in the eighteenth century. Most members of congregations did not want to be told how to behave in their business or electoral dealings, and, as it was they who paid the bills, ministers were likely to be deferential to their preferences and not much likely to get out in front in their official duties, whatever some of them may have done as citizens.

Now, on page 274, Bradley misleadingly describes Liverpool Presbyterians as indistinguishable from Unitarians. Lewin, the minister there for almost half a century from 1770, was not a Unitarian but an Arian, and Arians were notable for their preference for "gospel" or "practical" preaching. That meant that their sermons dealt with biblical or, more likely, devotional matters rather than with pointed ethical or political questions. While increasing numbers of well-off radicals found such old fashioned ministers out of touch - Bradley makes good use of the instance of this phenomenon offered by the Hurry family that dominated Colchester (e.g. pages 239-240) - and took the lead in bringing in younger, more radical ministers, the transformation of Presbyterian congregations in this regard had scarcely begun in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. But that is not to say that political preaching was what the insurgents wanted. The pulpit at Benn's Garden became clearly, aggressively Unitarian only after Lewin's forced retirement in 1816 and his replacement by George Harris, a shift that took some getting used to among older members of the congregation.[2] But Harris, and others like him, were *doctrinal*, not *political* preachers, and doctrinal preaching, though agreeable to many, was a matter on which high feeling and resistance were common right down through the Martineau-inspired revolution of the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The dynamics of congregations - and variations among them - were far more complex than this book allows.

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[2] Bradley is misleading when he refers on p.287 to Lewin as "the minister" of Benn's Garden. For much of his long tenure, Lewin had a ministerial colleague, a frequent occurrence in larger chapels, and such ministers might speak with rather different theological voices, but it is unclear how far that circumstance introduced variety here. But the practice of attending other chapels and reliance on extensive exchange of pulpits meant that congregations were not necessarily exposed for years to a single point of view. Certainly after 1791, radically-minded Liverpool Unitarians would have had much to do with the Rev. William Shepherd, a consummate political wirepuller, at Gateacre. And even in Benn's Garden different views could occasionally be heard: on the occasion of the opening of the new chapel, in Renshaw Street in 1811, Lewin, scarcely mentioning the occasion, preached in the morning on the relative duties of minister and congregation, while in the afternoon, the Rev. William Grundy of Cross Street, Manchester, preached an aggressively Unitarian sermon that made some of his hearers distinctly uneasy (Anne Holt, *Walking Together*, 4-5).

Bradley recognizes that Dissenters, even Rational Dissenters, had a "passion for theology" (pages 134-135), and he deplores the assumption by other scholars that politics took its place. Yet Bradley himself seems interested only in political consequences: "The religion of the Dissenters is therefore understood in this study as a set of firmly held convictions about the nature of moral and political authority [which] differed from other people's political convictions by their deep grounding in different ecclesiastical, political and social experience" (pages 4-5).[3] Fair enough: an author can be allowed to define his subject. But thus discounting the main business of a congregation and its ministers distorts historical significance and understanding: to argue as Bradley does in his conclusion (pages 422-424), that the rapid growth of Dissent (and the decline of Unitarianism, badly overstated) was owing to the alternative version of *society* offered by orthodox Dissenters, must rightly evoke a protest of some warmth.

Every historian of religion must wish that congregations had behaved differently from the way they did, had left us more printed sermons and more records with more details and more expressions of concern about this or that subject; had they done so, our lives would be much easier. But congregations were what they were, and evidences of divine power, the drama of salvation, and the compulsion to worship were uppermost in the minds of most congregants, even among the most politically emancipated. There were political consequences of Dissent, and this book helps in understanding how they worked. There were also links, direct and indirect, between Dissenting theology and Dissenters' views on politics and society, links of immense complexity that ran in both directions. Yet, despite Professor Bradley's valiant and valuable efforts, eighteenth-century Dissent remains as elusive as ever.

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[3] See p.137, n.47, where Bradley notes the seemingly political - but also obviously rhetorical - warning of George Walker to the Corporation of Nottingham (many of whose members, Bradley notes, were members of his congregation) that they would one day have to account for themselves to the "great Magistrate of the Universe"; he then seeks to reinforce the point by citing a funeral sermon by Caleb Evans to the effect that death is a great leveller. But that is hardly a political sentiment!

Peter Harrison, *'Religion' and the religions in the English Enlightenment* (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), pp.277, £30.

The author's declared aim is to examine the emergence of the twin concepts 'religion' and 'religions' and to describe the new science of religion that they enabled. The English Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the locus of the investigation for it is here the decisive early modern European moves were made.

The crucial overarching claim is that the concepts in question were developed in a polemical context so that the notion 'religion'/'religions' was prefabricated relative to the actual study of those entities we term 'religions'. Accordingly, Harrison hopes that we will revise some of our cherished notions of religion. But the book is ostensibly a piece of scholarship and not of advocacy. In that respect it is both timely and well-documented. The Platonists, Protestant scholastics and rationalistic divines that walked the land in those days are all cited, while the shadow of deism fades only at the end of the book with the arrival of David Hume. If discussion of religion until Hume was dominated by the strife of reason and revelation, Hume's enterprise supported the former as little as it restored the latter. Therein a new chapter in the study of religions begins and Harrison rightly terminates discussion at this point. What, then, of the story hitherto?

In the seventeenth century two distinguishable notions about religion emerged to challenge the Reformed Protestant championship of revealed, supernaturally-based religion. The first sought to align natural and revealed religion, rescuing the former from the mire of sin to which classic Protestantism had consigned it. The second sought actually to elevate natural religion to a criterion for true religion. The first came from Platonists, the second from the deists. (The author alludes to the difficulty of defining deism, p.62). The Platonists fought the theological battle invited by the scandal of Protestant soteriology and epistemology. The scandal was the belief that to be saved you need to assent to the truths of Christianity. That wraps up the question of religion. Where there is no knowledge there is no salvation, but where there is knowledge there is salvation. The implications of this for a notion of divine justice and goodness propelled Platonists to examine 'religion'. But there is a decisive postulate governing and shaping the discussion from the 'scholastic' end: as belief is assent to propositions, so religion is a matter of propositions, true or false. Between the soteriological context and the propositional interpretation, we have the vital clues to the way the concepts 'religion' and 'religions' emerged.

This point made, three chapters take us through the subsequent story. The first deals with Herbert of Cherbury and the deists. In whatever direction they moved, there were obstacles whatever the gains. Herbert pioneered, on an epistemological basis, a theory of natural religion consisting of five common notions. The problem was the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of such a universal natural religion. But in any case, the tangent taken by the deists took off from Herbert's allegations about priests. Dreaming and waking, priestcraft became the perpetual theme of 'freethinkers' (Richard Bentley, p.77). Harrison distinguishes the notion of priestly *imposture*, postulate of a leading theory of religion which attended to its fraudulent *origins* from *priestcraft*, postulate of the deistic account of religion which looked to its obnoxious *perpetuation*. The obstacle here was that this would remain a theory unacceptable to the establishment. Hence the development of the twofold philosophy, 'perhaps the most widely held theory of religion in seventeenth century England' (p.85), distinguishing between the popular, external and the intellectual, esoteric kind of religion. The author remarks on clandestine organizations in connection with this point.

The second deals with 'sacred history and religious diversity'. Hitherto the biblical story and the biblical world framed every other story and world. But now a massive reversal took place as the biblical scheme had to be fitted as best it could into the external data. Biblical criticism and comparative chronology boosted the revival of polygenetic theories of religion. That encouraged thinking about religious development less in terms of supernatural influence and more in terms of human agency. This engendered a variety of possibilities, including in general a positive view of religious diversity and in particular the idea of climatic influences on religion. But the momentous claim was that which followed the discovery of the New World and the improbability of tracing the descent of its inhabitants back to Noah. The problem could be pushed back to Adam himself. And with the theory of pre-Adamites developed conspicuously by Isaac de la Peyrere, it is obvious we have a very fundamental challenge indeed to the traditional notion of religion. One is reminded in Harrison's discussion of the significance of the fact (pointed out, e.g., by Paul Hazard) that it was books on theology and on travel that sold best at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The final chapter deals with the next step: 'From Sacred History to Natural History'. Now that sacred history ceases to be intellectually adequate, not even adequate as a criterion, could it even be corrigible? The push towards an entirely natural theory of religion promised a considerable victory over a theology which celebrated particularity, exclusiveness and election. But the terms of the onslaught were still dictated by a conception of religion as a propositional animal, East or West. The vital instincts of deism - the quest for a religion of reason and the repristination of classical ideas - were channelled according to that conception. In documenting the deistic effort Harrison urges in particular that John Toland's contribution has been unjustly neglected at the expense of other deists like Matthew Tindal. Toland is not alone; Thomas Morgan comes in for discussion too, although Harrison gives the impression that the title 'Christian deist' applies to Morgan and not to Tindal, whereas in fact Tindal so styled himself (see pp. 74,168). But the deist drive towards a natural history of religion ran up against the contribution of David Hume who severed their connection between the historical development and the rational basis of religion. And herein endeth the lesson.

Harrison's thesis, marked as it is by useful historical information, is marred however by lack of theological familiarity which affects not just the margins but the thrust of the argument. One notes it quickly when the author expresses as an obvious truth the contrast between the plain New Testament teaching on the universality of the atonement and the Calvinist denial of it, as though Calvinism did not root its own teachings (rightly or wrongly) in the biblical text (p.23). Again, Toland's argument that Matthew 7.6 and 1 Corinthians 2.6 form a basis for twofold philosophy is incredible, but not so to the author (p.206, n.130). However, there are three key points where the weakness makes a difference. These are all found in the introductory discussion of 'Antecedents' so that the whole subsequent argument is thrown out of kilter.

First, it is alleged that for the reformers revealed and natural knowledge were 'fundamentally opposed' (p.7). But 'knowledge' cannot logically be opposed to 'knowledge' and the reformers did not say so. Possibly the author is led into this misconception by conflating or insufficiently distinguishing between natural *knowledge* from natural *theology* (p.8). Secondly, a contrast is drawn between a Protestant propositional notion of faith and a mediaeval notion of faith as a dynamic of the heart (p.1). Unfortunately, the claim about mediaevals is not documented nor would one guess that the mediaevals also traded in propositions. (And which mediaeval would have found himself described as representative of a 'traditional view' that 'in the process of revelation God reveals *himself*', p.24, my italics)? Thirdly, there is confusion between thinking of religion as essentially a matter of assent to propositions and maintaining that assent to propositions is an element in religion. This explains the *non sequitur* comment: '...When there is no *propositional* 'religion' supposedly at the heart of the religious life, and when there are no 'religions' construed as mutually contradictory sets of propositions, then the modern problem of 'conflicting religious truth claims' cannot come into play' (p.14). Because the thesis of the book is geared to the claim that a (false) propositionalism formed the context for the development of 'religion' and 'religions' it is obvious how this mistake vitiates the argument of the book.

Yet the work is helpful. The argument could be readjusted without losing the whole force of the case. Meanwhile we are indebted to the author for his presentation of evidence in the service of an eminently deserving theme.

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Alan Sell, *Dissenting thought and the life of the Churches: Studies in an English Tradition* (San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1990), xi + 713 pp., $109.95.

This collection contains 22 essays, all previously published by the author between 1973 and 1990, the majority since the mid-1980s. Professor Sell holds the Chair of Christian Doctrine at the United Theological College, Aberystwyth, and he has also served as Theological Secretary to the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. These interests are reflected in the essays. The author states that his primary concerns are theological and philosophical, though he is not 'unappreciative' of 'sociological considerations'. This is a fair summary of the approach followed in the collection, which ranges from broad surveys of Congregational and Presbyterian doctrine to consideration of the ideas of individual ministers and theologians. Six of the essays are detailed local studies of ministers and congregations in the West Midlands, which the author believes help to demonstrate the close connection between doctrine and congregational behaviour. The final three essays in the volume have an explicitly confessional purpose, and were written in response to contemporary ecumenical concerns. The contents range in time from the sixteenth century to the modern period, with a majority concerned with the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries.

In one of the most substantial pieces in the volume, 'Presbyterianism in Eighteenth-Century England: the Doctrinal Dimension', Professor Sell examines the commonly held assumption that the spread of heterodox opinions amongst English Presbyterians explains their numerical decline. Presbyterians, from being the largest and most important body of Dissenters at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had only a third of the original number of congregations by the end, and those congregations had seen the size of their membership also decline substantially.[1] After a survey of the evidence for the spread of heterodox ideas amongst Presbyterian ministers, Professor Sell attempts to provide a statistical picture for a number of counties of the level of decline experienced by Presbyterians compared with Congregationalists during the eighteenth century using the available published sources. He is careful to point out that there are other reasons for the decline of heterodox congregations besides that of doctrine, and that some orthodox congregations also disappeared. Nonetheless, Professor Sell concludes that Presbyterian congregations declined because of the adoption of heterodox opinions, and that such ideas spread amongst their congregations because the appointment of ministers lay in the hands of trustees rather than in the church meeting. This point, though, is not new.[2]

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[1] J Seed, 'Gentlemen Dissenters: the Social and Political Meanings of Rational Dissent in the 1770s and 1780s', *Historical Journal*, XXVIII (1985), 302.

There are, however, serious objections to Professor Sell's conclusions concerning eighteenth century Presbyterianism. First, it is clear that anti-trinitarian speculation was widespread in the first half of the eighteenth century, not least within the Church of England.[3] Secondly, in support of the argument that congregations were becoming increasingly heterodox he relies upon the 1732 survey of London Dissent, but the anonymous author, an Independent, was clearly hostile to the Presbyterian interest. Moreover, even if reliable, the evidence cannot be applied to provincial Dissent. By concentrating on the evidence for heterodox opinion there is a danger of assuming that such ideas were not only widely held by ministers, but also widespread in congregations before the second half of the eighteenth century. The evidence from detailed local studies would suggest that this was not the case, and that the adoption of heterodox beliefs was slow and uneven, depending upon individual ministers and circumstances. Much is made of the decline in the number of rural Presbyterian congregations, but this took place mainly during the early eighteenth century,[4] before the spread of heterodoxy, and it affected all denominations, though it is true the Presbyterians experienced the greatest decline. Nonetheless, this loss had rather more to do with economic factors than doctrine. Presbyterianism depended upon a paid, educated ministry, which only the larger urban congregations could afford to maintain. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Presbyterian congregations outside the main towns which survived the eighteenth century, such as the Bardon Park Meeting in Leicestershire, and Kirkstead, near Woodhall Spa, in Lincolnshire, were still supported by the endowments of their original gentry patrons. Rural dissent was rescued by the evangelical revival, when for the first time religion captured the hearts of the labourer on a significant scale. The leading Presbyterian congregations in the main towns, of course, by adopting rational religious beliefs, rejected the religious enthusiasm of the evangelical revival and therefore did not experience the huge increase in numbers enjoyed by the Independents and the Baptists. Instead, despite their loss of numbers, they became centres of considerable wealth and influence.

Unfortunately, the perception of eighteenth-century Presbyterianism is still moulded by the prejudices of generations of denominational historians, who have seen English Presbyterianism as 'infected' by Socinianism. Professor Sell is far too balanced and fair to allow such prejudices to colour his discussion, yet he follows the same agenda by examining the reasons for the 'decline' in Presbyterian congregations. Rather than continuing the sterile debate over the 'decline' of eighteenth-century Presbyterianism, we need to understand its transformation. Churches that fail to respond to change die. The major urban Presbyterian congregations in Birmingham, Bristol, Manchester, Nottingham, London and the other main industrial centres were certainly not dying; they were in the vanguard of reform, major figures in provincial science and business. It is this transformation that needs to be studied, not the decline in numbers. Professor Sell's discussion is in terms of doctrine. He mentions Arianism and Socinianism, but, significantly, not Rational Dissent, and there is hardly any reference to the major political events of the period. The process by which most of the leading urban congregations became Unitarian is still little understood, yet it is clear that the conservative reaction provoked by the French Revolution had a dramatic impact on the development of a more aggressive and overt Unitarianism. A survey of the evidence for doctrinal heterodoxy seems inadequate to explain the transformation of eighteenth century Presbyterianism.

If there are doubts about Professor Sell's approach to the problems that concern historians, there is much of value in the collection. As one would expect, the strengths of Professor Sell's work are his knowledge of the doctrine and theology of his period, as well as the admirable clarity with which he discusses such ideas. Unlike many historians he also understands the importance of religious beliefs for the individuals he studies. Attempts to cross disciplinary boundaries are always to be welcomed; it is unfortunate that the history of ideas is so little valued by modern historians.

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[2] See C G Bolam *et al*, *English Presbyterianism: From Elizabethan Puritanism to Modern Unitarianism* (London, 1968), 25-6, 177-8.

[3] J Seed, 'Theologies of power: Unitarianism and the social relations of religious discourse, 1800-50' in *Class, power and social structure in British nineteenth-century towns*, ed. R J Morris (Leicester, 1986), 112-13; G M Ditchfield, 'Anti-trinitarianism and Toleration in Late Eighteenth Century British Politics: the Unitarian Petition of 1792', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, XLII (1991), 43-4.

[4] Compare the ;number of rural meetings in Nottinghamshire recorded in the 'Evans List' (*c.* 1715-17) with the number of Dissenters recorded in the visitation returns made nearly 30 years later, *sv.* Blidworth, Calverton, East and West Leake, Widerpool and Willoughby: Dr Williams's Library, London, MS34.4, pp.92-3; 'Archbishop Herring's Visitation Returns, 1743: IV', ed. S L Ollard & P C Walker, *Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series*, LXXVII (1930), 25, 85-6, 161, 162-3, 176.

Communication

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Nantes and the death of Richard Price

It is said that, on learning of Price's death in 1791, the Club of Jacobins in Paris went into mourning for him, as did the Society of the Friends of the Constitution at Nantes. The latter also resolved to place Price's bust in their Hall, side by side with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, to name one of the quarters of the town "le Quartier de Richard Price" and to read annually on 4 November a French translation of the discourse read by Andrew Kippis at his burial.

This year the Nineteenth Hume Society Conference was held at Nantes on Monday, June 29th - Friday, July 3rd and I took the opportunity of researching the evidence for this claim on the spot. With the assistance of Prof. Michel Malherbe of the Faculté des Lettres, Université de Nantes (who is also a Deputy Mayor of the Town) I visited the Archives Municipales, 1 rue Enfer, Nantes, and examined the town records of the year 1791. Contemporary maps of the time were not available, but no record of the Quartier de Richard Price survives on the maps of this day.

Sadly I have to say that no trace of the town's devotion to the memory of Price remains, but this is not to say that these events did not happen at the time. The town records I saw look as if they are fair copies of earlier documents, and it does not need a particularly suspicious mind to suspect that on one of the many changes of central government which France enjoyed in the next century, the town elders found it convenient to omit this episode in its history.

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