

The  
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Newsletter

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THE PRICE-PRIESTLEY NEWSLETTER

Editorial

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## Editorial

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This, the third issue of the newsletter, gives us an opportunity to welcome Professor W. Bernard Peach of Duke University to the advisory editorial board. Professor Peach, well known to scholars for his work as an editor and interpreter of Francis Hutcheson, has recently published an edition of Richard Price's pamphlets on the American Revolution under the title Richard Price and the Ethical Foundations of the American Revolution. This volume, handsomely published by Duke University Press, includes Observations on the nature of civil liberty, Additional observations, the general introduction and supplement to Two tracts, Observations on the importance of the American revolution, Price's Fast Sermon at Hackney on 10 February 1779, as well as extracts from some of the most important replies to Price, by, notably, John Lind, John Wesley, Adam Ferguson, William Markham and Edmund Burke, and extracts from Price's correspondence with leading Americans. To this collection, which is the first publication that brings Price's writings on this subject between two covers, Professor Peach contributes a detailed analysis of the arguments Price used in defence of the American rebels and a demonstration of how his political philosophy is firmly grounded in his moral philosophy. This work will be warmly welcomed by all those interested in Price because it makes accessible a great deal of information on his contribution to the justification of the American colonists that is not now readily available elsewhere, and because the presentation of these important pamphlets is greatly enhanced by the editor's thorough and careful scholarship and by his penetrating interpretation.

We are happy to be able to say that the publication of the first issue of this newsletter, or rather, more precisely, the initial steps taken to promote it, was the occasion of our discovering that the idea of collecting and publishing what remains of Price's widely scattered correspondence had occurred separately and independently at Duke University and at Aberystwyth. We are even happier to be able to say that this discovery has led to a joint undertaking, the publication of a complete edition of all Price's correspondence known to be extant under the editorship of W. Bernard Peach and D. O. Thomas. This work will extend to three, possibly four volumes, and it is hoped that the first of these will be published in the near future.

Few projects these days escape the unwanted attentions of inflation, and this newsletter is no exception. From the outset it has been our policy to keep the cost to the subscriber as low as possible, but even with strict attention to economy it is now clear that we cannot keep to the initial subscription of £1.00 indefinitely. Although costs of production are rising sharply we have decided to keep to this figure for this issue, but for the fourth we shall have to raise our charges to £2.00 per issue for readers in Britain and to \$6.00 or £2.60 sterling for readers overseas. We hope that our subscribers will appreciate the need for this step and maintain their sympathy and support.

M. F.  
D. O. T.

### Increase in Subscription.

It is with great regret that we have to announce an intention to increase the subscription for the fourth, the 1980, issue of the newsletter. We have kept the subscription steady for the first three issues, including the present one, but the increase in costs makes it impossible for us to continue with this rate. So for the fourth issue the subscription will be £2.00 (including postage and packing) for readers in Great Britain, and \$6.00 or £2.60 sterling (including postage and packing) for overseas readers.

### Notes to Contributors and Subscribers

CONTRIBUTORS are asked to send their typescripts to D. O. Thomas, Department of Philosophy, Hugh Owen Building, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DY, Great Britain. Contributions of article length should be submitted in duplicate, and the author should retain a copy. Articles should not exceed 8,000 words in length. All contributions should be typed in double spacing, and the footnotes should be presented on separate sheets. It would be of immense help to the editors if authors would kindly adopt the conventions recommended in the MLA Handbook.

It is hoped that readers will use the newsletter for the exchange of information by sending in short notes, queries, requests for information, reports of work in progress, and books for review.

SUBSCRIBERS who have not paid their subscriptions in advance will receive an invoice with each issue. The subscription for readers in Great Britain is £1.00 (including postage and package) per annum. For overseas readers it is \$3.00, or £1.30 sterling (including postage and packing).

All subscriptions and queries concerning them should be sent to Martin Fitzpatrick, Department of History, The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DY, Great Britain.

WILLIAM GODWIN AND THE RATIONAL DISSENTERS

William Godwin's spiritual and intellectual debt to Dissent is well known, but it has not attracted the specific and detailed investigation which it deserves. (1) This paper is an attempt to rectify in part that neglect by examining his connections with Rational Dissent and especially with Richard Price and Joseph Priestley. (2)

Born in 1756, William Godwin was a son of the manse and was educated by dissenters, most notably Andrew Kippis who was his tutor at Hoxton Academy. Kippis, however, failed to shake the firmly held Calvinistic theology of the youthful Godwin, and it was not until Godwin completed his formal education in 1778 that his intellectual development really began. For over a year after leaving Hoxton, he preached to a congregation at Ware in Hertfordshire. During this period his political opinions began to change; influenced by the speeches of Burke and Fox, he became an 'oppositionist'. (3) At the same time, he remained attached to Calvinism, possibly through the influence of his new friend, the poet and divine, Joseph Fawcett, whom he held in high esteem. (4) Nevertheless, the extent of that attachment was not great. In his last year at Hoxton, Godwin had conducted a private debate with Richard Evans, a fellow student, on the subject of God. Evans had been unable to resolve Godwin's difficulties, and the latter 'finally took refuge in the argument a priori, as contained in Dr. Samuel Clarke's Discourse on the Attributes'. (5) Godwin left his ministry at Ware in August 1779, and, after a short period in London, he moved in 1780 to Suffolk to minister to a congregation at Stowmarket. He later recorded that during this period 'my orthodoxy was insensibly declining; I rejected the doctrine of eternal damnation, and my notions respecting the trinity acquired a taint of heresy'. (6) His doubts were compounded when in the following year a new resident at Stowmarket, Mr. Frederick Norman, became his intimate friend. Norman had imbibed the doctrines of the philosophes and he gave Godwin books which shook his faith in Christianity, notably D'Holbach's Système de la nature. He became a Deist, but without overwhelming conviction for his opinions continued to fluctuate. He was, however, glad to be relieved of his charge at Stowmarket in 1782. Whether he resigned or was dismissed is unclear, but the immediate cause of the breach concerned church discipline. (7) His decision to take up another ministry at Beaconsfield in the following year, 1783, may have been the result of impecuniousness. (8) He stayed there only seven months during which he succeeded in resolving the difficulties posed by his 'infidel sentiments'. This was the result of his reading Priestley's Institutes of natural and revealed religion, a work which appeared to relieve 'so many of

the

the difficulties (he) had hitherto sustained from the Calvinistic theology' that he became a professed Socinian. (9)

When Godwin left Beaconsfield, although he may have been confident in his new 'faith' or 'creed' as he later preferred to call it, he did not seek a new charge. (10) Instead, he attempted to set up a school at Epsom. This proved abortive and now, living close to the heart of Rational Dissent, Theophilus Lindsey's chapel at Essex Street off the Strand, Godwin decided to become an author. (11) His 'principal employment' was reviewing for the English Review, for which he was paid at two guineas a sheet, so that when he undertook to review the controversy between Priestley, Samuel Horsley, and others, concerning the nature of the early Christian Church, the activity was not only congenial but also sustaining for the impecunious writer. (12)

The English Review was founded by John Murray, a Scot, in January 1783, (13) and amongst the works which received immediate notice was An history of the corruptions of christianity by Joseph Priestley, first published in the previous year. The review was slight and generally unfavourable: Priestley was charged with sovereign contempt of the opinions of his opponents, with failure in the art of persuasion, with stylistic infelicities, inconsistency, omissions, and superfluties, and was firmly relegated to the ranks of ranting sectaries. 'Pride and meanness', declared the reviewer, 'are never so conspicuously united as in the supercilious demagogues of contending sectaries'. (14) Subsequent notices in the English Review of the controversy provoked by the work were more favourable to Priestley, (15) but it was not until 1785 that the debate received serious and extended attention in its pages. At the beginning of that year, there appeared, belatedly as the reviewer confessed, the first of three long reviews of the major works in the controversy. Like all the articles in Murray's review, these appeared anonymously, but the authorship of these articles can be attributed with some confidence to William Godwin. The evidence of this lies in a copy in Godwin's hand of a letter which he wrote to Priestley in which he identified himself as 'the author of the article in the English Review relative to your vindication of H.C.'. (16) From the letter it is quite clear that the review was not hostile, he would hardly have written to Priestley if it was; this, together with the fact that it was probably not until 1784 that Godwin joined the Review, rules him out as the author of the first review quoted above. Other evidence in the letter enables one to exclude the other short notices of the controversy. Godwin himself was in some difficulty in reviewing the debate for he had already been convinced of the socinian position, and yet a positive endorsement of Priestley's views would not be acceptable to John Murray. In his letter to Priestley he described his position and his solution:

I am myself a Socinian. Convinced of the divine origins of Christianity, and yet perfectly satisfied that it will not stand the test of philosophical examination, unless stripped of its doctrinal corruptions; I should be happy by

every

every method which providence may seem to offer to be the most humble instrument of dispelling them.

I am however restrained from doing this in the most explicit manner by the character of the review. The description it wishes to claim is that of being friendly to the church of England. To its obtaining this description I shall certainly never positively contribute, by defending principles I do not believe. But however misguided I may be personally, and I believe, if my character should ever be thought worthy of Dr. Priestley's enquiries, it will be found not to be the most impenetrable, I consider myself in the present affair, not as an individual, but the member of a corps. And I am the more easy under this restriction, as the immediate business of a reviewer is not undoubtedly to make himself a party, but to represent candidly the arguments of both sides. Perhaps too, if the cause of Socinianism be the cause of truth, it cannot be more effectually served than in the manner I have chalked out to myself. (17)

The review of 1785 made identical claims to impartiality (18) and unlike previous treatment of the controversy in the English Review it stated clearly and at some length the arguments on both sides. Despite such claims and the profession of being written from the standpoint of an Anglican, the reviewer's admiration for Priestley was not concealed. Towards the end of his review of Priestley's Letters to Dr. Horsley..., Godwin drew the following picture of the author's character and virtues:

Though the controversy before us be certainly of only second rate importance, and though it deal much in dry, abstruse and unprofitable learning, yet the great and merited reputation of the disputants, particularly Dr. Priestley, had drawn upon it an uncommon degree of attention. Indeed, whatever becomes of the present dispute, and however we decide on his character as a divine, it must certainly be acknowledged that as a philosopher, and, what is much better, as a man, our author will reflect lasting honour on the age and country that produced him. Possessed of a more extensive share of learning than perhaps any other man living, endowed with the most undisputed and first-rate talents, and distinguished by an unparalleled rapidity of conception and facility of expression; these qualities are indeed accompanied with an answerable promptitude of feeling, which forms perhaps the weak side of this illustrious character. But, whatever may be decided respecting the style he has employed towards those who have insulted or offended him, and even in some cases where he had received no personal offence, certain it is that his natural temper and manners are perfectly mild, simple and unassuming. That disdain of literary reputation, by which he is animated in the pursuit of what he conceives

to be the cause of rectitude and truth, is, in a moral view, as noble and as venerable, as it is singular. The members of our church, if it should be thought proper to dissuade them from the indiscriminate perusal of his theological works, may however safely and advantageously study his character, as a model of evangelical virtue. (19)

This did not complete Godwin's praise of Priestley; he continued his review by printing verbatim extracts from Priestley's preface in which he wrote of his motivation and of his attitude towards controversy: he portrayed himself as acting as an instrument of Providence, stressed the importance of candour, benevolence and love of truth, and declared his willingness to change or modify any statement which was shown to be unjustified. Godwin's reaction to this personal testimony was generous and interesting, and with it he concluded the first instalment of his review:

It seldom happens, whether we chuse to ascribe the phenomenon to nature or habit, that the same mind, which has obtained important success in the pursuit of speculative science, is qualified to produce beauties of the imagination. Accordingly, though, from the solidity of his judgement, we are satisfied that our author is capable of exhibiting a much more polished and regular work, than he has yet given to the public; yet certain it is, that in aiming at the height of sublimity, or the finer touches of passion, he would fail in the attempt. But there is an interesting language, that comes from the heart, and with which the fancy of the writer has nothing to do; and of this the extract we have produced indisputably shows Dr. Priestley to be master. (20)

The second instalment of the review appeared in February 1785, and it concerned the replies of Horsley and Badcock to Priestley, and Priestley's reply to Badcock. Again Godwin followed his professed plan, summarising and extracting the salient arguments. (21) When, however, he came to discuss the merits of the contestants, he was dismissive of Badcock (22) quoting with approval Priestley's assessment of his opponent, and censorious of Horsley, whom he found to be 'in the course of his publication, frigid, prolix, supercilious, and formal'. Horsley, he suggested, had departed from the admirable tone of his charge to his clergy, the work which began his controversy with Priestley, and had turned to the abuse of his opponent. Nevertheless, Godwin found room, and, indeed, had to find room if he was to preserve the cloak of impartiality, to praise Horsley's abilities as a writer, and, more equivocally, as a reasoner, abilities which enabled Horsley even when he had the 'wrong side of the question...like Belial, to "make the worse appear the better reason"'. (23)

The third instalment was delayed until May, and it concerned Priestley's further reply to Horsley. (24) Again, amidst neutral statements of the argument, Godwin interspersed comments

favourable



favourable to Priestley, in particular to his reaction to Horsley's abuse. 'There are,' he opined 'few exhibitions more interesting than that of the language of a mild and ingenuous character, who had been exposed to unmerited censure'. (25) Godwin had, perhaps unwittingly, manoeuvred himself into a position in which a conclusion favourable to Priestley would have been difficult to avoid. This may well have been the reason why it never appeared. The June number of the English Review contained a brief statement saying that the conclusion had been 'unavoidably postponed to future number', and no further reference was made to its non-appearance.

It is not clear from Godwin's letter to Priestley whether he sent him all of the uncompleted review or just the first instalment, but it is clear that he wished to meet Priestley, and his wish appears to have been granted in that year, 1785. (26) By then, Godwin had a large circle of friends amongst the Rational Dissenters. They included, apart from Kippis, Abraham Rees, Thomas Rogers, Richard Price, William Morgan, Benjamin and Samuel Vaughan, Theophilus Lindsey, John Disney, Timothy Hollis, John Hollis and Thomas Brand Hollis. Through them he met people of note in politics, philosophy, literature and art, including Helen Maria Williams, James Barry, Samuel Rogers, Mrs. Piozzi, John Adams, the American Ambassador, Samuel Romilly, Capel Lofft, Thomas Paine and Baron Winckelmann. (27) The society of such people must have made his years as a struggling writer bearable before his Enquiry concerning political justice (1793) secured him fame and recognition, and at the same time given him the intellectual stimulation and sustenance necessary for his development.

In 1788 Godwin ceased to be a Socinian and took his 'last farewell to the Christian faith'. (28) In the course of writing his Enquiry concerning political justice he embraced atheism, to which he confessed he had 'hitherto been a resolute adversary'. Nevertheless, he retained his close personal relations with Dissent. In that same year, 1788, he began to keep a journal, a habit which he kept until the closing years of his life; he died in 1836. It is not a confessional diary in the remotest sense, nor does it yield up those personal comments and detailed observations which are the hallmarks of the great diarists. Godwin's journal is a plain record of what he did, with whom he met and dined, what he talked about, and what he read; as such it has its own intrinsic value. Its matter-of-fact entries reveal the extensive nature of his Dissenting connections during his early years in London, and enable one to chart his contacts with Richard Price and Joseph Priestley from 1788 on.

During the early years of the journal, Godwin met Richard Price rather more often than he did Joseph Priestley as one would expect for Priestley usually visited London only in the summer. He first met Price in 1777 or 1778. (29) The journal records his meeting him at radical gatherings such as meetings of the Revolution Society. He did not, however, record whether he was

present

present to hear Price's sermon 'A discourse on the love of our country'. That day, November 4th, 1789, he dined at Timothy Hollis's in the company of John and Brand Hollis, Lindsey, Disney, Belcham (sic), and Thorkelin (?). The following day, he noted that he saw Price at the dinner of the 'Revolutionists'. (30) Godwin's entry related only to those who attended the dinner; a year later his record of the society's meeting is more revealing. The radical gadfly, Horne Tooke, caused dissension amongst the Revolutionists by proposing a motion 'against nobility'. It is noteworthy that Price cast his chairman's vote against the motion. (31)

Godwin also met Price at more intimate gatherings at the home of Timothy Hollis. Here, in the period from April 1788, when the journal begins, to the end of 1790, when Timothy Hollis died, he met Price on five occasions. (32) He was to meet him once more only, at Brand Hollis's, before Price's death on 19 April 1791. (33) Godwin attended his funeral, and heard Priestley's oration. Two days later, he dined with Priestley, Lindsey, Belsham, and Dr. Lister at the home of John Hollis. It was surely an occasion dominated by talk of Price, and perhaps some of his anecdotes were retailed to relieve the gloom. A few of these were sufficiently treasured by Godwin for him to have made separate notes of them, and they provide us with some insight into Price's conversation. His concern with corruption in high places is betrayed in an anecdote concerning the political machinations of the Rockinghamites on the death of their leader on July 1, 1782. Godwin's note is,

'Lord Lansdown says he was desired by Fox to delay entering upon the treasury two days, which was spent in granting pensions & reversions to the party, particularly to Burke's cousin and son, one of which L. Lansdown negatived, 1782.

Dr. Price'. (34)

This bears the hallmark of authenticity: Price was a close confidant of Shelburne, and it is known that Burke tried to secure the Receivership of the Crown Land Revenues for Essex for his son. (35) Other anecdotes of Price were of a more amusing and spicy nature and were sure to have gone down well with his friends. As Godwin recorded them, they were:

Dr. Price, Dec. 12 1789

Lord Chatham de rege "I should like to take that serpent by the throat, & all but strangle him".

Dr. Price apud J. H. Mar 11

Prince of Wales writes love letters to Mrs. Dashwood, a new married lady, which she shows to her husband. (36)

Such anecdotes were evidently appealing to Godwin, and no doubt provided grist for the novelist and philosopher's mill. Godwin and Price, indeed, had had much in common: they had had firmly Calvinistic upbringings which they had both come to reject; at the same time their thought remained deeply infused by Calvinistic notions of duty. Although Price would not have been happy with Godwin's

eventual

eventual rejection of rational Christianity, he himself might have penned the letter written by Godwin late in life, in which he defended his religious views. The letter was written to the father of a young friend who had been converted to Christianity on his death bed and, having formerly been of a Godwinian persuasion, had wished his father to inform Godwin of his change of heart. Godwin, after offering his condolences to the father, wrote, 'As to my own creed, to which you refer, that is a totally different thing. It has been reflected on, and has been at least the fruit of as much patient and honest research as your own. I am now in my 79th year, and am not likely to alter in a matter of so much moment. We must be contented with different results, and should entertain charity for each other. If I am in error, I am in the hands of God, and I humbly trust that he will see the integrity and honesty of my enquiries'. (37) Yet despite their similarities, there is nothing to indicate that Godwin and Price ever became much more than acquaintances. (38)

The relationship between Godwin and Priestley is in some ways more interesting. The letter of Godwin to Priestley in 1785 and Godwin's review show that he held him in high esteem, and, by the time he began to keep his journal, Godwin was one of Priestley's many London acquaintances. In the early days of the journal when entries were sometimes sparse, Godwin thought that the dates of Priestley's London visits were significant enough to record, although he met him only a few times before he settled in London following the Birmingham Riots of July 1791. (39) On one of those occasions, he dined with both Priestley and Price at Timothy Hollis's, in the company of Lindsey, Shore, Planta, Disney, Brand and John Hollis. (40) Priestley moved to London at a critical stage in Godwin's career: the latter had just begun work on his Enquiry concerning political justice. For this he undertook a daunting programme of reading and recorded his progress in his journal. During this gestation period, Godwin's reading included 'Priestley versus Reid', 'Priestley on the Birmingham Riots', 'Price on the American Revoln.' 'Price on Morals', 'App. to Price on Morals', 'Price on Liberty' (on Christmas Day 1791; the reading was followed by indigestion!), and 'Price par Mira.'. (41) These works were, however, just a few of the many which Godwin read in preparation for his magnum opus, and Godwin's journal entries give little clue to influence. It is perhaps more interesting to know that during the same period he talked to and about Priestley. The first occasion of this sort, on October 1781, might well have been the last. Godwin's journal entry runs as follows:

Dine with Fawcet at North End: shew him letters to Fox and Sheridan: talk of Helvétius and his profession. Priestley offended..

One can only conjecture as to what gave offence; two suggestions would appear worth considering. The first is that Godwin in talking of Helvétius praised his worldly hedonism and secular utilitarianism and perhaps argued that they were the consequence of a materialism not essentially dissimilar from that of Priestley. (42)

The second, and on balance the more persuasive, is that the offence was caused by Godwin's reference to Helvétius's profession. Helvétius had a relatively short (ten years) but distinguished career as a member of the Company of General Farmers, which was responsible for the collection of all the principal indirect taxes in eighteenth century France prior to the Revolution. The company ensured that the government had a steady income and provided it with short and, from the mid-century, long term capital. But, as it needed to retain the confidence of the investing public, it was allowed to make profits disproportionate to the risks involved in the enterprise. (43) No more than Godwin would Priestley have condoned a system of taxation which creamed off large profits for an increasingly noble elite. In his Enquiry, Godwin rounded on taxes of the type collected by the Farmers General when he argued in Book VIII, 'Of Property', that, 'Every additional tax that is laid on, every new channel that is opened for the expenditure of the public money, unless it be compensated (which is scarcely ever the case) by an equivalent deduction from the luxuries of the rich, is so much added to the general stock of ignorance, drudgery and hardship'. (44) Although Priestley, unlike Godwin had some confidence in government as an agency of improvement, and although he tended to regard the distribution of wealth as ordained by God, the offence was probably caused less by their theoretical differences than by their differing assessment of the Farmers General as men. There is little doubt that Priestley would have been offended if Godwin had linked his condemnation of an evil system with an attack on the Farmers General as individuals, for his great rival in science, Antoine Lavoisier, was himself a tax farmer. He conformed to Priestley's highest ideal in that he consecrated the wealth which he gained from finance to the pursuit of knowledge. Whatever the cause of the offence, there is no evidence that it permanently altered their relationship. Both Priestley and Godwin attended the Revolution Society's dinner at the London Tavern on November 4, 1791, but it was a while before the two met informally at dinner. This was at Brand Hollis's on June 11, 1792, and if there had been a breach it was healed then, for less than a month later Godwin visited Priestley at his home. The journal entries on both occasions suggest interesting and wide-ranging conversations and are worth recording:

June 11 M.Writ 4 pages. Dine at B.Hollis's, with Priestley and Lindsey: the former a republican, lend him Anna St. Ives. J. Hollis calls'.

'July 5th. Visit Dr. Priestley, talk of the importance of politics, and moral causation... (45)

Godwin finished writing his Enquiry on January 29, 1793, and it is a testimony both to the speed of printers in those days and to the immense energy of Priestley that by March 23 he had read the work sufficiently to comment upon it. (46) On that day, John Hollis reported his opinions of the work to its author, who

made

made a special note of them in a supplement to his journal. This shows that Priestley was generous in his appraisal of Godwin particularly in view of his own work on the first principles of government, but was critical of his conclusions. Godwin's note is as follows:

Dr. Priestley says my book contains a vast extent of ability-Monarchy and aristocracy to be sure were never so painted before - he agrees with me respecting gratitude and contracts absolutely considered, but thinks the principles too refined for practice - he felt uncommon approbation of my investigation of the first principles of government, which were never so well explained before - he admits fully my first principle of the omnipotence of instruction, & that all vice is error - he admits all my principles but cannot follow them into all my conclusions - he agrees with me respecting self love, and is particularly delighted with the last paragraph, Bk. IV ch. VIII and the last sentence of a paragraph, p.359 - He thinks there is somewhere in the book a passage which agrees with him respecting my refinements and prognostics, and, if admitted, would overthrow (sic) them - he thinks mind will never so far get the better of matter as I suppose - he is of opinion that the book contains a great quantity of original thinking, and will be uncommonly useful. (47)

The passages which Priestley specifically commended occur in Godwin's chapter 'Of the principles of virtue' and concern the importance and practicability of 'disinterested benevolence'. Neither passage appears in exactly the same form in subsequent editions and, in the absence of a readily available critical edition of the Enquiry, it may be useful to reprint them here. (48) The last paragraph of p.359 is:

Neither philosophy nor morality nor politics will ever show like themselves, till man shall be acknowledged for what he really is, a being capable of justice, virtue and benevolence, and who needs not always to be led to philanthropical conduct by foreign and frivolous considerations.

and Godwin concluded the chapter thus:

The last perfection of this feeling (of disinterested benevolence) consists in that state of mind which bids us rejoice as fully in the good that is done by others, as if it were done by ourselves. The truly wise man will be actuated neither by interest nor ambition, the love of honour nor the love of fame. He has no emulation. He is not made uneasy by a comparison of his own attainments with those of others, but by a comparison with the standard of right. He has a duty indeed obliging him to seek the good of the whole; but that good is his only object. If that good be effected by another hand, he feels no disappointment. All men are his fellow labourers, but he is the rival of no man. Like Pedareus in ancient story, he exclaims: "I also have

endeavoured

endeavoured to deserve: but there are three hundred citizens in Sparta better than myself, and I rejoice". (49)

Despite Priestley's praise for such noble aspirations which were so much in accord with a Rational Dissenting view of things, (50) it is likely that Godwin was rather more interested in his criticisms of the Enquiry than his praise, not only because they invalidated the utopian edifice which he had erected upon his first principles, but also because he combined in himself an ardent desire to pursue truth wherever it took him and a belief in being utterly candid about one's conclusions, with a sensitivity to criticism especially that of friends. (51) It was, at any rate, very much in character for him to seek out Priestley on the very same day on which John Hollis reported his opinions to him. (52) The conversation that they then had may have contributed to the subsequent revisions of the Enquiry. Godwin listed the errors of the first edition as,

- 1) Stoicism, or an inattention to the principle, that pleasure & pain are the only bases upon which morality can rest.
- 2) Sandemanianism, or an inattention to the principle that feeling & not judgment is the source of human actions.
- 3) The unqualified condemnation of the private affections. (53)

Godwin attributed these errors to the persistence of 'Calvinistical' ways of thinking, and in this autobiographical fragment of 1800, suggested that, 'The first of these errors was rooted from my mind, principally by the argument of Mr. George Dyson, in 1794....The second and third owe their destruction to a perusal of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature in the following year.' (54) But the causes of the elimination of these errors and the process whereby Godwin changed his mind were more complex than he cared to recount or perhaps admit. For example, he had in a manuscript critique of Thomas Holcroft's novel Anna St. Ives published almost exactly a year before his Enquiry registered disquiet with the extent of Holcroft's reliance on reason; (55) again, it was his tragically brief relationship with Mary Wollstonecraft which enabled him to feel the pleasures and taste the fruits of private affections. Thus it is likely that Priestley's comment that 'mind will never so far get the better of matter as I (Godwin) suppose', helped to sew the doubts in Godwin's mind concerning his Stoicism and Sandemanianism. Certainly, Godwin sought him out on at least two further occasions before he left for America in April 1794, on one of them directly after talking to Fawcett 'of a God', but on both occasions Priestley was not at home. (56) Yet the intellectual influence of Priestley on Godwin must not be overplayed, for Godwin continued to deny the existence of matter, and he remained attached to 'the existence of an intellectual system', (57) and, it must be confessed, their personal and intellectual friendship never quite blossomed. Neither Price nor Priestley were classed by Godwin amongst his principal oral instructors (58) and the influence of their works on Godwin awaits further investigation. Nevertheless his journal makes it clear that in the late 1780s and early 1790s he was

heavily

heavily dependent upon the Rational Dissenters for companionship and conviviality. His habits of life at that time were deeply influenced by those of his Dissenting contemporaries. His decision not to make a career in the pulpit disappointed his family, and around about 1785, as Kegan Paul has noted, 'the links were severed between the old life and the new'. (59) But, it is important to note, the links with Dissent were not severed. On the contrary, it was Andrew Kippis who enabled him to make a permanent career as a writer by facilitating his appointment as the writer responsible for the historical part of the New Annual Register for a stipend of sixty guineas. It was also through Kippis that he gained a private tutorship which yielded an annual income of eighty guineas in 1785 and 1786. (60) Kippis was as at home in the literary world as he was in that of reform politics and theology, and his publishing contacts could be invaluable to a young writer. It was he who first found Helen Maria Williams a publisher and he may have been instrumental in gaining access for Godwin to her coterie late in 1787. (61) In the next few years Godwin attended her teas fairly regularly if not as frequently as Kegan Paul has suggested. It was via another Dissenting contact, John Hollis who had been a hearer at his congregation at Beaconsfield, that he gained entry in 1783 or 1784 to another circle, that of Timothy Hollis of Great Ormond Street. Timothy, John's uncle, gave public dinners twice a week, for which hospitality the indigent Godwin was grateful, and he was careful not to abuse it. If his circle was not the most brilliant of the day, he was, after all, in his mid-seventies when Godwin first met him, it was the one which the young writer chose to frequent most during his early years in London, apart, after 1788, from that of his close friend, Thomas Holcroft. Godwin completed his chain of Hollis contacts when he met Thomas Brand Hollis at the home of Timothy Hollis. (62) Brand Hollis was not a Hollis proper: he was the heir of Thomas Hollis of Lincoln's Inn (d. 1774), who was Timothy's cousin. Like his former benefactor, he was keenly interested in politics, and Godwin met leading reformers both moderate and radical, including Thomas Paine, at his dinners. (63) All three Hollises were, or had been, active in Rational Dissent. Timothy Hollis had been one of Caleb Fleming's congregation at Pinner's Hall. With Fleming's retirement in 1778 and the closure of the hall, he transferred his affections to Theophilus Lindsey's new chapel at Essex Street established in 1774. (64) He appears to have been almost a free thinker, (65) but never to the extent of offending his Rational Dissenting friends: his friendship with Richard Price began around about 1756 and lasted for the rest of his ample lifetime; (66) other Dissenting ministers such as Kippis, Towers, Lindsey, Belsham and Disney could be found dining at his table. (67) By the 1780's, the other two Hollises were naturally more actively concerned with the promotion of Rational Dissent than the septuagenarian Timothy. Thomas Brand had been a founder member of Lindsey's

congregation

congregation at Essex Street, contributing one hundred pounds towards the purchase of Essex House and the building of the chapel. (68) He was also closely associated with the founding of Hackney Academy in 1786. (69) John Hollis supported this venture too, and both he and Brand were original members of the Unitarian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Practice of Virtue, by Distributing Books, formed in 1791. (70) In no sense, however, were the Hollises narrowly sectarian, as Godwin's journal amply demonstrates. Like many of their Dissenting contemporaries, their friends and interests reflected catholic tastes and a concern with progress in many spheres. Indeed, the world of the late Enlightenment in England was so permeated with Rational Dissent that Godwin could not have avoided Dissenters or their sympathisers even if he had tried. (71) But he had no occasion to try, for it was a natural progression for him to settle into the milieu of the élite of Dissent, and the ease with which he did so is symptomatic of this. Thus the break around 1785 was in essence a break between an aspiring young man who had moved into the cosmopolitan culture of the metropolis, and his family who had little understanding of such a culture, and who, like true country cousins, could not understand the work in which he was employed; the cultural divide which Godwin traversed existed within Dissent. (72) And it was his contact with the society of the leading Dissenters that proved vital to the framing of the Utopia of his Enquiry. 'His Utopia, 'it has been suggested, 'is redolent of the non-conformist chapel'. (73) I would not wish to deny that but would prefer to emphasize the extent of Godwin's reliance upon Dissenting culture and society in London for his notion of the ideal, and the way it could be attained.

Godwin was extremely suspicious of political pressure as a means of political progress, nor did he believe in change through enlightened legislation for he thought government incapable of effecting permanent improvement. (74) The stark alternative for him was to rely upon the progress of truth through human reason. This was to treat the public rather as a 'tabula rasa' by placing the materials for reasoning before its mind and to confidently expect the development of public virtue. The Society for Constitutional Information, whose founder members included the Dissenters Thomas Brand Hollis, John Jebb, Capel Lofft, Richard Price, and Thomas Rogers, was formed expressly for public enlightenment of this sort. Political manoeuvre and compromise was not on its agenda; its leading member, John Jebb, was convinced that 'explore the right way, and pursue it steadily, and all will do well'. (75) Godwin did not share such assumptions: unlike Jebb he did not believe that 'political truth, like the moral feelings of the soul, is plain and simple', (76) nor did he believe that associations for public enlightenment would swiftly make converts to political virtue. (77) The Dissenters, for their part, coupled their confidence in human rationality and the ultimate triumph of truth over error with a belief in the importance of free enquiry. In this way the cause of truth would be served even in those areas in which truth itself was far from certain. Godwin, himself, would have been schooled in the virtues of candour and honest



enquiry at Hoxton, and in his letter to Priestley of 1785 he espoused, though guardedly, the idea that truth would emerge through the process of open and public debate. But it was unlikely that he was ever convinced of the self-sufficiency of free enquiry. Far from being an enthusiastic optimist, there was a deeply pessimistic strain in his character and thought. He had, as D. H. Monro has noted, 'a very real and possibly morbid sense of the extent of man's inhumanity to man'. (78) Thus he needed to find a way for progress to occur which depended neither upon political action nor upon enlightenment through public debate. His solution was founded upon his experience of the society of the most prominent Dissenters and their friends in London, and it combined honest enquiry with social persuasion.

The habit of honest enquiry could, and indeed can, be confined to the study, from which one may emerge convinced of the truth. Godwin placed a premium on silent study: human understanding could not be 'cultivated' unless man learned the practice of solitary intellectual inquiry by which he discovered his own mind and developed his individuality, 'the very essence of intellectual excellence'. (79) But if the perseverance of secluded individuals was the pre-condition for enlightenment, Godwin did not intend it to be unassisted. Honest enquirers needed the aid of their fellows in their quest for truth, and in the task of its promotion within the community at large, for publication alone would not vanquish error. (80) Thus it was the company and friendship of fellow enquirers that was essential both for the development and for the eventual triumph of enlightenment. 'Conversation', he wrote in his Enquiry, 'accustoms us to hear a variety of sentiments, obliges us to exercise patience and attention, and gives freedom and elasticity to the disquisitions'; 'conversation, and the intercourse of mind with mind, seem to be the most fertile sources of improvement'. (81) It was through conversation that the love of distinction could be redirected. If each man was prepared to accept the 'candid examination of another', this would provide invaluable assistance for 'correcting and moulding his conduct'. (82) Gradually political virtue would spread, the barriers 'of cold reserve' which kept 'man at a distance from man' would be broken down, and eventually Godwin's ideal in which small communities governed themselves without recourse to the force of law would be realised: candid discussion would be the only persuasion necessary for citizens to follow the path of virtue. (83) But that persuasion was not purely intellectual, it was social as well, for citizens would desire to know and to follow the path of virtue because in this ideal society it would provide 'the direct and unambiguous road to public esteem'. (84) Indeed, Godwin's very concept of the ideal was founded in his notion of social communication. Men would not come together just to pass the time of day, relate gossip, or even to repeat other men's ideas; they would only come together when they had something important to communicate, whether it concerned the development of a new talent, a philanthropic scheme, the discovery of a moral truth or the communication of candid and friendly advice to a neighbour. If one is correct in suggesting that Godwin's

scheme for the attainment of his ideal rested essentially upon the twin pillars of honest enquiry and candid discussion, then it can be maintained that his utopia was in so many ways the society of his London friends and acquaintances multiplied. In one key passage of his Enquiry, Godwin in elucidating his ideal of free social communication provides a description of that society:

Let us figure to ourselves a number of individuals, who, having stored their minds with reading and reflection, are accustomed, in candid and unreserved conversation, to compare their ideas, suggest their doubts, examine their mutual difficulties, and cultivate a perspicuous and animated manner of delivering their sentiments. Let us suppose, that their intercourse is not confined to the society of each other, but that they are desirous extensively to communicate the truths with which they are acquainted. Let us suppose their illustrations to be not more distinguished by impartiality and demonstrative clearness, than by the mildness of their temper, and a spirit of comprehensive benevolence. We shall then have an idea of knowledge as perpetually gaining ground, unaccompanied with peril in the means of its diffusion. Their hearers will be instigated to impart their acquisitions to still other hearers, and the circle of instruction will perpetually increase. Reason will spread, and not a brute and unintelligent sympathy. (85)

It was through 'small and friendly circles' of the sort Godwin encountered when dining with Timothy or Thomas Brand Hollis, or taking tea with Miss Williams, where conversation was 'carried on with advantage', (86) that he learned that the beneficial effects of discussion between two persons could be diffused. If men were freed from the need to labour extensively in order to provide for themselves, they would, Godwin believed, establish a pattern of life not dissimilar from that of Joseph Priestley, Andrew Kippis, Theophilus Lindsey, Richard Price or the Hollises. Their obligations were few, but their devotion to the discovery of truth and the improvement of mankind was extensive, and their pattern of life was dictated by such considerations. Godwin had in mind the needs of such men when he argued against communal meals:

Can there be a good reason for men's eating together, except where they are prompted to it by the impulse of their own minds? Ought I to come at a certain hour, from the museum where I am working, the retreat in which I meditate, or the observatory where I remark the phenomena of nature, to a certain hall appropriated to the office of eating; instead of eating, as reason bids me, at the time and place most suited to my avocations, (87)

Thus in his utopia men would come together according to their own convenience. 'All supererogatory co-operation' was ruled out by Godwin; the only form of co-operation he would allow was

co-operation

co-operation through conversation in which 'one or the other party (is) always yielding to have his ideas guided by the other'. (88) And so, although his idea of truth, especially political truth, spreading at a rapidly increasing rate in a society in which men were given the time to 'enquire and think for themselves' and were encouraged to learn the art of 'unreserved communication', (89) has always seemed hopelessly utopian, it was, nevertheless grounded in his own experience of men who were devoted to truth in all its forms, who practised the doctrine of candour, and who rejected the norms of conventional society. In this context Peter Gay's description of the most utopian ideas emerging from the Enlightenment appears highly percipient:

A few of the philosophers, fascinated by developments in the biological sciences, were even willing to dream of the possible evolution of the human species into higher forms. But these claims and speculations, no matter how utopian their formulation might be, were grounded in reality. They were expectations derived from experience, organized into a program designed to articulate and sustain high morale, and controlled by an ineradicable strain of pessimism. (90)

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William Godwin, the Hollises and Miss Williams.

<u>Timothy Hollis</u>	1788	1789	1790	1791	1792
Godwin dines at T.H.'s	17	26	24	-	-
Brand Hollis present	2	5	4	-	-
John Hollis present	6	15	17	-	-

Brand Hollis

Godwin dines at B.H.'s	-	6	5	7	8
John Hollis present	-	-	-	1	-
Godwin calls on him*	-	1	5	2	1
Brand Hollis calls on Godwin*	-	-	-	1	1

John Hollis

Godwin dines at J.H.'s	-	-	-	3	1
Godwin takes tea at J.H.'s	-	-	-	2	2
Godwin sups at J.H.'s	-	-	-	1	2
Godwin call on him*	-	-	2	6	-
John calls on Godwin*	-	4	3	9	6

Miss Williams

Godwin attends her teas	3	8	6	2	-
Godwin calls*	3	4	2	-	-
Godwin meets Miss W.	1	-	1	-	-

\*The figures do not include unsuccessful 'calls' when the various parties were not at home.

For an explanation of the above table see f.n.62.

1. This is not ignore the important contributions which have been made to this topic, notably by F. E. L. Priestley in the introductory essay to his excellent critical edition of Godwin's Enquiry and by B. R. Pollin in his Education and enlightenment in the works of William Godwin (New York, 1962). All references to the Enquiry, unless otherwise stated, will be to Priestley's edition, the details of which are: W. Godwin, Enquiry concerning political justice, and its influence on morals and happiness. Photographic facsimile of the third edition corrected, edited with variant readings of the first and second edition, and with a critical introduction by F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto, 1946, repr. New York, 1969), 3v.
2. Little has been added to our knowledge of Godwin's dissenting connections since the publication of C. Kegan Paul's William Godwin: his friends and contemporaries (London, 1876), 2v. This work contains much valuable information, which has, for the purposes of this article, been supplemented by material from Godwin's journal and his papers in the Abinger collection, both of which are available on microfilm from the Bodleian Library.
3. Abinger Collection: Bodleian M.S. Film 73, Autobiographical Notes, 1773-1796 (hereafter A.N. 1773-1796); Bodleian M.S. Film 75, Autobiographical Notes dated Mar. 10, 1800, recording 'the principal revolutions to which my mind has been subjected' (hereafter A.N.1800).
4. The extent of Fawcett's orthodoxy is unclear. By the end of his career he had rejected Original Sin, but I have found no indication as to whether he had already done so by the time he met Godwin. The latter noted that his attitude towards 'the private and domestic affections' was especially consonant with 'the austerity and perfection which Calvinism recommends'. Such notions were strengthened for Godwin by his reading of Jonathan Edwards's essay on The nature of true virtue, which reading he variously dates at just before meeting Fawcett in 1778 and in 1780 after leaving Ware. A.N.1800; Kegan Paul, op.cit., I, pp.16-18; M. Ray Adams, Studies in the literary background of English radicalism (Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1947), ch. VII; Alexander Gordon, Joseph Fawcett (d.1804), D.N.B.
5. A.N. 1773-1796. The reference is to Clarke's, A demonstration of the being and attributes of God, the Boyle lectures for 1704.
6. A.N. 1800; Kegan Paul, op.cit., I, p.18-19.
7. Ibid.; A.N. 1773-1796. According to Kegan Paul, Godwin was never formally appointed as minister.
8. Godwin did, in fact, receive some financial assistance in 1782 and 1783 from an unnamed friend, who went abroad in 1784 leaving Godwin forty pounds in his debt. A.N. 1773-1796.
9. Ibid.
10. He crossed out 'raith' and substituted 'creed' in the autobiographical note of 1800.

11. At the end of volume VII of Godwin's journal is a list of his friends and acquaintances grouped chronologically, one assumes, according to when he first met them. Lindsey's name appears in the 1783 group. It is almost certain that Godwin attended his chapel at some time.
12. A.N. 1773-1796. It was standard practice to pay in such a way. No distinction was made between extracts and original writing. This was naturally an incentive for Godwin and others to quote long passages from works under review. D. Roper, Reviewing before the Edinburgh 1788-1802 (London, 1978), p.43.
13. For the English review, see Roper, op.cit.
14. The English review, or an abstract of English and foreign literature (London, 1783), 205-212.
15. Ibid., p.362-371; 1784, pp.152-153, 469-470.
16. Abinger Collection, Bodleian M.S. Film 75.
17. Ibid.
18. The English review, 1785, p.52.
19. Ibid., p.60. Review of J. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, in answer to his animadversions on the history of the corruption of Christianity. With additional evidence that the primitive church was Unitarian (Birmingham, 1783).
20. Ibid., pp.62-63.
21. Ibid., pp.105-124. The works reviewed were: Letter from the Archdeacon of St. Albans in reply to Dr. Priestley. With an appendix containing those strictures on Dr. Priestley's letters by an unknown hand (London, 1784); J. Priestley, Remarks on the monthly review of the letters to Dr. Horsley, in which the Rev. Mr. S. Badcock, the writer of that review, is called upon to defend what he has advanced in it (London, 1784); A letter to Dr. Priestley, occasioned by his late pamphlet addressed to the Rev. Mr. S. Badcock (London, 1784).
22. Ibid., p.124.
23. Ibid., p.121.
24. Ibid., pp.377-384, review of J. Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley, part ii, containing further evidence that the primitive church was Unitarian (London, 1784).
25. Ibid., p.377.
26. W. Godwin, Journal, list at end of vol. VII. The list suggests that if Godwin did not actually meet Priestley in 1785 he regarded Priestley as one of his circle of friends and acquaintances from then on.
27. This list is by no means complete, but it contains only those whom Godwin met as a direct consequence of his dissenting connections. The evidence is contained in his journal and autobiographical notes already cited.

28. A.N. 1800. Kegan Paul (op.cit., 1, p.26) cites an alternative autobiographical note in which Godwin wrote, 'I remember the having entertained doubts (about Socinianism) in 1785 when I corresponded with Dr. Priestley. But I was not a complete unbeliever until 1787'. This recollection is difficult to reconcile with the tone of his letter to Priestley (fn. 16). George Woodcock, in his William Godwin, a biographical study, pp.28,29, suggests that Godwin 'was sufficiently troubled with doubts to enter into a correspondence with Dr. Priestley...on the subject of the existence of God'. This would appear to be a misreading of the above evidence.
29. Godwin, Journal, list end of v, VII, Abinger Collection, Bodleian M.S. Film 74, contains a similar list; in the former Price is listed under 1777, in the latter 1778. Given Price's location, I have assumed that Godwin and he met at this time rather than became acquainted through correspondence. At any rate, no such correspondence is extant.
30. Godwin, Journal, Nov. 4 & 5, 1789. I. Kramnick in his introduction to Godwin's Enquiry. (London, 1976), p.10. suggests that Godwin heard the sermon, but offers no supporting evidence. At least there can be no doubt that Godwin heard about it almost immediately.
31. Ibid., Nov. 5, 1790.
32. Ibid., Mar. 3, April 15, Sept. 25, Dec. 8, 1789, June 1, 1790. In the same period, he met Price at Brand Hollis's on Dec. 22, 1789, and Mar. 15, 1790. On May 6, 1789, Godwin attended the 'Hackney dinner' and may have met Price, there, although he did not record such a meeting in his journal.
33. Ibid. Jan. 11, 1791.
34. Abinger Collection, Bodleian M.S. Film, 75.
35. J. Norris, Shelburne and reform (London, 1963), p.173.
36. Abinger Collection, Bodleian M.S. Film, 74. J. H. probably refers to John Hollis.
37. F. K. Brown, Life of William Godwin (London, 1926), p.371.
38. This would appear to be borne out by references to Godwin in Price's correspondence with the Marquis of Lansdowne. In a letter to the Marquis, Sept. 23, 1787, Price described himself as 'acquainted' with the author of the 'History of the internal affairs of the seven united Provinces..', but when Lansdowne sent him some queries for Godwin concerning Dutch affairs, Price obtained the answers from a neighbouring Dutch minister as he was unable to reach Godwin immediately. (Price to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Sept. 23, & Nov. 10, 1787, MS. Bowood).
39. Godwin, Journal, April 15, 1789; May 1, 1790.
40. Ibid., April 15, 1789.

41. Ibid., Sept. 16, Dec. 25, 1791; Mar. 27, April 17, Sept. 13, Oct. 29, 1792. See also June 21 & 23, 1792.
42. Helvétius's works were amongst those which Mr. Frederick Norman supplied to Godwin and which led him to reject Calvinism. A.N. 1773-1796; W. Godwin, An Enquiry. 1st ed. (London, 1793), pref. Helvétius was a tax farmer from 1738 to 1748. His humane conduct of the tax farm won him praise from the philosophes. He retired when he had amassed a small fortune. D. Smith, Helvétius, a study in persecution (Oxford, 1965), p.12. Lavoisier became a General Farmer in March 1786. In 1771 he married the only daughter of another General Farmer, Jacques Paulze. He was arrested on 24 Dec. 1793 along with the other General Farmers, tried and convicted by a Revolutionary Tribunal on May 8, 1794, and guillotined that afternoon. H. Guerlac, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, chemist and revolutionary (New York, 1975), pp.64, 65, 130.
44. Godwin, Enquiry, 2, bk. VIII, ch.II, p.436.
45. Priestley was by this time a republican in the sense defined by Thomas Paine in Part Two of Rights of man, 'What is called a republic, is not any particular form of government..... Republican government is no other than government established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well individually as collectively' (ed. H. Collins, London, 1969, p.200). His A political dialogue (1791) did, however, evince considerable hostility towards the hereditary principle, and it is interesting to note that his posthumous editor drew attention to the parallels between Priestley's attitude to the aristocracy in this tract and Godwin's in his Enquiry... J. T. Rutt, ed. The theological and miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley (London, 1831), XXV, p.89. For a discussion of the meaning of the term republican at this time, see D. O. Thomas, Neither republican nor democrat, The Price-Priestley newsletter, no. 1, 1977, pp.49-60.
46. The work was published on Feb. 14, 1793.
47. Godwin, Supplement to Journal, 1793, Bodleian M.S. Film 75. Priestley's comment is printed almost in toto by Kegan Paul, op.cit., I, p.116, but not entirely accurately, and the specific references to the Enquiry were omitted. Note that in a different context, that of man's technological development, Godwin cited Franklin's conjecture that 'mind would one day become omnipotent over matter'. His source for the conjecture was 'the conversation of Dr. Price'. Enquiry 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII, 503.
48. The only critical edition is that edited by F.E.L. Priestley.
49. W. Godwin, An enquiry concerning political justice, 1st ed. (London, 1793), v.I, pp.359, 361. cf. J. Priestley, A political dialogue. On the general principles of government (London, 1791), in J. T. Rutt, ed., The theological and miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley (London, 1831), v.



XXV, pp.94, 95. 'But never will men appear to proper advantage, never will they be in a situation in which they will have sufficient motives to exert themselves, in order to acquire useful and laudable qualities, and in which all improper propensities will be repressed, but in a state of perfect equality; when every advantage will be accessible to every man alike, and where no man can expect any preference except from superior virtue or superior ability, employed for the public good.' In the third edition of his Enquiry (1798), Godwin added lines which suggested that he then thought that the Rational Dissenting ministers as well as other ministers of religion often failed to encourage feelings of disinterested benevolence (Enquiry, 2, bk. IV, ch. X, p.438; *ibid.*, 3, p.175).

50. It is interesting to note that L. Patton and Peter Mann have argued that the agreement between Godwin and Priestley on first principles enabled S. T. Coleridge to take 'an almost wholly critical attitude' to the Enquiry and to reformulate most of the Godwinian ideas which he found attractive in Christian and often Priestleian terms. The collected works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Lectures 1795 on politics and religion. ed. L. Patton & Peter Mann (London, 1971), pp.LXIII, LXIV, LXXVII.
51. Godwin was, for example, most upset later in the year to hear of the rejection of his Enquiry by his former tutor, Rev. Samuel Newton of Norwich. He wrote to him hoping that the report was wrong, but at the same time upbraiding Newton for depreciating the work in consequence 'of the incidental defects that may accompany it'. Newton replied in an equally spirited vein, admitting the report, praising many aspects of the Enquiry but deploring especially its anti-Christian nature, and suggesting improvements for the next edition. Godwin addressed a further letter to Newton, to which he replied even more firmly, implying that Godwin was of that set of men who 'may boast of sincerity, and treat the bulk of mankind as the swinish multitude who are not capable of examining and judging on the subject of religion and policy with themselves'. This equation with Burke must have been offensive in the extreme to Godwin who wrote his Enquiry... in order to provide a major philosophical refutation of Reflections... and he appears to have withdrawn from further correspondence with his feathers thoroughly ruffled. Abinger Collection, Bodleian MS. Film, 76, W. Godwin to Rev. S. Newton; Rev. S. Newton to W. Godwin, Dec. 4 & 14, 1793; Kegan Paul, *op.cit.*, 1, pp.83-89.
52. Godwin, Journal, March 23, 1793.
53. A.N. 1800.
54. *Ibid.* George Dyson was a friend of Godwin's second cousin Thomas Cooper. Godwin had high expectations of his abilities which were never fulfilled. Nevertheless, in the early 1790s he played an important role in Godwin's intellectual life to

- the extent that Godwin classed him as one of his four principal oral instructors along with Joseph Fawcett, Thomas Holcroft, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Kegan Paul, *op.cit.*, I, pp.17, 47-49; Abinger Collection, Bodleian MS. Film 75.
55. G. Kelly, The English Jacobin novel 1780-1815 (Oxford, 1976), pp.117, 123, 183. The criticism is in the Abinger collection and is undated. It appears to be a record of a conversation with Holcroft.
  56. Godwin, Journal, August 12(?), Sept. 18 (?), 1793. Priestley's name cropped up again in conversation when Godwin and Fawcett dined together on March 29, 1794; again talk was 'of God'. Interestingly, Godwin also recorded that Fawcett had been acting as an amanuensis for Priestley. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1794.
  57. See W. Godwin to T. Wedgwood, April 29, 1797, Abinger Collection, Bodleian MS. Film 75.
  58. See fn.54.
  59. Kegan Paul, *op.cit.*, I, p.21.
  60. A.N. 1773-1796.
  61. A Ruston, Two Unitarians in France, Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society, v.XVII, I, Sept. 1979, pp. 16, 17. Kippis informed Samuel Rogers of Helen Maria Williams's desire to meet him, and he may have acted as an intermediary on other occasions. It must be conceded, however, that the evidence as to how and when Godwin and Miss Williams met is contradictory. On June 3, 1788, Godwin entered in his journal: 'Hear Sheridan. Earl Mansfield resigns. See Miss Williams who goes everyday to Sheridan's speech. Introduced by Geo. Hardinge'. But in his autobiographical note (A.N. 1773-1796) Godwin wrote, 'towards the close of the year (1787) I was introduced by the desire of Helen Maria Williams to the coteries of that lady'.
  62. A.N. 1773-1796; Godwin, Journal, list at end of v.VII. Godwin did not become intimate with Holcroft until 1788 when they became constant companions, and naturally they often dined or supped alone. According to Godwin's journal, Holcroft did not attend the Hollises dinners, but he was sometimes present when Godwin took tea with Miss Williams. The table p. 19 records all the occasions when Godwin joined the company of the Hollises or Miss Williams at his or their homes. It does not record, except in the case of Miss Williams, the number of occasions when they met elsewhere, as this would not add anything to one's understanding of Godwin's debt to the Hollises; such occasions were anyway, in the case of the aged Timothy, non-existent. The figures, drawn from Godwin's journal and subject to my own considerable fallibility, show that until his death on Dec. 14, 1791, Timothy Hollis provided Godwin with his most regular contact with the Hollises and their friends. Such was Timothy's devotion to his dinners, that despite being 'long confined and incapable of helping

himself', he kept up the dining habit almost to the end: Godwin last dined with him on Nov. 30, 1790 (National Library of Wales, Richard Price's shorthand journal, March 1787 to Feb. 1791, entry Jan. 2, 1791; I am most grateful to Dr. Beryl Thomas for allowing me to consult the typescript of her decipher of the journal). By comparison, Godwin dined much less frequently with Brand Hollis, but although they would appear to have been not especially close they were friendly enough for Godwin to display his customary touchiness on one occasion when Brand Hollis described him as 'the defender of Calonne'. At any rate, Brand Hollis wrote to him on Jan. 10, 1791 apologising for expressing himself 'unguardedly' and praising him for his attachment to 'publick liberty' (Abinger Collection, Bodleian MS. F.11m 74). With John Hollis, Godwin's relationship was more casual: John was often present with him at his uncle's dinners; and they dined, took tea, supped, or simply called on each other from time to time. Yet again, perhaps the course of friendship did not run too smooth; once, when Godwin was not feeling very well, John called and chose the moment to be brutally candid with his friend, telling him of his 'want of ability' (Nov. 11, 1791). Godwin did not record his reply. No such devastating personal judgements appear to have clouded the atmosphere at the teas of Helen Maria Williams. During the early years of his journal, Godwin called on her and attended her teas on a number of occasions (cf. Kegan Paul, *op.cit.*, 1, p.63, where Godwin is described as a 'very constant visitor' at Miss Williams's), and would probably have continued to do so but for Miss Williams's increasing preoccupation with French affairs and with settling in France which led to the disbandment of her coterie in England. During the period between 1788 and the publication of An Enquiry in February 1793, Godwin dined with others who were Dissenters or closely associated with Dissent, such as Joseph Fawcett, Mrs. Jebb, Mrs. Barbauld, his publisher Robinson, or the radical publisher, Joseph Johnson, but never with the frequency or regularity of his attendance at the Hollises or Miss Williams's. With the death of Timothy Hollis and the emigration of Miss Williams, Godwin frequented only Holcroft's company regularly. These events occurred around about the time he began work on his Enquiry, when he had less time anyway for the social arts. Holcroft's personal influence was therefore predominant and has been well treated by Virgil R. Stallbaumer, although perhaps Godwin's conversation was more animated and interesting than he has suggested (V. R. Stallbaumer, Holcroft's influence on Political justice, Modern languages quarterly, v. 14, 1953; B. R. Schneider Jr. Wordsworth's Cambridge education (Cambridge, 1957), pp.222-223; Godwin, Journal, for his numerous démêlés with his friends; note too the premium placed

- on conversation between two persons in Enquiry, 1, bk. IV, ch. III, p.296). Nevertheless, the range of Godwin's associates was not seriously diminished during this period, and perhaps the occasions when he did venture beyond the company of his closest friends might be rendered thereby more significant, as for example when he met Priestley.
63. Brand Hollis was a founder member of the Society for Constitutional Information (1780) and in the 1790s was one of the most radical members of the Association of the Friends of the People. Along with Godwin and Holcroft, he helped Paine to bring out the Rights of man. Life of Holcroft, ed. E. Colby (New York, 1968), II, p.33. Kegan Paul, op.cit., I, p.69-70; C. Robbins, The eighteenth century commonwealthman (New York, 1968), pp.262-263, 374; P. J. Brunson, The association of the friends of the people (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Manchester University 1961), pp.76-77.
  64. C. Robbins, The eighteenth century commonwealthman (New York, 1968), pp.330-361.
  65. B. Cozens-Hardy, ed., The diary of Syllas Neville 1767-1788 (London, 1950), p.46.
  66. Richard Price's shorthand journal, March 1787 to Feb. 1791, Jan. 2, 1791. (T. Hollis left Price £50 in his will.)
  67. Godwin, Journal, passim.
  68. John Rylands Library, Autograph letters of Theophilus Lindsey, v. 1775-1789, T. Lindsey to W. Taylor, May 20, 1776.
  69. Dr. Williams's Library, MS. 38, 14, Minutes of Hackney College, 1785-1791.
  70. Unitarian society, 1794, a copy of the rules of the Unitarian society..with a list of the members and a preamble drawn up by Thomas Belsham.
  71. It is symptomatic of this fact that until the founding of the British Critic in January 1792 all the major reviews were to some degree pro-dissent and pro-reform in outlook. D. Roper, op.cit., pp.180,181.
  72. See e.g., Kegan Paul, op.cit., I, pp.22-23, Mrs. Sothren to W. Godwin, March 7, 1788.
  73. J. Joll, The Anarchists (London, 1961) p.31.
  74. W. Godwin, Enquiry, 2, bk. VIII, ch. II, p.438. An excellent discussion of Godwin's attitude towards government can be found in the recent work of J. P. Clark, The philosophical anarchism of William Godwin (Princeton, New Jersey, 1977).
  75. E. C. Black, The Association (Harvard, 1963) p.77.
  76. J. Disney, ed., The works, theological, medical, political, and miscellaneous of John Jebb (London, 1787), III, p.409, Report of the sub-committee of Westminster, May 27, 1780.
  77. Godwin, Enquiry, I, Bk IV, ch. III, esp. p.297.
  78. Godwin's moral philosophy: an interpretation of William Godwin (London, 1953), pp.174, 175.
  79. Godwin, Enquiry, 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII app., p.500.

80. Ibid., 1, bk. IV, ch. III, p.294.
81. Ibid., 1, bk. IV, ch. III, p.294: 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII, app., p.505.
82. Ibid., 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII, pp.496, 497.
83. Ibid., 1, bk. IV, ch. III, pp.294-297.
84. Ibid., 2, bk. VIII, ch.I, p.428.
85. Ibid., 1, bk. IV, ch. III, pp.295-296.
86. Ibid., p.296.
87. Ibid., 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII, pp.497-498.
88. Ibid., 2, bk. VIII, ch. VIII, app., pp.502, 505.
89. Ibid., 1, bk. IV, ch. III, pp.288, 294.
90. P. Gay, The enlightenment. An interpretation. v.II: the science of freedom (London, 1970), pp.99-100.

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AS A HISTORIAN

AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

James J. Hoecker

'In all ages the writing of history has employed the ablest men of all nations.'

Priestley

'Historians relate, not so much what is done as what they would have believed.'

Benjamin Franklin

'It seems, as one becomes older,  
That the past has another pattern, and ceases to  
be a mere sequence--  
Or even a development: the latter a partial fallacy,  
Encouraged by superficial notions of evolution,  
Which becomes, in the popular mind, a means of  
disavowing the past.'

T. S. Eliot, 'Dry Salvages',  
Four Quartets

Dr. Priestley's very pronounced historical sensibilities manifested themselves in every department of his thought, whether he was considering the development of human nature, personally or socially, the growth of political institutions and scientific knowledge, or the course of religion. The concrete, experimental evidences to which he was so drawn as a scientist were of less force and feasibility in these studies. Priestley thus turned to the historical past for his laboratory, with the intent and result of reinforcing his notion of the progress of civilization. Perhaps, as Carl Becker has claimed, the eighteenth century had begun to doubt the power of Reason and thus turned to history out of fear, looking for concrete and practical criteria to guide and encourage reform. Or, as Peter Gay asserts, the increased study of history may indicate an increasing philosophical boldness, a confidence in rational standards, rather than trepidations. (1) What is clear, in any case, is that 'the eighteenth century was in fact an age of consuming interest in history. History was a craft, a discipline, and an entertainment'. (2)

As historian, Priestley merits both praise and criticism, the latter mollified by an appreciation of the state of the art at the time. His several religious histories acknowledged the importance of the historical method and suggested new canons

of verification for Biblical studies. (3) In an effort to establish precision in religious controversy, Priestley published his 'Maxims of historical criticism' which set forth his methods of selecting testimony, judging its correctness and using exact meanings and words. (4) In filling his accounts with ideas and traditions rather than men and adventure, as in the History of the corruptions and christianity, Priestley is entitled to a place among the founders of the modern discipline of intellectual history', according to one scholar. (5) Priestley no doubt excelled as an historian of science, having been dubbed 'a great scientist and a splendid historian' for his work on electricity.

His History and present state of electricity was based on the study of articles and books..that is, original sources, to a degree that puts many later scholars to shame by comparison. He was an honest scholar and in his bibliography distinguished between the books which he 'had seen, and made use of in compiling this work,' and those which he knew only by title and at second-hand. (6)

Priestley recognized the educative value of historical studies and formulated manuals, courses, and charts to explicate historical developments. (7) He showed a sophisticated appreciation of social and cultural phenomena in history, complaining that histories generally dwell on princes and ministers of State to the exclusion of 'the people' and 'what has been the progress of science; of arts, of manufacturers, and commerce, by which the real welfare of nations is promoted'. (8) With neither the scholarly disinterest, scope of knowledge, nor style of a Robertson or Hume, Priestley was destined to be a minor figure in historiography. Yet he usually knew good work when he read it. Regarding Hume's History of England, he remarked that 'for a judicious choice of materials, and a happy disposition of them, together with perspicuity of style of recording them, this writer was hardly ever exceeded.....'.(9)

What concerns us, however, is Priestley's philosophy about history and his philosophy of history. As one might expect, he believed deeply in the utility of history. On the moral level, its study strengthened sentiments of virtue, in part by showing the virtues of great men..a Hartleian notion, of course..and by revealing the action of providence in human events. (10) Historical knowledge would, he was confident, help eradicate prejudice, encourage good judgment, understanding and ethical behaviour. 'History, therefore, may be called anticipated experience.' (11) The progress of the individual intellect was viewed by Priestley as unavoidable, but reflection on such matters as history determined the rate of advance. If men are 'deaf to what is behind', wrote Priestley, 'and blind to what is before, we may give ourselves up to mere sensual gratifications', the 'very lowest state of intellect'. (12) In its promotion of

virtue,

virtue, understanding and religious truth, history was philosophy teaching by example. Histories were essential to the spread of scientific knowledge as well, not to mention all the useful fields of commerce, government, law, war, and agriculture which stood to gain advancement by historical studies. The importance of historical investigation was apparent, Priestley believed, if it was remembered that

the most exalted understanding is nothing more than a power of drawing conclusions, and forming maxims of conduct, from known facts, and experiments, of which necessary materials of knowledge the mind itself is wholly barren. (13)

Does this therefore indicate that Priestley regarded history as a 'scientific' discipline? Methodologically speaking, he was more realistic than that. Historical evidence lacked the observability and constancy of natural and immediate evidence. There were, he observed, two kinds of evidence: the mathematical variety, scientific and demonstrable in nature, and the less reliable kind which rests on repeated observation of phenomena by humans. 'All our faith in history, which related to things too remote with respect to time or place to be of our own observation, is of this [second] kind; depending upon the knowledge and veracity of those who relate the facts.' This kind of evidence was frequently mistaken for the more certain variety, observed Priestley. (14) Despite this intelligent realization, Priestley no doubt intended history to serve as a foundation stone for 'sciences' of politics, society and human nature.

'The new science and the new history', states Herbert Butterfield, 'joined hands and each acquired a new power as a result of their mutual reinforcement.' (15) By the eighteenth century, the impression of time as purposive and its passage as generative was widespread, influenced markedly by the inclusion of natural events in the study of the past. The universe was attaining meaning as a historical process and product through revelations about biological species, geological epochs, and the 'chain of being.' 'The scientific revolution combined with the parallel development of history, and one now tended to envisage the world as existing and developing through the succession of ages'. (16) The affinity of man and nature within the whole historical context was an idea scarcely ignored by Priestley, especially as he depended on the physico-psychological perfectionism of Hartley's association theory and the complementary necessarianism. In his conception of historical man, Priestley was not unusual among his contemporaries. As his Hartleianism predisposed him, he envisioned man as a mechanical abstraction of immutable qualities operating at any one moment in static surroundings. In other words, he did not perceive an organic, moving history containing men who were empirical artifacts of their times and who, like the events they make, hold within them the seeds of things to come. Rather, Priestley 'was like Hume in that while he shows traces of an historical approach in some of his works, his efforts at formal history are dominated by a mechanical, atomistic conception of society'. (17)



History was becoming more than an exemplar in Priestley's time; it was envisioned as an 'empirical part of moral philosophy', and therefore a science of behaviour, as early as Bacon and Bolingbroke. (18) Such a study, based on immutability in human nature and uniform theories of causation, tended to be teleological, or aimed at revealing laws and purposes in natural progressions, and also deductive, or predisposed to go beyond purely empirical evidence. The danger in these characteristics was in mistaking the episodic and contingent for the uniform and characteristic. Priestley, it is true, warned against a priori reasoning in history. But he, too, relied on the propositions that nature was uniform and that providential influence was part of the historical law of progress, both assumptions which defy empirical verification. The historical outlook thereby tended to be peculiarly anti-historical and polemical and pseudo-scientific. (19) Collingwood commented on the histories of the Enlightenment in this vein:

Deep down beneath the surface of their work lay a conception of the historical process as a process developing neither by the will of enlightened despots nor by the rigid plans of a transcendent God, but by a necessity in which unreason itself is only a disguised form of reason. (20)

There existed two persuasive assumptions which tainted the study of history: that progress operated as a law of nature and that men and society were subject to the law. The idea of progress was thereby requisite to the eighteenth century view of the past and thus of the present and future. Problems were endemic to this way of thinking:

The conception of a 'law of progress,' by which the course of history is so governed that successive forms of human activity exhibit each an improvement on the last, is thus a mere confusion of thought, bred of an unnatural union between man's belief in his own superiority to nature and his belief that he is nothing more than a part of nature. If either belief is true, the other is false: they cannot be combined to produce logical offspring. (21)

There is general agreement that history-writing in the eighteenth century was not simply ideological or rank historicism. Historians were trying deliberately to overthrow authority and abstraction in favor of experientially founded truths. Hume, Voltaire, Gibbon and Robertson - and Priestley may be cautiously included - were methodologically conscious. They employed careful techniques and judgments in an effort to be historical and concrete rather than metaphysical. For their day, they were fine historians. Nevertheless, a tendency persisted in the Enlightenment to approach history with a general intellectual framework at the ready. (22) That framework in Priestley's case was an unbounded allegiance to the idea of progress.

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History, as Priestley perceived it, resembled the experiment with an air pump in revealing the operations of God in the natural world. If a general view of the human past showed an improvement, whether from corruption and superstition to rationality or the growth of liberty and security in the modern State or the rise of commercial wealth, it could only be attributed to the benevolence of the divine plan, thought Priestley. Ultimately, Priestley's views rest on this premise. As noted previously, he was aware of the evidentiary weaknesses of natural theology and therefore placed great faith in the explication of Biblical history to demonstrate the truth of revelation. Using history, Priestley wanted to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity and its institutions, the plausibility and probability of Jewish history and prophecy, and the historicity of the struggle against the forces of idolatry and corruption, whether the Ancients, the Mohammedans, or the Catholics. Accounts of martyrdoms, illiberal persecution and violence had instructive value for religious readers. (23) More importantly, history was expected to supply the proofs of the grand designs of God. The question, then, became one of the extent of human control over history itself. Priestley returns to necessarianism.

This is certain, that all the capital events in this world, which have contributed to bring about a better state of things in general, all the situations in human affairs favorable to liberty, virtue, happiness, were brought about in a manner independent of the policy, the designs, or even the wishes, of all human beings, and must be ascribed wholly to the good providence of God, wisely over-ruling the passions and powers of men to his own benevolent purposes. (24)

The vicissitudes of history and its overall linearity were included in it by a transcendent wisdom. But to a Hartleian like Priestley, this was not an automatic abdication of human power, simply a comforting reassurance and realization:

Let us deplore this depravity of human passions [war, megalomania], and may the contemplation of their fatal effects be a motive with us to keep a strict watch over our own; but let not the dark strokes which disfigure the fair face of an unhistorical chart affect our faith in the great and comfortable doctrine of an over-ruling Providence.

...The revolutions themselves, and the manner in which they have been brought about, are [by] his appointment, or permission. (25)

Consequently, Priestley's historicism sought to explain evil or tragedy as reasonable, necessary and even disguised good. (26)

Priestley's philosophy of history included none of the periodization of Condorcet, Comtean stages or calculations of probability. Yet, it avoided retreats to cyclical theory, a qualified optimism, or outright pessimism by this reliance on providence. This variety of progress theory was eventually regarded as naive, but its intent and a good deal of its method was firmly in the Enlightenment mainstream.

There

There were rationalists among these [Christian] prophets of progress, but at least until the nineteenth century, it was easier for a Christian than for a philosophe to construct a theory of progress [as opposed to a program of progress]. Christians could call on the millennial utopianism that was never far below the level of their consciousness, but the philosophes were, for all their lapses into optimistic fantasies, bound by the exigencies of this world. The pilgrim's progress was rather more direct, it seems, than the philosopher's progress. (27)

The Christian rationalist seems to have had the best of all theoretical worlds.

It seems somehow unfair and short-sighted, however, to discard Priestley's philosophy of history as 'little more than an exegesis of Biblical prophecy'. (28) It is true that his notions were strongly prejudiced by Scriptural accounts and contemporary theology. He even speculated that six thousand years separated his own time from that of Adam. Yet, Priestley's determination to improve historical method and to put the study to practical use, politically and socially as well as morally, suggests he was as much a secularist as a religionist in outlook. Whether or not he succeeded in these ambitions is another question, of course. Priestley examined the past with the intent, not so much of distinguishing the forces of good and evil, or even the rational and superstitious religions, as of presenting the proponents and antagonists of progress in its various forms. As with Butterfield's classic whig historian, whether we take the contest of Luther against the popes, or that of Philip II and Elizabeth, or that of the Huguenots with Catherine de' Medici; whether we take Charles I versus his parliaments or the younger Pitt versus Charles James Fox, it appears that the historian tends in the first place to adopt the whig or Protestant view of the subject, and very quickly busies himself with dividing the world into the friends and enemies of progress. (29)

Priestley's preferences were predictable; his historical accounts decidedly favor modernity over the ancients, the West over the East, the civilized and rational as opposed to the primitive and 'superstitious'. For instance, the lack of social virtue among the ancient Greeks in his eyes outweighed the positive effects of their unique political systems. They were deceitful, oppressive, cruel to the old and weak, vengeful and morally perverse, according to Priestley's standards. The cardinal sin of the Greeks, as might be expected, was polytheism and idolatry. (30) Having lived before Christ was unpardonable, it would appear. The Roman Republic fared better. Priestley found it just, virtuous and disciplined. The Empire, on the contrary, was licentious, lawless and factious, as Priestley perceived it. He hastened to extract lessons from such instances. Of the decline of Rome, Priestley stated;

No history furnishes so striking an example how incompatible extensive empire is with political liberty, or displays in a more conspicuous light the wisdom of Divine Providence, in appointing that that form of government which is, in a manner, necessary for extensive dominion, should be the happiest for the subjects of it. (31)

The era from the fall of Rome to the fifteenth century was a period of fragmentation and little progress, according to Priestley, who possessed a rationalist's contempt for the Catholic Church and its hegemony. But the condemnation of the Middle Ages is not wholesale and complete. Catholicism, observed Priestley, helped preserve learning, found towns, limit the spread of heathenism and political absolutism. Innovations were forthcoming in politics, commerce and discovery throughout the period. 'Dark and ignorant as we esteem the middle ages to have been, they furnish abundant matter to exercise the intellectual faculties of men'. (32) Although the questions of the Schoolmen were 'of little importance in themselves...', they did create a rational metaphysic which was, asserted Priestley, the boast of the 'present age' as well. (33) Science was in a 'low state' in medieval Europe, especially natural philosophy, astronomy, chemistry, and medicine, observed Priestley. (34) In sum, Priestley believed that Christianity had not 'laid all waste', as Paine had claimed. Before Christianity, countered Priestley, the state of science, the arts of speaking and writing, the science of government, and the progress of morality were all wretched. Christianity had made learned converts who subsequently 'published more books than the heathens had ever done...'. (35) Priestley had a special affection for the Renaissance because of its ostensibly progressive character, particularly in the arts. He preferred more 'manly studies' than literature and art, however. (36) It was the advent of science, the Cartesian challenge to Aristotle and Bacon's 'true philosophy', which showed conclusively the superiority of modern times, Priestley asserted. (37) Also, personal liberty was increasing in the modern State and, to Priestley, this was a prerequisite for other advances and further proof of superiority. (38) Priestley was not concerned that his students should 'perceive marks of things being in a progress towards a state of greater perfection' through reflection on the past. (39)

Priestley's total assurance of the progressive nature of history may have contained the bitter seeds of modern disenchantment with society. As a recent observer has noted:

The tendency to extreme pessimism, even despair, characteristic of many writers today is itself a sectarian phenomenon developing within the thought-world of liberal-rationalists given to a belief in inevitable progress through technology, wealth, liberty, science, and education. In this view history was visualized as a development from unreason and brutality, theological and philosophical chains, to the triumph of science and reason over primitive

impulses,

impulses, bigotry, will to power and naked force. It was proudly imagined that just as man gained mastery of natural forces so, by scientific method, he could control and perfect his historical development. (40)

The degree of this original faith in inexorable progress in history has heightened modern pessimism and anxiety as these liberal utopianisms become less realizable or more poverty-stricken. Curiously enough, modernity has subsequently developed a more truly historical consciousness. It has accepted the past as it was and found it a rich source of knowledge about man as artifact. Priestley had, in his enthusiasm, actually turned his back on real history in his zeal to ratify and glorify the present. This is forever an immanent failing when the idea of progress becomes a fetish.

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1. Carl Becker, The heavenly city of the eighteenth century philosophers (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 84-85, 92-93. Peter Gay, 'Carl Becker's heavenly city', Carl Becker's heavenly city revisited, Raymond O. Rockwood, ed. (Cornell University Press, 1958), 45-46.
2. Peter Gay, The enlightenment: an interpretation (2 vols., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966-69), II, 369. Because of eighteenth century dilettantism 'we cannot escape the impression that history was often an interesting idea rather than a deep faith' for most historians. Roland N. Stromberg, 'History in the Eighteenth Century', Journal of the History of Ideas, XII, no. 2 (April, 1951), 298. For material relevant to this discussion, see William T. Carden, Jr., 'The political and historical ideas of Joseph Priestley' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1966).
3. Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English thought in the eighteenth century (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1962), I, 368-69. 'Unluckily, it is of little use to adopt the historical method, whilst rejecting its fundamental canon....He is a judge who is not impartial, who has a scanty knowledge of the evidence, who treats it by no distinct logical principles, and who has not even devoted the whole strength of his mind to the case.' Ibid.
4. Joseph Priestley, Letters to Dr. Horsley in answer to his animadversions on the history of the corruptions of Christianity with additional evidence that the primitive Christian church was unitarian. (Birmingham and London, 1783), 135-40.
5. Ira V. Brown, 'The religion of Joseph Priestley', Pennsylvania history, XXIV, no. 2 (April 1957), 91.
6. I. Bernard Cohen, Franklin & Newton: an inquiry into speculative Newtonian experimental science & Franklin's work in electricity as an example thereof (American Philosophical society, 1956), 429. One of the major reasons for the success of this work, and for its superiority to the history of optics, was Priestley's own experimental expertise and original contributions..inverse square law of electrical force, 'Priestley's rings', the conductivity of charcoal, studies of resistivity..in addition to good historical research.
7. The charts of history and biography are contained in Priestley's Lectures on history and general policy: to which is prefixed an essay and course of liberal education for a civil and active life (Dublin, 1788), Lecture XVIII. George H. Nadel, 'Philosophy of history before historicism'. History and theory, III, no. 3 (1964), 306. Thomas Preston Peardon, The transition in English historical writing, 1760-1830 (Columbia University Press, 1933), 58.

8. Joseph Priestley, The proper objects of education in the present state of the world: represented in a discourse, delivered on Wednesday, the 27th of April 1791, at the meeting-house in the Old Jewry, London; to the supporters of the new college at Hackney (London, 1791), 31. A letter of 1764 contains this interesting request: 'It would be of great service to me in a course of lectures I am giving on the study of History (in which I propose to give particular attention to the progress of science and arts in our own country) if I could know the time when any improvements or capital alteration was made in building, food, dress, diversions, customs, or any of the conveniences and accommodations of life....'. J. Priestley to Paul Gemesage, Warrington, 26 February 1764, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Mss. Add. c. 244. Cf. Historical maxim 10 in Letters to Dr. Horsley, 138-39.
9. Priestley, Lectures, 176. Priestley took exception to Hume's views on the ancient constitution and the Stuarts, recommending Mrs. Macaulay's History of England as an antidote.
10. *Ibid.*, pp.14-33.
11. *Ibid.*, p.6.
12. Joseph Priestley, Letters to a philosophical unbeliever (2 vols., Birmingham & London, 1787), 2nd edn, I, iii.
13. Priestley, Lectures, 7-8. Stromberg, 'History', 302. Peardon, Transition, 58-60. Caroline Robbins, The eighteenth-century commonwealthman: studies in the transmission, development & circumstance of English liberal thought from the restoration of Charles II until the war with the Thirteen Colonies (Harvard University Press, 1961), 353.
14. Joseph Priestley, An outline of the evidence of revealed religion (Philadelphia: 1797), 3. R. V. Sampson, Progress in the age of reason: the seventeenth century to the present day (Harvard University Press, 1956), 192, 169. 'All historical evidence is ultimately an appeal to present appearances. For if things in time past had not been as they represent, the information we now receive concerning them, could not have been conveyed to us.' Priestley, Institutes of natural and revealed religion (3 vols., London, 1772-74), II, 76.
15. Herbert Butterfield, The origins of modern science, 1300-1800 (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1961), 219.
16. *Ibid.*, 223.
17. Peardon, Transition, 62, 58-60. Stromberg, 'History', 302, Robbins, Eighteenth century commonwealthman, 353.
18. Nadel, 'Philosophy of history', 313-14.
19. Sampson, Progress, 73-74. Stromberg, 'History', 302-03.
20. R. G. Collingwood, The idea of history (Oxford University Press, 1946), 81. 'After Locke and Shaftesbury..Hobbes was still not respectable..any significant attempts at constructing scientific systems of ethics would have to be based on psychology and not on history; to put it epigrammatically, on man, not men. Whoever wanted to convert the aspirations of exemplar history into rigorous scientific propositions would soon find either that the



propositions he advanced were scientific only in name or that he had in fact abandoned history for social science.' Nadel, 'Philosophy of History', 312.

21. Collingwood, Idea of history, 323.
22. Gay, 'Carl Becker's Heavenly City', Rockwood, ed., Heavenly City Revisited, 47-48. Stromberg, 'History', 295-300.
23. For example, Joseph Priestley, An history of the sufferings of Mr. Lewis de Marolles...and Mr. Isaac Le Fevre upon the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (Birmingham, 1788).
24. Priestley, Lectures, 211.
25. Joseph Priestley, A description of a new chart of history, containing a view of the principal revolutions of empire that have taken place in the world (6th edn., London, 1786).
26. Priestley, Lectures, 462, 770-71.
27. Gay, Enlightenment, II, 100. Sheldon Wolin presents another view of the liberal view of history which deserves mention. He perceives liberalism embracing a more pessimistic outlook. In the thought of Adam Smith and Montesquieu, and more systematically in that of Malthus and J. S. Mill, there was a fear of a 'static society' which could not progress beyond certain limits of wealth and political and social improvement. History was filled with impersonal, non-rational forces for these philosophers, according to Wolin. Progress could not come from conscious effort. Priestley, Condorcet and Godwin are therefore atypical. This view, while not wholly erroneous, appears to ignore the weight of historical evidence to the contrary. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Visions: continuity and innovation in Western political thought (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1960), 320-22.
28. Sampson, Progress, 170.
29. Herbert Butterfield, The whig interpretation of history (W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1965), 5.
30. Priestley, Institutes, II, 3-46.
31. Priestley, Lectures, 215.
32. Priestley, Lectures, 217-219, 470. Peardon, Transition, 61. Priestley, A general history of the Christian church to the fall of the Western Empire (2 vols., Birmingham and London, 1790), I, xxiv.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., I, xxv.
35. Joseph Priestley, An answer to Mr. Paine's age of reason, being a continuation of the letters to the philosophers and politicians of France, on the subject of religion; and of the letters to a philosophical unbeliever (London, 1795), 63, Letter IV.
36. Priestley, Lectures, 223-24.

37. Ibid., 222-23.
38. Ibid., 237-38.
39. Ibid., 454.
40. Sherman B. Barnes and Alfred A. Skerpan, Historiography under the impact of rationalism and revolution, Research Series I; A Bulletin Publication of Kent State University, XL, no. 10 (Kent State University Press, 1952), 31.

#### PRIESTLEY AS PREACHER

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## PRIESTLEY'S POLEMIC AGAINST REID

ALAN P. F. SELL

Just over two hundred years ago Joseph Priestley published his first philosophical tract, An examination of Dr. Reid's inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense, Dr. Beattie's essay on the nature and immutability of truth, and Dr. Oswald's appeal to common sense on behalf of religion (1774). (1) In the opinion of Reid's disciple, Dugald Stewart, Priestley was 'the most formidable of Dr. Reid's antagonists'; (2) but in our own time Professor A. D. Woozley has accused Priestley and Thomas Brown of making 'disingenuous assaults' upon Reid. (3) Priestley's tract was more in the nature of a broadside than the initial contribution to an on-going debate. He never reviewed his position in the light of Reid's later works on man's Intellectual powers (1785) and Active powers (1789); and for his part Reid did not publish a detailed reply to Priestley, though it appears that he did address a philosophical society on 'An Examination of Priestley's Opinions Concerning Matter and Mind'. (4) Almost our only positive clue to Reid's reaction to Priestley's onslaught is supplied by a letter addressed to Richard Price at Newington Green in which Reid says, 'I know not how Dr Priestley stands with you. I confess that in his late examinations he seems to me very lame as a Metaphysician as well as in some other Qualities of more Estimation. I have got no Light from him to atone for his abuse. And indeed what Light with regard to the powers of the Mind is to be expected from a Man who has not yet Learned to distinguish Vibrations from Ideas nor Motion from Sensation, nor simple Apprehension from Judgment, nor simple Ideas from complex nor necessary truths from contingent.' (5)

When Reid subsequently sent Price a copy of Intellectual powers, Price commended Reid, as the latter put it in a letter to Dr. James Gregory, 'for treating his friend Dr. Priestly (sic) so gently, who, he says, had been unhappily led to use me ill'. (6) That Priestley himself later realised that his tone left something to be desired is plain from his Memoirs in which he writes with reference to his trio of Scots, 'I was led to consider their system in a separate work, which, though written in a manner that I do not entirely approve, has, I hope, upon the whole, been of service to the cause of free enquiry and truth.' (7)

The phrase, 'their system', in the quotation just given begs the question. We should by no means take it on Priestley's authority that Reid, Beattie and Oswald were in accord at all points. Indeed, the adulation of Beattie and Oswald for Reid, and their resultant exaggeration of his position must on occasion have prompted Reid to sigh, 'God preserve me from my friends'. But we cannot here demonstrate this point. Neither shall we attempt to award points in connection with the extent to which either Priestley or Reid correctly interpreted their philosophical forebears on points of detail. Rather, we shall confine ourselves to Priestley's

main charges against Reid. We shall consider what, from Priestley's point of view, were Reid's sins of commission, and what was his great sin of omission. That done, we shall conclude that, Priestley's vehemence notwithstanding, he and Reid had rather more in common than a reading of Priestley's Examination might lead us to suppose. First, then, Reid's sins of commission.

## I

1. Reid construes literally what was intended metaphorically. In order to understand this charge we shall have to relate Reid's position to the received philosophical tradition as he understood it. We cannot be in doubt regarding Reid's intellectual pilgrimage, for he himself gives an account of it. He had been quite content with Berkeley's view of the external world, but the publication of Hume's Treatise of human nature (1739) awoke him from his dogmatic slumber - as the same author's Enquiry concerning the human understanding (1748) was later to awaken Kant from his. Reid had hitherto accepted the generally received opinions concerning human understanding - those derived from Locke's epistemology; but now Hume had built a sceptical conclusion upon Locke's foundations. Moreover, 'His reasoning appeared to me to be just; there was, therefore, a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion.' (8) The hypothesis to be challenged, whose roots Reid traces to Descartes, is 'That nothing is perceived but what is in the mind that perceives it: That we do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, which are called impressions and ideas.' (9) But this hypothesis 'overturns all philosophy, all religion and virtue, and all common sense'. (10) As Reid wrote to Dr. James Gregory, the unacceptable theory was 'founded on natural prejudices, and so universally received as to be interwoven with the structure of the language'. (11) He modestly added that his discovery and exposure of the prejudice 'was the birth of time, not of genius; and that Berkeley and Hume did more to bring it to light than the man that hit upon it'. (12)

Consistently with his admiration of Bacon (13) and Newton, Reid determines to proceed by way of observation and experiment. What is required, he is sure, is the patient analysis of the human faculties; and in face of the sceptical devastation which we owe to the philosophers, he expostulates, 'It is genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy, and fills it with error and false theory. A creative imagination disdains the mean offices of digging for a foundation...' (14) Thus it was that, building upon Descartes, Malebranche and Locke, Berkeley 'undid the whole material world'. It then only remained for Hume to undo 'the world of spirits', and we are left with ideas and impressions only, and with no subject on which they may be impressed. (15) Having been accorded independent existence the ideas 'are turned out of house and home, and set adrift in the world, without friend or connection, without a rag to cover their nakedness...' (16) At this point Reid ironically begs to make 'an addition to the sceptical system... I affirm, that the belief of the existence of impressions and ideas,

is as little supported by reason, as that of the existence of minds and bodies'. (17)

Clearly, to Reid ideas are entities which somehow come between the external object and the percipient mind - and he will have none of them. But is his understanding of ideas correct? Priestley thought not. (18) Reid, he thinks, has 'suffered himself to be misled...merely by philosophers happening to call ideas the images of external things; as if this was not known to be a figurative expression, denoting not that the actual shapes of things were delineated in the brain, or upon the mind, but only that impressions of some kind or other were conveyed to the mind by means of the organs of sense and their corresponding nerves, and that between these impressions and the sensations existing in the mind there is a real and necessary, though at present an unknown connexion'. (19)

To the degree to which Reid was misled, he was not without excuse, as Professor A. J. Ayer has granted; but if Ayer is correct, Priestley did not reach the heart of the matter in invoking the metaphorical:

Reid misses the point of what his opponents are saying; and this is not to be wondered at, since they are not at all clear about it themselves...there is a confusion between a question of logic and a question of fact. For while Locke and his followers may seem to be putting forward a factual thesis, and probably themselves believed that this is what they were doing, what they actually do is to introduce a new verbal usage. They do not show that it is factually incorrect to say that we directly perceive physical objects. What they do show is that, in any case in which a person claims that he is directly perceiving a physical object, it is logically possible that he should be mistaken...Accordingly, there is a use for a terminology allowing us to give a name to what we are perceiving without prejudging the question whether the perception is veridical or delusive. And it is this purpose that is served by such terms as "impression" or "simple idea of sensation" or the modern "sense-datum"... In refusing to follow Locke, Reid is not in error. He is merely less ambitious. It is perfectly legitimate to take one's stand with commonsense. But to do so is not to solve the problems that Locke raises; it is simply to avoid them. (20)

Underlying Reid's hostility towards ideas is, as Ayer implies, his view of common sense. At this point too Priestley faults him.

2. Reid's view of common sense is untenable in itself, and opens the door to unwarrantable dogmatism. Priestley argues that Reid's common sense approach - that is, his view that 'sensation implies the belief of the present existence of external objects' - is open to the following objections: (a) Since we may have strong feelings concerning both opinions which are true and opinions which are false, we need evidence independent of our feelings if fallacious opinions are to be exposed and discounted. (b) We do not need, for the purpose of the conduct of life, a special 'faith' arising from an instinctive principle, for 'a very high degree of probability, not to be distinguished in feeling from absolute

certainty,

certainty, is attainable without it.' (21) (c) Reid's position cannot allow for the fact that our feelings may deceive us.

(d) Reid does not apply his hypothesis to dreams, reveries and visions. Yet, 'In all these circumstances it cannot be denied that men imagine themselves to be surrounded with objects which have no real existence, and yet their sensations are not to be distinguished from those of men awake; so that, if sensations, as such, necessarily draw after them the belief of the present existence of objects, this belief takes place in dreams, reveries and visions, as indeed is the case; and if there be a fallacy in these cases, it is certainly within the compass of possibility that there may be a fallacy in the other also.' (22) Priestley can even charge Reid with acknowledging that his system is founded not upon absolute, but upon relative truth 'arising from his constitution' (23) - on which point Dr. S. A. Grave properly commented, 'The relativism of which Priestley accused Reid and Beattie would be in Reid's eyes a peculiarly absolute form of the theory of ideas.' (24)

What Priestley refuses to see is that Reid's doctrine of common sense is precisely not designed in order to sanction subjectivism or psychologism. Reid forcefully contends for the distinction in general between sensation (which is the condition of a percept) and extension as a percept. Again, he declares that 'Perception...hath always an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived; an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not.' (25) He insists again and again that we do not begin with ideas but with judgments, and that these judgments are present in every operation of the senses: 'every operation of the senses, in its very nature, implies judgment or belief, as well as simple apprehension'. (26) That is to say, 'instead of saying that the belief or knowledge is got by putting together and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analysing a natural and original judgment'. (27)

At this point it is not difficult to see why some - Thomas Chalmers, for example - have detected a likeness between Reid and Kant. However, as McCosh points out, Chalmers did not take the force of the fact that whereas to Kant the forms of reason were subjective, to Reid they were objective and externally valid in so far as they related to external objects. (28) As Reid was later to say in reply to Priestley, 'in common language, sense always implies judgment. A man of sense is a man of judgment. Good sense is good judgment. Nonsense is what is evidently contrary to right judgment. Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business'. (29)

Reid's emphasis upon judgment and common sense makes it plain that he was not out to substitute the appeal to personal prejudice for the appeal to reason. Priestley, however, was not alone in supposing the contrary. Kant was seldom more unscholarly than when he echoed Priestley's charge against Reid for, as



Professor Woozley has reminded us, Kant had not read Reid, but had seen Priestley's Examination in which Reid, Oswald and Beattie are 'lumped together for the purposes of destruction'. (30)

Positively, Reid had no desire at all to sanction 'herd' opinion. Common sense was not, to him, vulgar opinion. Rather, it stands for the commonly held belief of rational men. Of such beliefs our belief in the external world is among the most important. It is of our nature qua rational beings to entertain this belief. We owe this belief to that "inspiration of the Almighty" to which (quoting Job) Reid refers on the title page of his Inquiry, and we can give no other reason for it. Indeed, all our original and natural judgments are

a part of that furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of those principles, is what we call absurd. (31)

Of these self-evident principles Reid elsewhere says that they 'seldom admit of direct proof, nor do they need it. Men need not to be taught them; for they are such as all men of common understanding know; or such, at least, as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are proposed and understood'. (32) Berkeley's error, for example, is that his hypothesis of the unreality of the external world runs counter to common sense as thus understood:

that all mankind have a fixed belief of an external material world - a belief which is neither got by reasoning nor education, and a belief which we cannot shake off, even when we seem to have strong arguments against it and no shadow of argument for it - is likewise a fact, for which we have all the evidence that the nature of the thing admits. These facts are phaenomena of human nature, from which we may justly argue against an hypothesis, however generally received. But to argue from a hypothesis against facts, is contrary to the rules of true philosophy. (33)

I do not suggest that Reid is entirely self-consistent in his use of the term 'common sense'. (34) But what is quite clear is that he is not open to the charge levelled against him by Priestley. He was not in the position of saying of our instinctive principles simply that "they are so, because they are so, which is Dr. Reid's common sense, and his short irrefragable argument'. (35) He gave a much fuller account of them than that, and his appeal to common sense required him to

shun personal dogmatism.

3. Reid needlessly multiplies instinctive principles, and lands us in a scepticism more dire than that with which he charged Hume. Priestley expressed his complaint thus:

Dr. Reid meets with a particular sentiment, or persuasion, and not being able to explain the origin of it, without more ado he ascribes it to a particular original instinct, provided for that very purpose. He finds another difficulty, which he also solves in the same concise and easy manner. And thus he goes on accounting for everything, by telling you, not only that he cannot explain it himself, but that it will be in vain for you, or any other person, to endeavour to investigate it farther than he has done. Thus avowed ignorance is to pass for real knowledge, and, as with the old Sceptics, that man is to be reckoned the greatest philosopher who asserts that he knows nothing himself, and can persuade others that they know no more than he does. There is this difference between the ancient and these modern sceptics, that the ancients professed neither to understand nor believe any thing, whereas these moderns believe every thing, though they profess to understand nothing. And the former, I think, are the more consistent of the two. (36)

Reid is, indeed, a 'pretended', 'assuming' philosopher who, 'in order to combat Bishop Berkeley, and the scepticism of Mr. Hume, has himself introduced almost universal scepticism and confusion; denying all the connexions which had before been supposed to subsist between the several phenomena, powers and operations of the mind, and substituting such a number of independent, arbitrary, instinctive principles, that the very enumeration of them is really tiresome'. (37) While we must deny that Reid invoked each new instinctive principle as a deus ex machina, there is a legitimate complaint here, and it is one which stands against all intuitionist theories. Robert Mackintosh, for example, though less abusive than Priestley, was among others who found fault with intuitionism - or what he calls intuitionism - in general and with Reid in particular: 'Intuitionism leaves the mind in all the embarrassment of an infinite number of separate starting points. Every percept is such a starting point; it is an immediate certainty, remaining with us unmodified as the basis of reliable inference. Every First Principle of the mind is a starting point too. Reid - certainly a very unsystematic thinker - furnishes long and random lists of 'first principles'.' (38)

With Reid's list Priestley made merry; and he took particular delight in Reid's concession to the effect that 'If in any case we should give the name of a law of nature to a general phenomenon, which human industry should afterwards trace to one more general, there is no great harm done. The most general assumes the name of a law of nature when it is discovered, and the less general is contained and comprehended in it.' 'But,' replies Priestley, 'I must take the liberty to say, that if this should happen, harm will be done to the

hypothesis

hypothesis of that man who had been so rash and unguarded as to advance, over and over, so that nobody could mistake his meaning, that a certain law of nature was absolutely ultimate, which afterwards appeared not to be so...' (39) Lest it be thought, however, that Priestley is alone in being entirely self-consistent, I would note that in his reply to Priestley Dugald Stewart properly quotes both Priestley's concession that there are self-evident truths, and Dr. George Campbell's puzzled question: 'What is the great point which Dr. Priestley would controvert? Is it, whether such self-evident truths shall be denominated Principles of Common Sense, or be distinguished by some other appellation?' (40) In other words, have we here simply a squabble over terminology?

Be that as it may, it is not easy to see how the mind may rest content with a multiplicity of first principles. When Priestley further challenges Reid we come to his underlying complaint - that which was, in Priestley's eyes, Reid's great sin of omission: 'Let Dr. Reid lay his hand upon his breast, and say, whether, after what he has written, he would not be exceedingly mortified to find it clearly proved, to the satisfaction of all the world, that all the instinctive principles in the preceding table were really acquired, and that all of them were nothing more than so many different cases of the old and well-known principle of association of ideas.' (41)

## II

From Priestley's point of view, Reid's greatest fault was that he paid no heed to the 'well-known principle of association of ideas'. He took the greatest exception to the independence of Reid's instinctive principles. Reid had learned nothing from David Hartley. Reid's notions of human nature were 'the very reverse of those which I had learned from Mr. Locke and Dr. Hartley'. (42) Of Hartley's Observations on man (1749) he declared, 'I think myself more indebted to this one treatise, than to all the books I have ever read beside, the scriptures excepted.' (43) Given Priestley's high view of the work of Newton, we can readily estimate his opinion of Hartley's eminence when he writes that Hartley 'has thrown more useful light upon the theory of the mind than Newton did upon the theory of the natural world'. (44) Not indeed that Priestley (any more than Brown) swallowed Hartley whole. He dispensed with such physiological explanatory notions as that of vibrations, but remained convinced that the psychology was sound - namely, that it is possible to show how the more complex mental phenomena are derived from the simpler by the sensation-fed process of association. This notable advance in our understanding of the human psyche had been totally ignored by Reid, despite the fact that Hartley's name 'appears to have reached Scotland; for his work is quoted with some degree of respect by Dr. Beattie'. (45)

Priestley intends to perform the service of exposing Reid once and for all:

It is impossible to contemplate such a theory of the human mind as that of Dr. Reid with any satisfaction, and the farther study of the subject is thereby rendered exceedingly disgusting and unpromising. I flatter myself, therefore, that I may be doing some service to future enquirers, by endeavouring to show that this new system has in it as little of truth, as it has of beauty, that we may safely take up the subject where Mr. Locke left it, and proceed to attend to what Dr. Hartley has done, by following his steps; when, if I have any foresight, we shall smile at Dr. Reid's hypothesis, or rather string of hypotheses, as a mere puzzle, and look back upon it as upon a dream. (46)

Not only did Priestley welcome Hartley's psychology. He approved of Hartley because he was a scientist, a Christian, and an upholder of the doctrine of philosophical necessity. Moreover, Hartley's discoveries facilitated Priestley's progress down the materialistic path. By the time he wrote his first prefatory essay to his 1775 edition of Hartley's Observations Priestley was 'inclined to think' that man is not composed of two such different substances as matter and spirit, but rather that 'the whole man is of some uniform composition, and that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is the result (whether necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain'. (47) Because of his materialism Priestley was accused of atheism, and in 1782 copies of his Hartley, and of Cudworth's Intellectual System were burned. (48)

In the course of his defence of Reid, Stewart noted that 'the general spirit of Dr. Reid's philosophy is hostile to the conclusions of the Materialist'. This was not, however, 'because his system rests on the contrary hypothesis as a fundamental principle, but because his inquiries have a powerful tendency to wean the understanding gradually from those obstinate associations and prejudices, to which the common mechanical theories of mind owe all their plausibility'. (49) In a letter to Lord Kames dated 1775, Reid himself was much more to the point. Of Priestley's idea that mental powers originate in the organical structure of the brain he said, This seems to me a great mystery, but Priestley denies all mysteries. He thinks, and rejoices in thinking so, that plants have some degree of sensation. As to the lower animals, they differ from us in degree only, and not in kind. Only they have no promise of a resurrection. If this be true, why should not the King's advocate be ordered to prosecute criminal brutes, and you criminal judges to try them? You are obliged to Dr. Priestley for teaching you one-half of your duty, of which you knew nothing before. But I forgot that the fault lies in the legislature, which has not given you laws for this purpose. I hope, however, when any of them shall be brought to a trial, that he will be allowed a jury of his peers. (50)

## III

I may fairly claim to have exposed the main points of disagreement as between Priestley and Reid, but we should be warned. We must not allow Priestley's vehemence, or Reid's antipathy to materialism, to obscure the fact that there was more than a little temperamental and emotional sympathy between the two men. They appear to be on opposing teams, and so they are; but they are playing the Enlightenment game in accordance with Enlightenment rules. They both admired Newton; they both sought a reasoned faith; and it is hard to imagine either of them sanctioning the enthusiastic excesses of the Evangelical Awakening through which they lived. As we have seen, Priestley certainly did not think that Reid had reached the right conclusions. From Priestley's point of view Reid was far too conservative: advancing thought was following Hartley. The two were later to differ over the question of philosophical necessity. (51) Again, Reid's writings display no inclinations towards heterodoxy - unlike those of Priestley who, as early as his student days in Daventry (1752-55) 'saw reason', under the influence of Hartley's Observations, 'to embrace what is generally called the heterodox side of almost every question', - and this despite the fact that 'Dr. Ashworth was earnestly desirous to make me as orthodox as possible...' (52)

But however much their conclusions might differ, they were men of their age - perhaps of an already passing age. It was an age in which the more 'respectable' thinkers sought to commend the faith by showing how eminently reasonable - even commonplace - it was. (53) Reid's divinely inspired common sense, which Priestley regarded as an appeal to vulgar prejudice, was intended as a witness to the trustworthiness of religion: 'Scotch theologians even held the law within the heart to be a natural revelation, from which there developed themselves, with the development of the human soul, the great principles of morality and religion.' (54) It all seems so inevitable; and herein lies the final similarity between Priestley and Reid to which I would draw attention: neither of them closely related the ideas of sin and grace to his philosophy.

The way in which McCosh goes too far in saying of Scottish philosophy and Scottish theology that 'there never was any real opposition between the facts gathered by the one and the truths taken out of God's Word by the other' (55) is well illustrated by the career of Thomas Chalmers. As Professor Rice has shown, while Chalmers welcomed the emphasis of the Scottish philosophers on the constancy of nature, and their attempt to find the basis of morality in a priori laws which were constitutive of the mind itself, he could not espouse their 'optimistic anthropology in which traditional conceptions of sin and grace were thoroughly undermined'. (56) From the point of view there would not be much to choose between a common sense Scottish Moderate and a materialistic English Unitarian. (57)

## NOTES

1. Our quotations are from the 2nd edn. 1775, reprinted in The theological and miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley ed. J. T. Rutt, (25 vols., London 1817-31), iii. Reid's Inquiry was first published in 1764.
2. The collected works of Dugald Stewart, ed. Sir W. Hamilton, (Edinburgh, 1858), x, 303. Here (pp. 281-309) Stewart answers objections which had been brought against Reid's position.
3. Essays on the intellectual powers of man. by Thomas Reid, ed. A. D. Woozley, (London, 1941), xii.
4. See Dugald Stewart's "Account of the life and writings of Thomas Reid, D.D.," prefixed to The works of Thomas Reid, D.D., ed. Sir W. Hamilton, (Edinburgh, 1846), 29.
5. The letter, dated 10.4.1775 is at the Bodleian. There are passing references to Priestley's Examination in Reid's Essays on the intellectual powers of man (Works, 421 ff.), as we shall see.
6. So Reid in a letter to Dr. James Gregory dated 23.9.1785. See Reid, Works, 67.
7. Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley, written by himself (To the Year 1795), reprinted from the 1809 edn., (London, 1904), 51.
8. Reid, Works, 95.
9. Ibid., 96.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 88.
12. Ibid., Cf. Reid's letter to Hume dated 18.3.1763, in his Works, 91-92: "If you write no more in morals, politics, or metaphysics, I am afraid we shall be at a loss for subjects." Hume's letter of 25.2.1763 is given by A. C. Fraser, op.cit., 58-59.
13. Of Bacon Reid wrote to Gregory, 'I am very apt to measure a man's understanding by the opinion he entertains of that author.' Quoted by Dugald Stewart in his 'Life', Reid, Works, 11; cf. a letter of Reid to Lord Kames dated 16.12.1780, ibid., 56. It appears that Reid gained his enthusiasm for the inductive, empirical method in philosophy from George Turnbull (1698-1749), his teacher at Aberdeen. Unlike Reid, however, Turnbull subscribed to the conventional doctrine of ideas which Reid made it his business to attack. See Olin McKendree Jones, Empiricism and intuitionism in Reid's common sense philosophy, (Princeton, 1927), 2-3; Torngny T. Segerstedt, The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish philosophy, (Lund, 1935), 6; A. D. Woozley, op.cit., vii-viii.
14. Reid, Works, 99.
15. Ibid., 102. Hume did, it will be recalled, allow himself such intuitively perceived relations of ideas' as resemblances, contrareity, arithmetical relations, and degrees of quality. (See Treatise, I,1, iv and v). 'He is, of course, not entitled to these on his own principles', declared Andrew Seth, Scottish philosophy, (Edinburgh, 1890), 55.
16. Ibid., 109.

17. Ibid., 129. Cf. his Essays on the intellectual powers of man, Works, 293: "Mr. Hume's system does not even leave him a self to claim the property of his impressions and ideas."
18. So, for a different reason, did Thomas Brown. In Brown's view Descartes et al. did not hold that ideas were entities, but rather, that they indicate the way in which objects are presented to consciousness. See his Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind, (Edinburgh, 1820), lectures xxvi and xxvii. For a powerful exposé of Brown's misunderstanding of Reid see W. Hamilton, "Philosophy of perception," in his Discussions on philosophy and literature, education and university reform, (London, 1852), 39-97. Price was influenced by Reid at this point. See D. O. Thomas, The honest mind, The thought and work of Richard Price, (Oxford, 1977), 44-45; cf. T. T. Segerstedt, *op.cit.*, 21-31.
19. Priestley, Works, iii, 36.
20. British empirical philosophers, ed. A. J. Ayer and Raymond Winch, (London, 1952), 14-15, 18-19.
21. Priestley, Works, iii, 42.
22. Ibid., 43.
23. Ibid., 42.
24. S. A. Grave, The Scottish philosophy of common sense, (Oxford, 1960), 126.
25. Reid, Works, 183.
26. Ibid., 209.
27. Ibid., 106-7.
28. James McCosh, The Scottish philosophy (London, 1875), 404, Cf. A. Seth, *op.cit.*, 133.
29. T. Reid, Essays on the intellectual powers, Works, 421.
30. A. D. Woozley, *op.cit.*, xiv. Kant's charge is in the introduction to his Prolegomena to any future metaphysic. For a further reply to it see H. Sidgwick, "The philosophy of common sense," Mind, N.S. IV, No. 14, April, 1895.
31. Reid, Works, 209. In addition to our knowledge of the external world, the judgements of common sense include those concerning the individual's consciousness of his own personal identity, and the uniformity of nature. The Inquiry is concerned with the first of these only.
32. See his Essays on the intellectual powers, Works, 230.
33. Reid, Works, 132. For his part, Priestley found Reid's position supportive of Berkeley's: 'Now it appears to me that his notions of mind, ideas, and external objects, are such as are hardly compatible with one another, that he puts an impassable gulph between them, so as intirely to prevent their connexion or correspondence; which is all that the bishop could wish in favour of his doctrine.' See Priestley's Works, iii, 47. Seth grants that 'in their zeal against a subjective idealism, [the Scottish philosophers] have often over-stated their case, and maintained the independence of the material world in terms which imply the old two-substance doctrine. But the Natural Dualism of the school, as it is sometimes called, does not in itself involve this doctrine. On the contrary, it might be argued that, by maintaining a theory of Immediate Perception, Scottish philosophy destroys the foreignness of matter to mind, and thus implicitly removes the only foundation of a real dualism'. *Op.cit.*, 76-77; cf. T. T. Segerstedt, *op.cit.*, 47-48.

34. For further discussion of Reid's usage see e.g. A. D. Wozzley, op.cit., xxxii-xxxvii; Ronald E. Beanblossom in Thomas Reid's inquiry and essays, eds. Keith Lehrer and R. E. Beanblossom, (Indianapolis, 1875), xxvi-xxvii.
35. Priestley, Works, iii, 49.
36. Ibid., 11.
37. Ibid., 27.
38. R. Mackintosh, "Theism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn., 748.
39. Priestley, Works, iii, 33. Dugald Stewart countered by finding Priestley too eager to simplify and generalise. See his Works, x, 294-300.
40. Dugald Stewart, Works, x, 304.
41. Priestley, Works, iii, 33.
42. Ibid., 4.
43. Ibid., 10.
44. Ibid., 26.
45. Ibid., 64.
46. Ibid., 27.
47. Priestley, Works, iii, 182.
48. See DNB "Priestley," 360; Anne Holt, A life of Joseph Priestley (London 1931), 110-112; Priestley, Memoirs, 51, 52.
49. Dugald Stewart, Works, x, 282.
50. Reid, Works, 52.
51. See Reid, Essays on the active powers of the human mind, IV: 'On the liberty of moral agents,' Works, 599-636.
52. Priestley, Memoirs, 12.
53. For further comments on the prevailing climate of thought see my article, 'Arminians, deists and reason,' Faith and freedom, Autumn 1979, forthcoming.
54. James Walker, The theology and theologians of Scotland (Edinburgh 1872), 73.
55. J. McCosh, op.cit., 393.
56. Daniel F. Rice, 'Natural theology and the scottish philosophy in the thought of Thomas Chalmers', The Scottish journal of theology, xxiv, 1971, 33; cf. 23.
57. Chalmers' complaint against Moderate preaching is well known: 'A moderate sermon is like a winter's day, short and clear and cold. The brevity is good; the clarity is better; the coldness is fatal. Moonlight preaching ripens no harvest.' But Hugh Watt, who provides this quotation in his Thomas Chalmers and the disruption (Edinburgh 1943), 6, properly cautions us against the too hasty labelling of divines. We might also remember that Chalmers possessed the zeal of a convert from Moderatism.



GEORGE CADOGAN MORGAN (1754-1798).

D. O. Thomas

The career of George Cadogan Morgan, the nephew of Richard Price, although relatively brief and unhappily cut short by an accident before he could bring all his projects to fruition, is of interest to the students of Rational Dissent because it exemplifies and illustrates the intellectual convictions that were shared by many leaders of Non-conformity in the second half of the eighteenth century. Like Price and Priestley, Kippis and Lindsey, he made the journey from orthodox Christianity towards Unitarianism, and he shared their devotion to the ideals of candour and free enquiry, their optimism, their passionate belief that the development of science would lead to ever-increasing improvements in human welfare, and their humanitarianism. His career is of interest too to the student of political ideas because it illustrates how the attitudes of many Dissenters to the political establishment changed from an acceptance of Whig orthodoxies towards a more militant and a more radical stance that favoured republican institutions.

By vocation a minister, George Cadogan was endowed with an intense intellectual curiosity that led him to work in several widely different fields. He was a classical scholar, a chemist, and a physicist; under the influence of Priestley and Franklin he developed an interest in and made contributions to the study of electricity; he tried his hand at biography and history, was actively engaged in education both as a school-master and as a tutor in an academy, and he maintained a lively interest in politics. He was in no way troubled that his wholehearted pursuit of knowledge might be alien to his calling and that it might impair his effectiveness as a pastor. On the contrary, he believed that part of the service we owe to God is the duty to cultivate our understanding, to increase our stock of knowledge, and in doing so improve the lot of our fellowmen. Like Price and Priestley he was convinced that the acquisition and application of knowledge would bring men nearer to the time when life on earth would be paradisaical. George Cadogan's first passion, which he never entirely lost and which influenced his enthusiasm for republican institutions, was for the classics, but from an early date his attention became more and more absorbed by mathematics and the natural sciences. The successes achieved by and in the wake of Newton had fostered confidence in the possibility of an unlimited growth in our knowledge and understanding of the natural world, and had encouraged the belief that this would lead to an unlimited amelioration of the human condition. George Cadogan shared this

optimism

optimism to the full, and it had a profound influence upon his own practice as a teacher. He did not have a high opinion of the kind of education that was available in his own day, and when he came to set up a school on his own account he paid very much more attention to the physical sciences than it was then customary for a schoolmaster to do.

George Cadogan Morgan was born at Bridgend in 1754. He was the son of William Morgan, a surgeon and an apothecary, and Sarah, a sister of Richard Price. William and Sarah had eight children, four boys and four girls, of whom Catherine, who married Jenkin Williams, a doctor at Bridgend; William, who became Actuary to the Equitable Assurance Society and a Fellow of the Royal Society; Anne, who married Walter Coffin; George Cadogan, and Sarah (Sally) reached maturity. George Cadogan was educated at Cowbridge Grammar School where he became Head of School and acquired some reputation as a classical scholar. From Cowbridge he went up to Jesus College, Oxford, matriculating on 10 October 1771. (1) He intended to prepare for the Church, but his stay at Oxford was short. Different reasons have been given to explain why it was so brief. It has been suggested that after his father's death in 1772, the family became so reduced in their circumstances that George Cadogan was unable to continue at the University. (2) Another suggestion is that about this time he underwent a radical change in his religious beliefs and 'his scruples respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, and the other mysteries of the thirty-nine articles, determined him to abandon all thoughts of becoming a clergyman of the church of England'. (3) There is, probably, substance in both accounts. As William Morgan died intestate, (4) it may well be that his death was unexpected, and that his widow suddenly found herself unable to support a son at Oxford. At the same time George Cadogan's departure to the Dissenting Academy at Hoxton on Price's advice agrees with the suggestion that there had been a change in his religious views that would have prevented his staying and taking a degree at Oxford. The change to Hoxton was, no doubt, one his uncle could approve of, and one which, if there had been financial difficulties, would have made it easier for him to help his nephew. Price's links with the Academy were strong: in his youth he had attended Coward's Academy at Tenter Alley in Moorfields, and when, after a period at Wellclose Square, the Academy was moved to Hoxton, he received an invitation to become a tutor there. (5) At Hoxton, George Cadogan was taught by three Dissenting Ministers each of whom achieved academic distinction: Samuel Morton Savage; Andrew Kippis, editor of Biographia Britannica; and Abraham Rees, editor of Cyclopaedia. Later in his career George Cadogan was to join Kippis and Rees on the staff of New College, Hackney. At the Academy, George Cadogan continued his studies in the classics, but with the encouragement of his uncle he developed his interests in mathematics and the natural sciences and came to believe that the latter should be given first priority. In his Directions for the use of a scientific table in the collection and application of knowledge, which was published posthumously, he wrote:

Men of science must preside in our schools: and the elements of geometry must become the first grammar that is taught. (6)

In the summer of 1773 while he was a student at Hoxton, George Cadogan spent his vacation with Price at Newington Green. At the time, according to Caroline Williams, Price was busily engaged on the preparation of actuarial tables to be submitted to Parliament (probably those he drew up for the scheme introduced in A Bill for the relief of the labouring poor in old age) and George Cadogan was able to give him some assistance. (7)

George Cadogan remained at Hoxton until late in December 1776 when he received a call to preach at the Octagon Chapel at Norwich in succession to Samuel Bourn. On Lady Day in the following year he was appointed co-pastor there with Mr. Alderson. His being called at the age of twenty-two to a pulpit that had been held by the celebrated Dr. John Taylor was a signal honour, and an excellent opportunity to serve. He came to Norwich with a reputation for academic brilliance and the high expectations formed by his congregation were not disappointed, for during his stay there, according to the historians of the Octagon Chapel, (8) he so endeared himself to his hearers that it was a matter of much regret that his ministry with them came to an end when it did. One of the delights of his sojourn at Norwich was the friendship of Dr. Samuel Parr who held George Cadogan in high esteem. (9) But although the years spent at Norwich were pleasant and successful, they were not untroubled for 'his advanced opinions exposed him to much annoyance from the clergy of the town', (10) not all of whom, perhaps not surprisingly, shared Parr's opinion. George Cadogan, moreover, had a taste for controversy and an unbridled pen that occasionally led him into turbulent exchanges. One such arose from his review (11) of the Revd. F. J. Brand's Select dissertations from the Amoenitates academicae - a supplement to Mr. Stillingfleet's tracts relating to natural history (12) which contains selections from the works of the Swedish school of Natural History composed under the direction of its founder, Linnaeus. In the course of his review George Cadogan attacks Linnaeus's attempt to prove 'how from a single spot, a plant of a given species may be disseminated as to be found in all parts of the world'. But although critical of the Linnean system and its supporting hypotheses, he does not write disparagingly of Linnaeus himself. No such good fortune attended Brand whose commentary George Cadogan subjected to some very rough treatment, even complaining about Brand's grammatical errors. Brand was incensed by George Cadogan's review and attacked him in a letter - I have not been able to trace a copy of it - which to judge from George Cadogan's reply contained a great deal of personal abuse. So high did passions rise that Brand seems to have assaulted George Cadogan physically when they met in the market place at Norwich and to have challenged him to a duel. George Cadogan published his reply under the

title

title An appeal to the public in answer to a letter from Mr. Brand (13) in which he defends himself against Brand's assault upon his character. There is little in these exchanges that remains of interest, save perhaps a reminder of how warm and vehement men of the cloth could be when they engaged in controversy and of how ready George Cadogan was to jump to the defence of his uncle whom Brand had included among the objects of his denunciation. (14)

While he was at Norwich George Cadogan continued his studies in physics and submitted a paper to the Royal Society entitled 'Observations on the light of bodies in a state of combustion'. This was published with a postscript by Price in Philosophical Transactions. (15) At this time he also conducted a correspondence on scientific matters with Samuel Bowly whose interest in chemistry like his own had been stimulated by Priestley's researches. (16) But George Cadogan's attention was not exclusively confined to the cares of his ministry and to his scientific interests. He was also actively concerned in political affairs. During this period of his career he supported the work of the Society for Constitutional Information (of which Price was a founder member), and on 4 March 1784 he delivered a speech at Norwich on 'the propriety of addressing Parliament on the subject of a reform in the representation of the people'. (17)

The Dissenters were active in Norfolk politics: in 1784 they helped to secure the election of Henry Beaufoy - who was to play a prominent part in the campaign for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts - at Great Yarmouth, and in Norwich they formed the nucleus of the support for Sir Harbord Harbord and William Windham. Although the conduct of politics at Norwich was largely concerned with local issues, national interests and controversies of a wider significance were not wholly neglected. (18) Like so many Dissenters at this time George Cadogan had every hope that Pitt 'whom we now so much idolize' would prove a worthy son of a worthy father in the Dissenters' cause, and that he would introduce the kind of reforms that would make the House of Commons a true and an effective representative of the people. George Cadogan repeats many of the standard complaints of the time against the injustices and inadequacies of the existing system; there is nothing original in what he says for a great deal of his information together with the complaint that Britain is now a ptococracy, 'a government of beggars', is taken from James Burgh's Political Disquisitions. (19) George Cadogan complains that of the 558 seats in the Commons, 382 are for boroughs and the Cinque Ports and only 131 are for counties. He complains that 50 members are chosen by only 500 votes, and that a majority in the Commons are chosen by as few as 5,600 votes. He complains that Middlesex has only eight members while Cornwall has 44, even though it pays ten times as much land tax. He notes that Old Sarum and Newtown in the Isle of Wight send as many members as London. All this is, of course,

familiar

familiar enough; what is interesting to note is that George Cadogan, concerned as he is with the faithfulness of the representation of the country in the Commons, is more pre-occupied at this point in his career with the mal-distribution of constituencies than he is with the narrowness of the franchise. Since he did not have a vote himself in Parliamentary elections, it would not have been surprising if he had argued for a reform in the franchise, but this was not his main aim and purpose. The reforms he advocated were about re-distributing seats, especially in favour of the urban boroughs; preventing the control of a large number of them by Peers; reducing the number of place-men and pensioners in the Commons, and re-introducing tri-ennial Parliaments. In preferring these objectives he was following the example set by his uncle. Although Price argued that everyone has a 'natural and inalienable right' to participate in the government of his society, and although he envisaged universal suffrage as an essential requirement in a society that enjoyed perfect civil liberty, when he came to consider practical suggestions for reform he gave a much higher priority to securing shorter Parliaments, freeing Members of Parliament from corrupt influences, and securing an equitable distribution of constituencies than he did to extending the franchise. (20)

It is also interesting to note that at this stage in his career there is no hint of George Cadogan's later dissatisfaction with the concept of a balanced constitution, and no hint of the desirability of abolishing the monarchy and all forms of hereditary political privilege. Of course it would have been tactless on George Cadogan's part to have gone beyond the immediate concerns of the meeting he was addressing - to secure support for a moderate measure of parliamentary reform - and the fact that he was silent on other issues does not mean that he did not entertain more radical views. But, nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that there is no evidence extant that at this time he did share the markedly radical views that he held later in his career.

In 1783 George Cadogan married Anne, 'Nancy', Hurry, the daughter of William Hurry, a wealthy merchant at Great Yarmouth, and thus became connected with one of the most prominent Dissenting families in Norfolk. (21) Anne's sister, Priscilla, married Michael Maurice and was the mother of Frederick Denison Maurice. (22) In 1785 George Cadogan left the Octagon Chapel at Norwich to become a minister at Great Yarmouth, but his stay there was not long for in 1787 he moved again, this time to Hackney. Price had been morning preacher at Gravel Pit since 1770, and when his co-pastor William Metcalfe suffered 'a paralytic disorder' in the winter of 1786/7 and had to retire from the ministry, the congregation invited George Cadogan to assist his uncle. He preached his first sermon to the afternoon congregation on 1 April 1787. (23) In the last week of March of that year, Price, whose wife

had

had died in the preceding September, moved from Newington Green to a house in St. Thomas's Square, Hackney, and he was very pleased to have the company of his nephew and family. At Great Yarmouth George Cadogan had kept a school, and when he moved to Hackney he took his pupils with him. Price noted in his journal for 24 June 1787:

I grudge the time and labour which he is obliged to give to the instruction of pupils and am often thinking of schemes for making this unnecessary for him, and for setting him at liberty to employ himself entirely in making sermons and in studying Divinity and Philosophy. (24)

An opportunity to further George Cadogan's career in this way was soon to present itself at New College, Hackney. On 10 March 1786 the Committee of the College invited Price to become a tutor; he was to be responsible for 'select parts of Morals, Mathematics and Philosophy'. (25) He was advised by his friends that at his time of life he would find teaching too onerous, and they proved to be right. Price found that the work lay heavily upon him, and he was very relieved when the Committee allowed George Cadogan to give his lectures whenever he did not feel up to it. On 23 September 1787, Price wrote to the Marquis of Lansdowne:

I have been engaged your Lordship knows, by the solicitations of my friends to consent to be mentioned as a tutor in our Academical institution. This has made it necessary for me to try to do somewhat in this way. But, after drawing up a plan and an account of the subjects on which I chose to assist the studies of the pupils, my spirits revolted, and I have been obliged to request that I might be allowed either to withdraw entirely, or to be consider'd as obliged only to direct and superintend the execution of my plan by my nephew, Mr. George Morgan. The last has been agree'd to and I am now a little easier. (26)

According to one of Price's pupils, Thomas Broadhurst, George Cadogan frequently accompanied his uncle to lectures, (27) but although Price was relieved to have his nephew's help, it did not reconcile him to the duties of his post and he was glad to resign his tutorship in June 1788. (28)

At the beginning of the 1788/89 session, due to the absence of Hugh Worthington, George Cadogan was asked to take the two upper classes in the classics, and when Worthington resigned on 30 September he undertook to continue them for the remainder of the session. Further duties came his way in the same year. On 2 December he was asked to give lectures in 'Natural Philosophy and the higher branches of Mathematics as often as his other engagements will permit - till a Professor can be appointed for this purpose'. He gave these and continued to teach classics throughout the session, and it would appear, throughout the following session as well. But it was all proving too much for him. These duties, in addition to those at Gravel Pit Meeting House and the demands of his own school, were taxing his strength and,

so he decided to give up teaching at the College. In a letter to the Committee, dated 2 April 1790, which hints at some further undisclosed cause of vexation, he explained:

I am truly sorry that the engagements of my own Family compel me at the next Vacation, to resign the Classical Tuition at the New College. My Pride was gratified and prospects of Happiness brightened by the Hope I once formed of uniting the Ability to serve You, with that of managing my other concerns. But I have been disappointed in this hope, by the experience of unexpected Toils and Anxieties and by a serious intrusion upon my Health and Spirits.' (29)

In July 1789 George Cadogan went on a continental tour in the company of Dr. Rigby, a physician from Norwich, Mr. Beddington, and Mr. Olyett Woodhouse. (30) They landed in Calais on the 4th and reached Paris by the 9th. The party were in the capital when the Bastille fell, and George Cadogan stayed up all night to write to his uncle to convey an account of the events of that momentous day. (31) From an extract from this letter which was quoted in an anonymous pamphlet entitled A look to the last century: or, the Dissenters weighed in their own scales, (32) we can see that George Cadogan shared the fervour of the revolutionaries to the full and that he identified the spirit of the Rational Dissenters at home with their spirit:

The spirit of the people in this place is inconceivably great, and has abolished all the proud distinctions which the King and the Nobles had usurped in their minds. Whether they talk of the King, the Nobles, or the Priest, their whole language is that of the most enlightened and liberal amongst the English. (33)

In another letter (34) to Price from Paris which was also quoted in A look to the last century George Cadogan claimed that to see,

A king dragged in submissive triumph by his conquering subjects, was one of those appearances of grandeur which seldom rise in the prospect of human affairs, and which, during the remainder of his life, he should think of with wonder and gratification. (35)

These letters from Paris made a considerable impact upon Price for they seemed to him evidence that his own prophecies were about to be fulfilled, and his own rejoicing echoes his nephew's words even though he moderates the vehemence of his language. In his famous sermon, A discourse on the love of our country he exulted:

I have lived to see Thirty Millions of People, indignant and resolute, spurning at slavery, and demanding liberty with an irresistible voice; their king led in triumph, and an arbitrary monarch surrendering himself to his subjects. (36)

The author of A look to the last century used both of the passages I have quoted from George Cadogan's letters to make a sweeping attack upon Price and Priestley. He wished to show that the Dissenters' campaign for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts masked a much more deep seated attack upon social and political institutions, and that they really sought the disestablishment of the Church (or its replacement by one more congenial to them) and the abolition of the Monarchy and the House of Lords. He even accused the Dissenters of being anarchists:

It cannot but have occurred to the observation of those who have much intercourse with the Dissenters, with what pleasure they contemplate the anarchy and confusions of France, not as tending to restore the liberties which had been infringed (which every friend of liberty must rejoice to see), but as shaking off all authority, and level[ing] all distinctions. (37)

The passages from George Cadogan's letters which I have quoted above were also used by Edmund Burke - indeed the anonymous pamphlet could have been his source - in his attack upon Price in Reflections on the Revolution in France. (38) Burke alleged that Price in his use of the phrase 'their king led in triumph', and George Cadogan (although he does not refer to him by name) in his use of the phrase 'a king dragged in submissive triumph' were both celebrating and exulting in the events of October 1789 when the King, the Queen, and other members of the Royal Family were forced amid scenes of violence and bloodshed to return from Versailles to Paris.

In the brief preface that he wrote to the fourth edition of the Discourse Price claimed that Burke's conjectures were ill-founded. George Cadogan's letters were written in July and so it was impossible that he should have been referring to the events of October and rejoicing in the slaughter that had then occurred. George Cadogan had been concerned with the events of 14 July and subsequent days,

When, after the conquest of the Bastil[le], the King of France sought the protection of the National Assembly, and, by his own desire, was conducted, amidst acclamations never before heard in France, to Paris, there to shew himself to his people as the restorer of their liberty.

Price also claimed that in his sermon he too was concerned not with the events of October but with those that followed the fall of the Bastille, and complained that Burke had conveniently and disingenuously confused the two events in order to show that Price and his sympathizers were 'exulting in the riot and slaughter at Versailles'. (39)

Price retired from the pulpit at Gravel Pit in February 1791, shortly before his death. If it had been his wish that George Cadogan should succeed him as pastor, he was disappointed, for

his



his nephew gave up the ministry and confined his attention to his school which he moved to Southgate in Middlesex. Different accounts have been given as to why he resigned the ministry. According to the Dictionary of National Biography he was 'disappointed of Price's post as preacher'; according to the obituary notice in the Gentleman's Magazine 'he was invited to succeed Price as pastor at Hackney', but he declined it. (40) However this may have been, it is clear that henceforth his school dominated his attention and brought him a considerable amount of success. One of his pupils at Southgate was Sir George Cayley, the future pioneer of aviation. According to Mr. J. Laurence Pritchard, Cayley began his aeronautical experiments while he was at Southgate, 'modifying a simple helicopter apparatus first shown to the French Academy by Launoy and Bienvenu'. (41)

Price died on 19 April 1791 and thus George Cadogan lost the person he regarded as 'his best friend'. Price had begun collecting materials towards an autobiography in the closing years of his life, but he did not complete the work. This George Cadogan took over and in his hands the project grew until he divided it into a biography and a history of the War of American Independence. Death interrupted his labours too, and it was left to William Morgan, George Cadogan's brother, to write the first biography of Price. (42) Although George Cadogan's papers were available to him he had difficulty unravelling his shorthand and much of George Cadogan's work was thus lost. In his will Price made George Cadogan one of his executors and he bequeathed to him, besides some property and money, his library together with his telescope and his other 'philosophical' instruments. (43)

In 1792 George Cadogan published anonymously a pamphlet entitled: An address to the Jacobine and other Patriotic Societies of the French: urging the establishment of a republican form of government. By a native of England, and a Citizen of the World. (44) As he explained in the preface, he had been moved to write the pamphlet by a report that a member of the National Assembly had proposed on 11 August, the day following the suspension of Louis XVI, 'that a Governor of the Prince Royal be appointed'. George Cadogan had become alarmed that the French might retain the monarchy in some form or other. He acknowledged that these apprehensions had been premature, but thought that it was still worthwhile to publish the essay as doing so might help to stiffen the resolve to create a republic.

George Cadogan's essay is a bitter and vehement attack upon all kinds of monarchical and aristocratic institutions, a plea for the abolition of hereditary privileges, and a defence of republicanism and the sovereignty of the people. What is perhaps most striking about this piece is the extent to which his aims and purposes had changed since he made his speech in support of parliamentary reform eight years earlier. From his speech at Norwich we may gather that George Cadogan's chief concern at that time was to support a programme of political reform that would secure the changes needed to make the Commons a more effective

representative

representative of the people. In his advice to the French his ambitions were much more radical - nothing less than the abolition of the monarchy and the destruction of the powers and privileges of an hereditary aristocracy.

On these matters the opinions that he expressed in his pamphlet show a sharp divergence from those embodied in Price's Discourse. To the end of his career Price conceived himself to be a defender of the balanced constitution; he had no wish to remove either the King or the Lords from the Constitution, but rather to remedy the weakness of the Commons by reducing the dependence of its members on the patronage of the Crown. Very largely, Price had viewed the programme of the reforming party in the light of what he took to be the achievements of the Glorious Revolution - securing the natural rights and the freedom of the individual against arbitrary rule. But George Cadogan had no patience with the concepts of limited monarchy, mixed government and the balanced constitution. The claim that the British Constitution of his day was an ideal embodiment of the latter was, he believed, fraudulent. The assumption upon which it depended, namely, that the Peers and the Commons were strong enough to prevent the Monarch acting arbitrarily, was illusory. Monarchy, even in its allegedly limited form could not be tolerated without danger, for nothing could prevent the King attracting to himself the kind of support that would enable him to subvert the Constitution. Experience, even in Britain, the shining exemplar of all that a balanced constitution was supposed to be, had shown how difficult it was to prevent the King acting arbitrarily:

Experience proves that Constitutional Checks can only retard the Evil; and you may rest assured, that your Court, if established, in a very few Years, will manage your Biennial Representatives, with as much Ease as we manage our Septennial Hirelings in England. (45)

The counterpart of George Cadogan's rejection of the balanced constitution is the affirmation of a simple form of republicanism, consisting largely in the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of the people. The abolition of the monarchy and the political privileges of the aristocracy would naturally leave the Commons the sole repository of authority and power, and like many of his contemporaries who entertained a complete faith in the representatives of the people, George Cadogan is quite happy to dispense with all Whiggish restraints upon the exercise of sovereignty. If precautions were needed it would be wiser to seek them in annual parliaments rather than in the traditional devices of the balanced constitution. But the adoption of republicanism was not the only respect in which George Cadogan espoused a more radical stance than his uncle had done. Whereas Price had thought of reform predominantly in political terms, he was content - apart from seeking the disestablishment of the Church - to leave the social structure that supported the existing constitution relatively unchanged. George Cadogan attacked all forms of hereditary privilege and powers much more decisively, and he inveighed against the inequalities of wealth that they

supported.

supported. Although no egalitarian in the modern sense of the term - the abolition of privilege was to prepare the way for securing just rewards for 'merit and talents' - George Cadogan is quite clear that the political reforms he sought would result in far-reaching changes in the social structure of society. Moreover, the abolition of monarchical and aristocratic institutions would facilitate the elimination of waste and extravagance that was a marked feature of court life, and help to foster the virtues which support and are supported by republican institutions.

To the modern mind one of the most striking features of radical thought at the close of the eighteenth century is the naïveté shown by many of George Cadogan's contemporaries - it can be seen in Rousseau, in Paine, in Priestley as well as in Price - touching the probity of the people. George Cadogan seems to have believed that all that was needed to purify the political scene was to remove the pernicious influences of the monarchical and aristocratic elements in society. The way would then be clear for the inherent virtue of the people to shine forth; it needed only the elimination of monarchs and aristocrats to make it possible for all individuals and all sections of society to seek the public good in a spirit of peace and harmony, and if only the kings and nobles would leave the stage all the nations of the earth could live together in perfect amity.

Like Joseph Priestley, George Cadogan minimizes the legitimate functions of government. Since it is always a temptation to those in power to waste the substance of the people, the functions of government should be reduced to those required by the need to prevent injury, that is, to resist aggression from abroad and the invasion of natural rights at home.

Even though there is not enough evidence to establish in detail what George Cadogan's political views were at this time, and even though for this reason speculation must be tentative, it is interesting to ask why there was what seems to have been a dramatic change in his opinions in the period from 1784 to 1792, and to ask why he moves from an unquestioning acceptance of the balanced constitution to a simple and straightforward assertion of the absolute, unlimited, sovereignty of the people. One reason lies in the instability, if not the inconsistency, of the constitutional theory defended by leaders of Rational Dissent like Price and Priestley. Priestley for the greater part of his career, and Price for the whole of his, thought of themselves as defenders of the balanced constitution. In that respect they were, essentially, Whigs. But at the same time they asserted both that the source of all political authority lies in the people, and that the people through their representatives, had the unquestioned right not only to check abuses but also to remedy deficiencies in the Constitution. The only way in which to make this position fully coherent - if in fact it can be made so - is to assume that although the people have an undoubted right to fashion the Constitution as they please, they will in their wisdom choose to retain the forms of a mixed government and the balanced constitution. This position proved to be unstable for several reasons: partly on account of its complexity (for polemical purposes and in the heat and excitement of controversy there was a temptation to simplify it into a bare assertion of the unlimited sovereignty of the people); partly because it attempts to reconcile two conflicting bases of political authority, namely,

election

election and hereditary privilege; and partly because frustration at several failures to secure reform led the radicals to insist more and more emphatically upon the people's right to effect it. The inherent instability of the stance adopted by moderate reformers and the emergence of a more radical view can be illustrated by comparing Priestley's Familiar letters to the inhabitants of Birmingham which was published in 1790 with his A political dialogue on the general principles of government which was published in the following year. In the former he recounts a discussion he had with Dr. Jackson, Dean of Christ Church:

In a conversation I had last summer, at which Dr. Jackson... was present, I maintained the importance of three different powers in every well balanced state, with so much earnestness, that, with great good humour, he and the rest of the company rallied me as being a trinitarian in politics, though an unitarian in religion. On this question I always took the part of Mr. Adams against Dr. Franklin, who was a favourer of a republican government...

I scruple not to say that I think the power of the crown to be at present much too great; but this does not affect my idea of the real use of a king. I am an enemy to the HIERARCHY, not only as antichristian, but as a great means of giving the crown the undue influence it now has; in consequence of which the court can carry almost whatever measures they please. (46)

In the latter Priestley argues:

In every state as in every single person, there ought to be but one will, and no important business should be prevented from proceeding by any opposite will. (47)

It is quite likely that George Cadogan's political views were influenced by Priestley's: it is known that among the projects left unfinished at the time of his death was a work on chemistry in which he defended the theory of phlogiston, and it may well be that he paid the same respect to Priestley's non-scientific writings. Moreover in the year preceding the publication of George Cadogan's pamphlet he would have had several opportunities for meeting Priestley in person. Priestley was a pall-bearer at Price's funeral at Bunhill Fields on 26 April, and he delivered the memorial address to Price at the Old Gravel Pit Meeting House on 1 May. In September Priestley took up residence at Hackney when he succeeded Price as morning preacher at the Old Gravel Pit Meeting House, the post Price hoped that George Cadogan would fill, and throughout the winter George Cadogan would have had opportunities to discuss political matters with Priestley and to be impressed with the latter's more utilitarian conception of the people's right 'to frame a government for themselves'. But there were, no doubt, other influences at work, notably the writings of Thomas Paine, both parts of whose The Rights of Man had been published before George Cadogan wrote his pamphlet. On one occasion, which I have not been able to date, George Cadogan met Paine at a supper given by the students at New College, Hackney. A friend of Charles Wellbeloved, a student at the College, left the following account:

Johnson told me that Paine was much pleased with the invitation, and would wait on us. We asked George Morgan to meet him, and had the most glorious republican party that the walls of the College ever contained. We sat down to supper, eighteen or nineteen, and were very agreeably disappointed to find Paine as agreeable and striking in conversation as he is in his writings. (48)

The correspondences between Paine's writings at this period and George Cadogan's essay are close: the same opposition to monarchy, aristocracy and the court, the same trenchant dismissal of the concepts of mixed government and the balanced constitution, the same opposition to hereditary privilege, the same affirmation of the principles of equality and 'la carrière ouverte aux talents', the same minimalist conception of the functions of government, and the same passionate desire to remove the burdens laid on the poor by the rich.

Paine did not carry his hostility towards the monarchy to the person of the King - on the contrary, he became renowned for his courageous attempt to prevent the execution of Louis XVIth. Neither did George Cadogan seek the death of the King; the fate he would have reserved for Louis was to retire him like Demetrius Poliocertes - 'in some distant, but safe Enclosure, he should sport and fatten amongst his Stags'. (49)

George Cadogan's chief publication in science was his Lectures on Electricity, a digest of the lectures he had given at Hackney. It was published in two volumes in Norwich in 1794, and a second edition appeared in 1795. A translation into German was published in Leipzig in 1798. The preface is interesting to the student of politics because it contains a warm tribute to Benjamin Franklin whom George Cadogan revered both as a leader in the development of science and as a founder of republican institutions. Perhaps he was influenced by Turgot's epigram: Eripuit caelo fulmen sceptrum que tyrannis, (50) for in his mind the achievements of the scientist and the republican were fused. The displacement of mythical explanations of the source of lightning and the overthrow of monarchy were the product of the same questing intelligence exposing the impostures of fraud and oppression:

Let every art reach the fullest maturity which reason can give it, when cultivated by the leisure and education of myriads improving through successive centuries; and amongst the highest objects of its praise, will not eminence belong to the example and intellectual greatness of Benjamin Franklin, who, when he had wrenched the thunderbolt from the grasp of tyranny and fraud, enrolled himself among the heroes and patriots of his country, chased away the minions and mercenaries of oppression, and amongst the ruins accumulated by despotism in the fury of its dying hour, established the first free community that ever blest the eyes of men. (51)

But

But although George Cadogan acknowledged the eminence of Franklin's experimental genius, he was not uncritical either of his theoretical hypotheses, or of his practical recommendations. Whereas Franklin postulated both an attractive and a repulsive force, George Cadogan laboured to show that 'an attractive force alone is sufficient to account for all the phenomena of charged electrics', (52) and his recommendations for the construction of lightning conductors were markedly different from Franklin's. For the protection of houses he advocated the use of lead strips  $\frac{1}{4}$ " thick and 2" wide under all the partition walls, continued up the sides of the house, around the base of the first floor and then up to the top of each chimney. (53)

To some of the alleged benefits of the uses of electricity, however, he remained sceptical. He wrote at length of Ingenhousz's experiments which confirmed doubts about the claims that electricity can be used to make plants grow more abundantly, (54) and, as the following passage makes clear, he did not altogether accept the claims made for the use of electricity in medicine:

If the charge, sent through the diaphragm, be small, it never fails to excite a violent fit of laughter...I have made the trial on those whose calmness and solemnity are never disturbed by the ludicrous occurrences of life; but I have scarcely known the instance in which they could resist the comic effects of electricity. If the charge be set through the abdomen, so as to make the bladder and the rectum in its passage, it produces in many cases an instantaneous discharge of the urine and the faeces. Some electricians have asserted that the most obstinate costiveness may be thus conquered. I have myself been witness to the removal of female obstructions of long duration. Indeed, the effects of the charge on women or irritable habits, are so very sudden, that most distressing catastrophes, even in large companies, have attended the improper direction of it. It was the conceit of an impudent empyric, that electricity could restore the vigour which nature takes away from the intemperate, and could make the bed of profligate effeminacy prolific. To the stimulants of a Mahometan paradise, he proposed the addition of an atmosphere charged with electric particles, and this proposal was privately defended by many persons of information, as perfectly philosophical. I should for my own part as soon expect a flame from exhausted embers, as the spirit of a man from a system mangled and unnerved by vice. (55)

George Cadogan died on 17 November 1798. (56) It is said that he inhaled some poison while conducting a chemical experiment, and that this led to a pulmonary consumption which was the cause of his death. He was survived by his wife, Anne, and eight children, seven sons and one daughter. The daughter, Sarah Price Morgan (1784-1817?), married Luke Ashburner and went to India

with

with him. Two of George Cadogan's sons, Edmund and William Asbthurner Morgan, became solicitors to the East India Company in Bombay; another son, Richard Price Morgan, died in America after a career in engineering. (57)

As I have noted George Cadogan's early death prevented the completion of his work on chemistry and of his history of the War of American Independence. More grievously it deprived us of his biography of Richard Price. Had this been available we should now have a much clearer idea of the extent to which George Cadogan was in sympathy with his uncle's political philosophy, a much sharper delineation of those respects in which his own political philosophy became much more radical in the last decade of his life, and, in all probability, we should have a fuller account of the reasons why Price approved the opening events of the French Revolution.

THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF WALES,  
ABERYSTWYTH.

1. J. Foster, Alumni Oxoniensis 1715-1886, III (1888). I am indebted to Dr. D. A. Rees of Jesus College, Oxford, for this reference.
2. D.N.B.
3. Monthly Magazine, XXXIX (1798), 475-480. The whole of the article from which this passage is taken is included as a preface in G. C. Morgan, Directions for the use of a scientific table in the collection and application of knowledge (London, 1826).
4. See Llandaff Probate Records, National Library of Wales. Deed of Administration, Sarah Morgan et al., 6 Oct. 1772.
5. William Morgan, Memoirs of the life of the Rev. Richard Price, D.D.F.R.S. (London, 1815), 27.
6. Op.cit., 43-44.
7. Caroline E. Williams, A Welsh family, 2nd edn. (London, 1893), 52-3.
8. John and Edward Taylor, History of the Octagon Chapel, Norwich (London, 1848), 46.
9. See William Field, Memoirs of the life, writings, and opinions of the Rev. Samuel Parr. LL.D., 2 vols. (London, 1828), I, 142. 'In the fly-leaf of... /George Cadogan's Lectures on Electricity/ in Dr. Parr's Library is inserted the following note: "Morgan was a very acute and very enlightened man...he was Dr. Parr's intimate acquaintance at Norwich. S.P."' (Ibid. 142n.)
10. D.N.B.
11. See The Critical Review, vol. 51 (1781), 455-61. This review is reprinted as an appendix in G. C. Morgan, An appeal to the public in answer to a letter from Mr. Brand (Norwich, 1782)
12. 2 vols. (London, 1781).
13. See n.11.
14. Brand had accused Price of falsifying statistics concerning the amount of gold coin in circulation. He maintained that the amount of gold coin in the kingdom was £30 millions, and that Price had known this to be so, having been given the relevant information by Mr. Alcon, Deputy Assay-Master in the Tower. George Cadogan showed that the first of these assertions was false, and to disprove the latter quoted a letter in which Price had written, 'The story you mention is all false; no account has been ever sent me by the Deputy Assay-master of the Tower, nor is it possible to be sure (as you say) that he proved to the Treasury and the Bank Directors, that there are 30 Millions of gold coin in the kingdom.' The other allegation that George Cadogan defended Price against was Brand's claim that Price had given only one reason why 'it is better to borrow at high rather than low interest'. (G. C. Morgan, An appeal to the public, 19 and 10.) For George Cadogan's spirited defence of Price against Gilbert Wakefield's charge that he was illiterate see The theological and miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley, ed. J. T. Rutt (25 vols., London, 1817-31), XX, 308n.



15. Op.cit., LXXV (1785), part 1, 190-212.
16. Caroline E. Williams, 84.
17. The following speech was delivered by the Rev. G. C. Morgan at an assembly of the freemen, freeholders, and other inhabitants of the City and County of the City of Norwich. Convened on the 4th of March, by public advertisement from the sheriffs, to take into consideration, the propriety of addressing Parliament on the subject of a reform, in the representation of the people [Norwich, 1784]. I am indebted to the Houghton Library, Harvard, for sending me a copy of this document.
18. Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The House of Commons, 3 vols. (H.M.S.O., 1964), I, 342.
19. 3 vols. (London, 1774-5), I, 22-50. It is quite likely that George Cadogan met Burgh when he was staying with his uncle in 1773, for Burgh was a member of Price's congregation at Newington Green.
20. Richard Price, Additional observations (London, 1777), 42-43.
21. See Sir William P. Elderton, 'Some family connections of William Morgan (1750-1833), F.R.S.', The Genealogists' Magazine, vol. 12, no. 10 (June, 1957), 336-7.
22. Michael Maurice (b. 1766) was educated at Hoxton and New College, Hackney. Before he left New College in 1787 he had become a Unitarian. In 1792 he was appointed afternoon preacher at Old Gravel Pit Meeting House at Hackney; at that time Joseph Priestley was the morning preacher there.
23. 'Richard Price's Journal', MS. (shorthand), National Library of Wales.
24. Ibid.,
25. Resolutions and proceedings, relating to the establishment of a new academical institution among Protestant Dissenters in the vicinity of London in the year 1786 published as an appendix to A. Kippis, A sermon preached...on Wednesday the 26th of April 1786 (London, 1786).
26. MS. Bowood.
27. The Christian Reformer, XV (1848), 172. See also H. McLachlan. 'The Old Hackney College, 1786-1796', T.U.H.S., III, no. 3, (1925), 190.
28. 'Richard Price's Journal'.
29. 'Hackney College Minutes', Dr. Williams's Library, MS. RNC. 38.14.
30. Caroline E. Williams, 96ff.
31. This letter was published in The Gazetteer for 13 Aug. 1789. I have not been able to trace a copy of this issue of the newspaper nor a copy of that referred to in n.32.
32. London, 1790.
33. Op.cit., 122-3.
34. This letter was published in The Gazetteer for 14 Sept. 1789. see n.29 above.
35. Ibid., 122.
36. Op.cit., 2nd edn. (London, 1789), 49.
37. Op.cit., 120-21.
38. Op.cit., 2nd edn. (London, 1790), 97n. 128-9n.

39. Op.cit., 4th edn. iv, and v.
40. Op.cit., LXVIII (1798), 1144.
41. J. Laurence Pritchard, Sir George Cayley (London, 1961), 7 and 18-20. I am indebted to Mr. T. L. Watkins for drawing my attention to George Cadogan's links with Cayley.
42. See n.5 above.
43. MS. American Philosophical Society.
44. The place of publication is not given on the title page. It is interesting to note that George Cadogan, though born at Bridgend, thought of himself as an Englishman (as Price did). On the use of the phrase 'Citizen of the World' see Richard Price, A discourse, 10, and Thomas J. Schlereth, The cosmopolitan ideal in Enlightenment thought (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), passim.
45. Op.cit., 18, 19.
46. Op.cit. (Birmingham, 1790), part iv, letter viii, 12.
47. Op.cit. (London, 1791), 96.
48. John Kenrick, A biographical memoir of the late Rev. Charles Wellbeloved (London, 1860), 22.
49. An address to the Jacobine and other patriotic societies of the French, 46.
50. See Schlereth, 42, 190. 'He seized lightning from the sky and the sceptre from tyrants.'
51. Ip.cit., xxxviii-xxxix.
52. Ibid., I, 112.
53. Ibid., II, 296.
54. Ibid., II, 386ff.
55. Ibid., II, 246.
56. Foster, loc. cit.
57. Elderton, 337.

THE AUCTION SALE CATALOGUE (1796) OF THE LIBRARY  
OF ANDREW KIPPIS, 'LITERARY ORNAMENT OF THE DISSENTERS'.

GWYN WALTERS

Not all book-collectors were great readers. The collections, for example, of Richard Heber (1773-1833) and Sir Thomas Phillipps (1792-1872) of Middle Hill were on such a scale that the buyers could not possibly have read more than a small fraction of their purchases. For them and others (it would be true of the Rawlinsons and the Harleys) the time consumed and fever generated in amassing libraries precluded that necessary aura of tranquillity which fostered sustained reading. But there were exceptions; Horace Walpole certainly read and used the books he housed at Strawberry Hill, (1) and William Beckford (1759-1844), author of Vathek, was an even more exotic exception. (2) After purchasing the historian Edward Gibbon's library in 1797 Beckford is reported to have travelled to Lausanne in 1802 (where Gibbon's books were stored), 'shut himself up with his books for six weeks, and read himself nearly blind'. Avoiding participation in the high-price mania epitomised by the Roxburghe sale of 1812, Beckford's life at Fonthill from 1800 was characterised by isolation and reliance on reading: 'reading, not vanity-books for me' he wrote to William Clarke his English book agent. After travel books (the attraction for Beckford in the Duc de la Valliere's sale in Paris in 1784, and in purchasing Gibbon's Library) his major interests were books of history, biography and memoirs. This aligns the Fonthill collections, however incongruous the idea of coupling Beckford and a staid dissenting divine, with the library collected somewhat earlier by Andrew Kippis, editor-in-chief of the revised edition of the monumental Biographia Britannica. The link with the biographical strength of the Beckford library is indeed only one point of coincidence, for Kippis too was a prodigious reader - over a period of three years, he confessed to Alexander Chalmers (1759-1834), his reading consumed sixteen hours of every day. (3)

The sale of Kippis's Library was effected by Leigh and Sotheby at their auction house in York Street, Covent Garden. (4) The first, and major, sale was on 6 April 1796 and five succeeding days, in 1365 lots covering 'English and foreign history, English biography, Voyages and Travels, Divinity, Philosophy, Belles Lettres, Arts and Sciences, Poetry, Miscellanies and other branches of Literature'. The catalogue description, thus, was a fair indication of the library content. The second sale, which, again undertaken by Leigh and Sotheby at the same location, was three years later, commenced on 15 May 1799 and embraced 1295 lots. Now, however, only 'the reserved part of Dr. Kippis's Library' was sold, but apart from certain obvious lots it is not possible to distinguish Kippis's books from those of the other persons whose books were sold in the same sale. These were John Bramston of

Northamptonshire,

Northamptonshire, and William Melmoth, the younger (1710-1799), a commissioner of bankrupts who knew Mrs. Thrale at Bath and who published translations of Pliny and Cicero.

The basic facts of Kippis's life and publications can easily be digested in the Dictionary of National Biography and the British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books. His death elicited the expected flurry of obituary tributes in the Gentleman's Magazine and the St. James's Chronicle, (5) and useful detail can be extracted from the otherwise too wordy funeral sermon preached at the Meeting House in Prince's Street, Westminster on 18 October, 1795 by Abraham Rees, and the address delivered, again by Rees, at the interment in Bunhill Fields on 15 October. A 'chronological account' of the publications of Kippis and Rees concludes the printed issue of the sermon and address.

The auction catalogue of 1796 is not only a vivid documentary device for assessing the polymathic ambience which adhered to Kippis and his circle (and for gauging the intellectual temper of the English Enlightenment) but is in itself, with its ancillary apparatus of buyers and prices paid, an important artefact of book trade history. Yet it will scarcely be necessary here to over-analyse each aspect of the library. 'C.L.M.', the obituarist in the St. James's Chronicle who referred to Kippis as 'the literary ornament of the Dissenters', joined others in his praise of Kippis's classical erudition. Quite apart from the traditionally necessary classical knowledge for his own ministerial training (he was singled out for his classical propensities at Sleaford Grammar School, and under Dr. Doddridge at the Northampton academy) Kippis was for some twenty years a classical and philological tutor in the Coward Academy at Hoxton. The catalogue indicates that for the most part the classics he owned were from the 17th century presses of Elzevir, Plantin and Blaeu, or with the 18th imprints of London, Oxford and Glasgow (Foulis) presses. Equally obvious in the catalogue are those historical and comparative studies pertaining to his role as a divine.

The first thirty lots in the sale contained classified parcels of tracts which are virtually a microcosm of Kippis's world of knowledge and interest. Some of these labels we could anticipate: 'theological', 'dissenting sermons', 'Priestley's sermons', 'On the Test Act' and 'Priestley, Price and Tucker's Tracts'. Two parcel lots were marked 'political' and 'American politics', a reflection of the interest which prompted Kippis to write Considerations on the provisional treaty with America (1783). He had known most of the literary men of the period 1745-1795 personally and we can safely predict that tracts contained in a group of parcels labelled 'Poetry and plays', 'critical literature', 'poetical', and 'miscellanies, poetry &c.' would today be of extravagant value and rarity. Lot 15 was a parcel 'Relating to Dr. Johnson', testimony to Johnson's dramatic appeal to his contemporaries. Lot 9 was a parcel of 'Biography'. Following the parcels of tracts were lots of periodical sets, to some of which Kippis was a notable contributor. His 'History of

Knowledge,

Knowledge, learning and taste in Great Britain' was prefixed to the New Annual Register, and the sections 'History of Ancient Literature' and 'Review of Modern Books' were initially written by him.

The most important single group of works in the sale catalogue must inevitably be those collective and individual biographies which Kippis used as reference material for his great labours on the revised Biographia Britannica. (6) Chalmers, one of his obituarists, reported that Kippis 'read entirely through the General Dictionary in ten volumes, folio; this, he (Kippis) added, laid the foundation of his taste and skill in biographical composition'. It is no surprise that the work alluded to appears as lot 1116 in the 1796 catalogue: 'Bayle's General Dictionary, by Sale 10v'. Disappointing in one respect is the paucity of biographical works which are noted as containing MS notes by Kippis, although this may be due to descriptive inadequacies in the catalogue. Only two such works appear, lot 627, 'Life of Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (with MS. notes by Dr. Kippis, large paper)' - sold, significantly, to Augustus Henry Fitzroy, 3rd Duke of Grafton, a defender of unitarianism, and lot 675 in the subsequent sale of 1799: 'Biographia Britannica by Kippis, with his MS. corrections...interleaved, 10v', sold to the bookseller Robinson for £8-8s. There were, in all, in excess of sixty volumes of collective biography, ranging from such obvious works as Dugdale's Baronage, Collins's Peerage, and Walpole's Catalogue of royal and noble authors to works of regional allusion, Prince's Worthies of Devon, and Crawford's Lives and characters of the officers of the Crown of Scotland. There were, too, several literary and academic biographical dictionaries and such specialised compilations as Ballard's Memoirs of British ladies and Calamy's Account of ejected ministers. Individual biographies were more numerous, ranging from major works such as Carte's Life of James, Duke of Ormond and Chalmer's Life of Ruddiman to an array of mainly political, literary and religious biographies. Here, as elsewhere in the catalogue, duplicates keep turning up. There were, for example, two copies (lots 533 and 746) of Lewis's Life of Wycliffe, but interpretation of one as a working copy would be mere surmise. The numerous second copies may well have been gifts of friends and colleagues having knowledge of his editorial labours.

Providing necessary ancillary material to the purely-biographical works was a well-chosen collection of the available historical and topographical literature relating to Britain. These were mostly in 18th century editions, Kippis not appearing to have the disposition to collect pre-1700 imprints in the manner of a committed antiquary - Wharton's Anglia sacra 2v. (1691) being one of the few 17th century works in this category. This chronological restriction of imprint still allowed him to possess the really major works: Bede, Leland, Camden, Tanner, Hearne, Clarendon, Hume. Scottish histories, too, were present in strength, including those by Buchanan, Pinkerton, Smith, Ridpath, Guthrie and Dalrymple; and British regional topographies were epitomized

by works such as Gale's Winchester (1723), Bentham's Antiquities of Ely (1771) and Whitaker's Manchester 2v. (1773). Nor were non-British histories neglected: Gibbon and Kennett informed him of the Roman past, and Kippis's American sympathies are reflected by possession of works such as Gordon's History of the American War 4v. (1788), Ramsay's History of the American Revolution 2v. (1793) and Hutchinson's History of Massachussets Bay 3v. (1769). The East was represented by Orme's Indostan 2v. (1789) and Dow's History of Hindostan 2v. (1770).

We have already noted the special lot in the 1799 catalogue which itemised Kippis's own copy, interleaved and annotated, of the Biographia Britannica. Other copies of his works were also present in the 1796 catalogue: The life of Captain James Cook (1788), his edition of Doddridge's Course of Lectures, and his Life of Doddridge prefixed to the 7th edition of the Family Expositor (1792). Of more significance, however, are the appearance of the works of his colleagues. We have had occasion to note that two of the parcels of tracts in the early lots were labelled 'Priestley's sermons' and 'Priestley, Price and Tucker's Tracts'. Elsewhere in the catalogue are twenty-two works by or concerning Priestley, four by Price, Furneaux's Letters to Blackstone (1772), and Vindiciae Priestleianae by Lindsey (1788). Neither was the Scottish Enlightenment neglected; indeed it is represented by one of the strongest collections in the catalogue, and the several works of James Burnett (Lord Monboddo), Henry Home (Lord Kames), David Hume, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, James Beattie, Thomas Reid, Hugh Blair, Francis Hutcheson and George Campbell are a convincing testimony to Kippis's regard for the stimulation of his Northern mentors.

Abraham Rees stated (7) that the studies in which Kippis most excelled were the classics, belles lettres and history, and one would scarcely argue the point. But he certainly had a familiarity with the field of science. We must not forget that he became a Fellow of the Royal Society and that his Observations on the late contests in the Royal Society (1786) was a potent force in allaying contemporary animosities in the Society. It is not surprising that he possessed the histories of that body by Sprat and Birch, or that he was interested in the precursors of the Society - for he owned Ward's Lives of the professors of Gresham College (1740). Just before his death he had acquired the first volume, in two parts, of Charles Hutton's Mathematical and philosophical dictionary (1795). The imprints of his scientific books were as with his historical works, predominantly of the 18th century; Bishop Wilkins's Essay towards a real character (1668) and Sibbald's Scotia illustrata (1684) were isolated examples of 'Restoration' science. There were works on astronomy (Ferguson), chemistry (Wilson), anatomy (Hunter), botany (Pulteney), medicine (Black) and physiology (Crawford), and in a broader philosophical context were works such as Burnet's Theory of the earth 2v. (1710) and Gouget's Origins of the arts and sciences 3v. (1761). The usage

of the term 'Arts' normally meant, in the 18th century, the mechanical arts, but Kippis was also equipped with surveys of the arts as we use that term today. There was the almost obligatory History of music 5v. (1776) by Hawkins, and Horace Walpole's Anecdotes of painting in England with his Catalogue of engravers; and on a more utilitarian note were compilations such as Bromley's Catalogue of engraved British portraits (1793) and Berry's Account of the pictures at the Adelphi (1783).

What were Kippis's books in English Literature? Not, for one thing, in the antiquarian mould, for the 17th century editions comprised only Sidney's Arcadia (1613), Browne's Religio medici (1689) and Bacon's Essays (1696). Swift, Sterne, Pope, Smollett and Gray found favour with him, and there were 18th century editions of Chaucer, Milton, Crashaw and Cowley. The official obituary notice on Kippis in The Gentleman's Magazine referred to his style as 'having been formed on the models of Sir William Temple and the classical Addison'; and the Works of both authors are listed in the sale catalogue, Addison's in Baskerville's four volume edition of 1761. Shakespeare's Plays he possessed in the edition of 1788 by Steevens and Johnson; and he saw fit to collect the associated contemporary literature, the Remarks of the cantankerous Joseph Ritson and Farmer's Essay on the learning of Shakespeare (1767). Like many of his literary contemporaries he was aware of the great body of minor English verse awaiting discovery. Percy's Reliques was oddly absent, but Ritson's Collection of English songs 3v. (1783) and Pinkerton's Scottish tragic ballads (1781) are indicative of the genre. All Johnson's works are present with the notable exception of Rasselas; and to these were added Piozzi's Anecdotes (1786) and her edition of his letters (1788), and Hawkins's Life (1787).

A fuller picture of Kippis as a bookman emerges by noting that he collected, too, those catalogues of manuscripts essential for an appreciation of our national literature; thus Ayscough's catalogue of British Museum manuscripts, the catalogue of manuscripts in the Cottonian Library, and Nasmith's catalogue of Corpus Christi manuscripts, allied to the possession of those seminal works on contemporary literature and bibliography which we associate with the names of Bowyer, Nicholas, Astle and Ames, serve to remind us that Kippis looked seriously on his book-collecting. Other sale catalogues owned by a collector are often missing in an auction catalogue, for they are ephemeral by nature and at best subsumed in anonymous 'parcels'. Two only appear in Kippis's sale, but each are of interest. One was the sale of the Library of the notorious Maffao Pinelli of Venice, the other of Antony Collins, a friend of Locke and author of Discourse of freethinking (1713).

We have noted that the second sale of Kippis's Library in 1799 was that of 'the reserved part' of his collections, and that the annotated and inter-leaved Biographia Britannica is almost the only lot which can without doubt be ascribed to him, since there is no demarcation of lots between the three collectors whose books are

amalgamated in this sale. Nevertheless certain early lots, parcels again, are very reminiscent of the Kippis parcels in the 1796 sale, and still other entries, notably biographical dictionaries, are likely to be Kippis's. But there is often a pretty point of confusion. Kippis, for instance, had spent some five years at the Northampton academy under Dr. Doddridge. Are we to assume that interest in Northamptonshire occasioned his buying or obtaining lot 1291, Brydges's Antiquities of Northamptonshire 2v. (1791), and lot 1293, Morton's Natural history of Northamptonshire (1712), or are we to assume that they belonged to the person designated on the title page of the catalogue as 'John Bramston, Esq. of Northamptonshire', And are the classical works the property of Kippis, or of William Melmoth, 'translator of Cicero, Pliny &c.'?

The sum realized at the sale of 1796 was not unduly large, £519 16s., but the high price boom was not yet in focus. Certainly the book trade was present in great strength. It is not possible, from the practice of noting buyers by surname only, to be definitive about many of the names in the annotated copies at the British Museum, but the following booksellers were certainly present:- (8)

Thomas Lewis, of Great Russell Street, whose father was at school with Alexander Pope.

John Priestly, of High Holborn.

John Cuthel, of Holborn, notable for his medical and general science catalogues.

Peter Floyer, of Holborn.

Thomas Combe, of Chancery Lane.

Thomas Evans, of Paternoster Row.

William Duncan, of Chancery Lane.

Thomas Sabine, of Shoe Lane.

George Leigh, of Leigh and Sotheby, whose snuff-box was part of the rhetoric and mechanics of auctioneering.

Benjamin (or John) White, successors to the elder White of Horace's Head, Fleet Street.

John Marsom, of High Holborn.

S. Sael, wholesale antiquarian bookseller and publisher of moral tracts.

Edmund Winstanley, of St. Giles.

John Walker, of Paternoster Row.

More interesting, perhaps, were the private collectors at the sale. The aristocracy was represented by Lord Henry Petty of the Lansdowne-Shelburne dynasty, and by the 3rd Duke of Grafton (Augustus Henry Fitzroy), First Lord of the Treasury from 1766 to 1770, and a defender of unitarianism. Collectors of a more exotic bibliographical hue were: Isaac Gossett, the Lepidus of Dibdin's Bibliomania; Thomas Astle, antiquary and palaeographer, and Keeper of Records in the Tower; Maxwell Garthshore, physician, and friend of the great John Hunter; Richard Gough, the antiquary; Joseph Ritson, antiquary and textual critic.



The most prolific buyer present was the legendary Richard Heber (1773-1833) whose collections eventually, it is estimated, topped 150,000 volumes, housed at eight separate establishments at home and abroad. Heber's first introduction to the auction rooms was at the Pinelli sale in 1789 at the age of fifteen. (9) Early confining himself to the classical field, he later became a specialised collector of literature of the Tudor and Stuart periods, the fields of Farmer, Steevens and Malone. By 1795 (at the age of 21) he was the intimate of expert collectors - Gossett, Bindley and Routh. He was aged 22 at the time of the Kippis sale and his purchases were, this once, rather miscellaneous, and he bought some eighty lots. It was said of him, in these early years, that he was 'a liberal purchaser of sixpenny articles'. There are examples of his sixpenny purchases in the sale of 1796:

- (lot 79) Odes of Anacreon, by Urquhart (1787)
- (lot 164) Stockdale's Nature and Genuine Laws of Poetry (1778)
- (lot 177) Rennell on the Rate of Travelling, as performed by Camels.
- (lot 301) Kennet's Funeral Sermon on William Duke of Devonshire (1708)
- (lot 333) Characters (1777)
- (lot 373) Noble's Genealogical History of the Royal Families of History (1781).

At the other extreme he could give £2. 7s. for Howard's Account of Lazarettos in Europe (Warrington, 1789). The 1796 catalogue poses one intriguing problem in relation to Heber's interests. While still an undergraduate at Brasenose College he issued his own small octavo edition of Silius Italicus, printed by Bulmer at the charge of R. Faulder. (10) It was essentially based on Drakenborch's text, and this text in the Utrecht edition of 1717, 'full of MS notes' (Kippis's?) was lot 1079 in the Kippis sale. There is an undecipherable annotation by a Sotheby clerk alongside, but no indication of purchaser. Could it have gone to Heber, to whom its attractions would have been manifest? The catalogue, in short, has interests for the book trade which vie with its documentary importance for the life and intellectual milieu of Kippis and his circle.

1. W. S. Lewis, Horace Walpole's Library (Cambridge, 1958) is explicit on this point.
2. Anthony Hobson, 'William Beckford's Library', The Connoisseur, April 1976, 298-305.
3. Gent. Mag., LXVI (1795), part ii, 803-5.
4. The British Museum copies of the two sales are S.-C.S.28 (9.) and S.-C.S. 34. (5.)
5. Gent. Mag.: the tribute by Alexander Chalmers (supra n.3) and the official obituary notice on pp.882-883; St. James's Chronicle (1795), a tribute by 'C.L.M.', reprinted in Gent. Mag., LXVI (1795), part ii, 805-6.
6. Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. G. B. Hill, rev. L. F. Powell (Oxford, 1971), III, 174. Boswell referred to the Biographia as 'this literary Temple of Fame' and records that Johnson had declined the Editorship, which he 'afterwards regretted'.
7. Abraham Rees, Sermon (1795), 46.
8. Ian Maxted, The London Book Trades 1775-1800 (1977) is the primary source.
9. A.N.L. Munby, 'Father and son: Richard Heber's bibliomania', The Library, 5th ser., XXXI, No. 3, 181-187 gives a vivid portrait of Heber's early collecting phase.
10. Munby, op.cit., enlarges on Heber's early zest for textual editing.

THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF WALES,  
ABERYSTWYTH.

A CHECKLIST OF THE PUBLISHED WORKS OF RICHARD PRICE

P. A. L. JONES and D. O. THOMAS

The publication of this checklist is a preliminary step in an attempt to produce a comprehensive bibliography of the works of Richard Price. As will be noticed there are some gaps in our information - chiefly concerning editions we have been unable to locate - and we hope that our readers will be able to fill some of these. We should be glad to hear of any copies of items for which we have fewer than three locations in the United Kingdom.

The main difficulties for Price's bibliographer arise in connection with the two pamphlets he wrote in support of the rebels during the War of American Independence, Observations on the nature of civil liberty and Additional observations which were also published together under the title Two tracts. The bibliography of the first of these pamphlets is complicated by some unusual features. Fifteen impressions of the work were issued in London, all except the last in 1776. They fall into three groups: the original edition published by Cadell at two shillings and two cheap editions; one in octavo issued at first without name of printer or publisher and then by Dilly and Cadell; the other in duodecimo issued first by Cadell and Johnson and then by Cadell, Dilly and Johnson. The numbering of the cheap editions is not independent of the numbering of the more expensive editions: as far as we know it began with the cheap edition designated 'sixth'. There are 'sixth' and 'seventh' editions in both the standard and the cheap series but it appears that the only 'eighth' edition published in London is the two shilling version. Again, it cannot be assumed that an edition bearing a higher number appeared later than an edition bearing a lower number: there is evidence to suggest that the ninth edition in the cheaper format appeared before the seventh in the more expensive one, and that the eleventh in the cheaper format appeared before the eighth in the other.

What seems to have happened, as far as we have been able to unravel the tangle, is this. The early editions of the pamphlet were produced in the more expensive, two shilling format. They sold quickly, and by 12 March 1776, barely five weeks after the appearance of the first edition, Price was signing the preface for the fifth. To get an even better circulation it was thought advisable to issue the pamphlet in a cheaper form, and the first edition of this series appeared un-numbered and without the names of either printer or publisher. But when the City of London honoured Price with the Freedom of the City 'as grateful testimony of the approbation of this Court for his late pamphlet', Cadell and Dilly put their names to the cheaper editions and they started numbering them. The first of these they called the sixth. But

the

the fact that a cheaper edition had been labelled the sixth did not deter Cadell from also calling the next edition he published in the more expensive series the sixth. Publishers in Dublin and Edinburgh, however, took the existence of the cheaper edition into account when they labelled their reprints the '8th edition', and, oddly enough, Dilly and Cadell appear to have returned the compliment when they called the next reprint of the cheaper edition after the seventh, the ninth.

The cheaper series sold much more briskly than the more expensive one. An advertisement appearing in the seventh edition in the more expensive series is dated 6 May 1776; on the 14th of the same month Price was writing to John Winthrop to say that the eleventh edition had appeared (MS. American Philosophical Society). This '11th edition' was a partly re-set re-issue of the second cheap version which had been published by Cadell and Johnson with the designation 'new edition'. As far as we know no eighth edition in the more expensive series appeared before 1778 when it was incorporated in Two tracts; in the meantime the thirteenth edition in the cheaper series had already appeared.

The last edition in the more expensive series known to us is in fact that incorporated in Two tracts. We should be glad to have the details of any later editions in this series; we should also be glad to learn of editions in the cheaper series that we have been unable to locate, namely the eighth, tenth, and twelfth editions. Should copies of the eighth and tenth in the cheaper series turn up, we would, of course, have to revise the publishing history sketched above.

The bibliography of Two tracts is also complicated, but for rather different reasons. The work is a re-issue of the two earlier pamphlets and their supplements together with a General Introduction and various additions. To help the purchaser who had already bought a copy or copies of early editions of the pamphlets, these supplements and additional material were published and could be purchased separately. This appears to have been Price's usual practice (cf. items 11i, 11j, 13d, 22c, 26b, 34f, 34g). What complicates the bibliographer's task is the fact that publisher, booksellers, and individual owners bound up different combinations of these various elements - pamphlets, supplements, introductions, additions - to suit their own convenience. The work is therefore to be found in several different forms. To assist the reader to identify and analyse the copies known to him we have given the pagination of the different compilations we have seen. Copies of Two tracts are not uncommon, but because of the number of variants we give no locations. We would, however, be glad to be informed of extant copies and have details of their collations whether these agree with or differ from the collations given by us.

We have included in the checklist Price's contributions to the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Some of these (3, 4, 7) we have also found as independent publications with their

own pagination and title-pages, though in the same setting of type as in the Transactions. We should like to locate copies of any of his other Royal Society papers extant as separate publications.

In an entry in his shorthand journal for 25 May 1790 (MS. National Library of Wales) Price noted that he had been informed by letter from Paris that his A discourse on the love of our country 'had gone through five editions there'. We have details of two French editions (34i and 34h) only, and we should be glad to have further information about any others still extant.

There is no edited collection of the whole of Price's works. An apparent exception is a ten volume compilation of different editions of Price's works which was put together possibly by William Morgan under a title page printed in 1816. As far as we know there is only one copy of this compilation, and this is held by the British Library.

To date the only published selection containing more than one of Price's works is Professor Bernard Peach's excellent edition of the pamphlets concerning the American War of Independence, Richard Price and the ethical foundations of the American revolution (Duke University Press, 1979). This work includes selections from Two tracts, Observations on the importance of the American révolution and A sermon delivered to a congregation of Protestant dissenters at Hackney (1779) together with extracts from works written in reply to these pamphlets and from Price's correspondence.

Checklist:	<u>Guide to Abbreviations for Locations.</u>
A	The National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.
B	University College of North Wales Library, Bangor.
Be	Queen's University Library, Belfast.
Bi	University of Birmingham Library.
BiP	Birmingham Public Library.
Bo	Boston (Mass.) Public Library.
Br	University of Bristol Library.
BrC	Avon County Library, Bristol.
Bru	Bibliothèque Royale Albert I <sup>er</sup> , Brussels.
C	Cambridge University Library.
CC	Gonville and Caius College Library, Cambridge.
CK	King's College Library, Cambridge.
Cd	University College Library, Cardiff.
Co	New Hampshire State Library, Concord.
D	Trinity College Library, Dublin.
DA	Royal Irish Academy, Dublin.
E	The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
F	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence.
G	Glasgow University Library.
L	The British Library, London.
LG	Guildhall Library, London.
LU	University of London Library.
LW	Dr. Williams's Library, London.
La	St. David's University College Library, Lampeter.
Le	Leeds University Library.
Li	Liverpool University Library.
M	John Rylands University Library of Manchester.
MP	Manchester Public Libraries.
N	University Library, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
NYP	New York Public Library.
O	Bodleian Library, Oxford.
OAS	Codrington Library, All Souls College, Oxford.
P	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
S	University College of Swansea Library.
Y	University of York Library.

Instead of listing individual holdings of Libraries in the United States we have quoted the National Union Catalogue number for every item found therein. We have however listed a few American locations for items not found in N.U.C.

We have not given locations for twentieth century editions or for periodical articles.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations.
1a	A review of the principal questions and difficulties in morals viii, 486, [2] p.		London	Millar	1758	A;Br;Cd;D; G;L;LW;O;P; NP 0574322.
1b	do. viii, 462p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1769	A;C;CK;G; L;LW;O; NP 0574324.
1c <sup>1</sup>	A review of the principal questions vii, 502, 3p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1787	A;Be;Bi;C; Cd;D;G;L; LW;O; NP 0574326.
1c <sup>2</sup>	do.		New York	B. Franklin	1974	
1d <sup>1</sup>	do. ed. D. D. Raphael xlvii, 301p.		Oxford	Clarendon	1948	NP 0574328.
1d <sup>2</sup>	do.		Oxford	Clarendon	1974.	
2a	Britain's happiness and the proper improvement of it. 24p.		London	Millar	1759	C;Cd;L; NP 0574214.
2b	Britain's happiness and its full possession of civil and religious liberty. 20p.		London	Rivington	1791	A;Cd;L;O; NP 0574213
2c	do. 21p.	2nd	London	Rivington	1791	Cd.
2d	do. 16p.		[s.l.]	[s.n.]	1791	NP 0574212

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher of Printer	Date	Locations.
3a <sup>1</sup>	[An essay in the doctrine of chances] A method of calculating the exact probability of all conclusions founded on induction. 51p.		London		1764	Cd.
3a <sup>2</sup>	(In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LIII, p.370).		London	Royal Society	1764	
3b	G. A. Barnard, 'Thomas Bayes's essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances', <u>Biometrika</u> , XLV (1958), 293-315.)		London		1958	
4 <sup>1</sup>	[An essay in the doctrine of chances] A supplement to the essay on a method of calculating the exact probability of all conclusions founded on induction. 32p.		London		1765	Bi;Cd; NP 0574345.
4 <sup>2</sup>	A demonstration of the second rule in the essay towards the solution of a problem in the doctrine of chances (In <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LIV, p.296-325)		London	Royal Society	1765	
5	The nature and dignity of the human soul [2], 29p.		London	Millar	1766	C;Cd;L;La;O; NP 0574255.



No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
6a	Four dissertations vii, 439p.		London	Millar and Cadell	1767	A;Cd;D;L; LU;M;S; NP 0574237.
6b	do. viii, 464p.	2nd	London	Millar and Cadell	1768	A;C;Cd;L;O; NP 0574238.
6c	do viii, 464p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1772	A;Be;Bi;Cd;L; NP 0574241.
6d	do. viii, 464p.	4th	London	Cadell	1777	A;Cd;G;L; NP 0574242.
6e	do. vii, 303p.	5th	Harlow	B. Flower for M. Jones	1811	Be;Cd; NP 0574243.
6f	On the reasons for expecting that virtuous men shall meet after death 27p.		London	'Printed in year'	1798	C;Cd;L;LG;LW.
6g	do. (In: <u>Sermons and extracts consolatory on the loss of friends</u> )		London	Hatchard	1819	L.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
6h	The nature, reasonableness and efficacy of prayer 20p		Philad- elphia	Fry	1820	NP 0574256.
6i	Vier verhandelingen [6], 328p.		Harlingen	Van der Plaats	1768	NP 0574350.
6j	Essai sur la Providence vij [i.e.] vi, 116p.		Yverdon	Société Littéraire et Typogra- phique	1776	L;P;F.
7a <sup>1</sup>	Observations on the expectations of lives 39p.		London	Bowyer and Nichols	1769	Cd;L;LU; NP 0574266.
7a <sup>2</sup>	do. (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> LIX, p.89-125.)		London	for Lockyer Davis	1770	
7b	do. (In: <u>The papers of Benjamin Franklin</u> XVI, 81-107.)		New Haven	Yale U.P.	1972	
8	The vanity, misery and infamy of knowledge without suitable practice 31p.		London	Buckland	1770	A;C;Cd;L; LG;LW;MP. NP 0574349.
9.	Observations on the proper method of calculating the value of reversions (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LX, p.268-276)		London	for Lockyer Davis	1770	

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
10a	On the effect of the aberration of light on the time of a transit of Venus. (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LX, p.536-540)		London	for Lockyer Davis	1770	
10b	do. In: <u>The papers of Benjamin Franklin</u> XVII, 304-7.)		New Haven	Yale U.P.		
11a	Observations on reversionary payments xvi, 344p.		London	Cadell	1771	A;Cd;L;LU; Li;O;S; NP 0574257.
11b	do. xv, 404p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1772	Bi;C;Cd;E;G; L;LU;O;P; NP 0574260.
11c	do xv, 334p.	'3rd'	Dublin	Williams	1772	D;P;Y; NP 0574258.
11d	do xl, 431p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1773	A;Cd;L;LG; LU;LW;P; NP 0574261.
11e	do. 2v.	4th	London	Cadell	1783	CC;Cd;D;G; L;LU;LW;P; NP 0574262.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
11f	do. ed. William Morgan 2v.	5th	London	Cadell	1792	A;C;Cd; E;LU;LW; O;S; NP 0574263.
11g	do. 2v.	6th	London	Cadell and Davies	1803	B;C;Cd;E;G; L;LU;S; NP 0574264.
11h	do. 2v.	7th	London	Cadell and Davies	1812	Cd;D;LU;P; NP 0574265.
11i	Supplement to the second edition of the treatise on reversionary payments. 62p.		London	Cadell	1772	Bi;Be;L;LU; LW; NP 0574346.
11j	A preface to the third edition of the treatise on reversionary payments. 43p.		London	Cadell	1773	L;LU; NP 0574320.
11k	Questions relating to schemes for granting reversionary annuities		Dublin	McKenzie	[1784]	DA.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
111	Vom öffentlichen Credit und Nationalschulden (In: Sammlungen zur Geschichte und Staatswissenschaft hrsg. von V. A. Heinze, Bd.I)		Göttingen	Bandenhof und Ruprecht	1789	L.
12	A letter from the Rev. Dr. Webster ....and Dr. Price's answer. 35p.		Edinburgh	Murray and Cochrane	1771	LU;MP, NW 0138322
13a	An appeal to the public on the subject of the National Debt [4] 52p.		London	Cadell	1772	Br;C;L; LU;LW;O;P; NP 0574207.
13b <sup>1</sup>	do. vi, [i] , 97p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1772	Cd;Be;Bi;L; LU;LW;La;P; NP 0574208.
13b <sup>2</sup>	do. xvi, 97p.	New	London	Cadell	1774	A;E;L;LU; NYP.
13c	do. (In:MacCulloch, J. R.: <u>Select collection of ... tracts ...</u> )p.301-358		London	[Harrison]	1857	
13d	Additional preface to a pamphlet entitled. An appeal to the public [2] , 5-12p.		London	Cadell	1774	L;LU; NP 0574203.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
14	Farther proof of the insalubrity of marshy situations (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> LXIV pt. I p.96-98)		London	for Lockyer Davis	1774	
15	Calculations and observations relating to the scheme of the Laudable Society for the benefit of widows. 8p.		[London]		[1774]	L.
16.	Observations on the difference between the duration of human life in towns and in country parishes... (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LXV, pt.I, p.424-445)		London	by Bowyer Nichols for Lockyer Davis	1775	
17.	Short and easy theorems for finding in all cases the differences between the values of annuities payable yearly and...half-yearly, quarterly or monthly (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LXVI., Pt.1, p.109-128.		London	by Bowyer and Nichols for Lockyer Davis	1776	
18a <sup>1</sup>	Observations on the nature of civil liberty [ 8 ] , 128p.		London	T.Cadell	1776	A;C;L;LU; Le;P; NP 0574282.
18a <sup>2</sup>	do. [8 ], 128p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1776	A;Bi;Br;C;Cd; DA;L;Le;M; MP;O; NP 0574291.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
18a <sup>3</sup>	Observations on the nature of civil liberty [8], 128p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1776	A;C;Cd;D;L; LG;LU;MP;N; P; NP 0574292.
18a <sup>4</sup>	do. [8] 128p.	4th	London	Cadell	1776	C;Cd;L;P; NP 0574293.
18a <sup>5</sup>	do. [8] 132p.	5th	London	Cadell	1776	A;Cd;L;LU;P; NP 0574294.
18a <sup>6</sup>	do. [8] 132p.	6th	London	Cadell	1776	A;Be;Br;C; CC;Cd;L;LW; Le;O;P; NP 0574296
18a <sup>7</sup>	do. [8] 134p.	7th	London	Cadell	1776	A;C;G; NP 0574297.
18a <sup>8</sup>	do. [6] 112p.	8th	London	Cadell		[see prefatory note]
18b <sup>1</sup>	do. 48p.		London	'Printed in the year'	1776	P.
18b <sup>2</sup>	do. 48p.	'6th'	London	Dilly and Cadell	1776	C;L;P; NP 0574295.
18b <sup>3</sup>	do. 48p.	'7th'	London	Dilly and Cadell	1776	L;G;LW; NP 0574298.
18b <sup>4</sup>	do. 48p.	'9th'	London	Dilly and Cadell	1776	A;C;Cd;L;OAS; NP 0574301.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
18c <sup>1</sup>	Observations on the nature of civil liberty [2] 76p.	New	London	Cadell and Johnson	1776	Cd;L;LW; NP 0574288.
18c <sup>2</sup>	do. 71p	11th	London	Cadell, Dilly and Johnson	1776	A;BrC;Cd;L; NP 0574302.
18c <sup>3</sup>	do.	13th	London	Cadell, Dilly and Johnson	1776	NP 0574303.
18d	do. [8], 180p.		Dublin	J.Exshaw	1776	Bi;Be;C;D;L; M;O;P; NP 0574284.
18e	do. xii, 179p.	'8th'	Dublin	W.Kidd for J.Exshaw	1776	A;Be;O; NP 0574299.
18f	do. [7], 94p.	'8th'	Edin- burgh	J.Wood and J.Dickson	1776	L;LG;LU;O; NP 0574300.
18g	do. 71p.		Boston	T. and J. Fleet	1776	A;L; NP 0574280.
18h	do. [8] 104p.		Charles- Town	D.Bruce	1776	NP 0574281
18i	do. 107p.		New York	S.Loudon	1776	L; NP 0574306.



No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
18j <sup>1</sup>	Observations on the nature of civil liberty. 61 [i.e.71], p.		Phila- delphia	J.Dunlap	[1776]	L; NP 0574307.
18j <sup>2</sup>	do. 71p.		Phila- delphia	J.Dunlap	1776	C;O; NP 0574308.
18k	do. 12p..		[London]	Friends of Liberty	[1795?]	LU.
18l	do. 16p.		London	T.Dolby (&c)	1817	Br;Cd;E; NP 0574311
18m	A just and impartial review of the funds of England, pp.41-50. (In: J.Horne Tooke: <u>The causes and effects of the National Debt...</u> )		London	Sherwood, Neely and Jones	1818	C;L;LU; NP 0270038.
18n	Aanmerkingen over den aart der burgerlyke vryheid		Leyden	L.Herdingh	1776	NP 0574193.
18o	do. 18,[2],110,25,2p.	2de	Leyden	L.Herdingh	1777	P; NP 0574195.
18p	Observations sur la nature de la liberté civile [6], 148p.		Rotterdam	Hofhout & Wolfsbergen	1776	Le;Bru; NP 0574315

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
18q	Anmerkungen über die Natur der bürgerlichen Freyheit (In: Remer, J.A.: Amerikanisches Archiv, 1.Bd.)		Braun- schweig		1777	NP 0574205.
18r	Anmerkungen über die Natur der politischen Freyheit (In:Ebeling, Ch.D.: <u>Amerikanische Bibliothek</u> )		Leipzig		1777	NP 0574206.
19a <sup>1</sup>	Additional observations on the nature and value of civil liberty xvi, 176p.		London	Cadell	1777	A;C;L;Li; N;O; NP 0574197.
19a <sup>2</sup>	do. xvi, 176p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1777	A;B;Br;C;D; L;LU;P; NP 0574200.
19a <sup>3</sup>	do. xxi, (i), 176p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1777	L;LU; NP 0574201.
19b	do. xxiii, 260 [i.e. 236] p.		Dublin	W.White- stone [&c.]	1777	C;D;L;LW; NP 0574196
19c	do. x, 122p.		Phila- delphia	Hall and Sellers	1778	C;O; NP 0574202.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
19d	Nadere aanmerkingen over den aart en de waarde der burgerlyke vryheid 58, 106, [2]p.		Leyden	L.Herdingh	1777	P; NYP.
20a <sup>1</sup>	Two tracts on civil liberty [3], xxvi, [6] 112; xvi, 216p.		London	Cadell	1778	[See prefatory note]
20a <sup>2</sup>	do. [3], xxvi [6]112; xiv, 216, 8p.		London	Cadell	1778	
20a <sup>3</sup>	do. [3]xxvi [6] 112; xxii, 216p.		London	Cadell	1778	
20a <sup>4</sup>	do. [3] xxx, [6] 112; xxii, 216p.		London	Cadell	1778	
20b <sup>1</sup>	The general introduction and supplement to the two tracts pp.xxvi, 181-216.		London	Cadell	1778	L;O;OAS;N;
20b <sup>2</sup>	do. pp.xxxii, 36	2nd	London	Cadell	1778	Br;Le;
20c	do. [1],xiv,[1]p.		Phil- adelphia	Hall and Sellers	1778	C;O; NP 0574250.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
21	A free discussion of the doctrines of materialism, and philosophical necessity xliv, [1] , 428, [4]p.		London	J. Johnson	1778	A; Be; Bi; Br; C; D; G; L; Le; LW; S; NP 0574244.
22a	A sermon delivered to a congregation of protestant dissenters at Hackney on the 10th of February. [3] , 35 [1] p.		London	Cadell	1779	B; Bi; C; Cd; E; L; S; NP 0574330.
22b <sup>1</sup>	do. [3] , 45p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1779	A; Bi; Cd; L; NP 0574331.
22b <sup>2</sup>	do. [3] , 45p.	3rd	London	Cadell	1779	NP 0574332.
22c	Postscript to Dr. Price's sermon on the Fast-day 8p.		[ London ]	[ Cadell ]	[ 1779 ]	
23a	Essay on the population An essay on the present state of population in England and Wales (In <u>The doctrine of annuities...</u> by William Morgan) pp. 275-310.		London	Cadell	1779	A; C; G; L; LU; N; P; NM 0777846.
23b	An essay on the population of England. v, [1], 82p.		London	Cadell	1780	A; B; C; Cd; D; L; LU; P; NP 0574228.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
23c.	An essay on the population of England vi, 88p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1780	A;Bi;Br;C; Cd;E;L;LW; Li; NP 0574229.
24 <sup>1</sup>	Facts: addressed to the landholders... 117p.		London	Johnson	[1780]	C;L;M;O; NT 0270051
24 <sup>2</sup>	do.	2nd	London	Johnson	[1780]	C;LU; NT 0270053.
24 <sup>3</sup>	do.	3rd	London	Johnson	[1780]	C;L;LU;M; NT 0270054.
24 <sup>4</sup>	do.	4th	London	Johnson	[1780]	C;L;LU; NT 0270055.
24 <sup>5</sup>	do.	5th	London	Johnson	1780	L;LU;O; NT 0270056.
24 <sup>6</sup>	do.	6th	London	Johnson	1780	G; NT 0270057.
24 <sup>7</sup>	do.	7th	London	Johnson	1780	L; NT 0270058.
24 <sup>8</sup>	do.	8th	London	Johnson	1780	C;L; NT 0270059.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
25	A discourse addressed to a congregation at Hackney, on February 21, 1781 [3], 39p.		London	Cadell	1781	Bi;C;Cd; L;LW; NP 05/4217
26a <sup>1</sup>	The state of the public debts and finances at signing the preliminary articles of peace [3] 36p.		London	Cadell	1783	B;Bi;C;L; La;O; NP 0574334.
26a <sup>2</sup>	do.	2nd	London	Cadell	1783	A;Bi;Br;L;
26b	Postscript to a pamphlet by Dr. Price on the state of the public debts and finances. [1]16p.		London	Cadell	1784	A;Br;L; NP 0574318.
26c	Etat des dettes publiques... (In:Hocquart de Coubron, <u>Vues d'un citoyen sur la distribution des dettes de l'etat...</u> ) viii, 6lp. 1 tab		La Haye		1783	P; NH 0420217
27a	[Letter to Col. Sharman] (In: <u>Proceedings relative to the Ulster Assembly of Volunteer Delegates</u> ) pp.26-32.		Belfast	Henry and Robert Joy	1783	C;

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
27b	[Letter to Col. Sharman] (In: <u>A collection of the letters which have been addressed to the Volunteers of Ireland.</u> ) pp. 80-83.		London	Pr. for J. Stockdale	1783	C; L; NE 0051033
28a <sup>1</sup>	Observations on the importance of the American revolution [2], 85p.		London		1784	L;
28a <sup>2</sup>	do. [2], 110p.		London		1784	C; NP 0574267.
28b	do. 87 [1] p.		Boston	Powars and Willis	1784	A; NP 0574268.
28c	do. viii, 156p.		London	Cadell	1785	A; Br C; C; Cd; E; L; LU; LW; O; NP 0574271.
28d	Observations on the importance of the American revolution viii, 156p.		Dublin	L. White W. White- stone [and others]	1785	A; Cd; D; E; L; NP 0574269.
28e	do.		New- Haven	Meige [etc.]	1785	NYP.
28f	do. [1], 60, [1] p.		Phil- adelphia	M. Carey for Spotswood and Rice, and T. Seddon.	1785	Br.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
28g	Observations on the importance of the American revolution	2nd	Phila- delphia	M.Carey for W.Spotswood J. Rice and T. Seddon	1785	NP 0574274.
28h	do.		Trenton	Collins	1785	NP 0574275.
28i	do.		Richmond Va.		[1786?]	
28j	do. 80p.		Amherst	J.Cushing	1805	Co.
28k	do. 40p.		Boston	True & Rowe	1812	NP 0574276.
28l	do. 36p.		Boston	True & Rowe	1818	L; NP 0574277.
28m	do. 36p.		Boston	True & Weston	1820	L; NP 0574278
28n	An abstract of Dr. Price's Observations on the importance of the American revolution (In:Mirabeau, H. G. Riqueti comte de: <u>Considerations on the Order of Cincinnatus</u> ) pp.163-180.		London	Johnson	1785	BC; NP 0574342



No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
28o	Reflections on the Observations on the importance of the American revolution...Trans. from the French of...Mirabeau	new	Phila- delphia	Seddon, Spotswood	1786	A; NP 0574192.
28p	Aanmerkingen over de gewigtigheid der staatsomwenteling in Noord-Amerika viii, 149p.		Amster- dam	Johannes Weppelman	1785	NP 0574192.
28q	Observations sur l'importance de la révolution de l'Amérique. (In: Mirabeau H. G. Riqueti, comte de: <u>Considérations sur l'ordre de Cincinnatus</u> ) p.217-313.		Londres	Johnson	1784	L; NM 0630046. NP 0574313.
28r	do.		Londres Rotter- dam	Johnson C. R. Hake	1788	Le;L; NM 0630048. NP 0574314.
29	Postscript [to George Cadogan Morgan's 'Observations on the light of bodies in a state of combustion'] <u>In: Philosophical transactions</u> , LXXV , pt. 1,p.211)		London		1786	
30	[Letter introducing Dr. Clarke's 'Observations on some causes of the excess of mortality of males above that of females' (In: <u>Philosophical transactions</u> , LXXVI, pt.2, p.349)		London		1786	

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
31	[Prefatory letter to] A statute of Virginia				1786	L.
32a	Sermons on the Christian doctrine as received by the different denominations of Christians... [ 3], vii[1], 368p.		London	Cadell	1787	A;Bi;Cd; G;L;O; NP 0574337.
32b	do. vii, 396, 4p.	2nd	London	Cadell	1787	A;C;L;LW;
32c	do.		Dublin	Exshaw	1787	NP 0574336.
32d	Sermons on the security and happiness of a virtuous course 222p.		Phila- delphia	Dobson	1788	NP 0574339.
32e	Sermons by R. Price and J.Priestley [ 8 ], 214 [ i.e., 216 ] p.		London	Unitarian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge	1791	BiU;C;MP; NP 0574333
32f	Sermons on the security and happiness...To which are added Sermons on the Christian doctrine		Boston	E.W.Weld & W.Greenough for J.West	1794	NP 0574340.
32g	Sermons by R.Price and J.Priestley 8 216p.		London	J.Davis	1800	OCC;B;O;LG;
32h	Sermons on the Christian doctrine as held by all Christians pp.143-164 [We have not seen this item. It would appear to be extracted from 32p.]		Boston	Munroe & Francis	1813	Bo.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
32i	Sermons on the Christian doctrine as held by all Christians [3], 210, [2]p.		Hackney	C.Stower for J.Johnson and D.Eaton	1814	Cd;LG;BiP; NP 0574334.
32j	Sermons on the Christian doctrine 120p.		Boston	Weils & Lilly	1815	NP 0574338.
32k	do. xvi, [2] , 178p.		Belfast	Pr. by Finlay; sold by S. Archer &c.	1819	Cd.
32l	Sermons by R. Price and J.Priestley 222p.		London	British & Foreign Unitarian Association	1830	L.
32m	Sermon (In Unitarian tracts, IX)		London		1836	NP 0574335.
32n	Sermon on the Christian doctrine (In BONNET, C.H.: <u>Interesting views of christianity</u> vii,246p.		London			NB 0633569.
32o	do. 274p.		Dublin	P.Byrne	1789	NB 0633570
32p	do. [iii]-vii,[7]-164p.		Boston	Bradford & Read	1813	NB 0633571
32q	do. [iii]-vii,[7]-164p.		Boston	Bradford & Read	1818	NB 0633572.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Location
33	The evidence for a future period of improvement in the state of mankind [3] , 56 [1]p.		London	H. Goldney for Cadell and Johnson	1787	A; Bi; C; Cd; L; LG; LU; LW; NP 0574232.
34a <sup>1</sup>	A discourse on the love of our country [3], 51, 13, [2] p.		London	George Stafford for T. Cadell	1789	C; Cd; L; NP 0574218.
34a <sup>2</sup>	do. [3], 51, 13, [2]p.	2nd	London	Stafford for Cadell	1789	C; G; L; LU; LW; Li; O; NP 0574219.
34b	do. [3], 51, [1], 34, [2]p.	3rd	London	Stafford for Cadell	1790	A; B; Bi; BrC; C; L; LU; O; NP 0574224.
34c <sup>1</sup>	do. xii, 51, 44p.	4th	London	Stafford for Cadell	1790	Bi; C; O; NP 0574225.
34c <sup>2</sup>	do. x, 51, 44p.	5th	London	Stafford for Cadell	1790	A; C; CK; L; NP 0574226.
34c <sup>3</sup>	do. x, 51, 44p.	6th	London	Stafford for Cadell	1790	A; Br; C; Cd; E; G; O; NP 0574227.
34d	do. [1], 42, 6p.		London		1790	A;
34e	do.		Boston	Powars	1790	NP 0574222.

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
34f <sup>1</sup>	Additions to Dr. Price's discourse on the love of our country. 24p.		[London]	[Cadell]	[1790]	A;L;LU;
34f <sup>2</sup>	do. 24p		[London]	[Cadell]	[1790]	L;O;
34g	Preface and additions to the discourse on the love of our country x, 35 - 44p.		[London]	[Cadell]	[1790]	A;O; NP 0574319.
34h	Discours sur l'amour de la patrie 72p.		Paris	Prault	1790	P; NP 0574216
34i	do.		Paris			P.
34j	Tre lettere apologetiche		Venezia	Tosi	1791	O.
35a	[Three plans communicated to Mr. Pitt] (In: MORGAN, W. <u>A review of Dr. Price's writings on the finances</u> )		London	Cadell	1792	N.
35b	do. pp.24-34.	2nd	London	Cadell	1795	A;MP;N;O.
36	Sermons on various subjects xii, 404p.		London	Longman, Hurst, &c	1816	A;Bi;BiP; C;E;L;O; NP 0571341

No.	Title	Ed.	Place	Publisher or Printer	Date	Locations
37	Extracts from sermons (In <u>CHRISTIE, A., The Holy Scriptures the only rule of Faith</u> )		Montrose	Buchanan	1790	L.
38a	Letters to and from Dr. Price 119p.		Cambridge	John Wilson University Press	1903	NP 0574253.

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